The document discusses sectarian abuse and religious freedom issues around the world. It provides details about the killing of Farkhunda Malikzada in Afghanistan after she was falsely accused of burning the Quran. It discusses how her death sparked outrage and calls for justice, with many being convicted. However, it notes blasphemy laws in other Islamic countries still endanger people and curtail religious freedom. Cases from Mauritania and Pakistan are briefly described to illustrate ongoing issues.
1) Yemen's al Houthis escalated conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi airbase and attacking Saudi border forces, complicating efforts for a negotiated solution.
2) An Iranian military commander increased rhetoric on Iran's importance in the Yemen conflict.
3) Infighting in Somalia between government and local groups could allow al Shabaab to exploit security issues and regain territory.
There were several terrorist attacks and security incidents reported over the weekend:
- In Khost province, Afghanistan, over 20 Taliban insurgents attacked two NATO bases wearing US Army uniforms and suicide vests. All the attackers were killed while two Afghan soldiers were killed and four US troops wounded.
- In Kashmir, India, the mastermind of recent protests was arrested.
- In Pakistan, militants attacked security forces in the Khyber tribal region, killing one foreign terrorist. Meanwhile, the bullet-riddled body of an FC soldier was found who had been kidnapped and executed by the Taliban for alleged spying.
- Drones also struck militants in Pakistan's Kurram tribal area, killing
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed credit for simultaneous bombings at two mosques frequented by al Houthis in Sana’a and an attempt at third mosque in the al Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada in Yemen on March 20. The attack, ISIS’s first terrorist attack in Yemen, deliberately targeted al Houthis and was designed to stoke sectarian tensions.
2. ISIS also claimed the attack on Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, signaling its presence in the country. The museum attack, along with a recent uptick in militant activity, shows that the Libyan conflict may be seriously undermining security in Tunisia.
3. The Iranian regime expressed less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. One of the key issues has been sanctions relief, with the Iranians pressing for the immediate lifting of sanctions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced a U.S. airstrike killed its leader and al Qaeda’s general manager Nasser al Wahayshi. AQAP added that military commander Qasim al Raymi will succeed Wahayshi as its leader in Yemen. Wahayshi’s death will probably not have a significant impact on AQAP’s operations in Yemen, where the group has capitalized on an anti-al Houthi momentum to expand. His death may have a short-term impact on al Qaeda global operations, though the strategy of attrition has not been effective against al Qaeda in the long term.
2. The death of veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Libya following U.S. airstrikes, if confirmed, would have significant ramifications for the attempts of local Islamist groups to coordinate their activities. U.S. F-15s bombed a reported meeting between Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya, killing a number of those present. Belmokhtar attended meetings in the past in Libya in which groups attempted to synchronize their efforts. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued a statement condemning the airstrike and offering condolences for those who were killed, but it did not eulogize Belmokhtar.
3. Al Shabaab has increasingly focused its military operations in northern Kenya and is expanding into the area. The group may escalate attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Kenyan reaction to the al Shabaab threat may inflame tensions with the Somali refugee population inside of Kenya. Al Shabaab most likely seeks to continue to gain influence within that population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
1) Yemen's al Houthis escalated conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi airbase and attacking Saudi border forces, complicating efforts for a negotiated solution.
2) An Iranian military commander increased rhetoric on Iran's importance in the Yemen conflict.
3) Infighting in Somalia between government and local groups could allow al Shabaab to exploit security issues and regain territory.
There were several terrorist attacks and security incidents reported over the weekend:
- In Khost province, Afghanistan, over 20 Taliban insurgents attacked two NATO bases wearing US Army uniforms and suicide vests. All the attackers were killed while two Afghan soldiers were killed and four US troops wounded.
- In Kashmir, India, the mastermind of recent protests was arrested.
- In Pakistan, militants attacked security forces in the Khyber tribal region, killing one foreign terrorist. Meanwhile, the bullet-riddled body of an FC soldier was found who had been kidnapped and executed by the Taliban for alleged spying.
- Drones also struck militants in Pakistan's Kurram tribal area, killing
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed credit for simultaneous bombings at two mosques frequented by al Houthis in Sana’a and an attempt at third mosque in the al Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada in Yemen on March 20. The attack, ISIS’s first terrorist attack in Yemen, deliberately targeted al Houthis and was designed to stoke sectarian tensions.
2. ISIS also claimed the attack on Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, signaling its presence in the country. The museum attack, along with a recent uptick in militant activity, shows that the Libyan conflict may be seriously undermining security in Tunisia.
3. The Iranian regime expressed less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. One of the key issues has been sanctions relief, with the Iranians pressing for the immediate lifting of sanctions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced a U.S. airstrike killed its leader and al Qaeda’s general manager Nasser al Wahayshi. AQAP added that military commander Qasim al Raymi will succeed Wahayshi as its leader in Yemen. Wahayshi’s death will probably not have a significant impact on AQAP’s operations in Yemen, where the group has capitalized on an anti-al Houthi momentum to expand. His death may have a short-term impact on al Qaeda global operations, though the strategy of attrition has not been effective against al Qaeda in the long term.
2. The death of veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Libya following U.S. airstrikes, if confirmed, would have significant ramifications for the attempts of local Islamist groups to coordinate their activities. U.S. F-15s bombed a reported meeting between Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya, killing a number of those present. Belmokhtar attended meetings in the past in Libya in which groups attempted to synchronize their efforts. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued a statement condemning the airstrike and offering condolences for those who were killed, but it did not eulogize Belmokhtar.
3. Al Shabaab has increasingly focused its military operations in northern Kenya and is expanding into the area. The group may escalate attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Kenyan reaction to the al Shabaab threat may inflame tensions with the Somali refugee population inside of Kenya. Al Shabaab most likely seeks to continue to gain influence within that population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
An Iraqi bill proposes granting immunity to Shia militias who fought against ISIS, but critics say this could encourage rights violations and affect Sunni Arabs. ISIS is preparing for the battle over Mosul by digging trenches, booby-trapping areas, and removing residents to use as human shields. Sources say the number of foreign ISIS fighters in Mosul has diminished recently. Experts say the political issues that allowed ISIS to take hold in Mosul must be addressed for long-term stability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
1. An IRGC Intelligence Organization representative released details on the recent arrest of several media professionals in Iran, likely in an effort to contain President Rouhani's domestic influence following the nuclear deal.
2. An American contractor died in custody in Sana'a, Yemen while a second American contractor and an American teacher remain detained.
