The document discusses security insights for poll workers based on research conducted across 19 elections in 12 states. Key findings highlight that while security procedures are embedded within the election process, challenges persist, particularly in terms of documentation and responsibility among poll workers. Recommendations include improving training and trust among teams to enhance election security.

1. Security insights
and issues
for poll workers
Whitney Quesenbery
Dana Chisnell
Center for Civic Design
civicdesign.org
Project workshop September 26, 2014
Humphrey School of Public Affairs, UMN

2. Opening remarks
 Larry Jacobs
Professor, Walter F. and Joan
Mondale Chair for Political Studies
 Doug Chapin
Director, Program for Excellence in
Election Administration
 Jeremy Epstein
Program Director, NSF

3. Who is here
 Election officials from 12 jurisdictions
 Researchers who contributed to the
project (8 of 17)
 Friends of the project

4. About the project
What we wanted to learn

5. Background
First research to look at security from
point of view of poll workers interacting
with systems

6. Coverage
 19 elections in 12 states
 November 2012 – November 2013
 17 researchers
 Purposeful but convenient sample
 Types of elections
 Range of systems
 Geographical range
 Range of sizes of jurisdiction
 Different approaches to administration and process

7. What we expected:
 Security would be a distinct part of
procedures & training
 Issues would occur in the interaction
with voting systems
 Issues caused by mistakes, not
purposeful attacks
Was not exactly what we found!

8. Highlights from the
research

9. Security is baked in
 Poll workers have and use
procedures designed for security
 Procedures are designed to support
trust in elections
 Security is not treated separately

10. Nobody is doing it flawlessly
 Even great jurisdictions see
imperfect completeness, accuracy,
or clarity
 Empowered poll workers cope well,
generally

11. Security vulnerabilities are distributed
 People
 Processes
 Paper
 Procedures and training

12. Reconciling and closing
 "Controlled chaos"
 Team work helped

13. Poll worker attitudinal factors
 Personal history
 Election culture
 Voting equipment
 Who manages the team
 Local policies
 Leadership of clerk or election
director
 Changes in laws

14. 4 ownership attitudes
Attitude Focus of responsibility
I’m responsible for
running the polling
place
Safety and comfort of voters, and maintaining
an orderly polling place.
I have to follow
procedures
Completing all procedures correctly, as a way of
running the polling place well.
I have to account
for paperwork
Forms and reports as a double-check on
equipment tallies and to ensure all votes are
accounted for.
I’m responsible for
“my election”
The overall results of the election, broadly
incorporating the polling place, procedures, and
tallies.

15. Big insights
Security and
the Goldilocks Problem

16. Security in elections
The processes, procedures,
tools, and people put in place to
ensure that elections run freely,
fairly, and efficiently.

17. Stress points: particular challenges to
security on Election Day
Setup and opening
 Delivering materials to the polling
place
 How much direction poll workers do
or don’t get
 Inventorying
 Coping with early start

18. Stress points: particular challenges to
security on Election Day
During the day
 Managing traffic flow
 Documenting and troubleshooting
incidents

19. Stress points: particular challenges to
security on Election Day
Closing & shutdown
 Inventorying & packing up
 Recording counts
 Organizing, sorting
 Managing assignments and tasks
 Coping with exhaustion + urgency

20. Stress points
Reconciling was, by far, the biggest
and most persistent problem

21. Stress points
Elections appear to be optimized
for opening the polls

22. Stress points: particular challenges to
security on Election Day
Delivering results
 Checking in with the election office
from the polling place
 Returning materials

23. The Goldilocks Problem
Too hard: 200-400 pages of
documentation and forms
What is just right?
Too soft: 100-page manual and a
phone number

24. Best practice
Empower through training and trust
 Teams had ways to resolve disputes
 Leads took strong responsibility
 Forms and checklists helped catch
mistakes before they became big
problems

25. Helping poll workers do the best possible
job
 Use scenarios and role-playing to
practice anticipating problems
 Trust them and leave them alone
 Use appropriate constraints such as
checklists
 Give responsibility
 Have strong expectations and
equivalent consequences for not
meeting them

26. Show-and-tell
progression
Sharing polling place materials
and training manuals

27. Guidelines
If jurisdictions could do just a few
things, what should they do?

28. Thank you.

29. With support from the
National Science
Foundation
EAGER grant CNS-1301887

30. And special help from
Doug Chapin, UMN
Lea Chittenden, UMN
Laura Pointon, CCD

31. Field Guides
To Ensuring
Voter Intent

32. Field Guides to Ensuring Voter Intent

33. Get in touch!
Whitney Quesenbery
whitneyq@civicdesign.org
@whitneyq
Dana Chisnell
dana@civicdesign.org
@danachis
civicdesign.org
@civicdesign