Download as PDF, PPTX
Uploaded byDana Chisnell
Usability and security in future voting systems
1) The document discusses the challenges of balancing usability and security in future voting systems. Poor usability can undermine security and lead to lost votes if voters develop faulty mental models of how voting works or vote counter to their intentions. 2) Research on election websites and ballots found widespread usability problems that cause voter confusion and disenfranchisement. Complex ballots and voting methods increase these problems. 3) Usable system design is needed to ensure voters can securely cast votes as intended and those votes can be accurately counted and audited. If systems are not usable, they are not secure.
Usability and security in future voting systems
- 1. Challenges of balancing usabilityand security in future voting systems Dana Chisnell @danachis @ChadButterfly
- 2. How are the votescounted?
- 3. How are the votescounted?
- 5. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
- 6.
- 7. Cataloged 147 electionwebsites Conducted 41 remote moderated usability tests
- 8. Voters are ballot-centric they’re focusedon that act, not conscious of the overall process
- 9. What’s on theballot?
- 10. ? ? ?
- 11. ? ? ?
- 12. ! ?
- 14. If voters don’tknow what is on the ballot they are more likely to go to third-party sources they are less likely to show up at the right polling place they’re likely to undervote down-ballot they are less likely to turn out
- 15. Website design problemsare well understood sites are hard to find find other sources navigation reflects don’t know where to go department don’t know how to get to labels are jargon content dates and deadlines don’t know when to act are vague get distracted or lost in the graphics are gratuitous site, lose trust sites are not accessible disenfranchisement
- 16. San Francisco andOakland, December 2011 EVN, March 2012
- 17.
- 18. Alameda Co. demoballot
- 19.
- 20. New York statedemo
- 21.
- 22. How is myvote counted?
- 25. Ballot design problemsare well understood split contests across columns overvoting there are responses on both overvoting sides of names arrows rather than bubbles marking incorrectly formatting is inconsistent or undervoting too consistent instructions are complicated all kinds of crazy things or lacking voters don’t know how to lost votes correct their ballots
- 26.
- 27. n=52 Joe
- 28. Mental models Peoplemake inferences about how things work based on available information and context
- 29. Mental models This is what we teach people
- 30. Mental models Sometimes itreally is this simple - but not in the US
- 31. Mental models Sometimes itreally is this simple - but not in the US
- 32. Much more likesigning for a mortgage
- 33. This is theballot we test NIST medium complexity ballot
- 34. Mental models Pointsystem Weighted Reversed
- 35. Point / weightsystem
- 36. Intent is loaded Preparing to vote Knowing what to expect Interacting with the ballot
- 37. What’s on theballot? What are my options for voting? absentee early voting Election Day what’s the where do I vote? where do I vote? deadline to apply? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due?
- 38. what’s the where do I vote? where do I vote? deadline to apply? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due? who is in office now? do I need ID to vote? what’s the deadline for registering?
- 39. 1. Voters developfaulty mental models
- 40. 2. Voters don’tunderstand the consequences of their actions
- 41. 3. Voters votecounter to their intentions
- 42.
- 44. straight party voting + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests + measures 6 different models
- 45. We’re pretty surethere’s a problem
- 46.
- 47. Voters bear a cognitiveburden that design can relieve.
- 48. Poor design andinstructions on ballots make understanding, marking, and casting difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 49. Poor design andinstructions on ballots make counting, verifying, and audits difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 50. Raises questions aboutwhat is being secured.
- 51. complex ballots =lost votes
- 52. complex ballots +vote-by-mail = lost votes
- 53. complex ballots + multi-language = lost votes
- 54. RCV + VBM + multi-language = 1000s of lost votes
- 55. Lack of trustin elections Lack of trust in officials Recalls Scrambling county boards
- 56. Security may addto the cognitive burden without thoughtful design.
- 57. Security = Countedas cast
- 58. Security = Castas intended + counted as cast
- 59.
- 60. Voter ed isnot the answer.
- 61. If it’s notusable, it’s not valid.
- 62. If it’s notusable, it’s not countable.
- 63. If it’s notusable, it’s not verifiable.
- 64. If it’s notusable, it’s not auditable.
- 65. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
- 66. Thank you Rick Bond Jared Spool Cyd Harrell David Cary Ethan Newby Rebecca Sherrill Callie Wheeler Frank Castro Chelsey Glasson Sandy Olson Sara Cambridge Nancy Frishberg Laura Paajanen Yelena Nakhimovsky Beth Lingard Whitney Quesenbery Beth Pickard
- 67. And... Andrea Moed Doug Hanke Kristen Johansen Karen McGrane Boaz Gurdin Krysta Chauncey Ashley Pearlman Karen Bachmann Donald A. Cox Rosa Moran Kamaria Campbell Josie Scott Paul Schreiber Rachel Goddard Jenn Downs Samantha LeVan Jacqui Adams Kate Aurigemma Michelle Milla Erin Liman Josh Keyes Alessandra Brophy Josh Bright Andrea Fineman
- 68.
- 69. Field Guides series Research Research Usability and Civic Research commissioned by commissioned by Life Project commissioned by EAC NIST NIST
- 70. Coming soon Designing Writing voter Guiding voters Poll worker election education through the security best department materials polling place practices websites Research partially Research partially From research Research to be funded by funded by funded by EAC funded by the MacArthur MacArthur and work by National Science Foundation Foundation Design for Foundation Democracy
- 71.
- 72. Field Guides ToEnsuring Voter Intent civicdesigning.org /fieldguides
- 73. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
- 74.
- 75.