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The Art of Cyber War 
Werner Thalmeier – Director Security Solutions EMEA & CALA
The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, a high-ranking military general, strategist and tactician. It is commonly known to be the definitive work on military strategy and tactics, and for the last two thousand years has remained the most important military dissertation in Asia. It has had an influence on Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond. Leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong and General Douglas MacArthur have drawn inspiration from the work. 
Many of its conclusions remain valid today in the cyber warfare era. 
孫子兵法
3 
知彼知己,百戰不殆 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. 
Notable DDoS Attacks in the Last 12 Months
Feb/July 2013 
USA 
Operation Ababil 
Targeting financial institutions 
July 2013 
Colombia 
The Colombian Independence Day Attack 
March 2013 
The Netherlands 
Spamhaus 
The biggest DDoS attack ever 
August 2013 
Syria 
Syrian Electronic Army attacking US media outlets 
November 2013 
Ukraine & Baltic Countries 
Operation “Opindependence” 
June 2013 
South Korea 
South Korea governement websites under attacks
Variation of Tactics 九變 
The Army on the March 行軍 
Illusion & Reality 虛實 
The Use of Intelligence 用間 
Laying Plans 始計
Volumetric attacks 
Network & Stateful attacks 
Application attacks 
App Misuse 
6 
Attackers Deploy Multi-vulnerability Attack Campaigns 
High Bandwidth or PPS Network flood attacks 
Network Scan 
Syn Floods 
SSL Floods 
HTTP Floods 
Brute Force 
Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server 
SQL Injection 
Cross Site Scripting 
Intrusions 
“Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress) 
More than 50% of 2013 attack campaigns had more than 5 attack vectors. 
Source: Radware 2013 ERT Report
7 
Hacktivism – Move To Campaign-APT Oriented 
•Complex: More than seven different attack vectors at once 
•Blending: Both network and application attacks 
•Targeteering: Select the most appropriate target, attack tools 
•Resourcing: Advertise, invite, coerce anyone capable 
•Testing: Perform short “proof-firing” prior to the attack 
•Timeline: Establish the most painful time period for his victim
Sophistication 
2013 
2010 
2011 
2012 
• Duration: 3 Days 
• 4 attack vectors 
• Attack target: Visa, MasterCard 
• Duration: 3 Days 
• 5 attack vectors 
• Attack target: HKEX 
• Duration: 20 Days 
• More than 7 attack vectors 
• Attack target: Vatican 
• Duration: 7 Months 
• Multiple attack vectors 
• Attack target: US Banks 
8 
故善战者,立于不败之地 
The good fighters of old, first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat.
Slide 9 
The Threat Landscape 
DDoS is the most common attack method. 
Attacks last longer. 
Government and Financial Services are the most attacked sectors. 
Multi-vector trend continues.
10 
You don’t control all of your critical business systems. 
Understand your vulnerabilities in the distributed, outsourced world. 
没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 
漏洞 
Vulnerability
Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
Individual Servers Malicious software installed on hosts and servers (mostly located at Russian and east European universities), controlled by a single entity by direct communication. Examples: Trin00, TFN, Trinity 
Botnets Stealthy malicious software installed mostly on personal computers without the owner’s consent; controlled by a single entity through indirect channels (IRC, HTTP) Examples: Agobot, DirtJumper, Zemra 
Voluntary Botnets 
Many users, at times part of a Hacktivist group, willingly share their personal computers. Using 
predetermined and publicly available attack tools and methods, with an optional remote control channel. 
Examples: 
LOIC, HOIC 
New Server-based 
Botnets 
Powerful, well orchestrated attacks, using a geographically spread server infrastructure. Few attacking servers generate the same impact as hundreds of clients. 
12 
2012 
1998 - 2002 
1998 - Present 
2010 - Present 
不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也 
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill
13 
不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也 
Current prices on the Russian underground market: 
Hacking corporate mailbox: $500 
Winlocker ransomware: $10-$20 
Unintelligent exploit bundle: $25 
Intelligent exploit bundle: $10-$3,000 
Basic crypter (for inserting rogue code into benign file): $10-$30 
SOCKS bot (to get around firewalls): $100 
Hiring a DDoS attack: $30-$70 / day, $1,200 / month 
Botnet: $200 for 2,000 bots 
DDoS Botnet: $700 
ZeuS source code: $200-$250 
Windows rootkit (for installing malicious drivers): $292 
Hacking Facebook or Twitter account: $130 
Hacking Gmail account: $162 
Email spam: $10 per one million emails 
Email scam (using customer database): $50-$500 per one million emails
14 
不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也
15 
不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也
16 
Battlefield: U.S. Commercial Banks 
Cause: Elimination of the Film “Innocence of Muslims” 
Battle: Phase 4 of major multi-phase campaign – Operation Ababil – that commenced during the week of July 22nd. Primary targets included: Bank of America, Chase Bank, PNC, Union Bank, BB&T, US Bank, Fifth Third Bank, Citibank and others. 