3. A second small group of al Shabaab militants in Somalia pledged allegiance to ISIS, prompting al Shabaab to crack down on potential defectors.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
Jabhat al Nusra in Syria rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al Sham to facilitate unifying Syrian opposition groups under its leadership while still pursuing al Qaeda's goals. The expansion of US airstrikes against ISIS in Libya may help defeat ISIS in Sirte but not across Libya. Al Houthi forces in Yemen have increased attacks on Saudi borders to provoke Saudi Arabia into direct negotiations outside of UN talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
An Iraqi bill proposes granting immunity to Shia militias who fought against ISIS, but critics say this could encourage rights violations and affect Sunni Arabs. ISIS is preparing for the battle over Mosul by digging trenches, booby-trapping areas, and removing residents to use as human shields. Sources say the number of foreign ISIS fighters in Mosul has diminished recently. Experts say the political issues that allowed ISIS to take hold in Mosul must be addressed for long-term stability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
1. An IRGC Intelligence Organization representative released details on the recent arrest of several media professionals in Iran, likely in an effort to contain President Rouhani's domestic influence following the nuclear deal.
2. An American contractor died in custody in Sana'a, Yemen while a second American contractor and an American teacher remain detained.
3. A second small group of al Shabaab militants in Somalia pledged allegiance to ISIS, prompting al Shabaab to crack down on potential defectors.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
Jabhat al Nusra in Syria rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al Sham to facilitate unifying Syrian opposition groups under its leadership while still pursuing al Qaeda's goals. The expansion of US airstrikes against ISIS in Libya may help defeat ISIS in Sirte but not across Libya. Al Houthi forces in Yemen have increased attacks on Saudi borders to provoke Saudi Arabia into direct negotiations outside of UN talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
animacion en gif, evaluar a una madre embarazadaam3lid4
El documento describe los procedimientos para el control prenatal de madres embarazadas y niños, la atención a niños de 5 años, cómo tomar la presión arterial de un paciente, y cómo atender a un paciente enfermo. Se enfatiza la importancia de revisar el estado de salud del paciente a través de exámenes y análisis para determinar el tratamiento apropiado.
This document contains a resume for Amaechi Cajetan Ikechukwu seeking a position as an FPSO Safety Officer/Supervisor. The resume outlines his educational background which includes a BSc in Applied Biochemistry and professional diplomas in Safety and Security Management and Computer Engineering. His professional experience includes serving as a Safety Supervisor/Coordinator for Daewoo Exploration & Construction Limited where he followed permit to work procedures and managed safety reporting systems. He also has awareness training in areas like hot work safety, confined space entry safety, and welding and lancing safety.
Guy Fawkes Night commemorates the failed Gunpowder Plot of 1605, when Guy Fawkes and other English Catholics plotted to blow up the Houses of Parliament in protest of the oppression of Catholics under King James I. They dug a tunnel and stored barrels of gunpowder beneath Parliament but were caught when an anonymous letter tipped off authorities. To this day, the British celebrate by lighting bonfires, setting off fireworks, and burning Guy Fawkes in effigy on November 5th.
El documento define la cultura como un sistema socialmente construido que consiste en elementos que interactúan entre sí y que se adapta al medio físico y social. Explica que la cultura no es solo tener buenos modales o educación, sino este sistema holístico. Además, señala que la cultura existe en diferentes niveles, desde la civilización hasta las subculturas étnicas.
The document describes how a class will be organized and two cooperative learning techniques that will be used in a unit plan. The class will initially work as a whole group and then be split into pairs and groups of four. For the first technique, called Circumlocution, students will work in pairs to describe logos to each other without saying the logo name. For the second technique, which combines Think-Pair-Share and Numbered Heads Together, students will work first individually and then in groups of four to design a logo for a simulated company based on provided conditions.
Este documento describe la evolución histórica de los sistemas operativos desde la generación cero hasta la sexta generación, explica las principales funciones y estructuras de los sistemas operativos, y analiza los tipos y características de sistemas operativos más comunes como MS-DOS, Unix, Windows y otros.
Establece el conocimiento como principio para hacer ciencia, describe los distintos tipos conocimientos como introducción al curso de Ciencias Sociales.
En esta unidad se revisa la situación actual de los jóvenes explicando los factores que tienen a favor y en contra para su desarrollo personal. Revisa la importancia de la toma de decisiones para tener una vida plena y lograr la realización personal. Se presentan también los elementos administrativos para esta clase.
This document discusses how to prove that a language is not regular using the pumping lemma for regular languages. It provides two examples:
1) It shows that the language Leq consisting of strings with an equal number of 0s and 1s is not regular by pumping a string w in Leq to get a string with an unequal number of 0s and 1s, violating the definition of Leq.
2) It shows that the language Lpal consisting of palindrome strings is not regular by pumping a string w in Lpal to get a string that is not a palindrome, again violating the definition of the language.
Este documento analiza el potencial del turismo relacionado con la Ruta de la Seda en Valencia. Presenta el contexto histórico de la producción de seda en la ciudad y describe el proyecto de la UNESCO para promover la Ruta de la Seda. Analiza los recursos turísticos de Valencia relacionados con la seda, como la Lonja de la Seda y el Barrio de Velluters. También propone mejoras como crear rutas temáticas e incentivar el turismo experiencial. Concluye que Valencia tiene un gran potencial turístico
Un official convinced of myanmar rohingyalucilalarraga
Texto sobre el genocidio de los rohingya. Temas: migraciones, rol de los medios de comunicación en conflictos internacionales, soluciones internacionales a conflictos.
The document discusses recent attacks by an insurgent group called Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY) in northern Rakhine State in Myanmar that killed 12 security officers. HaY is a new Muslim insurgent group led by Rohingya émigrés and has support from local Muslims. The attacks represent a serious escalation and the emergence of a new insurgency. The government faces challenges in balancing security responses with addressing the underlying grievances and discrimination faced by Rohingya Muslims. A heavy-handed military response risks worsening the situation by increasing alienation, while political and policy reforms are needed to resolve the crisis.
Christians under attack_in_india_reportZahidManiyar
The document provides a summary of attacks on Christians in India, including two specific incidents in Roorkee and Mau, Uttar Pradesh:
1) In Roorkee, a mob of 250-300 people attacked a church, injuring several attendees. Police did not provide security despite prior complaints.
2) In Mau, a mob accused Christians of conversion during a prayer meeting. Seven people including the pastor were arrested under anti-conversion laws.
It also lists other incidents of threats, violence and false accusations against Christians in various parts of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and other states, indicating growing targeted attacks against the Christian minority in India.
Genocide aganinst rohingya muslims a classical model of ethnic cleansingBelayet Hossen
These are slides of article entitled "Genocide against Rohingya Muslims: A Classical Model of Ethnic Cleansing", which were presented in "International Conference on Forced Migration", held between 5th-7th December 2017 at International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM).
