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Usability and security in future voting systems
1. The document discusses challenges with balancing usability and security in voting systems. Studies found voters develop faulty mental models of how voting works and can vote counter to their intentions due to poorly designed ballots and websites. 2. Complex ballots and voting methods like ranked choice voting combined with factors like vote-by-mail and multiple languages can lead to thousands of lost votes. 3. The key theme is that if a voting system is not usable, it is not secure as voters will not understand how to cast their ballot properly or elections cannot be properly counted, verified, and audited. Usability is paramount to security.
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Usability and security in future voting systems
- 1. Challenges of balancing usabilityand security in future voting systems Dana Chisnell @danachis @ChadButterfly
- 2. How are the votescounted?
- 3. How are the votescounted?
- 5. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
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- 8. Cataloged 147 electionwebsites Conducted 41 remote moderated usability tests
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- 11. Voters are ballot-centric they’re focusedon that act, not conscious of the overall process
- 12. What’s on theballot?
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- 16. If voters don’tknow what is on the ballot they are more likely to go to third-party sources they are less likely to show up at the right polling place they’re likely to undervote down-ballot they are less likely to turn out
- 17. Website design problemsare well understood sites are hard to find find other sources navigation reflects department don’t know where to go labels are jargon don’t know how to get to content dates and deadlines are vague don’t know when to act graphics are gratuitous get distracted or lost in the site, lose trust sites are not accessible disenfranchisement
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- 19. San Francisco andOakland, December 2011 EVN, March 2012
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- 21. Alameda Co. demoballot
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- 23. New York statedemo
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- 25. How is myvote counted?
- 28. Ballot design problemsare well understood split contests across columns overvoting there are responses on both sides of names overvoting arrows rather than bubbles marking incorrectly formatting is inconsistent or too consistent undervoting instructions are complicated or lacking all kinds of crazy things voters don’t know how to correct their ballots lost votes
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- 31. What does itmean?
- 32. Mental models People makeinferences about how things work based on available information and context
- 33. Mental models This iswhat we teach people
- 34. Mental models Sometimes itreally is this simple but not in the US
- 35. Mental models Sometimes itreally is this simple but not in the US
- 36. Much more likesigning for a mortgage
- 37. This is theballot we test NIST medium complexity ballot
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- 39. Point / weightsystem
- 40. Intent is loaded Preparingto vote Knowing what to expect Interacting with the ballot
- 41. What’s on theballot? What are my options for voting? absentee what’s the deadline to apply? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due? early voting Election Day where do I vote? where do I vote?
- 42. what’s the deadline toapply? where do I vote? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due? who is in office now? do I need ID to vote? what’s the deadline for registering? where do I vote?
- 43. 1. Voters developfaulty mental models
- 44. 2. Voters don’tunderstand the consequences of their actions
- 45. 3. Voters votecounter to their intentions
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- 48. straight party voting +regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests + measures 6 different models
- 49. We’re pretty surethere’s a problem
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- 51. Voters bear a cognitiveburden that design can relieve.
- 52. Poor design andinstructions on ballots make understanding, marking, and casting difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 53. Poor design andinstructions on ballots make counting, verifying, and audits difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 54. Raises questions aboutwhat is being secured.
- 55. complex ballots =lost votes
- 56. complex ballots + vote-by-mail =lost votes
- 57. complex ballots + multi-language =lost votes
- 58. RCV + VBM + multi-language =1000s of lost votes
- 59. Lack of trustin elections Lack of trust in officials Recalls Scrambling county boards
- 60. Security may addto the cognitive burden without thoughtful design.
- 61. Security = Countedas cast
- 62. Security = Castas intended + counted as cast
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- 64. Voter ed isnot the answer.
- 65. If it’s notusable, it’s not valid.
- 66. If it’s notusable, it’s not countable.
- 67. If it’s notusable, it’s not verifiable.
- 68. If it’s notusable, it’s not auditable.
- 69. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
- 70. Thank you Rick Bond JaredSpool Cyd Harrell David Cary Ethan Newby Rebecca Sherrill Callie Wheeler Frank Castro Chelsey Glasson Sandy Olson Sara Cambridge Nancy Frishberg Laura Paajanen Yelena Nakhimovsky Beth Lingard Whitney Quesenbery Beth Pickard
- 71. And... Andrea Moed Doug Hanke KristenJohansen Karen McGrane Boaz Gurdin Krysta Chauncey Ashley Pearlman Karen Bachmann Donald A. Cox Rosa Moran Kamaria Campbell Josie Scott Paul Schreiber Rachel Goddard Jenn Downs Samantha LeVan Jacqui Adams Kate Aurigemma Michelle Milla Erin Liman Josh Keyes Alessandra Brophy Josh Bright Andrea Fineman
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- 73. Field Guides series Research commissionedby EAC Research commissioned by NIST Usability and Civic Life Project Research commissioned by NIST
- 74. Field Guides series Research supportedby MacArthur Foundation Research supported by MacArthur Foundation Research supported by MacArthur Foundation Research commissioned by EAC
- 75. Field Guides To Ensuring VoterIntent civicdesigning.org /fieldguides
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- 77. If it’s notusable, it’s not secure.
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