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3/10/2016
1
SCADA Security
Challenges & Strategies
Jeffrey Wang, P. Eng.
2016, Oshawa
Acronym
ICS: Industrial Control System
DCS: Distributed Control System
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
PLC: Programmable Logic Controller
RTU: Remote Terminal Unit
HMI: Human Machine Interface
TCP/IP: Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
IDS: Intrusion Detection System
COTS: Commercial off-the-shelf
ACL: Access Control List
DMZ: Demilitarized Zone
WAN: Wide Area Network
LAN: Local Area Network
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Content
Overview
Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities
Security Challenges
Mitigation Strategies
References
Page 3 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Overview
SCADA system
Overview
SCADA System Components
SCADA System Functionality
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SCADA System - Overview
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
SCADA is an Industrial control system (ICS).
Page 5 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
SCADA System - Components
Typically SCADA system include the following components:
RTU (Remote Terminal Unit)
PLC (Programmable Logic Controller)
HMI (Human Machine Interface)
Field devices (Actuators and Sensors)
WAN(Wide Area Network): Wireless/RF communication devices
LAN (Local Area Network): Router and Switches
Centralized Server
Database Server (Data Historian)
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SCADA System - Functionality
Major functions of SCADA system including:
Field devices control via local or remote working mode
Collect field data and transmit to central control server via WAN network
Monitor processing and/or control field devices via HMI
Manage database for tracking and management analysis
Page 7 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
SCADA System - Critical infrastructure
SCADA systems are critical national infrastructures
Canadian Critical infrastructure within the 10 sectors listed below:
• Energy and utilities
• Finance
• Food
• Transportation
• Government
• Information and communication technology
• Health
• Water
• Safety
• Manufacturing
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SCADA System - Tasks
SCADA system simply performs four tasks:
Data Acquisition
Data Communication
Data Monitor and Control
Data Historian
Page 9 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Data
Communication
Data
Acquisition
Data
Monitor & Control
Why securing SCADA system ?
Why?
IP-based technologies
Internet of Thing (IoT)
Cloud computing
Mobile computing
Threats growing (Cyber threats source refers to From Homeland Security ICS-CERT)
Hostile governments
Terrorist groups
Disgruntled employees
Malicious intruders.
GAO Threat Table (Source: GAO-Government Accountability Office)
Vulnerabilities increasing
Alerts (From ICS-CERT for control system/Government /Home & Business)
Alerts provide timely notification to critical infrastructure owners and
operators concerning threats to critical infrastructure networks.
Be proactive for potential cyber- attack to SCADA system
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Vulnerabilities
Physical Vulnerabilities
Cyber Vulnerabilities
Page 11 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Vulnerabilities –ICS-CERT Alerts
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team(ICS-CERT )
Publish cyber security alerts to three categories:
• Control System Users
• Government Users
• Home and Business
Examples:
ICS-ALERT-15-225-02A : Rockwell Automation 1766-L32 Series Vulnerability (Update A)
ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B : Siemens S7-300_S7-400 Hardcoded Credentials (Update B)
ICS-ALERT-12-097-02A : 3S CoDeSys Improper Access Control (Update A)
ICS-ALERT-11-256-06 : Beckhoff TwinCAT Vulnerability
ICS-ALERT-12-020-07A : WAGO IO 750 Vulnerabilities (Update A)
ICS-ALERT-12-136-01 : Wonderware SuiteLink Unallocated Unicode String
ICS-ALERT-12-020-02A : Rockwell Automation ControlLogix PLC Vulnerabilities (Update A)
ICS-ALERT-11-332-02A : Siemens SIMATIC WinCC Flexible (Update A)
ICS-ALERT-11-256-05A : Rockwell Automation RSLogix Overflow Vulnerability (UPDATE A)
Source: ICS-CERT Alerts: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts
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Physical Vulnerabilities
Common Physical Vulnerabilities:
Inadequate policies, procedures, and culture governing control system security
Inadequately designed networks with insufficient defense-in-depth
Remote access without appropriate access control
Separate auditable administration mechanisms
Inadequately secured wireless communication
Use of a non-dedicated communications channel for command and control
Lack of easy tools to detect/report anomalous activity
Installation of inappropriate applications on critical host computers
Inadequately scrutinized control system software
Unauthenticated command and control data.