Myanmar (Burma): Extremism & Counter-Extremism !Than Han
Myanmar’s western Rakhine State experienced an uptick in violence in mid-October 2016 when insurgents belonging to the ethnic Rohingya Muslim minority carried out two large-scale attacks against security officials. The attackers killed nine police officers and four soldiers in Maungdaw Township on October 9 and October 11, respectively. Myanmar’s government quickly blamed the attacks on a jihadist group called Aqa Mul Mujahidin, which it claims has ties to foreign jihadists. The attacks were followed by another assault on Burmese officials in November 2016 when approximately 500 Rohingya insurgents were able to kill two soldiers before being fired on by army helicopters. The attacks led to renewed clashes between Rohingya civilians and state armed forces, resulting in the widespread burning of Rohingya villages. (Sources: New York Times, Guardian, Human Rights Watch)
HUMAN RIGHT WATCH AND BURMA(MYANMAR) UPDATE JULY 2018MYO AUNG Myanmar
HUMAN RIGHT WATCH AND BURMA(MYANMAR) UPDATE JULY 2018
https://www.hrw.org/sitesearch/BURMA%202018
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/09/us-strengthen-targeted-sanctions-burma
US: Strengthen Targeted Sanctions on Burma
46 Groups Call Legislation ‘Imperative’ to Address Atrocities
https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/satellite-imagery/2018/02/23/demolition-gwa-son
February 23, 2018-Demolition of Gwa Son
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/09/reuters-journalists-charged-myanmar
July 9, 2018 3:30PM EDT Dispatches
Reuters Journalists Charged in Myanmar
Targeted for Exposing Massacre of Rohingya
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/04/myanmar-accountability-needed-stem-continuing-abuses-against-rohingya
July 4, 2018 11:18AM EDT
Myanmar: Accountability needed to stem continuing abuses against Rohingya
Interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner for Human Rights
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/02/myanmar-quash-conviction-former-child-soldier
April 2, 2018 12:00AM EDT
Myanmar: Quash Conviction of Former Child Soldier
Protect Victims of Underage Military Recruitment
Several mosques, Muslim homes and shops have been vandalized and attacked in Tripura by right-wing Hindu groups in retaliation to violence against Hindus in Bangladesh. Over 15 mosques have reportedly been damaged and Muslim families have been living in fear. Videos on social media show mob violence against Muslims, including shops being burned and a mosque being destroyed. While the police claim the situation is under control and no mosques were damaged, eyewitnesses report the attacks were carried out by groups like VHP, Bajrang Dal and RSS. The letter requests the National Commission for Minorities to conduct an independent inquiry, take cognizance under the Minorities Act and study problems facing minorities in the state.
1. Citizens for Justice and Peace wrote a letter to the National Commission for Minorities complaining about attacks on mosques, homes, and shops belonging to Muslims in Tripura by right-wing Hindu groups in response to attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh.
2. Over 15 mosques were reportedly vandalized and Muslim shops ransacked in several districts of Tripura. Videos on social media showed destroyed mosques, shops being burned, and men beating a man with swords.
3. The letter requests the Commission to conduct an inquiry into the incidents, ensure perpetrators are brought to justice, and address the targeting of Muslims violating their constitutional rights.
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss.For real time update Visit our social media handle.Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace.Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
The document summarizes the genocide of Kashmiris that occurred in 1947 when over 200,000 Muslims were killed as they migrated from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. It describes how the Muslim population became a minority in the region as a result of the targeted killings and massacres carried out by Dogra state forces and Hindu and Sikh groups. It provides population figures showing the decline in Muslims from 80% of the population in 1947 to a minority. It also outlines ongoing human rights violations against Kashmiris by Indian armed forces, including thousands of killings since 2016 and the use of rape and torture against civilians. International organizations like Human Rights Watch have condemned the ongoing repression and violence against civilians in the region.
According to the UN, over 270,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled from Burma to Bangladesh since August 25th due to violence. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority that lives in Buddhist-majority Burma, facing severe discrimination. After Rohingya militants attacked police posts, the military responded with "clearance operations" that killed Rohingya civilians. Villages have been burned and civilians shot, with over 73,000 refugees arriving in Bangladesh with injuries from bombings and attacks. Despite international criticism, Burma's leader Suu Kyi has dismissed claims of persecution.
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/federalism-considerations-form-myanmar.pdf
Natural Resource Federalism:Considerations for Myanmar
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/federalism-considerations-for-myanmar-summary.pdf
Natural Resource Federalism:Considerations for Myanmar
Andrew Bauer, Natalie Kirk and Sebastian Sahla with contributions from Khin Saw Htay, Ko Ko Lwin and Paul Shortell
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Summary-for-December-2017.pdf
Summary of situation update for December 2017
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/JST.jpg
https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/01/23/urgent-humanitarian-update-for-kachin-state-january-23-2018/
URGENT HUMANITARIAN UPDATE FOR KACHIN STATE JANUARY 23, 2018
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES ...MYO AUNG Myanmar
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RAKHINE STATE
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rohingya-battalions/
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
Tip of the Spear A REUTERS INVESTIGATION
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/en/
27 June 2018, Index number: ASA 16/8630/2018
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-amnesty/top-myanmar-military-officers-should-be-tried-for-crimes-against-humanity-amnesty-international-idUSKBN1JN089
Top Myanmar military officers should be tried for crimes against humanity: Amnesty International
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-battalions-specialre/the-shock-troops-who-expelled-the-rohingya-from-myanmar-idUSKBN1JM1X7
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-eu/eu-canada-sanction-myanmar-generals-over-rohingya-myanmar-says-two-are-fired-idUSKBN1JL0SC
EU, Canada sanction Myanmar generals over Rohingya; Myanmar says two are fired
Robin Emmott, Antoni Slodkowski
The document summarizes Sheikh Hasina's humanitarian efforts in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. It describes how Hasina was given the title "Mother of Humanity" by British media for welcoming over 1 million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar into Bangladesh. It outlines how Hasina demanded the Myanmar military stop its genocide and drew international attention to the crisis. The document also provides background on the persecution of the Rohingya people in Myanmar and the events leading to hundreds of thousands fleeing to Bangladesh in 2017.
What's really behind the rakhine crisis in myanmar!!!!!MYO AUNG Myanmar
What's Really Behind the Rakhine Crisis in Myanmar?
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201709051057098493-myanmar-rohingya-energy-china-soros/
The Rakhine conflict in Myanmar, which had caught its second wind in August 2017, appears to be a multidimensional crisis with major geopolitical players involved, experts say, referring to both internal and external reasons behind the recent upsurge in violence in the country.
The Rakhine conflict, which erupted between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar's western Rakhine state in late August, was apparently fanned by external global players, Dmitry Mosyakov, director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told RT.
According to the academic, the conflict has at least three dimensions.
"First, this is a game against China, as China has very large investments in Arakan [Rakhine]," Mosyakov told RT.
"Second, it is aimed at fuelling Muslim extremism in Southeast Asia….
Third, it's the attempt to sow discord within ASEAN [between Myanmar and Muslim-dominated Indonesia and Malaysia]."
