By the 16th century, four Moro states were established, asserting their independence from the Philippines, which was acknowledged during the Spanish-American War. The Bates Treaty, signed in 1899, recognized the Sulu Sultanate's sovereignty, but its abrogation in 1904 led to the Moro-U.S. War until 1913, and a series of peace agreements followed, including the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Ongoing disputes over territorial and resource management issues persist between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine government, complicating the implementation of various agreements aimed at achieving autonomy for Bangsamoro regions.

1. MORO
HOMELAND

2. 16TH
CENTURY MORO
STATES
By the 16th Century, four Moro states
already existed:
1. Sultanate of Sulu;
2. Sultanate of Maguindanao;
3. Buayan Sultanate; and
4. Apat na Pangampong in Lanao

3. During the Spanish-American War
of 1898, all three competing powers -
Aquinaldo's revolutionary government,
the Kingdom of Spain, and the U.S.
government acknowledged that the
Moros were not part of the Philippines.

4. During the peace negotiations conducted
between Madrid and Washington to
formally terminate the war and resolve
colonial issues, Spain - contrary to
earlier pronouncements - officially
declared that Moroland, Basilan,
Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu
archipelago, was not part of her colony
of the Philippines.

5. The Moros were independent of the
Philippines so bilateral treaties were to
be negotiated especially with the
Sultanate of Sulu. A commercial treaty
had already existed between the U.S. and
Sulu since 1842.

6. The result was the Bates Treaty.
Negotiated between two, equal,
sovereign states - the United States and
the Sultanate of Sulu - the treaty was
signed on August 20, 1899. This was
eight months after the Treaty of Paris
had been signed ending the Spanish-
American War.
.

7. BATES TREATY
Washington officially acknowledged that
the Moros were not part of the
Philippines and specifically guaranteed
to respect the identity and the integrity of
the Sulu Sultanate. In return, the sultan
recognized U.S. sovereignty

8. MORO-US WAR AFTER BATES
TREATY ABROGATION
March 21, 1904, the U.S. government
unilaterally, and illegally, abrogated the
Bates Treaty and provoked a MORO-US
war which lasted until 1913.

9. Notable Pockets of War were: the
Panglimas Hasan and Maharadja Andung
in Sulu, the Datus of Maciu, Binidayan,
and Taraca in Lanao, Mindanao, the Datu
Ali in Cotabato, Mindanao, and the
leaders of the Footmen Uprising in
Palawan.

10. MORO PROVINCE
June 1, 1903
Moro Province consisting of all of the
territory of the Philippines lying south of
the eight parallel of latitude, excepting
the island of Palawan and the eastern
portion of the northwest peninsula of
Mindanao, which includes current
provinces/regions of Zamboanga, Lanao,
Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu.

11. MORO PROVINCE
MISAMIS
SURIGAO
AGUSAN
MINDANAO-SULU
1903-1913
SPECIAL: Moro; Agusan
REGULAR: Misamis; Surigao

12. SEAL OF GOVERNMENT OF
MORO PROVINCE

13. COAT OF ARMS OF MINDANAO AND
SULU 1914-1920
EAL OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MORO PROVINCE

14. FILIPINO COLONIZATION
In 1935, the Commonwealth of
the Philippines was formally
established. Under the Quezon
administration an escalation of
Filipino colonization of Bangsa
Moro homeland commenced.

15. President Quezon's address to the First
National Assembly on June 16, 1936
states that. . .
“the time has come when we should
systematically proceed with and bring
about the colonization and economic
development of Mindanao..”

16. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
OF MINDANAO AND SULU
May 1, 1968, the provincial governor of
Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam, made a
dramatic move. He issued the Mindanao
Independence Movement (MIM)
manifesto calling for the independence
of Mindanao and Sulu to be known and
referred to as the Republic of Mindanao
and Sulu.

17. DECOLONIZATION
STRUGGLE
THE FOUNDING OF THE MORO
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN 1969
BY YOUNG MILITANT MUSLIM
STUDENTS, POLITICAL LEADERS AND
THE MORO GRASSROOTS SIGNALLED
THE POLITICAL AND ARMED STRUGGLE
TO DECOLONIZE THE MORO
HOMELAND FROM THE PHILIPPINE
“NEO-COLONIAL RULE”

18. 1976 TRIPOLI
AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION FOR SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES.