Page 13 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Cyber Vulnerabilities
Common Cyber Vulnerabilities including:
Operating System Vulnerabilities
Interconnections
Open Source / Public Information
Authentication
Remote access
Monitoring and Defenses
Wireless access
SCADA/SQL/PLC Software
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Cyber Vulnerabilities
Cyber Vulnerabilities in details:
Un-patched published vulnerabilities
Web-based HMI vulnerabilities
Improper authentication
Improper access control (authorization)
Buffer overflow in SCADA services
SCADA data and command message manipulation and injection
SQL injection
insecure protocols
unprotected transport of SCADA application credentials
Standard IT protocols with pain-text authentication
Page 15 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Vulnerabilities – Allen-Bradly/Rockwell PLC
Web-based access with default user ID and password
AB SLC505
AB Micrologix PLC
AB CompactLogix
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Vulnerabilities – Unprotected Authentication
MicroLogix 1400, It is easy to access with administrator and default password
Page 17 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Vulnerabilities – Access with Default ID & Password
Intruder can change access permission once granted access control.
Default IDs( administrator, and default passwords
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Vulnerabilities – Supervisory Control
Supervisory control: Write/Read memory block or disable the device
Page 19 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Cyber Attack - STUXNET
STUXNET: the most famous cyber attack by United States and Israel.
STUXNET worm was at first identified by a Belarus company VirusBlokAda in mid-
June 2010.
Physical Impact:
Sabotaging 1000 centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant
Stuxnet worm – now every hacker in the world knows about PLCs, HMIs
and the opportunities to attack them.
The Windows operating system
Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 and WinCC
Siemens S7 – 300/400 PLCs
S7-315-2/S7-417
USB flash memory
Zero-Day via Windows OS
DB memory block in PLC
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Cyber Attack - Insider
Insider hacks into sewage treatment plant
Queensland, Australia (2000) Disgruntled employee Vitek Boden hacks into
sewage system via WiFi from the company’s Parking lot and releases over a
million liters of raw sewage into the coastal waters.
Physical Impact”
Intruder controlled about 150 pump stations near three months
Released about 1 million litre of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.
Tools: Laptop, radio and wireless access
Page 21 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Security Challenges
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SCADA Security Challenges
Vulnerable operating system (OS) and applications in SCADA system are from
commercial off-the –shelf (COTS) including Linux, Mac OS, Windows and
embedded PLC OS (VxWorks);
Most industrial control network connected to corporation network with Internet
access. Especially IP-based technologies. Such as Wireless, IoT (Internet of
Things), Cloud computing, Mobile computing and smart metering;
Unsecure legacy system and devices are still widely used in SCADA system. No
updated firmware available , no patching. They are transparent to control
professional;
Open source communication protocols (Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850,Ethernet/IP)
were not designed with security in mind and lack basic authorization features;
There are numerous unpatched and unpatchable systems;
Lack of remote access authentication, weak or default password;
Lack of physical security protection
.
Page 23 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Security Standards
• Security Standards
• Cyber Security Objective
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Industrial Control System Security Standards
Good News! There are many security standards….
NIST SP-800-82 : Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security
National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST)
ISA/IEC-62443 (formal ANSI/ISA99) : Security for Industrial Automation and
Control Systems Security
The International Society of Automation (ISA)
The International Electrotechnical Commission(IEC)
NERC CIP- 006 : Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
North American Reliability Corporation(NERC)
Critical Infrastructure Protection(CIP)
TR12-002 : Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best
Practices (combined with NIST and ISA99 standards)
• Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC)
Page 25 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Cyber Security Objective- I.T. Security Perspective
Three fundamental goals per NIST SP800-82 standard
Confidentiality
Any important information you have — such as employee, client
or financial records — should be kept confidential. This
information should only be accessed by people (or systems)
that you have given permission to do so.
