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How does politics shape development?
The role of incentives, ideas and coalitions
PSA Annual Conference, 10 April 2017, Gl...
How does politics shape developmental forms
of state capacity and elite commitment?
 Consensus that capacity and commitme...
‘It’s the politics, stupid’
Three Core Variables
1. The Political Settlement
– “…the balance or distribution of power between
contending social groups...
The Political Settlement
 Elite bargaining: central to political settlements
– Elites agree to centralise violence
– Esta...
Two Types of Political Settlements
1) Dominant: Concentration of power in one dominant
political group of elites; strong (...
INSTITUTIONS 
POWER 
Personalized bargain Impersonal rules
Dominant party/leader
settlements
RWANDA
ETHIOPIA
UGANDA
Comp...
Ideas matter
Three main types of ideas:
i) policy ideas: provide potential solutions to pre-defined
social problems;
ii) p...
The politics of policy domains
• Policy domain: a meso-level social field where actors
advance (competing) agendas
Domain ...
ESID framework: ‘domains of power’
POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT
Power relations and
modes of power; ruling
coalition; shaped by
ma...
 Please add text here
 Please add text here
 Please add text here
 Please add text here
 Please add text here
Politic...
Pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness:
from ‘what works’ to the politics of order,
state-building and democracy
Oil governance in Ghana and Uganda
Ghana Uganda
Development $1,570 GDP per capita $500 GDP per capita
Democracy
(Polity IV, ‘06)
Democratic: 8 Polity IV Semi...
Comparative findings
Ghana (competitive) Uganda (weak dominant)
Ruling coalition Short-term horizons (rush to first
oil)
L...
‘that level of spending (for the 2011 elections) was
catastrophic to the economy and it will not happen this
time’ (Govern...
PoEs and the art of PS maintenance
• 2011: the bought elections
– Loss of central bank autonomy threatens the
political se...
Theoretical implications
• From ‘inclusive institutions’ (Acemoglu and Robinson
2012) to the interplay of political order,...
Strategic implications
• Two main development trajectories
– Dominant: elite cohesion & vision, enforcement
– Competitive:...
Can donors do development differently?
• Brokers, arms-length, problem-solving, risk-taking…
• …but are donors fit for pur...
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How Does Politics Shape Development? The Role of Incentives, Ideas and Coalitions

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PSA 2017 Presentation by Sam Hickey

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How Does Politics Shape Development? The Role of Incentives, Ideas and Coalitions

