In the wake of ISIS’ decline in Syria and Iraq, the African Union warned in December 2017 that some 6,000 (former) ISIS fighters could return to the continent. This warning comes at a time when counterterrorism (CT) in Africa is starting to yield some positive dividends, especially in Western Africa. In the Lake Chad Basin Area, the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin have succeeded in dispersing Boko Haram factions, and in putting the Islamist militants on the defensive. In the Sahel-Sahara, the G5-Sahel Joint Force, a regional response initiative made up of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, and buoyed by some 4,000 French troops and a plethora of security actors have unsettled the region’s various Islamist groups. In each of these cases, extremist groups have lost significant territorial and ideological control, and have resorted to sporadic attacks organised with little coordination. Returning ISIS fighters might however complicate and or reverse these CT efforts. This presentation looks at the ways in which ISIS’ decline and returning fighters may impact CT and de-radicalisation in Western Africa. It also provides some countermeasures for consideration by policy makers.

1. The Decline of ISIS and
Counter-extremism in
Africa
Muhammad Dan Suleiman
University of Western Australia
muhammad.suleiman@research.uwa.edu.au
CMSS Conference | Friday, 4 May 2018

2. How might the decline of ISIS impact radicalisation and
de-radicalisation in West Africa? And what CE responses
are required in the face of ISIS’ decline?
Extremist movements usually thrive:
1. Deep-seated local grievances
2. Conditions of political instability for their start
3. Where there are conditions for their growth, and
4. Where there are conditions for their sustenance

3. On Political Instability

4. Boko Haram in the LCBA
 Started in Nigeria in 2002 (non-violent) and but became violent in 2009
 Expanded and threatens Niger, Chad and Cameroon since 2013/2014
 Links to AQIM, ISIS (Islamic State West Africa Province since April 2015)
 Deadliest terrorist organisation globally in 2015, followed by ISIS (GTI, 2015).
 Claims of defeat by the Buhari administration. But…the Feb 19, 2018 abduction 110 school girls in
Dapchi, Yobe State?

 But BH is truly on the back foot; due to efforts by MNJTF, internal divisions, sporadic attacks etc.

5. The Sahel – A tale of many ‘Jihads’
 A myriad of terror cells and
groups operate there
 Proximity to North Africa, as
well to the broader Middle
East
 Size and “absent” borders
 Historical routes
 Poverty/quest for survival

6. The LCBA and the Sahel
 Political ineptitude of governments and official corruption
 Gadhafi’s overthrow and geopolitical vacuum
 The role of NATO’s intervention in 2011
 The ‘jihad’ is traveling south in Mali
 “The 2012 conflict and the collapse of state authority has led to the formation of
practical alliances between non- state armed groups (MNLA, Movement for
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa [MOJWA], and Ansar Dine) and some ethnic
communities [in southern Mali].” (Diallo 2017, p. 300).

7. Conditions for the growth of Extremism
 All the conditions proven to cause the growth of extremism found in West Africa.
 West Africa is the “heartland of black Africa’s Islam.” (Ali Mazrui)
 Home to around 20% of global Islamic population (an estimate based 15% in
1986)
 Demographics cross-pollinate with poverty, ignorance to provide a recruitment
pool

8. Conditions for sustaining extremism
movements
 Proximity to Middle East and North Africa and on the arc of instability
(Afghanistan to Mali)
 Ungoverned spaces and “absent” borders
 The borderline between Maghrebian Africa — the region with the highest ISIS
activity — and sub-Saharan Africa.
 Traditional entry point for extremist elements from the Middle East into Africa

9. Meaning of ISIS’ Decline for CE in West Africa
 “the 2015 pledging of allegiance to ISIS by Boko Haram and the subsequent
announcement of Boko Haram as a “province” of…[ISIS]…may be understood as a
desperate attempt by Boko Haram to win the support and solidarity of a more
globally powerful EEG [external ethno-guarantor] in the Middle East in the face of
mounting pressure and potential annihilation by Nigerian and sub-regional security
forces.” (Dan Suleiman, 2017)
 ISIS’ decline denies extremists in WA the geopolitical-ideological solidarity of a big
brother in ‘the Jihad’ in the Middle East.
 ISIS, like extremist groups in WA, is disrupted and dispersed, not defeated.
 The challenge for CT in West Africa is how to sustain and improve the small CT
dividends.

10. Meaning of ISIS’ Decline for CE in West Africa,
cont’d
 Reservations over the accuracy of the 6,000 figure; stops short of crucial details
 Any number of ISIS returnee fighters will complicate CT efforts in region
 Extremist movements do not need territorial control to attacks and threaten
 Dispersed ISIS more dangerous than territory-controlling ISIS
 Resolve to assert continuing global relevance
 ISIS returnees will likely remain and operate in/from North Africa, strategically.

11. 6,000 ISIS Fighters: a deadly reinforcement?
 The future of ‘the Jihad’ in post-ISIS West Africa will be determined by 4 factors:
Pre-existing structural regional limitations
The policy responses of governments in the region
The normative challenges posed by external actors
• E.g. France
The strategy of extremist groups going forward

12. ISIS and the future of CE in (W) Africa
 Africa may provide a location for the organisation to regroup, with Maghrebian Africa
as the next potential ISIS heartland, alongside its original territories in Iraq/Syria and
Afghanistan
 ISIS may fully adopt the dispersal strategy of the organisation from which it evolved, al
Qaeda.
 ISIS returnees may serve as kernels to breathe life into African terrorist groups.
 ISIS may also exploit the many vulnerabilities and uncertainties of the Sahel-Sahara in
ways difficult to predict.

13. Response Options?
 Understand extremism and radicalisation
 “And in general, there isn’t enough understanding around this issue of radicalization
and violent extremism. State agencies often are so good at combat missions or at
combat operations.” Mutaru Mumuni Mukhtar, Executive Director, WACCE, Ghana
 How much do security officers and policy makers know about radicalisation and de-
radicalisation?
 Youth Empowerment (education, employment engagement etc.)
 Civic education of society – in socio-cultural and political spaces
 My story: “No, I look like Jesus. Was Jesus Christ, apart from being white, a terrorist as
well?”

14. Response Options Respond?
 Develop a counter-Ideology that reaches the lowest spheres of society
 Involve so-called “Salafists” and “Wahhabists” -- a jihad against ‘the jihad’
 Security actors must change the narrative around extremism
 “…sometimes too let’s listen to the voices of Boko Haram. If I say so it is as if I am
supporting Boko Haram. Why are Boko Haram people saying western civilization is sin?
What is western civilization?... There are some things they say that are correct.” Prof.
Yuroms, National Defence College, Nigeria.
 Utilise (former) extremist militants to fight active one