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201709031057035739-uk-myanmar-state-counsellor-end-violence/
https://sputniknews.com/russia/201709031057050283-rally-rohingy-myanmar-moscow/
https://sputniknews.com/world/201708301056937810-zarif-rohingya-myanmar-un/
https://sputniknews.com/asia/201709081057210915-moscow-myanmar-crisis-pressure/
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201709041057081489-myanmar-rohingya-muslim-crisis/
Research Interests: Myanmar, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND RAKHINE STATE CIRCUMSTANCES, and rakhine crsis
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss.For real time update Visit our social media handle.Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace.Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
L.K. Advani announced the culmination of his Jan Chetna Yatra in New Delhi and said his struggle against corruption, black money, and inflation will continue until these issues are eliminated. Advani criticized the UPA government for failing to release names of those with foreign bank accounts containing illegal wealth.
In other news, Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee said Anna Hazare's demand for the right to recall elected representatives is not feasible in a large country like India and could create political instability. At least 14 people died in a fire at an event for eunuchs in East Delhi.
Finally, Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain made another gaffe saying the Taliban
Ahmadis in Pakistan are seeking government protection after an extremist student group circulated pamphlets labeling Ahmadis as "fit to be killed" and including a hit list of 32 Ahmadi names and addresses. The pamphlets incite violence against Ahmadis, a minority Muslim sect, and justify killing them. Concerned Ahmadis have presented the hit list to police but feel more must be done to protect threatened religious minorities given past killings and the police's release of a would-be suicide bomber due to pressure from hardliners.
Similar to Sectarian abuse different from country to country (20)
This presentation by OECD, OECD Secretariat, was made during the discussion “The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 13 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/ibcdp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
XP 2024 presentation: A New Look to Leadershipsamililja
Presentation slides from XP2024 conference, Bolzano IT. The slides describe a new view to leadership and combines it with anthro-complexity (aka cynefin).
This presentation by Nathaniel Lane, Associate Professor in Economics at Oxford University, was made during the discussion “Pro-competitive Industrial Policy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 12 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/pcip.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
Carrer goals.pptx and their importance in real lifeartemacademy2
Career goals serve as a roadmap for individuals, guiding them toward achieving long-term professional aspirations and personal fulfillment. Establishing clear career goals enables professionals to focus their efforts on developing specific skills, gaining relevant experience, and making strategic decisions that align with their desired career trajectory. By setting both short-term and long-term objectives, individuals can systematically track their progress, make necessary adjustments, and stay motivated. Short-term goals often include acquiring new qualifications, mastering particular competencies, or securing a specific role, while long-term goals might encompass reaching executive positions, becoming industry experts, or launching entrepreneurial ventures.
Moreover, having well-defined career goals fosters a sense of purpose and direction, enhancing job satisfaction and overall productivity. It encourages continuous learning and adaptation, as professionals remain attuned to industry trends and evolving job market demands. Career goals also facilitate better time management and resource allocation, as individuals prioritize tasks and opportunities that advance their professional growth. In addition, articulating career goals can aid in networking and mentorship, as it allows individuals to communicate their aspirations clearly to potential mentors, colleagues, and employers, thereby opening doors to valuable guidance and support. Ultimately, career goals are integral to personal and professional development, driving individuals toward sustained success and fulfillment in their chosen fields.
This presentation by Tim Capel, Director of the UK Information Commissioner’s Office Legal Service, was made during the discussion “The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 13 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/ibcdp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by Juraj Čorba, Chair of OECD Working Party on Artificial Intelligence Governance (AIGO), was made during the discussion “Artificial Intelligence, Data and Competition” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 12 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/aicomp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
Why Psychological Safety Matters for Software Teams - ACE 2024 - Ben Linders.pdfBen Linders
Psychological safety in teams is important; team members must feel safe and able to communicate and collaborate effectively to deliver value. It’s also necessary to build long-lasting teams since things will happen and relationships will be strained.
But, how safe is a team? How can we determine if there are any factors that make the team unsafe or have an impact on the team’s culture?
In this mini-workshop, we’ll play games for psychological safety and team culture utilizing a deck of coaching cards, The Psychological Safety Cards. We will learn how to use gamification to gain a better understanding of what’s going on in teams. Individuals share what they have learned from working in teams, what has impacted the team’s safety and culture, and what has led to positive change.
Different game formats will be played in groups in parallel. Examples are an ice-breaker to get people talking about psychological safety, a constellation where people take positions about aspects of psychological safety in their team or organization, and collaborative card games where people work together to create an environment that fosters psychological safety.
The importance of sustainable and efficient computational practices in artificial intelligence (AI) and deep learning has become increasingly critical. This webinar focuses on the intersection of sustainability and AI, highlighting the significance of energy-efficient deep learning, innovative randomization techniques in neural networks, the potential of reservoir computing, and the cutting-edge realm of neuromorphic computing. This webinar aims to connect theoretical knowledge with practical applications and provide insights into how these innovative approaches can lead to more robust, efficient, and environmentally conscious AI systems.
Webinar Speaker: Prof. Claudio Gallicchio, Assistant Professor, University of Pisa
Claudio Gallicchio is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Computer Science of the University of Pisa, Italy. His research involves merging concepts from Deep Learning, Dynamical Systems, and Randomized Neural Systems, and he has co-authored over 100 scientific publications on the subject. He is the founder of the IEEE CIS Task Force on Reservoir Computing, and the co-founder and chair of the IEEE Task Force on Randomization-based Neural Networks and Learning Systems. He is an associate editor of IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems (TNNLS).
This presentation by Professor Giuseppe Colangelo, Jean Monnet Professor of European Innovation Policy, was made during the discussion “The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 13 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/ibcdp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by Thibault Schrepel, Associate Professor of Law at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam University, was made during the discussion “Artificial Intelligence, Data and Competition” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 12 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/aicomp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by OECD, OECD Secretariat, was made during the discussion “Artificial Intelligence, Data and Competition” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 12 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/aicomp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by Professor Alex Robson, Deputy Chair of Australia’s Productivity Commission, was made during the discussion “Competition and Regulation in Professions and Occupations” held at the 77th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 10 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/crps.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by OECD, OECD Secretariat, was made during the discussion “Pro-competitive Industrial Policy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 12 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/pcip.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
This presentation by Katharine Kemp, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law & Justice at UNSW Sydney, was made during the discussion “The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 13 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/ibcdp.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy – KEMP – June 2024 OECD...
Sectarian abuse different from country to country
1. SECTARIAN ABUSE
DIFFERENT FROM
COUNTRY TO COUNTRY
Religion forhumanity
ABSTRACT
In the age of World Peace, the Messianic
age, we shall be Serving each other all the
time; there shall be no nations nor money nor
separate religions; the human family shall be
One
Himadry sarkar->142-15-3586
Tanjila Afroz->142-15-3452
Myin Uddin->142-15-3561
Adison goms-142-15-5256
Department of CSE
Section: F
38th
batch CSE
2. Rohingya killingsin Myanmar: UN urges
Bangladesh to openborder
The Daily Sun
18th November, 2016 09:48:52
Security forces are killing civilians, torching houses, and raping women in Muslimghettos around the Maungdaw
township, according to Human Rights Watch.