Integrity
You need to make sure to maintain the integrity of this
information and other assets (such as software) in order to keep
everything complete, intact and uncorrupted.
Availability
You should maintain the availability of systems (such as
networks), services and information when required by the
business or its clients.
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Cyber Security Objective- SCADA Security Perspective
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Page 27 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Mitigation Strategies
Physical Assets Security
Cyber Security
Page 28 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Cyber
Security
Standards
Physical
Security
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Mitigation Strategies - Recommendations
My recommendation:
Physical Assets Security
NERC CIP-006 standard is intended to ensure the implementation of a
physical security program for the protection of Critical Cyber Assets
Cyber Security
NIST SP800-82 standard is cybersecurity guidance for Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) Security
ISA/IEC-62443 (ISA99) standard
Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre(CCIRC)
TR12-002 :Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended
Best Practices
Page 29 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Mitigation Strategies - Risk Assessment
Sources of threats
External
Internal
Accidental
Vulnerabilities
Risks = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact
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Physical Assets Security
Page 32 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Mitigation Strategies - NERC CIP Standards
NERC CIP standards Include 9 standards and 45 requirements:
CIP-002-1: Critical Cyber Asset Identification
CIP-003-1: Security Management Controls
CIP-004-1: Personnel and Training
CIP-005-1: Electronic Security Perimeters
CIP-006-1: Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
CIP-007-1: Systems Security Management
CIP-008-1: Incident Reporting and Response Planning
CIP-009-1: Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets
NERC: North American Electric Reliability Corporation
CIP: Critical Infrastructure Protection
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Mitigation Strategies - Physical Protection Guideline
Physical Access Controls
The Responsible Entity shall document and implement the operational and
procedural controls to manage physical access at all access points to the
Physical Security Perimeter(s) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Monitoring Physical Access
The Responsible Entity shall document and implement the technical and
procedural controls for monitoring physical access at all access points to the
Physical Security Perimeter(s) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Unauthorized access attempts shall be reviewed immediately and handled in
accordance with the procedures specified in Requirement CIP-008.
Logging Physical Access
• Logging shall record sufficient information to uniquely identify individuals and the
time of access twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Responsible
Entity shall implement and document the technical and procedural mechanisms
for logging physical entry at all access points to the Physical Security
Perimeter(s).
Page 33 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Mitigation Strategies - Physical Security
Physical Security Purpose:
To assist you detect and identify threats and restrict access to sensitive area (server
room and important field equipment)
Detect
Be alerted to unauthorized entries or attempts
Be alerted to mechanical/electrical failures
Be alerted to remote site entry requests
Identify
Remotely view facility, people, equipment
View recorded information and events
Restrict and allow entry to facility
Create physical facility access logs
Prosecute offenders
Restrict
Keep the bad guys out
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Cyber Security
Mitigation Strategies - NIST SP 800-82 Standards
NIST SP 800-82 : Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security
Provide guidance for establishing secure ICS, including implementation
guidance for SP 800-53 controls
Content
Overview of ICS
ICS Characteristics, Threats and Vulnerabilities
ICS Security Program Development and Deployment
Network Architecture
ICS Security Controls
Appendixes
Current Activities in Industrial Control Systems Security
Emerging Security Capabilities
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
SP: Special Publication
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Mitigation Strategies - Cyber Security Objective
Restricting logical access to the SCADA network and network activity
This includes using a demilitarized zone (DMZ) network architecture with
firewalls to prevent network traffic from passing directly between the corporate
and SCADA networks, and having separate authentication mechanisms and
credentials for users of the corporate and SCADA networks. The ICS should also
use a network topology that has multiple layers, with the most critical
communications occurring in the most secure and reliable layer.
Restricting physical access to the SCADA network and devices
Unauthorized physical access to components could cause serious disruption of
the SCADA’s functionality. A combination of physical access controls should be
used, such as locks, card readers, and/or guards.
