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- 1 -
Mobile & Embedded System Lab.
Dept. of Computer Engineering
Kyung Hee Univ.
SCC
(Security Control Center)
Presented by Junyoung Jung
Capstone Design Ⅱ
- 2 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Contents
 Motivation
 Related works
 Proposed System
 SCC: Security Control Center
 Demonstration
- 3 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Motivation
 Recent Trends
 Accelerated the launch of a variety of IoT products & services
 Increased interest in IoT device security issues
 Problems
 Manufactured without considering security level
 Absence of a security control system
▶ Difficult to respond to security attacks
Need for a Security Control System
(Collecting and Analyzing the information about security attacks.)
- 4 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Related works
 SecurePi: Secure Raspberry Pi (Using TPM*)
 Linux based high-end secure COTS IoT device platform
① Secure Key Storage & Management
② Secure Boot
③ Secure Firmware Update
④ Remote Attestation
⑤ Secure Communication
⑥ Mandatory Access Control
⑦ Filesystem Integrity
⑧ Filesystem Encryption
*TPM : Trusted Platform Module
- 5 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Related works
 SArduino: Secure Arduino (Using SE*)
 RTOS/Firmware based Low-end secure COTS IoT device platform
① Secure Key Storage & Management
② Secure Boot
③ Secure Firmware Update
④ Remote Attestation
⑤ Secure Communication
*SE : Secure Elements
- 6 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Proposed System
 Functional requirements (for performing Security Controls)
① Ensure availability of sensitive data
▶ Storing and managing the encryption key data in TPM/SE
▶ Secure Key Storage & Management Monitoring
② Ensure F/W integrity (Secure Boot)
▶ Firmware replacement attacks prevention
▶ Secure Boot Monitoring
③ Ensure secure F/W update
▶ The previous versions of firmware install prevention
▶ Secure Firmware Update Monitoring
- 7 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Proposed System
 Functional requirements (for performing Security Controls)
④ Ensure F/W integrity (Remote Attestation)
▶ Firmware replacement attacks prevention through other device
▶ Remote Attestation Monitoring
⑤ Detect the device login attempt
▶ Checking the login log(/var/log/auth.log) periodically
▶ Login Monitoring
⑥ Detect the device allow/deny packet
▶ Checking the iptables log periodically
▶ Packet Monitoring
- 8 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
SCC: Security Control Center
 System Architecture
IoT Control Platform
SSL
Administrator
Web browser HTTP
SCC-Server
SCC-Web Database
JSON
On-demand Event
Secure Pi
SCC-Client
SecureKeyManagement
Monitor
Front-end
Back-end
EJS
Node.js
.css .js
express
AJAX
Transaction
Upload the SCC-Client Info. to Database
Remote Attestation Server
Firmware Update Server
Secure Boot
Monitor
SecureFWUpdate
Monitor
RemoteAttestation
Monitor
Login Monitor Packet Monitor
SCC table
LOG table
…
- 9 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Demonstration
 http://163.180.118.193:3000
① Device registration
② Device detail view
③ Device Firmware Update
• Secure Key Storage & Management
• Secure Boot
• Secure Firmware Update
• Remote Attestation
④ Login & Packet Monitoring
- 10 - Kyung Hee University
Mobile Embedded System Lab.
Thank you

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SCC (Security Control Center)

  • 1. - 1 - Mobile & Embedded System Lab. Dept. of Computer Engineering Kyung Hee Univ. SCC (Security Control Center) Presented by Junyoung Jung Capstone Design Ⅱ
  • 2. - 2 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Contents  Motivation  Related works  Proposed System  SCC: Security Control Center  Demonstration
  • 3. - 3 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Motivation  Recent Trends  Accelerated the launch of a variety of IoT products & services  Increased interest in IoT device security issues  Problems  Manufactured without considering security level  Absence of a security control system ▶ Difficult to respond to security attacks Need for a Security Control System (Collecting and Analyzing the information about security attacks.)
  • 4. - 4 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Related works  SecurePi: Secure Raspberry Pi (Using TPM*)  Linux based high-end secure COTS IoT device platform ① Secure Key Storage & Management ② Secure Boot ③ Secure Firmware Update ④ Remote Attestation ⑤ Secure Communication ⑥ Mandatory Access Control ⑦ Filesystem Integrity ⑧ Filesystem Encryption *TPM : Trusted Platform Module
  • 5. - 5 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Related works  SArduino: Secure Arduino (Using SE*)  RTOS/Firmware based Low-end secure COTS IoT device platform ① Secure Key Storage & Management ② Secure Boot ③ Secure Firmware Update ④ Remote Attestation ⑤ Secure Communication *SE : Secure Elements
  • 6. - 6 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Proposed System  Functional requirements (for performing Security Controls) ① Ensure availability of sensitive data ▶ Storing and managing the encryption key data in TPM/SE ▶ Secure Key Storage & Management Monitoring ② Ensure F/W integrity (Secure Boot) ▶ Firmware replacement attacks prevention ▶ Secure Boot Monitoring ③ Ensure secure F/W update ▶ The previous versions of firmware install prevention ▶ Secure Firmware Update Monitoring
  • 7. - 7 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Proposed System  Functional requirements (for performing Security Controls) ④ Ensure F/W integrity (Remote Attestation) ▶ Firmware replacement attacks prevention through other device ▶ Remote Attestation Monitoring ⑤ Detect the device login attempt ▶ Checking the login log(/var/log/auth.log) periodically ▶ Login Monitoring ⑥ Detect the device allow/deny packet ▶ Checking the iptables log periodically ▶ Packet Monitoring
  • 8. - 8 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. SCC: Security Control Center  System Architecture IoT Control Platform SSL Administrator Web browser HTTP SCC-Server SCC-Web Database JSON On-demand Event Secure Pi SCC-Client SecureKeyManagement Monitor Front-end Back-end EJS Node.js .css .js express AJAX Transaction Upload the SCC-Client Info. to Database Remote Attestation Server Firmware Update Server Secure Boot Monitor SecureFWUpdate Monitor RemoteAttestation Monitor Login Monitor Packet Monitor SCC table LOG table …
  • 9. - 9 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Demonstration  http://163.180.118.193:3000 ① Device registration ② Device detail view ③ Device Firmware Update • Secure Key Storage & Management • Secure Boot • Secure Firmware Update • Remote Attestation ④ Login & Packet Monitoring
  • 10. - 10 - Kyung Hee University Mobile Embedded System Lab. Thank you