19. 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
1. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
2. THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT;
3. WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COMMISSION
MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

20. TERRITORY
Provinces: Tawi Tawi, Sulu, Basilan,
Palawan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga
del Norte, Sibugay, Lanao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
North Cotabato, South Cotabato,
Sarangani Province, Davao del Sur
Cities: Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga,
Dipolog, Pagadian, Iligan, Marawi,
Cotabato, Koronadal, Kidapawan, General
Santos

21. 13 Provinces Territory of Autonomy
Tripoli Agreement 1976

22. TRANSITIONAL MECHANISM
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE SIGNING OF THE TRIPOLI
AGREEEMENT TO BE APPOINTED BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

23. MANDATE OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. To prepare for the elections of the
Legislative Assembly in the territories
of the autonomy;
2. Administer the areas in accordance
with the Tripoli Agreement until a
Government is formed by the elected
Legislative Assembly. (Par. 15, TA)

24. PROCESS OF
IMPLEMENTATION
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
SHALL TAKE ALL NECESSARY
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENTIRE
AGREEMENT (Par. 16)

25. FRAMEWORK OF AUTONOMY
SECURITY
• JOINING OF THE FORCES OF MNLF
AND THE AFP (par. 2)
• SETTING UP OF SPECIAL REGIONAL
SECURITY FORCES (par. 8)

26. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
• Right to set up Courts to implement
Islamic Shari’ah laws
• Right to be represented in all courts
including the Supreme Courts (par. 3)

27. EDUCATION
Right to set up schools, colleges and
universities (par. 4)

28. SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES
OF AUTONOMY, LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
(par. 5 and 9)

29. NATURAL RESOURCES
REASONABLE PERCENTAGE
DERIVED FROM THE REVENUES OF
MINES AND MINERALS (par. 10)

30. REPRESENTATION
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION AND
PARTICIPATION IN THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT AND ALL OTHER
ORGANS OF THE STATE.

31. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY UPON
THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT
ON DECEMBER 23, 1976. (par. 15)

32. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
DURING MARTIAL LAW
On the basis of the "referendum
-plebiscite" of April 17, 1977, the
Philippine government by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1618 issued on
July 25, 1975 established two
autonomous regions, namely, Region IX
(Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga
del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur) and
Region XII (Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and
Sultan Kudarat).

33. MNLF REJECTION
THE MNLF REJECTED THE PD 1816
BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE 1976
TRIPOLI AGREEMENT.

34. ARMM
ON AUGUST I, 1989, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES PASSED REPUBLIC ACT
6734 CREATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO
WHEREBY A PLEBISCITE WAS HELD IN
THE TWO AUTONOMOUS REGIONS OF
REGION IX AND REGION IX PLUS THE
PROVINCES OF DAVAO DEL SUR,
SOUTH COTABATO AND PALAWAN.

35. MNLF REJECTION
AGAIN, THE MNLF REJECTED RA 6734
BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE 1976
TRIPOLI AGREEMENT AND BOYCOTTED
THE PLEBISCITE FOR THE
RATIFICATION OF THE NEW AUTONOMY
LAW. THE LATE PRESIDENT CORAZON
AQUINO ADMITTED THAT RA 6734 WAS
A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE OF THE GRP
TO IMPLEMENT THE 1976 TRIPOLI
AGREEMENT.

36. RA 6734 PLEBISCITE
THE PLEBISCITE RATIFYING RA 6734
SHRUNK THE BANGSAMORO HOME
LAND TO FOUR PROVINCES NAMELY:
TAWI TAWI, SULU, LANAO DEL SUR
AND MAGUINDANAO

37. ARMM 1989

38. 1996 FINAL PEACE
AGREEMENT
THE IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM TO
FULLY IMPLEMENT THE 1976 TRIPOLI
AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS THE
1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT

39. 1996 PEACE AGREEMENT
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
1.GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (GRP);
2. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF);
3. WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
(OIC) MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF THE SIX AND
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OIC

40. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
(PHASE I)
• Establishment of Special Zone of Peace
and Development SZOPAD
• Establishment of Southern Philippinnes
Council for Peace and Developemnt
(SPCPD)
• Joining of MNLF elements with the PNP
(1,500) and AFP (5,750)
• Right of Representation
• Establish Development Task Forces

41. • Creation of the Darul Iftah
• Establishment of the Consultative
Assembly having powers, among others,
to make rules and regulations to the extent
necessary for the effective and efficient
administration of the affairs of the area.
• Channeling of public and private
investment into the area to spur economic
development

42. POWERS OF THE SPCPD
• Exercise control and supervision over
appropriate agencies engaged in peace and
development activities in the area;
• Monitor, promote, and coordinate development
efforts;
• Attract foreign investment ;
• Cause the implementation of peace and
development projects;
• To be deputized by the Commission on Elections
to assist in the preparation of the holding of
elections, referenda or plebiscite and people’s
initiative

43. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW
AUTONOMOUS REGION (PHASE II)
THE SECOND PHASE SHALL
BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH
A CONGRESSIONAL ACT TO
LEGISLATE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE
AGREEMENT BY AMENDING
RA 6734.

44. THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
The New Autonomous Government
exercises broad and plenary powers
Exceptions: Foreign Affairs, National and
Security Defense, Postal Service, Coinage,
Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Administration of
Justice except Shari’a,. Quarantine, Customs
and Tariff, Citizenship, Naturalization,
Immigration, Deportation, General Auditing, Civil
Service and Foreign Trade, Patents,
Trademarks, Trade-names and Copyrights. (par.
27)

45. The Establishment of the
Special Regional Security
Forces for the Autonomous
Region -Phase-2 of the
Implementation of the Tripoli
Agreement (paragraphs 73-93)

46. Educational System to develop total
spiritual, intellectual, social, cultural,
scientific and physical aspects of
Bangsamoro people to make them
God-fearing, productive, patriotic
citizens conscious of their Filipino and
Islamic values and Islamic cultural
heritage (paragraphs 94-124 PA);

47. • The Economic and Financial
System, Control over Mines
and Minerals (paragraphs 126-
151, PA);
• Establishment of Shari’ah
Courts (152 PA)

48. GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
IN PHASE I
Executive Order No. 371 signed in
October 1996 omitted the stipulated
control, and/or regulatory powers of
the SPCPD over government agencies
operating within SZOPAD

49. Immediately after the signing of the
1996 Peace Agreement, the GRP held
peace talks with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front without any
participation and knowledge of the
SPCPD/MNLF ignoring the vital role of
the latter to orchestrate the peace and
development projects within SZOPAD

50. In the 1998 general elections, and
local elections and even in the
plebiscite in 2000 the SPCPD was not
deputized to participate in the
conduct of these electoral exercises
violating the agreement that the
SPCPD would be deputized by the
COMELEC in the conduct of any
electoral activity within the SZOPAD.

51. The deteriorating peace and order
condition in the area, the all out war
policy of the GRP particularly in the
Estrada regime, the unabated criminal
activities of lawless elements
aggravated by the deliberate ignoring of
the SPCD’S role by the GRP in the
resolutions of these conflicts, have all
conspired to marginalized and render the
SPCPD irrelevant in violation of the 1996
Peace Agreement.

52. The “business as usual” attitude of the
government in the preparations and
enactment of the General
Appropriation Acts from 1997 to 2001
up to the present resulted in the lack
of/insufficient funding for projects
intended for rehabilitation,
reconstruction, reconciliation, social,
economic and infrastructure projects.

53. The projects implemented and the
funds released in the SZOPAD during
the 3 year transitory period were
regular funds for regular projects and
programs (to be implemented even if
there was no Peace Agreement). The
alleged projects were implemented by
national agencies but not the SPCPD.

54. RA 9054
EXPANDED ARMM
RA 9054 LAPSED INTO LAW ON
MARCH 31, 2001 WITHOUT THE
PRESIDENT’S SIGNATURE,
PURSUANT TO SEC 27(1), ARTICLE
VI OF THE CONSTITUTION.

55. LEGITIMACY OF REPUBLIC ACT 9054
IS QUESTIONED
RA 9054 IS QUESTIONED BY
THE MNLF BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES THE 1976 TRIPOLI
AGREEMENT AND 1996 FINAL
PEACE AGREEMENT

56. UNRESOLVED HOMELAND
SHRINKAGE
THE PLEBISCITE PROCESS TO
RATIFY RA 9054 IN 2001
ADDED BASILAN PROVINCE
ONLY TO THE SHRUNK
BANGSAMORO HOMELAND
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

57. ARMM 2001

58. 13 Provinces Territory of Autonomy
Tripoli Agreement 1976

59. MORO PROVINCE
MISAMIS
SURIGAO
AGUSAN
MINDANAO-SULU
1903-1913
SPECIAL: Moro; Agusan
REGULAR: Misamis; Surigao

60. OIC INITIATIVES TO FULLY
IMPLEMENT THE 1996 FPA
NOVEMBER 2007
JEDDAH, KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
FORMATION OF THE OIC-GRP-MNLF
TRIPARTITE REVIEW FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1996 FINAL
PEACE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE
FOLLOWING:
SHARI’AH, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;POLITICAL
SYSTEM; SPECIAL REGIONAL SECURITY
FORCE and EDUCATION.