Page 37 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Mitigation Strategies - Cyber Security Objective
Protecting individual SCADA components from exploitation
This includes deploying security patches in as expeditious a manner as possible,
after testing them under field conditions; disabling all unused ports and services;
restricting SCADA user privileges to only those that are required for each
person’s role; tracking and monitoring audit trails; and using security controls
such as antivirus software and file integrity checking software where technically
feasible to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate malware.
Maintaining functionality during adverse conditions
This involves designing the SCADA so that each critical component has a
redundant counterpart. Additionally, if a component fails, it should fail in a manner
that does not generate unnecessary traffic on the SCADA or other networks, or
does not cause another problem elsewhere, such as a cascading event.
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Mitigation Strategies – ANSI/ISA99 Standard
Module 1: Defining Industrial Cybersecurity
Covers the concepts of physical, operational, and electronic security; and defines
Cybersecurity as it relates to industrial automation and control systems
Module 2: Risk Assessment
Covers the concept of risk and how safety plays a part in assessing possible
consequences from a cyberattack
Module 3: Threats and Vulnerabilities
Covers "social engineering" and how outsiders gather information to enable attacks
and to physically enter your secured areas
Module 4: Security Policies, Programs, and Procedures
Covers the creation and deployment of policies, standards, and procedures and how
they are a critical aspect of a security program
Page 39 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Mitigation Strategies – ANSI/ISA99 Standard
Module 5: Understanding TCP/IP, Hackers, and Malware
Covers the basics of the IP networking architecture and how computers are
addressed and how IP delivers information to computers and TCP/UDP to
complete the delivery to specified applications using port numbers
Module 6: Technical Countermeasures
Covers the technical countermeasures and technology that can be employed to
protect your systems, detect and remove malware, and block hacking attempts;
and explains the technologies such as firewalls, proxy servers, VPN, and
VLAN and how they relate to industrial automation systems
Module 7: Architectural & Operational Strategies
Covers ways to segment and isolate your process automation systems in order to
increase their reliability and Cyber security
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Mitigation Strategies -TR12-002 Recommendation
TR12-002 :Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best
Practices, by Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre
1. Network Segmentation
2. Remote Access
3. Wireless Communications
4. Patch Management
5. Access Policies and Controls
6. Secure the Host (System Hardening)
7. Intrusion Detection
8. Physical and Environmental Security
9. Malware Protection and Detection
10. Awareness
11. Periodic Assessments and Audits
12. Change Control and Configuration Management
13. Incident Planning and Response
Page 41 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
Useful software
Solarwinds Inc. URL: http://www.solarwinds.com/
Develops enterprise information technology (IT) infrastructure management
software for IT professionals.
Kaspersky - URL: http://www.kaspersky.com
Kaspersky Lab is an international software security group operating in almost
200 countries and territories worldwide.
Bitdefender- URL: http://www.bitdefender.com
Bitdefender products feature anti-virus and anti-spyware capabilities against
internet security threats such as viruses, Trojans, rootkits, rogues, aggressive
adware, spam and others.