The United Nations has appealed to Bangladesh to keep the border for fleeing
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. TheUN's refugee agency spokesperson Adrian
Edwardsmade the appeal at a briefing in Geneva today.
Mr. Adrian said, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is
'appealing to the governmentof Bangladesh to keep its border with Myanmar
open and allow safe passage to any civilians from Myanmar fleeing the violence.'
At the same time, the United Nations pressed the Burmese governmentfor access
to the Rohingya ghettos in Maungdawtownship bordering Bangladesh, whereat
least 150 peoplehad been killed during armyoperations. Securityforcesare killing
civilians, torching houses, and raping women in Muslim ghettos around the
Maungdawtownship, according to Human Rights Watch.
UNHCR urged ‘for humanitarian accessto assess and meet the needs’ in the
Rohingya villages where it believes thousandsof people have ben displaced from
their homes by the ongoing security operation. ‘The affected population is
3. believed to be in urgentneed of food, shelter and medical care,’ the statement
said.
It urged Myanmar ‘to immediately allow humanitarian actorsto resume the life-
saving activities they had been carrying out for some 160,000 civiliansin northern
Rakhine State until such activities were suspended on 9 October.’ Myanmar state
media have reported that 102 suspected Rohingya attackers and 32 security forces
have been killed since Oct. 9.
Acrossthe Myanmar, Rohingyasareregularlypushed to specially designated areas
which have been transformed into de facto open-air prisons, with the movement
of inhabitantstightly restricted by armed guards.
While the army has barred anyhumanitarian assistance in the Maungdawarea
bordering Bangladesh, human rightsactivists are questioning newly elected
Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi’scontrol over the armed forces.
CNN today published a reportasking ‘Is The Lady listening?’ referring to the
‘deafening silence’ by the Burmese leader. A handfulof video shows remnantsof a
burned house, bodies clearly visible sticking outof the mud and ash, CNN reports.
All of the key issues in Rakhine State and activities are under military control, it
said.
Myanmar deniesaccounts of Rohingya
killings
The daily Sun 19thNovember, 2016 08:39:16
Myanmar’sstate media on Saturdaydenied Bangladesh border guards’ accountsof
Rohingya Muslims fleeing conflict at home by trying to crossinto the northern
neighbor.
4. A commanding officer of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) said on Fridayhis staff
provided food and medicines to 82 people, including women and children,
attempting to leave Myanmar butturned them back from the frontier. Two boats
with 86 people were pushed back on Tuesday.
State-run English languagenewspaper GlobalNew Lightof Myanmar said on
Saturdaya newly created information taskforce had found the reportsto be
untrue.
Soldiershave flooded the north of Rakhine state, along Myanmar’sfrontier with
Bangladesh, responding to attacks by alleged Muslim militants on border posts on
9 Oct.
Sixty-ninesuspected insurgentsand 17 membersof the security forces have been
killed since the violence began, according to official reports. Butreports from
rights bodies claim, latest armycrackdown on Rohingyasclaimed at least 150
lives until today.
In the early hoursof Saturday, Bangladesh Coast Guard hassent back At least 125
Rohingya refugees who were fleeing armycrackdown in bordering Myanmar. The
seven boats pushed back by the Coast Guard werecarrying 34 children, 64 females
and 27 males. Coast Guard officer atTeknaf, Lt Nafiur Rahman said that they have
increased patrolsince the Oct 9 attack on security posts of Myanmar border forces
in Rakhine state.
On Friday, the UN's refugee agency appealed to Bangladesh to keep the border
open for fleeing Rohingya refugeesfrom Myanmar. Spokesperson of UNCHR,
Adrian Edwardsmadethe appeal at a briefing in Geneva on Friday.
Earlier this month, Myanmar denied accusations by Rohingya that its military had
killed people fleeing the conflictwhich has displaced up to 30,000 people.
Rohingya residents have told Reuters hundredshavetried to flee to Bangladesh
after fighting intensified a week ago. The UN refugeeagency has said the border
should be kept open for people fleeing violence.
5. The conflict is the biggest test for Nobel PeacePrize winner Aung San Suu Kyi since
becoming Myanmar’sde facto leader seven monthsago, laying bare her lack of
oversight over the military, which has been accused of human rightsviolations
against ethnic minorities in the past.
The Global New Light of Myanmar said the government planned to create an
investigation commission to look into the “violent attacks in Maungtaw”, the
region in Rakhine at the center of the unrest.
The reportdid not specify whether the probewould include an investigation of
allegations of human rights abuses that the United Nations, the United States and
Britain have called for.
01:13 AM, November 08, 2016
Rampage over Hindus in B’baria
The daily Star
At least 15 Hindu temples in Brahmanbaria’sNasirnagar arevandalised and looted
this afternoon along with hundredsof houses of the Hindu community.
Miscreants vandalised and looted at least 10 Hindu temples in Brahmanbaria’s
Nasirnagar this afternoon along with hundredsof houses of the Hindu community.
Nasirnagar Upazila NirbahiOfficer (UNO) ChowdhuryMuazzam Ahmed told The
Daily Star that the rampagebegan around 1:30pm after a Facebookpost a few
days ago.
Protesting the Facebook post, a group of people staged two separate
demonstrationsat the upazila headquarterstoday, during the festivities of Diwali.
Nasirnagar Puja Committee’s GeneralSecretaryKhailpada Poddar alleged that at
least 15 Hindu temples were vandalised and looted. “200 Hindu houses were
ransacked and looted.”
6. Brahmanbaria policeSuperintendentMizanur Rahman told The Daily Star that
around 150 to 200 people launched the attacks and vandalised at least seven to
eight idols of five temples in the area.
Two people were injured in the attacks while six people were detained, he added.
Police took controlover law and order in the area around 2:00pm, thepolice
officialsaid. A raid was underwayto nab the culprits, last reported.
“A group of Hefajat-e-Islam attacked on the Hindu community and vandalised their
houses and temples while we were holding peaceful rally,” said Riazul Karim,
convener of Nasirnagar unitof AhleSunnatWal Jamaat.
A hugenumber of law enforcersfrom differentagencies including police, Rapid
Action Battalion (Rab), and paramilitaryBorder Guard Bangladesh (BGB) were
deployed in the area.
The law enforcerswill remain deployed until the situation cools down to normal,
Maj Abu Saeed, captain of Rab-7, told the correspondent.
Our correspondentvisited a dozen temples and confirmed thevandalism.
AbdulKader, officer-in-chargeof Nasirnagar PoliceStation said the attacks spread
in Kashipara, Ghoshpara and Dashpara areasand manyother places soon.
7. Police file two cases in this
connection
Zealots attackedtemples andvandalised Hindu houses in Nasirnagar over a Facebook post in Nasirnagar upazila onOctober 30,
2016. Star file photo
The Upazila NirbahiOfficer of Nasirnagar hasbeen transferred amid blames on
local administration for failureto contain attack on Hindu community in
Brahmanbaria.
