STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN EMU
National Government perspective
Álvaro Nadal MP Spain
Juncker’s curse
“We all know what to do,
but we don´t know how to
get re-elected once we
have done it”
TWO WELL-KNOWN STARTING POINTS
Rodrik’s trilemma EMU style
2
Fully
integrated
EMU
National
Affirmation
Democratic
Politics
We need to work
this out much more
POSITIVE APPROACH
There is a conflict between economic theory
and practice and political theory and practice
We need to undestand better the political side
of structural reforms
3
THREE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY QUESTIONS
What to do?
Easier to answer:
Flexibility of prices
and wages (and other
rents) is the key
Mundellian condition
for OCA
(Many times forgotten)
How to do it?
Very difficult to
answer:
In most cases reforms
have worked out
economically and
backfired politically
When to do it?
Very difficult as well:
Example of the
Spanish labour
reforms in 1994 and in
2012
4
WHAT TO DO?
Huge inflation differentials
and current account
imbalances have been the
major source of instability in
the EMU.
Why aren’t we using the main
nominal convergence
criteria?
5
Straitjacket: Macroeconomic
Imbalances Procedure
▰ Too many indicators (politically introduced)
▰ No thresholds, somehow arbitrary
▰ No real implementation
Reform:
▰ Reputational sanctions work
▰ Only inflation and current account
indicators
▰ Thresholds and procedure similar to GSP
HOW TO DO IT? CURRENT SITUATION (ONLY STICKS)
Growing competences to National
Independent Regulators
▰ Not enough democratic legitimacy and accountability
▰ Cases of power vacuum
▰ Also subject to social or lobby pressure
▰ Do not take into account the complexities of political
decision-making
6
▰ Deeper knowledge of the full process of reform: more positive (vs normative) analysis
including economics, public choice, political science and sociology
▰ More intensive communication and education effort
▰ Most problems come from income transfers. Instruments for (at least temporary) Kaldor-
Hicks compensations are needed: budget (national and EU), taxation, redefinition of state
aids…
▰ Avoid strategic games in National and European Parliament bearing in mind that now
Parliaments are much more fractured
▰ Comprehensive reform plans to avoid the feeling of being the only targeted sector (the only
advantage of devaluations)
AND…
HOW TO DO IT? SOME IDEAS AND CARROTS
7
An enormous ammount of
wisdom, courage, luck, common
sense, communication skills and
experience.
8
9
THANKS!

Structural reforms in EMU

  • 1.
    STRUCTURAL REFORMS INEMU National Government perspective Álvaro Nadal MP Spain
  • 2.
    Juncker’s curse “We allknow what to do, but we don´t know how to get re-elected once we have done it” TWO WELL-KNOWN STARTING POINTS Rodrik’s trilemma EMU style 2 Fully integrated EMU National Affirmation Democratic Politics We need to work this out much more
  • 3.
    POSITIVE APPROACH There isa conflict between economic theory and practice and political theory and practice We need to undestand better the political side of structural reforms 3
  • 4.
    THREE FUNDAMENTAL POLICYQUESTIONS What to do? Easier to answer: Flexibility of prices and wages (and other rents) is the key Mundellian condition for OCA (Many times forgotten) How to do it? Very difficult to answer: In most cases reforms have worked out economically and backfired politically When to do it? Very difficult as well: Example of the Spanish labour reforms in 1994 and in 2012 4
  • 5.
    WHAT TO DO? Hugeinflation differentials and current account imbalances have been the major source of instability in the EMU. Why aren’t we using the main nominal convergence criteria? 5
  • 6.
    Straitjacket: Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure ▰Too many indicators (politically introduced) ▰ No thresholds, somehow arbitrary ▰ No real implementation Reform: ▰ Reputational sanctions work ▰ Only inflation and current account indicators ▰ Thresholds and procedure similar to GSP HOW TO DO IT? CURRENT SITUATION (ONLY STICKS) Growing competences to National Independent Regulators ▰ Not enough democratic legitimacy and accountability ▰ Cases of power vacuum ▰ Also subject to social or lobby pressure ▰ Do not take into account the complexities of political decision-making 6
  • 7.
    ▰ Deeper knowledgeof the full process of reform: more positive (vs normative) analysis including economics, public choice, political science and sociology ▰ More intensive communication and education effort ▰ Most problems come from income transfers. Instruments for (at least temporary) Kaldor- Hicks compensations are needed: budget (national and EU), taxation, redefinition of state aids… ▰ Avoid strategic games in National and European Parliament bearing in mind that now Parliaments are much more fractured ▰ Comprehensive reform plans to avoid the feeling of being the only targeted sector (the only advantage of devaluations) AND… HOW TO DO IT? SOME IDEAS AND CARROTS 7
  • 8.
    An enormous ammountof wisdom, courage, luck, common sense, communication skills and experience. 8
  • 9.