McAFee - URL: http://www.mcafee.com
Intel Security Group (previously McAfee, Inc.) is an American global
computer security software
Symantec - URL: Http://www.symantec.com
Security, Antivirus and Backup Solutions provider
Page 42 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
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References
NIST SP-800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf
ICS-CERT, ICS-TIP-12-146-01A—Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-TIP-12-146-01A.pdf
CCIRC, TR11-002 Mitigation Guidelines for Advanced Persistent Threats
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cybr-ctr/2011/tr11-002-eng.aspx
ICS-CERT, Incident Response Summary Report 2009 – 2011
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-
CERT_Incident_Response_Summary_Report_09_11.pdf
US-CERT, Control Systems Security Program (CSSP)
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/
US-CERT, Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with
Defense-In-Depth Strategies
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/documents/Defense_in_Depth_Oct09.pdf
CPNI, CPNI Viewpoint: Securing the move to IP-based SCADA/PLC networks
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2011/2011034-scada-
securing_the_move_to_ipbased_scada_plc_networks_gpg.pdf
International Society of Automation (ISA), ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems
Security
http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821
Page 43 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
THANK YOU
Page 44 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang

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Securing SCADA

  • 1. 3/10/2016 1 SCADA Security Challenges & Strategies Jeffrey Wang, P. Eng. 2016, Oshawa Acronym ICS: Industrial Control System DCS: Distributed Control System SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition PLC: Programmable Logic Controller RTU: Remote Terminal Unit HMI: Human Machine Interface TCP/IP: Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol IDS: Intrusion Detection System COTS: Commercial off-the-shelf ACL: Access Control List DMZ: Demilitarized Zone WAN: Wide Area Network LAN: Local Area Network Page 2 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 2. 3/10/2016 2 Content Overview Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities Security Challenges Mitigation Strategies References Page 3 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Overview SCADA system Overview SCADA System Components SCADA System Functionality Page 4 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 3. 3/10/2016 3 SCADA System - Overview SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA is an Industrial control system (ICS). Page 5 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang SCADA System - Components Typically SCADA system include the following components: RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) HMI (Human Machine Interface) Field devices (Actuators and Sensors) WAN(Wide Area Network): Wireless/RF communication devices LAN (Local Area Network): Router and Switches Centralized Server Database Server (Data Historian) Page 6 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 4. 3/10/2016 4 SCADA System - Functionality Major functions of SCADA system including: Field devices control via local or remote working mode Collect field data and transmit to central control server via WAN network Monitor processing and/or control field devices via HMI Manage database for tracking and management analysis Page 7 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang SCADA System - Critical infrastructure SCADA systems are critical national infrastructures Canadian Critical infrastructure within the 10 sectors listed below: • Energy and utilities • Finance • Food • Transportation • Government • Information and communication technology • Health • Water • Safety • Manufacturing Page 8 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 5. 3/10/2016 5 SCADA System - Tasks SCADA system simply performs four tasks: Data Acquisition Data Communication Data Monitor and Control Data Historian Page 9 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Data Communication Data Acquisition Data Monitor & Control Why securing SCADA system ? Why? IP-based technologies Internet of Thing (IoT) Cloud computing Mobile computing Threats growing (Cyber threats source refers to From Homeland Security ICS-CERT) Hostile governments Terrorist groups Disgruntled employees Malicious intruders. GAO Threat Table (Source: GAO-Government Accountability Office) Vulnerabilities increasing Alerts (From ICS-CERT for control system/Government /Home & Business) Alerts provide timely notification to critical infrastructure owners and operators concerning threats to critical infrastructure networks. Be proactive for potential cyber- attack to SCADA system Page 10 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 6. 3/10/2016 6 Vulnerabilities Physical Vulnerabilities Cyber Vulnerabilities Page 11 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Vulnerabilities –ICS-CERT Alerts Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team(ICS-CERT ) Publish cyber security alerts to three categories: • Control System Users • Government Users • Home and Business Examples: ICS-ALERT-15-225-02A : Rockwell Automation 1766-L32 Series Vulnerability (Update A) ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B : Siemens S7-300_S7-400 Hardcoded Credentials (Update B) ICS-ALERT-12-097-02A : 3S CoDeSys Improper Access Control (Update A) ICS-ALERT-11-256-06 : Beckhoff TwinCAT Vulnerability ICS-ALERT-12-020-07A : WAGO IO 750 Vulnerabilities (Update A) ICS-ALERT-12-136-01 : Wonderware SuiteLink Unallocated Unicode String ICS-ALERT-12-020-02A : Rockwell Automation ControlLogix PLC Vulnerabilities (Update A) ICS-ALERT-11-332-02A : Siemens SIMATIC WinCC Flexible (Update A) ICS-ALERT-11-256-05A : Rockwell Automation RSLogix Overflow Vulnerability (UPDATE A) Source: ICS-CERT Alerts: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts Page 12 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 7. 