ChowdhuryMuazzam Ahmed was transferred to the public administration ministry
today, deputy commissioner of Brahmanbaria Rezwanur Rahman told The Daily
Star.
The Daily Star has obtained a copy of the transfer order of the public
administration ministry, dated today, which said the move was made for the sake
of “public welfare”.
Contacted, the UNO told The Daily Star that he saw the transfer as a “blessing”.
Brahmanbaria hasbeen experiencing a spate of attacks on the Hindu minority
groups– the chain of which started a week ago last Sundaycentering a Facebook
post.
8. That day, zealots vandalised at least five temples and ransacked over a hundred
houses. Later, twice more, attacks were carried out on Hindus – setting their
houses on fire.
National rightsbody, rights activists and minority communityleaders said that the
main intention of attack was to drive away Hindusand occupy their lands.
They criticised local law enforcersand administration for failing to contain the
violence.
Meanwhile, Nasirnagar PoliceStation this evening filed two cases in connection
with torching five Hindu homes in the wee hoursof Fridayaccusing unnamed 150
people, said Abu Zafar, officer-in-chargeof the police station.
This is for the first time police filed cases related to the attacks on Hindu people
and vandalising their houses and temples.
New York-based rights bodyHRW released satellite image analysis from last week
showing hundredsof homes have been destroyed in multiple villages. The rights
body also called on the governmenton Thursdayto allow rightsmonitorsand
independentjournalists’ access to the area.
Citing an advocacygroup, Associated Press reports, at least 150 Rohingya had been
killed since last Saturday. Ko Ko Linn, a senior official of the Arakan Rohingya
9. National Organization (ARNO) said, Myanmar'sgovernmentsought to cover up the
killings by barring themedia and aid groupsfrom entering the area.
According to reportsby AFP, as the latest high-profilemedia-ban bythe Burmese
government, prominentUS photographer, Greg Constantine, was barred from
attending his own exhibition aboutpersecuted Muslim minority.
The agency reports, around 200 Rohingya Muslimsfleeing the surge in violence
after Burmese armed forces took controlof the state last month are stranded at
the Bangladesh border. Bangladeshiborder guardspushed backthe Rohingya --
mostly women and children.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR
International Religious Freedom Report for 2015
Executive Summary
Learn more about the U.S. Government's engagement on human rights abroad
Executive Summary
March 19 began as an ordinaryday for 27-year old Farkhunda Malikzada.
Farkhunda lived in Kabul, Afghanistan, a city that had alreadyendured decades of
warfareand still existed under the constantthreat of terroristattacks by the
Taliban. Despite this, Farkhunda lived a happyand optimistic life, according to her
family. She worked as a teacher’sassistant while studying Islamic law. Shelived
with a loving family and dreamed of being married and having children, and
perhapsbecoming a judge.
On March 19, Farkhunda’sdreamscameto a tragic end when she was falsely
accused of burning the Quran, an accusation that resulted in her brutal and
senseless death. As she made her way home from workthat day, Farkhunda
10. stopped at the Shah-eDu Shamshira Shrinein downtown Kabul. Shesaid her
prayersand then got into a discussion with the caretaker of the shrine, Zainuddin,
aboutthe selling of charmsat the shrine, which Farkhunda considered to be un-
Islamic. The discussion escalated into an argument, and the caretaker then
accused her of being a tool of the Americans, and of having committed blasphemy
by burning a Quran.
A crowd quickly gathered to hear the incendiaryaccusations. Quran burning is a
grave religiousoffense in many Islamic countries, where it is viewed as a form of
blasphemy.
Farkhunda denied the accusations and tried to defend herself from the
increasingly agitated mob. Before long, a member of the crowd urged the mob to
take “justice” into its own handsand kill her. Someof the police nearbytried to
intervene as the crowd began to beat Farkhunda and pull at her clothing. The
police officersgave up, however, and watched as the crowd tormented and killed
its victim. Shewas beaten with sticks and boards, kicked, run over by a car and
dragged, thrown into a dry riverbed, stoned, and finally set on fireas bystanders
recorded the crime and police watched every act of barbarity. Farkhunda died in
tormentand pain sometime during the attack, according to medical examiners, but
the crowd continued to abuse her lifeless body.
While Farkhunda’skilling illustrates the horrorsthatcan result from false
accusations of blasphemy in deeply conservative Islamic societies, what happened
subsequently demonstrates that changeis possible. President Ghani immediately
condemned the attack and ordered an investigation. The domestic outrageafter
the attack was immediate, led by civil society and women’sgroups. Afghan women
carried Farkhunda’sbodyto her grave-site in a culturally unprecedented funeral
procession that doubled as a widely publicized protest against her killing.
Governmentofficials and members of parliamentparticipated in the funeral, and
the head of the Ministry of Interior’scriminalinvestigation departmenttold the
crowd that Farkhunda wasinnocent. A few Afghan governmentand religious
leaders who had initially endorsed the killing were marginalized and in at least one
case fired.
Reflecting public pressure, the investigation was swift, and numerousindividuals
were broughtto trialand convicted for their involvement in Farkhunda’sdeath,
including police officers. Appealsin some of these cases continue, and civil society
11. has been vocal in pressing authoritiesto do moreto secure justice. The fact that
individuals have been held accountablefor this horrific crimerepresents a
significantstep forward for Afghanistan’sjustice system, and sends an important
message to those who mightsee allegations of blasphemyas a meansto act with
impunity againstothers. A prominentpublic memorial erected on the site of
Farkhunda’sdeath hasbeen the site of vigils and a widely publicized
commemoration of the one-year anniversaryof her killing.
In many other Islamic societies, societal passions associated with blasphemy –
deadly enough in and of themselves – are abetted by a legal code that harshly
penalizes blasphemyand apostasy. Such laws conflictwith and undermine
universally recognized human rights. All residents of countries where laws or social
normsencouragethe death penalty for blasphemy arevulnerable to attacks such
as the oneon Farkhunda. Thisis particularlytrue for those who have less power
and are morevulnerable in those societies, like women, religious minorities, and
the poor. False accusations, often lodged in pursuitof personalvendettas or for
the personalgain of the accuser, are notuncommon. Mob violence as a result of
such accusationsis disturbinglycommon. In addition to the danger of mob
violence engendered by blasphemy accusations, courtsin many countries
continued to hand down harsh sentences for blasphemyand apostasy, which were
used to severely curtail the religious freedom of their residents.
In Mauritania, Mohammad Cheikh Ould Mohammad (better known as “MKheytir”)
published an online article the governmentalleged criticized the Prophet
Mohammad, and implicitly blamed the country’sreligiousestablishment for the
plight of the country’sforgeron (blacksmith) caste, which historically has suffered
discrimination. In December 2014, a courtconvicted him of apostasy, a charge
which was subsequently downgraded in April2016 after the blogger “repented”,
and sentenced him to death. He remains in prison pending a decision from the
SupremeCourt, expected in May 2016, on a possible pardon. Protesterscalled for
the death of a prominenthuman rightsactivist who defended MKheytir, Aminetou
Mint El Moctar. Authoritiesissued an arrest warrantfor the leader of the
protestorsthreatening el Moctar’slife, Yahdih Ould Dahi, buthave not arrested
him.