61. STATUS OF THE TRIPARTITE
REVIEW
1. Agreement to amend 46 defective
provisions of RA 9054 to conform to the
1996 Final Peace Agreement;
2. Proposed Amendments to 9054 shall be
certified by the President to Philippine
Congress as Administration Urgent Bill;
3. Affirmed the Primacy of the 1996 FPA;
4. On March 1, 2012, MNLF walked out during
Tripartite Meeting in Bandung, Indonesia
because GRP insist the latter had fully
implemented Phase 2 of the 1996 FPA

62. GPH-MNLF AGREEMENT
UNDERSTANDING
DURING MNLF-OIC-GPH WITH OIC
MEETING IN KUWAIT LAST MAY 2015
THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING TO
RESUME THE TRIPARTITE REVIEW

63. PROPOSED MEETINGS
• TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL MEETING ON
AUGUST 2015;
• MINISTERIAL LEVEL TRIPARTITE
REVIEW MEETING ON OCTOBER 2015

64. UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN
THE TRIPARTITE REVIEW
1. TERRITORY OF THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION AND AREAS TO BE
COVERED BY A NEW PLEBISCITE;
2. DEFINITION AND SHARING OF
REVENEUS OF STRATEGIC
MINERALS; AND
3. TRANSITIONAL MECHANISM.

65. Question: What is the MNLF
position on plebiscite?
Answer:
1. The emendment/revision/repeal of RA 9054 shall
be ratified in a plebiscite to be conducted in the five
provinces and one city in the ARMM;
2. All other provinces and cities identified in the
1976 Tripoli Agreement and 1996 Final Peace
Agreement which are outside the ARMM will be
asked whether they will join the autonomous
government.
(Par. 2(a-b), Section 1, Art. II, 9054)

66. Question: What is the GPH position
on territory and plebiscite?
Answer:
1. The territory of the ARMM is the final
territory of the autonomous region;
2. The result of the plebiscite in 2001 is
final so there cannot be another
plebiscite

67. Question: Does the Constitution prohibit the
conduct of another plebiscite to the determine
the new territory of the autonomous region?
• Answer: No. In fact there are two
plebiscites already conducted to
determined the territory of the ARMM
namely:
1. 1990 Plebiscite to create ARMM;
2. 2001 Plebiscite to expand the ARMM

68. Question: What does the constitution
say on autonomous regions?
Answer: Section 5, Article X provides
that the autonomous regions shall
“consist of the provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structure and other
relevant characteristics.

69. Based on the constitution the
autonomous region can comprise the
provinces and cities mentioned in the
1976 Tripoli Agreement and all other
areas in Mindanao sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structure
and other relevant characteristics

70. Question: What is the GPH position on
Strategic Minerals?
Answer:
1. Definition: Uranium, petroleum, other
fossil fuels, mineral oils, and all sources
of potential energy, aquatic parts, forest
and watershed reservation;
2. Sharing: 50=50

71. Question: What is the MNLF
position on Strategic Minerals?
Answer:
1. Definition: Uranium and imported
minerals.
2. Sharing: 70% for the autonomous
government; 30% for the central
government.

72. INTERIM AGREEMENT ON
STRATEGIC MINERALS
1. THE ARMM AND DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY SHALL CO-MANAGE
STRATEGIC MINERAL;
2. SHARING OF REVENUES SHALL BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH 9054– 50-50.

73. CO-MANAGEMENT OF
STRATEGIC MINERALS
ARG ARMM DENR-DOA
Acceptance, processing, evaluation, and
assessment of application for permit to
explore, utilization contracts, to impose
administrative charges and fees.
Approval of application for permit
to explore and/or utilization contact
duly recommended by the ARG.
No application shall be approved
without the favorable
recommendation of the ARG
If, after the lapse of 30 working
days upon receipt of the
recommended application, no
action is taken by the national
government, the application is
deemed approved.

74. ARG-ARMM DENR-DOA CENTRAL GOVT.
Recommends approval of permits,
contract upon endorsement of all
the respective Sangguniangs (Local
Government Councils) and after
securing the free and prior
informed consent in accordance
with the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act.
Approval of the permits, contracts
recommended by ARG
Co signatory together with the GPH of
any permit, contract
Co signatory together with the ARG
of any permit, contract
Tasked to be primarily responsible for
the monitoring of compliance to the
duly approved exploration permits and
utilization contracts
May at its option, monitor compliance
to the duly approved exploration
permits and utilization.