3/10/2016 7 Physical Vulnerabilities Common Physical Vulnerabilities: Inadequate policies, procedures, and culture governing control system security Inadequately designed networks with insufficient defense-in-depth Remote access without appropriate access control Separate auditable administration mechanisms Inadequately secured wireless communication Use of a non-dedicated communications channel for command and control Lack of easy tools to detect/report anomalous activity Installation of inappropriate applications on critical host computers Inadequately scrutinized control system software Unauthenticated command and control data. Page 13 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Cyber Vulnerabilities Common Cyber Vulnerabilities including: Operating System Vulnerabilities Interconnections Open Source / Public Information Authentication Remote access Monitoring and Defenses Wireless access SCADA/SQL/PLC Software Page 14 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 8. 3/10/2016 8 Cyber Vulnerabilities Cyber Vulnerabilities in details: Un-patched published vulnerabilities Web-based HMI vulnerabilities Improper authentication Improper access control (authorization) Buffer overflow in SCADA services SCADA data and command message manipulation and injection SQL injection insecure protocols unprotected transport of SCADA application credentials Standard IT protocols with pain-text authentication Page 15 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Vulnerabilities – Allen-Bradly/Rockwell PLC Web-based access with default user ID and password AB SLC505 AB Micrologix PLC AB CompactLogix Page 16 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 9. 3/10/2016 9 Vulnerabilities – Unprotected Authentication MicroLogix 1400, It is easy to access with administrator and default password Page 17 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Vulnerabilities – Access with Default ID & Password Intruder can change access permission once granted access control. Default IDs( administrator, and default passwords Page 18 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 10. 3/10/2016 10 Vulnerabilities – Supervisory Control Supervisory control: Write/Read memory block or disable the device Page 19 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Cyber Attack - STUXNET STUXNET: the most famous cyber attack by United States and Israel. STUXNET worm was at first identified by a Belarus company VirusBlokAda in mid- June 2010. Physical Impact: Sabotaging 1000 centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant Stuxnet worm – now every hacker in the world knows about PLCs, HMIs and the opportunities to attack them. The Windows operating system Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 and WinCC Siemens S7 – 300/400 PLCs S7-315-2/S7-417 USB flash memory Zero-Day via Windows OS DB memory block in PLC Page 20 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 11. 3/10/2016 11 Cyber Attack - Insider Insider hacks into sewage treatment plant Queensland, Australia (2000) Disgruntled employee Vitek Boden hacks into sewage system via WiFi from the company’s Parking lot and releases over a million liters of raw sewage into the coastal waters. Physical Impact” Intruder controlled about 150 pump stations near three months Released about 1 million litre of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks. Tools: Laptop, radio and wireless access Page 21 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Security Challenges Page 23 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 12. 3/10/2016 12 SCADA Security Challenges Vulnerable operating system (OS) and applications in SCADA system are from commercial off-the –shelf (COTS) including Linux, Mac OS, Windows and embedded PLC OS (VxWorks); Most industrial control network connected to corporation network with Internet access. Especially IP-based technologies. Such as Wireless, IoT (Internet of Things), Cloud computing, Mobile computing and smart metering; Unsecure legacy system and devices are still widely used in SCADA system. No updated firmware available , no patching. They are transparent to control professional; Open source communication protocols (Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850,Ethernet/IP) were not designed with security in mind and lack basic authorization features; There are numerous unpatched and unpatchable systems; Lack of remote access authentication, weak or default password; Lack of physical security protection . Page 23 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Security Standards • Security Standards • Cyber Security Objective Page 25 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 13. 