kremlins war against Ukraine

1. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN
CITIZENS, STATELESS PERSONS
AND FOREIGN NATIONALS BY THE
RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES TO
ASSIST AGGRESSION
AGAINST UKRAINE.
UKRAINE’S POSSIBLE RESPONSES
Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies
2017
This research was carried out by an expert group of the Center for Army, Conversion,
and Disarmament Studies, within the work scope of the International Information Consor-
tium Bastion, in order to develop a system for public opposition to Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine

2. ecently, due to the need
to maintain their hold on
the occupied territories
of Ukraine (the Autono-
mous Republic of Crimea, and parts
of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions),
as well as to carry out heavy military
operations in Syria, Russian military
and political leaders have faced per-
sonnel problems – namely, a shortage
of qualified military specialists to staff
the detachments and units of invading
and occupying forces.
At the early stages of conflicts in
Ukraine and Syria, personnel gaps
were largely filled by previously
trained servicemen from special op-
erations forces, as well as agents of the
FSB (Federal Security Service), GRU
GSh (Main Intelligence Directorate of
the General Staff of the Russian Fed-
eration), SVR (Foreign Intelligence
Service), and other special services of
the Russian Federation. As the con-
flicts intensified, permanent losses
mounted among Russian enforcement
personnel and agents, and the scale
and nature of missions changed, the
staffing issue has become critical for
implementing the Kremlin’s aggres-
sive plans.
Strategic operations against
Ukraine implemented and planned by
the Russian armed forces and other
power structures in 2016, 2017, and
onward, have already resulted in the
creation of new major Russian mili-
tary units in Crimea and at the east-
ern borders of Ukraine, intensified
military construction, and virtually
ceaseless military exercises around
Ukraine’s borders.
One of the priorities of the Russian
military command is to achieve stra-
tegic advantage by quickly increasing
the Russian Armed Forces’ headcount,
using all available human resources.
1. MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN
RESOURCES OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION’S POWER
STRUCTURES
The Russian leadership’s current
and prospective plans require more
personnel than can be provided by the
battered special operations units, mo-
tor rifle brigades, tank brigades, other
units included in the battalion task
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS,
STATELESS PERSONS AND FOREIGN
NATIONALS BY THE RUSSIAN ARMED
FORCES TO ASSIST AGGRESSION
AGAINST UKRAINE.
UKRAINE’S POSSIBLE RESPONSES
R

3. 3
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groups used for invasion, or the spe-
cial forces units used against Ukraine
in 2014-16. This is why recruiting
maximum possible numbers of fresh
personnel is one of the primary tasks
for the Russian leadership. The follow-
ing two courses of action are pursued
to that end:
• Expanding the contract recruitment
base for the Russian Armed Forces
and other power structures, and ac-
celerating the changes in the legisla-
tion regulating military service in
the Russian Federation;
• Preventing contract soldiers from
refusing to participate in aggression
against Ukraine, by ensuring harsh
court prosecution of those who re-
fuse.
To expand the contract recruit-
ment base for the Russian Armed
Forces and other power structures,
legislative support is being provided
on two levels:
• improving and eliminating any le-
gal loopholes from the process of
recruitment for Russian conscripts
and military reservists with neces-
sary military specialties;
• recruiting stateless persons and for-
eign nationals who meet the criteria
of the Russia MoD.
To enable broad recruitment of
Russian citizens for contract military
service, a legislative package has been
prepared and submitted to the State
Duma of the Russian Federation, ti-
tled “On Introduction of the Draft of
Federal Law “On Amendments to the
Federal Law “On Conscription and
Military Service,” N7742p-P4, dated
October 14, 2016 and signed by the
Prime Minister of the Russian Federa-
tion Dmitry Medvedev. This law draft
introduces significant changes to the
terms of contract military service. It
would facilitate short-term contract
recruitment (for periods less than one
year, or even for a single mission) for
Russian conscripts and reservists. The
law draft is expected to be approved by
the State Duma in the nearest future,
seeing as by November 1, 2016, the
State Duma Defense Committee had
already recommended it to be adopted
in the first reading.
The reasons for the mentioned
amendments to the law are quoted as
“…changes in the military and politi-
cal situation, and intensified activity
by international terrorist organiza-
tion,” resulting in “the necessity for
increased mobility of troops (forces),
the creation of combined and irregu-
lar detachments, and their expedited
staffing by contract servicemen, to
quickly accomplish short-term yet
crucial missions related to participa-
tion in peacekeeping operations and
the fight against terrorist and extrem-
ist organizations.”
It should be noted that at this time,
the Russian legislation states that the
first military contract with a conscript
or another citizen entering military
service for positions with the rank
of soldier, seaman, sergeant, or ser-
geant-major should be signed for two
or three years, at the recruit’s discre-
tion; and for positions with the rank
of warrant officer, sub-officer, or of-
ficer, for five years. These categories of