Pakistan's blasphemylaws, which prescribeharsh punishments for crimes such as
the desecration of the Quran or insulting the ProphetMohammad, haveoften
been used as justification for mob justice. Since 1990, morethan 62 peoplehave
12. been killed by mob violence (according to Centre for Research and Security Studies
in Pakistan). In 2013, therewere 39 registered cases of blasphemy against a total
of 359 people, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP).
According to the U.S. Commission on InternationalReligious Freedom (USCIRF),
morethan 40 people remain on death rowfor blasphemy in Pakistan, many of
whom are members of religious minorities. Numerousindividuals involved in well-
publicized blasphemy cases from previous years -- including Sawan Masih, Shafqat
Emmanuel, Shagufta Kausar, and LiaquatAli -- remained in jail awaiting appeal.
In Sudan on November 2 and 3, authoritiesdetained 27 Muslims on chargesof
disturbing public order and apostasy. Those arrested areadherents of a school of
Islam that maintainsthat the Quran isthe sole source of religious authority, and
that rejects the sanctity of the hadiths -- contraryto the government’sofficialview
of Islam. The arrests happened during a seminar in which two individuals of the
group were leading a group discussion regarding their views of Islamic teachings.
Police charged membersof the group under Sudan’snewly-broadened apostasy
provision. Courtproceedingsfor those arrested have since been suspended, and
they have been released, butcharges have not been dismissed.
In SaudiArabia, media and localsources reported that the GeneralCourt in Abha
sentenced Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh to death for apostasy in November,
overturning a previous sentence of four years’ imprisonmentand 800 lashes (the
death sentence was subsequently overturned in February2016 and a sentence of
eight years’ imprisonmentand 800 lashes imposed). Officials from the Committee
for the Promotion of Virtueand Prevention of Vice initially arrested Fayadh in
August2013, after reportsthathe had made disparaging remarksaboutIslam. In a
separate incident in January, authoritiespubliclylashed Raif Badawi 50 times in
accordancewith a sentence based on his 2013 conviction for violating Islamic
values, violating sharia, committing blasphemy, and mocking religious symbols on
the Internet.
OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2015
Non-state actorssuch as Da’esh and Boko Haram continued to rankamongstthe
most egregious abusersof religiousfreedom in the world.
Da’esh continued to pursue a brutalstrategy of what SecretaryKerryjudged to
constitute genocide against Yezidis, Christians, Shia, and other vulnerablegroupsin
13. the territoryit controlled, and was responsible for barbarousacts, including
killings, torture, enslavement and trafficking, rapeand other sexual abuse against
religious and ethnic minorities and Sunnis in areasunder its control. In areas not
under Da’esh control, the group continued suicide bombingsand vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device attacks against Shia Muslims. In July, for example, the
media reported a Da’esh suicide bomber attacked a crowded marketplace in
Diyala, Iraq and killed 115 people. The victims were mostly Shia, who had gathered
in the market for the end of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to Da’esh in an audiotaped message in
March 2015, continued to launch indiscriminate, violent attacks targeting both
Christians and Muslims who spoke out against or opposed their violent ideology.
Boko Haram claimed responsibility for scores of attacks on churchesand mosques,
often killing worshippersduring religiousservices or immediately afterward.
The Syriangovernmentand its Shia militia allies killed, arrested, and physically
abused Sunnisand members of religious minoritygroups, intentionally destroying
their property, according to numerousreports. Asthe insurgency increasingly
became identified with the Sunnimajority, according to experts, the government
targeted towns and neighborhoodsin variousparts of the countryfor siege,
mortar shelling, and aerialbombardmenton the basis of the religious affiliation of
residents. The governmentreportedlytargeted places of worship, resulting in
damageand destruction of numerouschurchesand mosques. Non-state actors,
including a number of groupsdesignated as terroristorganizationsby the United
States, such as Da’esh (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), and the Al-Nusra
Front, targeted Shia, Alawites, Christians and other religious minorities, as well as
other Sunnis. There were reportsof sectarian violence due to tensions among
religious groups, exacerbated bygovernment actions, culturalrivalries, and
sectarian rhetoric.
The result in the Levant, South Asia and northern Nigeria was continued mass
migration of vulnerable communities outof areas controlled and threatened by
violent extremism with a concordantlossin cultural richnessand diversity.
Around theworld, governments continued to tighten their regulatorygrip on
religious groups, and particularlyon minorityreligious groupsand religions which
are viewed as nottraditional to that specific country. ResearchersRoger Finke and
DaneMataic of Penn State University found that the number of countriesthat
14. requiresome sort of registration has increased significantly over the last two
decades, to nearly90 percentof all countries. Finke and Mataic assess that, while
some of these countries regulate religion in what appearsto be a non-
discriminatoryway, manyof the measures used to regulate religion, or to decide
what is a valid and recognized religion and what is not, are clearly discriminatory.
They also found that: the percentage of countries that required submission of
religious doctrinefor approvalprior to registration increased from 13 to 18
percent during their period of research; that the percentage of countries that
required a minimum number of religious communitymembers increased from 17
to 32 percent, and that the percentageof countriesthat sometimes denied
registration increased from 22 to 27 percent. Finke and Mataic found a strong link
between increasing registration requirementsand an overall deterioration in the
status of religious freedom in manycountries. They also found that membersof
minorityreligions, or religions that arenew to a country, aredisproportionately
discriminated against by this increasing regulation of the religiousspace.
For example, in Angola, thelawrequires religiousgroupsto register to receive legal
recognition from the state. In order to applyfor legal recognition, a religious group
must collect 100,000 member signaturesfrom 12 of the 18 provincesand submit
them to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The Baha’i faith and the Global
Messianic Church were the only two non-Christian organizationslegallyregistered;
no Islamic groupswere recognized. The state, which recognizes 83 religious
groups, hasnot registered a new religious group since 2004, when it established
the currentregistration requirements.
Another example is Azerbaijan,wherethe registration processis also restrictive,
and religious groupsconsidered non-traditionalto Azerbaijan were often reluctant
to attempt to register. Religious groupswhose registration applicationsremained
pending included some Islamic groups, Jehovah’sWitnesses outside of Baku, and
Baptists, among others. Several of these communities were registered prior to a
2009 lawrequiring all previously-registered religious communitiesto reregister.
These groupsreported thatthe StateCommittee for Workwith Religious
Organizations(SCWRA) either rejected or did not adjudicatereregistration
applications.