3/10/2016 13 Industrial Control System Security Standards Good News! There are many security standards…. NIST SP-800-82 : Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) ISA/IEC-62443 (formal ANSI/ISA99) : Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security The International Society of Automation (ISA) The International Electrotechnical Commission(IEC) NERC CIP- 006 : Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets North American Reliability Corporation(NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection(CIP) TR12-002 : Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best Practices (combined with NIST and ISA99 standards) • Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) Page 25 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Cyber Security Objective- I.T. Security Perspective Three fundamental goals per NIST SP800-82 standard Confidentiality Any important information you have — such as employee, client or financial records — should be kept confidential. This information should only be accessed by people (or systems) that you have given permission to do so. Integrity You need to make sure to maintain the integrity of this information and other assets (such as software) in order to keep everything complete, intact and uncorrupted. Availability You should maintain the availability of systems (such as networks), services and information when required by the business or its clients. Page 26 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 14. 3/10/2016 14 Cyber Security Objective- SCADA Security Perspective Availability Confidentiality Integrity Page 27 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Integrity Confidentiality Availability Mitigation Strategies Physical Assets Security Cyber Security Page 28 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Cyber Security Standards Physical Security
  • 15. 3/10/2016 15 Mitigation Strategies - Recommendations My recommendation: Physical Assets Security NERC CIP-006 standard is intended to ensure the implementation of a physical security program for the protection of Critical Cyber Assets Cyber Security NIST SP800-82 standard is cybersecurity guidance for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security ISA/IEC-62443 (ISA99) standard Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre(CCIRC) TR12-002 :Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best Practices Page 29 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Mitigation Strategies - Risk Assessment Sources of threats External Internal Accidental Vulnerabilities Risks = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact Page 30 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 16. 3/10/2016 16 Physical Assets Security Page 32 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Mitigation Strategies - NERC CIP Standards NERC CIP standards Include 9 standards and 45 requirements: CIP-002-1: Critical Cyber Asset Identification CIP-003-1: Security Management Controls CIP-004-1: Personnel and Training CIP-005-1: Electronic Security Perimeters CIP-006-1: Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets CIP-007-1: Systems Security Management CIP-008-1: Incident Reporting and Response Planning CIP-009-1: Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets NERC: North American Electric Reliability Corporation CIP: Critical Infrastructure Protection Page 32 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 17. 3/10/2016 17 Mitigation Strategies - Physical Protection Guideline Physical Access Controls The Responsible Entity shall document and implement the operational and procedural controls to manage physical access at all access points to the Physical Security Perimeter(s) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Monitoring Physical Access The Responsible Entity shall document and implement the technical and procedural controls for monitoring physical access at all access points to the Physical Security Perimeter(s) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Unauthorized access attempts shall be reviewed immediately and handled in accordance with the procedures specified in Requirement CIP-008. Logging Physical Access • Logging shall record sufficient information to uniquely identify individuals and the time of access twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Responsible Entity shall implement and document the technical and procedural mechanisms for logging physical entry at all access points to the Physical Security Perimeter(s). Page 33 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Mitigation Strategies - Physical Security Physical Security Purpose: To assist you detect and identify threats and restrict access to sensitive area (server room and important field equipment) Detect Be alerted to unauthorized entries or attempts Be alerted to mechanical/electrical failures Be alerted to remote site entry requests Identify Remotely view facility, people, equipment View recorded information and events Restrict and allow entry to facility Create physical facility access logs Prosecute offenders Restrict Keep the bad guys out Page 34 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 18. 3/10/2016 18 Cyber Security Mitigation Strategies - NIST SP 800-82 Standards NIST SP 800-82 : Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security Provide guidance for establishing secure ICS, including implementation guidance for SP 800-53 controls Content Overview of ICS ICS Characteristics, Threats and Vulnerabilities ICS Security Program Development and Deployment Network Architecture ICS Security Controls Appendixes Current Activities in Industrial Control Systems Security Emerging Security Capabilities NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology SP: Special Publication Page 36 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 19. 