  1. 1. How does politics shape development? The role of incentives, ideas and coalitions PSA Annual Conference, 10 April 2017, Glasgow Sam Hickey Research Director, Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Global Development Institute, University of Manchester www.effective-states.org
  2. 2. How does politics shape developmental forms of state capacity and elite commitment?  Consensus that capacity and commitment matter, and that they are largely shaped by politics  But which forms of politics and how?  Large variations between and within countries  Problems with existing explanations  Changes in development progress in relatively short time frames across countries with similar initial conditions or long run determinants of state capacity (geography, wars, ethnic diversity, etc.).
  3. 3. ‘It’s the politics, stupid’
  4. 4. Three Core Variables 1. The Political Settlement – “…the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based.” (di John & Putzel) 2. Ideas/Beliefs: from paradigms to policy solutions 3. The Policy Domain
  5. 5. The Political Settlement  Elite bargaining: central to political settlements – Elites agree to centralise violence – Establish institutions that align the distribution of benefits with the underlying distribution of power (Khan 2010)  Elite bargains: personalised deals not impersonal rules/organisations (North, Wallis, Weingast 2009)  Shapes the capacity of the state to act; establishes incentives for elites behaviour
  6. 6. Two Types of Political Settlements 1) Dominant: Concentration of power in one dominant political group of elites; strong (Ethiopia, Rwanda) versus weak (Uganda) 2) Competitive: Power is dispersed across several political elites jockeying for political control (Bangladesh, Ghana) • In Dominant Settlements, elites can develop long time horizons and capabilities to enforce institutions. • In Competitive Settlements; elites tend to have short time horizons and have to resort to clientelist distribution of resources to buy political support.
  7. 7. INSTITUTIONS  POWER  Personalized bargain Impersonal rules Dominant party/leader settlements RWANDA ETHIOPIA UGANDA Competitive settlements BANGLADESH KENYA ZAMBIA
  8. 8. Ideas matter Three main types of ideas: i) policy ideas: provide potential solutions to pre-defined social problems; ii) problem definitions provide ways of framing particular social issues; favours certain types of policy solution and forecloses others iii) overarching paradigms that serve as road maps, providing ‘a relatively coherent set of assumptions about the functioning of economic, social and political institutions’ (Béland 2005: 8, Schmidt 2008).
  9. 9. The politics of policy domains • Policy domain: a meso-level social field where actors advance (competing) agendas Domain features: 1. Political capture/autonomy from ruling coalition • Does the domain offer rents and/or legitimacy? 2. Availability of shared frames (policy problems & solutions) 3. Policy entrepreneurship/agency (range of actors) 4. Policy legacies 5. Governance arrangements
  10. 10. ESID framework: ‘domains of power’ POLITICAL SETTLEMENT Power relations and modes of power; ruling coalition; shaped by material incentives and paradigmatic ideas; dynamic POLICY DOMAIN Political role; ideas and actors; policy legacies; governance arrangements ELITE COMMITMENT STATE CAPACITY ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, HISTORY, NORMS POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES
  11. 11.  Please add text here  Please add text here  Please add text here  Please add text here  Please add text here Political settlement Competitive clientelist Dominant coalition Country Ghana Bangladesh Rwanda Uganda Accumulat- ion Growth & state- business relations Growth/ SBRs Growth/SBRs Growth/SBRs ” Oil governance Oil governance Redistribut- ion Education Health Education Health Education Health Social protection Education Health Social protection Recognition Gender equity Gender equity Gender equity Gender equity Global Public sector reform Public sector reform Public sector reform
  12. 12. Pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness: from ‘what works’ to the politics of order, state-building and democracy
  13. 13. Oil governance in Ghana and Uganda
  14. 14. Ghana Uganda Development $1,570 GDP per capita $500 GDP per capita Democracy (Polity IV, ‘06) Democratic: 8 Polity IV Semi-authoritarian:-1 Polity IV Governance indicators (WGI, 2006) Voice & Acctbty: 0.37 Govt effectiveness: 0.11 Rule of Law: 0.00 Control of Corruption:0.02 Voice & Acctbty: -0.42 Govt effectiveness: -0.48 Rule of Law: -0.34 Control of Corruption: -0.75 Historical institutionalis m British colonialism; indirect rule Partly centralized: (0.65 - Gennaioli and Rainer 2007) British colonialism; indirect rule Partly centralized: (0.63 - Gennaioli and Rainer 2007) Geography & Demography Tropical climate; access to coast Ethnically diverse: (0.85 - Fearon 2003) Tropical climate; landlocked Ethnically diverse: (0.93 - Fearon 2003)
  15. 15. Comparative findings Ghana (competitive) Uganda (weak dominant) Ruling coalition Short-term horizons (rush to first oil) Longer-term vision Political institutions Early deals before legislation; legal provisions on borrowing overturned Legislation before main deals State capacity Deals: average Oil technocracy: capacity undermined by party politicking, limited autonomy Deals: strong Oil technocracy: high capacity, embedded autonomy (PoE), strong support from ‘patriotic’ President
  16. 16. ‘that level of spending (for the 2011 elections) was catastrophic to the economy and it will not happen this time’ (Governor BoU, November 2014)
  17. 17. PoEs and the art of PS maintenance • 2011: the bought elections – Loss of central bank autonomy threatens the political settlement (protests, politico-techno deal, transnational legitimacy) • 2016: – BoU fights rearguard action, regains autonomy – Fiscal indiscipline; other PoEs undermined to ensure electoral victory • PoEs at the intersection of state-building, political survival & democracy (more to come)
  18. 18. Theoretical implications • From ‘inclusive institutions’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) to the interplay of political order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic capacity over time (Fukuyama 2016)? • PSPD/’domains of power’ – A mid-range theory for explaining capacity and commitment within proximate timeframes – Complements/nuances theories of long-run development • From politics to power
  19. 19. Strategic implications • Two main development trajectories – Dominant: elite cohesion & vision, enforcement – Competitive: multi-stakeholder coalitions overcome dysfunctional tendencies created by a fragmented elite/politicised bureaucracy – Offer different entry points and require different strategies of engagement • From ‘good’ to ‘good enough governance’ – State capacity as critical, including through PoEs – Coalitions for change – Institutionalise political economy analysis
  20. 20. Can donors do development differently? • Brokers, arms-length, problem-solving, risk-taking… • …but are donors fit for purpose? • Competing pressures – Domestic pressures vs. GWTG, long-timeframes – Pressure to disburse vs. PEA – VFM/RBM vs. risk-taking – Posting cycles and accountability reporting vs. Deep contextual knowledge – Challenges from beyond aid (security, trade, tax…)

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