Attackers: Cyber Fighters of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Result: Major US financial institutions impacted by intensive and protracted Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 
行軍: Operation Ababil
17 
行軍: Operation Ababil 
Massive TCP and UDP flood attacks: 
•Targeting both Web servers and DNS servers. Radware Emergency Response Team tracked and mitigated attacks of up to 25Gbps against one of its customers. Source appears to be Brobot botnet. 
DNS amplification attacks: 
•Attacker sends queries to a DNS server with a spoofed address that identifies the target under attack. Large replies from the DNS servers, usually so big that they need to be split over several packets, flood the target. 
HTTP flood attacks: 
•Cause web server resource starvation due to overwhelming number of page downloads. 
Encrypted attacks: 
•SSL based HTTPS GET requests generate a major load on the HTTP server by consuming 15x more CPU in order to process the encrypted attack traffic.
18 
Don’t assume that you’re not a target. 
Draw up battle plans. Learn from the mistakes of others. 
没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 
目标 
Target
Variation of Tactics 九變 
The Army on the March 行軍 
Illusion & Reality 虛實 
The Use of Intelligence 用間 
Laying Plans 始計
Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server 
20 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
Internet Pipe 
Firewall 
IPS / DSS 
ADC 
Server 
SQL Server 
2011 
2012 
2013 
Volumetric attacks 
Network & Session attacks 
Application attacks 
不可胜在己 
Being unconquerable lies within yourself.
不可胜在己 
21 
Proportion of businesses relying on CDNs for DDoS protection. 
70%
不可胜在己 
22 
Bypassing CDN Protection 
Botnet 
Enterprise 
CDN 
GET www.enterprise.com/?[Random]
不可胜在己 
23 
Cloud protection limitations. 
Botnet 
Volumetric attacks 
Low & Slow attacks 
SSL encrypted attacks 
Enterprise 
Cloud Scrubbing
24 
Don’t believe the propaganda. 
Understand the limitations of solutions. 
Not all networking and security solutions are created equal. 
没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 
宣传 
Propaganda
Variation of Tactics 九變 
The Army on the March 行軍 
Illusion & Reality 虛實 
The Use of Intelligence 用間 
Laying Plans 始計
26 
兵之情主速 
Speed is the essence of war 
Attack Degree Axis 
Attack Area 
Suspicious 
Area 
Normal Area
27 
兵之情主速 
THE SECURITY GAP 
Attacker has time to bypass automatic mitigation. 
Target does not possess required defensive skills.
28 
You can’t defend against attacks you can’t detect. 
Know your limitations. 
Enlist forces that have expertise to help you fight. 
没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 
检测 
Detection
Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
30 
故兵貴勝,不貴久 
•Web Attacks 
•Application Misuse 
•Connection Floods 
•Brute Force 
•Directory Traversals 
•Injections 
•Scraping & API Misuse 
Detection: Application Attacks
31 
故兵貴勝,不貴久 
What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations. 
•Envelope Attacks – Device Overload 
•Directed Attacks - Exploits 
•Intrusions – Mis-Configurations 
•Localized Volume Attacks 
•Low & Slow Attacks 
•SSL Floods 
Detection: Encrypted / Non-Volumetric Attacks
32 
故兵貴勝,不貴久 
Attack Detection: Volumetric Attacks 
•Network DDoS 
•SYN Floods 
•HTTP Floods
App Misuse 
Slide 33 
Layered Lines Of Defense 
Large volume network flood attacks 
Network Scan 
Syn Floods 
SSL Floods 
“Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress) 
HTTP Floods 
Brute 
Force 
DoS protection 
Behavioral analysis 
SSL protection 
IPS 
WAF 
Cloud DDoS protection 
Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server 
Volumetric attacks 
Network & Stateful attacks 
Application attacks
34 
Aligned forces will make the difference 
Protecting your data is not the same as protecting your business. 