3/10/2016 19 Mitigation Strategies - Cyber Security Objective Restricting logical access to the SCADA network and network activity This includes using a demilitarized zone (DMZ) network architecture with firewalls to prevent network traffic from passing directly between the corporate and SCADA networks, and having separate authentication mechanisms and credentials for users of the corporate and SCADA networks. The ICS should also use a network topology that has multiple layers, with the most critical communications occurring in the most secure and reliable layer. Restricting physical access to the SCADA network and devices Unauthorized physical access to components could cause serious disruption of the SCADA’s functionality. A combination of physical access controls should be used, such as locks, card readers, and/or guards. Page 37 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Mitigation Strategies - Cyber Security Objective Protecting individual SCADA components from exploitation This includes deploying security patches in as expeditious a manner as possible, after testing them under field conditions; disabling all unused ports and services; restricting SCADA user privileges to only those that are required for each person’s role; tracking and monitoring audit trails; and using security controls such as antivirus software and file integrity checking software where technically feasible to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate malware. Maintaining functionality during adverse conditions This involves designing the SCADA so that each critical component has a redundant counterpart. Additionally, if a component fails, it should fail in a manner that does not generate unnecessary traffic on the SCADA or other networks, or does not cause another problem elsewhere, such as a cascading event. Page 38 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 20. 3/10/2016 20 Mitigation Strategies – ANSI/ISA99 Standard Module 1: Defining Industrial Cybersecurity Covers the concepts of physical, operational, and electronic security; and defines Cybersecurity as it relates to industrial automation and control systems Module 2: Risk Assessment Covers the concept of risk and how safety plays a part in assessing possible consequences from a cyberattack Module 3: Threats and Vulnerabilities Covers "social engineering" and how outsiders gather information to enable attacks and to physically enter your secured areas Module 4: Security Policies, Programs, and Procedures Covers the creation and deployment of policies, standards, and procedures and how they are a critical aspect of a security program Page 39 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Mitigation Strategies – ANSI/ISA99 Standard Module 5: Understanding TCP/IP, Hackers, and Malware Covers the basics of the IP networking architecture and how computers are addressed and how IP delivers information to computers and TCP/UDP to complete the delivery to specified applications using port numbers Module 6: Technical Countermeasures Covers the technical countermeasures and technology that can be employed to protect your systems, detect and remove malware, and block hacking attempts; and explains the technologies such as firewalls, proxy servers, VPN, and VLAN and how they relate to industrial automation systems Module 7: Architectural & Operational Strategies Covers ways to segment and isolate your process automation systems in order to increase their reliability and Cyber security Page 40 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 21. 3/10/2016 21 Mitigation Strategies -TR12-002 Recommendation TR12-002 :Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security: Recommended Best Practices, by Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre 1. Network Segmentation 2. Remote Access 3. Wireless Communications 4. Patch Management 5. Access Policies and Controls 6. Secure the Host (System Hardening) 7. Intrusion Detection 8. Physical and Environmental Security 9. Malware Protection and Detection 10. Awareness 11. Periodic Assessments and Audits 12. Change Control and Configuration Management 13. Incident Planning and Response Page 41 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang Useful software Solarwinds Inc. URL: http://www.solarwinds.com/ Develops enterprise information technology (IT) infrastructure management software for IT professionals. Kaspersky - URL: http://www.kaspersky.com Kaspersky Lab is an international software security group operating in almost 200 countries and territories worldwide. Bitdefender- URL: http://www.bitdefender.com Bitdefender products feature anti-virus and anti-spyware capabilities against internet security threats such as viruses, Trojans, rootkits, rogues, aggressive adware, spam and others. McAFee - URL: http://www.mcafee.com Intel Security Group (previously McAfee, Inc.) is an American global computer security software Symantec - URL: Http://www.symantec.com Security, Antivirus and Backup Solutions provider Page 42 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang
  • 22. 3/10/2016 22 References NIST SP-800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf ICS-CERT, ICS-TIP-12-146-01A—Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-TIP-12-146-01A.pdf CCIRC, TR11-002 Mitigation Guidelines for Advanced Persistent Threats http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cybr-ctr/2011/tr11-002-eng.aspx ICS-CERT, Incident Response Summary Report 2009 – 2011 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS- CERT_Incident_Response_Summary_Report_09_11.pdf US-CERT, Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/ US-CERT, Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-In-Depth Strategies http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/documents/Defense_in_Depth_Oct09.pdf CPNI, CPNI Viewpoint: Securing the move to IP-based SCADA/PLC networks http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2011/2011034-scada- securing_the_move_to_ipbased_scada_plc_networks_gpg.pdf International Society of Automation (ISA), ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821 Page 43 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang THANK YOU Page 44 Securing SCADA prepared by Jeffrey Wang