In Iran, thegovernmentexecuted at least 20 individuals on charges of moharebeh,
translatableas “enmity towardsgod,” among them a number of SunniKurds. A
number of other prisoners, including several Sunnipreachers, remained in custody
15. awaiting a governmentdecision to implement their death sentences. According to
the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center database of prisoners, at least 380
religious practitionersremained imprisoned at the end of the year for their
membership in, or activities on behalf of, a minorityreligious group, including
approximately250 Sunnis, 82 Baha’is, 26 Christian converts, 16 non-SunniSufis, 10
Yarsanis, three Sunniconverts, and two Zoroastrians. According to representatives
of the Baha’icommunity, the governmentcontinued to prohibitthe Baha’isfrom
officially assembling or maintaining administrative institutions, actively closed such
institutions, harassed Baha’is, and disregarded their propertyrights. Christians,
particularlyevangelicals and converts, continued to experience disproportionate
levels of arrests and high levels of harassment and surveillance, according to
reportsfrom exiled Christians.
In SaudiArabia, theSupremeCourtupheld death sentences for at least four Shi’a,
including Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. The three other Shi’a men -- Ali al-Nimr (Nimr al-
Nimr’snephew), Dawood al-Marhoon, and Abdullah al-Zaher -- wereconvicted of
crimes committed when they were legal minors. Allthree alleged that authorities
had used confessions obtained under duress in their convictions. The Saudi
governmentalso sought prison terms and death sentences for dozens of
individuals involved in 2011-2012 protestsdemanding greater rightsfor Shi’a in the
Kingdom; some of the charges includeviolence against security forces.
Since 2013, provincialauthoritiesin Zhejiang, China ordered thedemolition of
several state-sanctioned Protestantand Catholic churchesand the removal of over
1,500 crossesas partof a governmentcampaign targeting so-called “illegal”
structures. Lawyers and religious leaders protesting the campaign facedetention
and arrest. In August2015, Chineseauthorities seized human rights lawyer Zhang
Kai just prior to a scheduled meeting with the U.S. Ambassador atLarge for
InternationalReligious Freedom. Zhang Kaihad been providing legal counsel to
church communitiesaffected by a government-led campaign to demolish “illegal”
churchesand crosses. He was finally released in March 2016, buttheU.S.
governmentremains concerned abouthis well-being.
The exercise of religious freedom continued to be nearly non-existent in North
Korea. In 2015, theUnited States co-sponsored annualresolutionsadopted by the
UN GeneralAssembly and Human Rights Council that condemn the country’s
“systematic, widespread, and grosshuman rights violations.” The resolutions
further expressed their grave concern over the DPRK’sdenialof the rightto
16. freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom of
opinion, expression, and association, and urged the governmentto take immediate
steps to ensure these rights.
The June 2015 reportreleased by the UN Commission of Inquiry(COI) on Human
Rights in Eritrea found thatauthoritiesprohibited religiousgatherings; confiscated
religious materials; arrested, ill-treated, tortured, and coerced religious adherents
to recant their faith; and disappeared or killed many religious followersover the
courseof its reporting period between 1991 and 2015.
In 2014, Brunei implemented Phase1 of a Sharia Penal Code(SPC), which
expanded existing restrictions on minor religiousoffenses such as eating during
Ramadan, cross-dressing, and close proximitybetween unmarried people of
differentgenders. Phase 2 and Phase3 are scheduled for implementation in 2017
and 2018. Phase2 includes corporalpunishmentssuch as amputation for theft,
and Phase 3 includes stoning to death for apostasy.
In Burma, between May and August, the previous military-led government adopted
a package of four laws related explicitly to “protection of race and religion” that, if
enforced, will infringeon the exercise of religiousfreedom and other human rights.
These laws, which appear to target members of the country’sMuslim minority,
were championed by prominentBuddhistleaders. The new governmenthas not
taken any steps to reverse these laws.
The Vietnamese Committeefor ReligiousAffairsreleased a draftof the “Law on
Religion and Belief” for public comment in April2015. Despiterepresentationsby
Vietnamese officialsthat the new law would begin to bring the countryinto
compliancewith its internationalobligations, the draftlaw appeared to make only
minimal changesto the deeply problematic currentregulationson religion. Several
representatives of religiouscommunities have asserted that a “bad” draftlaw
would be worse than keeping the current, less formalpatchworkof regulations.
Others have argued the draftlaw, while imperfect, will legally “lock in” certain
limited rights, such as the rightof religious groupsto rent property, hold events, or
ordain clergy. Subsequentdraftshave made some encouraging improvements, but
many concerning issues remain unaddressed.
In the CentralAfricanRepublic, a Muslim motorcycletaxi driver in Banguiwas
beheaded by unknown attackers and his bodydumped in frontof a mosque.
17. According to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central Africa Republic (MINUSCA), atleast 41 civilians died in Banguiduring
the ensuing interreligiousviolence, while morethan 40,000 peopleweredisplaced.
In response to the violence, the mostly Christian anti-Balaka forces surrounded the
Muslim PK5 communitywith blockades, trapping theresidents inside. The
blockades were broken during PopeFrancis’ visit morethan a month later.
Despite a policy of “zero tolerance” for anti-Semitism, the Hungariangovernment
and Szekesfehervar city governmentprovided funding for the Balint Homan
Foundation to erect a statue to Balint Homan, a notoriousWorld War II-era anti-
Semite, which they later withdrew after an internationaloutcry.
The Sunni-led governmentin Bahrain continued to question, detain, and arrest
Shia clerics, communitymembers, and opposition politicians for defaming another
religion, inciting hatred against another religiousgroup, engaging in political
speech in sermons, and allegedly supporting terrorism. In April, the Courtof
Cassation upheld the dissolution of the Islamic Ulema Council (IUC), themain
assembly of Shia clerics in the country, saying the IUC had used religion as a cover
for political activity.
In Ukraine, Russian-occupation authorities in Crimea continueto take action
against membersof minorityreligious groups, including Tatarsthrough raids,
detentions, and prosecutionsthrough “anti-extremism” laws.
The governmentof Russia continued to grantprivileges to the Russian Orthodox
Church that it did not accord to others, while limiting the activities of Muslims and
other minority religious groupssuch as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, and
Scientologists. Additionally, Russian authorities used anti-extremism laws
throughoutRussia to revoke the registrationsof minorityreligious groupsand
impose restrictions on their religious practices, and their ability to purchaseland
and build places of worship. Currently, the Prosecutor General’sOfficeis
threatening to liquidate the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia
for alleged “extremist activity,” which would effectively shut down all of its 406
local religious associations and over 2,500 congregations. Itcould also result in
confiscation of their assets.
In Europe, some governments expressed concern over entryof migrantsand
asylum seekers on religiousgrounds. In Hungary, for example, theprimeminister
18. repeatedly emphasized the importanceof defending the “Christian values of
Europe,” and some SlovakRepublic officialsportrayed Muslimsas potential threats
to Slovak security, cultureand society and threatened to select only Christian
refugees for resettlement.