True security necessitates data protection, system integrity and operational availability. 
没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 
可用性 Protection
35 
你准备好了吗? 
Are You Ready?
Thank You 
mottya@radware.www.radware.com 
http://security.radware.com

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The Art of Cyber War [From Black Hat Brazil 2014]

  • 1. The Art of Cyber War Werner Thalmeier – Director Security Solutions EMEA & CALA
  • 2. The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, a high-ranking military general, strategist and tactician. It is commonly known to be the definitive work on military strategy and tactics, and for the last two thousand years has remained the most important military dissertation in Asia. It has had an influence on Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond. Leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong and General Douglas MacArthur have drawn inspiration from the work. Many of its conclusions remain valid today in the cyber warfare era. 孫子兵法
  • 3. 3 知彼知己,百戰不殆 If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. Notable DDoS Attacks in the Last 12 Months
  • 4. Feb/July 2013 USA Operation Ababil Targeting financial institutions July 2013 Colombia The Colombian Independence Day Attack March 2013 The Netherlands Spamhaus The biggest DDoS attack ever August 2013 Syria Syrian Electronic Army attacking US media outlets November 2013 Ukraine & Baltic Countries Operation “Opindependence” June 2013 South Korea South Korea governement websites under attacks
  • 5. Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
  • 6. Volumetric attacks Network & Stateful attacks Application attacks App Misuse 6 Attackers Deploy Multi-vulnerability Attack Campaigns High Bandwidth or PPS Network flood attacks Network Scan Syn Floods SSL Floods HTTP Floods Brute Force Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server SQL Injection Cross Site Scripting Intrusions “Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress) More than 50% of 2013 attack campaigns had more than 5 attack vectors. Source: Radware 2013 ERT Report
  • 7. 7 Hacktivism – Move To Campaign-APT Oriented •Complex: More than seven different attack vectors at once •Blending: Both network and application attacks •Targeteering: Select the most appropriate target, attack tools •Resourcing: Advertise, invite, coerce anyone capable •Testing: Perform short “proof-firing” prior to the attack •Timeline: Establish the most painful time period for his victim
  • 8. Sophistication 2013 2010 2011 2012 • Duration: 3 Days • 4 attack vectors • Attack target: Visa, MasterCard • Duration: 3 Days • 5 attack vectors • Attack target: HKEX • Duration: 20 Days • More than 7 attack vectors • Attack target: Vatican • Duration: 7 Months • Multiple attack vectors • Attack target: US Banks 8 故善战者,立于不败之地 The good fighters of old, first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat.
  • 9. Slide 9 The Threat Landscape DDoS is the most common attack method. Attacks last longer. Government and Financial Services are the most attacked sectors. Multi-vector trend continues.
  • 10. 10 You don’t control all of your critical business systems. Understand your vulnerabilities in the distributed, outsourced world. 没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 漏洞 Vulnerability
  • 11. Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
  • 12. Individual Servers Malicious software installed on hosts and servers (mostly located at Russian and east European universities), controlled by a single entity by direct communication. Examples: Trin00, TFN, Trinity Botnets Stealthy malicious software installed mostly on personal computers without the owner’s consent; controlled by a single entity through indirect channels (IRC, HTTP) Examples: Agobot, DirtJumper, Zemra Voluntary Botnets Many users, at times part of a Hacktivist group, willingly share their personal computers. Using predetermined and publicly available attack tools and methods, with an optional remote control channel. Examples: LOIC, HOIC New Server-based Botnets Powerful, well orchestrated attacks, using a geographically spread server infrastructure. Few attacking servers generate the same impact as hundreds of clients. 12 2012 1998 - 2002 1998 - Present 2010 - Present 不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也 To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill
  • 13. 13 不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也 Current prices on the Russian underground market: Hacking corporate mailbox: $500 Winlocker ransomware: $10-$20 Unintelligent exploit bundle: $25 Intelligent exploit bundle: $10-$3,000 Basic crypter (for inserting rogue code into benign file): $10-$30 SOCKS bot (to get around firewalls): $100 Hiring a DDoS attack: $30-$70 / day, $1,200 / month Botnet: $200 for 2,000 bots DDoS Botnet: $700 ZeuS source code: $200-$250 Windows rootkit (for installing malicious drivers): $292 Hacking Facebook or Twitter account: $130 Hacking Gmail account: $162 Email spam: $10 per one million emails Email scam (using customer database): $50-$500 per one million emails
  • 16. 16 Battlefield: U.S. Commercial Banks Cause: Elimination of the Film “Innocence of Muslims” Battle: Phase 4 of major multi-phase campaign – Operation Ababil – that commenced during the week of July 22nd. Primary targets included: Bank of America, Chase Bank, PNC, Union Bank, BB&T, US Bank, Fifth Third Bank, Citibank and others. Attackers: Cyber Fighters of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Result: Major US financial institutions impacted by intensive and protracted Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 行軍: Operation Ababil
  • 17. 17 行軍: Operation Ababil Massive TCP and UDP flood attacks: •Targeting both Web servers and DNS servers. Radware Emergency Response Team tracked and mitigated attacks of up to 25Gbps against one of its customers. Source appears to be Brobot botnet. DNS amplification attacks: •Attacker sends queries to a DNS server with a spoofed address that identifies the target under attack. Large replies from the DNS servers, usually so big that they need to be split over several packets, flood the target. HTTP flood attacks: •Cause web server resource starvation due to overwhelming number of page downloads. Encrypted attacks: •SSL based HTTPS GET requests generate a major load on the HTTP server by consuming 15x more CPU in order to process the encrypted attack traffic.
  • 18. 18 Don’t assume that you’re not a target. Draw up battle plans. Learn from the mistakes of others. 没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 目标 Target
  • 19. Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
  • 20. Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server 20 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Internet Pipe Firewall IPS / DSS ADC Server SQL Server 2011 2012 2013 Volumetric attacks Network & Session attacks Application attacks 不可胜在己 Being unconquerable lies within yourself.
  • 21. 不可胜在己 21 Proportion of businesses relying on CDNs for DDoS protection. 70%
  • 22. 不可胜在己 22 Bypassing CDN Protection Botnet Enterprise CDN GET www.enterprise.com/?[Random]
  • 23. 不可胜在己 23 Cloud protection limitations. Botnet Volumetric attacks Low & Slow attacks SSL encrypted attacks Enterprise Cloud Scrubbing
  • 24. 24 Don’t believe the propaganda. Understand the limitations of solutions. Not all networking and security solutions are created equal. 没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 宣传 Propaganda
  • 25. Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
  • 26. 26 兵之情主速 Speed is the essence of war Attack Degree Axis Attack Area Suspicious Area Normal Area
  • 27. 27 兵之情主速 THE SECURITY GAP Attacker has time to bypass automatic mitigation. Target does not possess required defensive skills.
  • 28. 28 You can’t defend against attacks you can’t detect. Know your limitations. Enlist forces that have expertise to help you fight. 没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 检测 Detection
  • 29. Variation of Tactics 九變 The Army on the March 行軍 Illusion & Reality 虛實 The Use of Intelligence 用間 Laying Plans 始計
  • 30. 30 故兵貴勝,不貴久 •Web Attacks •Application Misuse •Connection Floods •Brute Force •Directory Traversals •Injections •Scraping & API Misuse Detection: Application Attacks
  • 31. 31 故兵貴勝,不貴久 What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations. •Envelope Attacks – Device Overload •Directed Attacks - Exploits •Intrusions – Mis-Configurations •Localized Volume Attacks •Low & Slow Attacks •SSL Floods Detection: Encrypted / Non-Volumetric Attacks
  • 32. 32 故兵貴勝,不貴久 Attack Detection: Volumetric Attacks •Network DDoS •SYN Floods •HTTP Floods
  • 33. App Misuse Slide 33 Layered Lines Of Defense Large volume network flood attacks Network Scan Syn Floods SSL Floods “Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress) HTTP Floods Brute Force DoS protection Behavioral analysis SSL protection IPS WAF Cloud DDoS protection Internet Pipe Firewall IPS/IDS ADC Attacked Server SQL Server Volumetric attacks Network & Stateful attacks Application attacks
  • 34. 34 Aligned forces will make the difference Protecting your data is not the same as protecting your business. True security necessitates data protection, system integrity and operational availability. 没有战略,战术是之前失败的噪音 可用性 Protection
  • 36. Thank You mottya@radware.www.radware.com http://security.radware.com