4. 4
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
people are allowed to sign a contract
for a term between 6 months and one
year only in case of “disaster relief or
efforts related to a state of emergency,
restoration of the constitutional order,
and other extraordinary situations,
or to take part in collective measures
to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”
Therefore, by adopting the men-
tioned amendments, the Russian lead-
ership will have grounds to legalize
unlawful recruitment of conscripts for
“short-term tours of duty” to Ukraine
as contract soldiers, and have a for-
mally legal way to recruit the neces-
sary numbers of “volunteers,” “leave
men” and “exercise participants” from
among the “reservist mercenaries”
contracted for one military or special
operation.
For Ukraine, from the military
point of view, this means that Russia
will be able to very quickly deploy and
use a large invasion and occupation
army, under the pretext of Russian
military detachments carrying out
“peacekeeping operations” and “fight-
ing terrorist and extremist organiza-
tions.”
In addition to creating military
advantages and cutting costs, the Rus-
sian leadership may also be hedging
against possible criminal liability for
its decision to start an armed aggres-
sion against Ukraine with the use of
unlawful forces and means of warfare.
Significant changes have also been
made to the procedure for contract
recruitment and contract service in
the Russian Armed Forces for state-
less persons and foreign nationals.
On January 2, 2015, the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation
N3 (effective from the date of publi-
cation) introduced amendments to
the document titled “Provision on the
Procedure of Military Service” dated
September 16, 1999. The amendments
offer stateless persons and foreign
nationals much more opportunity to
join the Russian Armed Forces under
contract (while their recruitment by
Russia’s other power structures is pro-
hibited).
Relevant amendments are also be-
ing made to a number of bylaws that
regulate military service in the Rus-
sian Federation. Most prominently,
the new version makes contract mili-
tary service available to foreign na-
tionals who are aged between 18 and
30 and “have not broken the law,”
without the need to assume Russian
citizenship. This includes active ser-
vice, including operations abroad dur-
ing “international conflicts.”
It is possible that this category of
potential contract soldiers is receiv-
ing special attention due to the Rus-
sian leadership’s attempts to make up
for the growing shortage of contract
servicemen for large-scale covert and
regular military operations that are
currently being carried out or planned
in Ukraine, Syria, and, quite possibly,
other crisis regions, including Russia’s
“partner states” within the CIS and the
CSTO.
Russia’s military efforts require
large numbers of trained and moti-
vated servicemen, while Russia’s de-

5. 5
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mographic situation tends to further
decrease the size of its draft base.
Meanwhile, Russian experts estimate
that almost 25 million Russian-speak-
ing people are potentially available for
contract recruitment to the Russian
Armed Forces from abroad (mainly
from the CIS countries).
Another factor is the growing dis-
content among the locals of many
Russian regions, caused by the large
casualties among the military and
“volunteers” as a result of the Russian
government’s gambles in Ukraine. Not
even the heavy militarist propaganda
is sufficient to cancel it out.
At the same time, large numbers
of Russian-speaking migrant work-
ers from the former USSR countries,
who had lost their income during
the recession, are viewed as poten-
tially affordable and obedient “can-
non fodder.” Countries of Central
Asia and the Caucasus region, as
well as the self-proclaimed “repub-
lics” of South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and Transnistria, may indeed offer
large numbers of people willing to
become contract soldiers, consider-
ing that the quality of life in these re-
gions is low while unemployment is
high, and Russian military bases are
already present there.
Foreign experts believe that not
many Russian-speaking people settled
in Western Europe, the Middle East,
or the USA will be willing to serve in
the Russian army, since the payment
and social benefits offered to Russian
contract soldiers are low compared to
the world standard. Because of this,
potential candidates for the Russian
Armed Forces from the “far abroad”
are likely to come from fringe groups,
including nationalist and religious
radical-extremist formations.
The number of non-Russian-
speaking foreign nationals outside of
the CIS who would study the Russian
language with the explicit purpose of
serving in the Russian Armed Forces
under contract is considered to be
very insignificant.
Military experts believe that these
changes to contract service in the
Russian Armed Forces are not aimed
at creating detachments similar to the
elite French Foreign Legion, with high
standards of compensation, social
benefits, and bonuses for foreign na-
tionals (even though Russian recruit-
ment organizations often make such
promises). Rather, their purpose is
only to expand the recruitment base
for low-rank, entry-level jobs, paying
the candidates low wages and not as-
signing them to any positions requir-
ing access to state secrets. Plus, there
is no plan to create separate “foreign”
detachments – rather, contract sol-
diers with different citizenships would
be distributed among regular Russian
Armed Forces units.
Therefore, we can make the follow-
ing conclusions about the bulk of Rus-
sian Armed Forces’ potential contract
recruitment base, at which the legisla-
tive efforts of the Russian leadership
are aimed:
• firstly, these are Russian conscripts
and reservists, who would agree to
high-risk, short-term contracts;

6. 6
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
• secondly, these include large num-
bers of citizens from countries in the
Central Asia and Caucasus regions,
as well as people from self-pro-
claimed republics in the post-Soviet
area, who already reside in Rus-
sia for any reason, or plan to move
there; as well as citizens of post-So-
viet countries with Russian military
bases, such as Moldova, Armenia,
and Tajikistan;
• finally, and especially importantly
for Ukraine’s national security, these
efforts are also aimed at citizens of
Ukraine who reside in Russia or in
the occupied territory of Ukraine, to
recruit them to contract service with
the Russian Armed Forces.
This considerably increases the
risk of conflict escalation in Ukraine
at its current stage. In case of further
expansion of armed aggression, this
also opens up the possibility of vari-
ous “national liberation armies” or
“Ukrainian national detachments”
created on the basis of the Russian
Armed Forces.
For an example of such a situ-
ation, we can look back at the Bol-
shevist Russia aggression against
Ukraine in the 1920’s, and at the So-
viet-Finnish war.
During Soviet Russia’s repeated
invasion into Ukraine in 1917-1920,
“Ukrainian Soviet” armed formations
were created in the occupied territory
and in areas of rebellion in Ukraine.
These formations acted directly on
Moscow’s orders, while being formally
subordinated to the “Ukrainian Soviet
government” in Kharkiv. These regu-
lar formations included large numbers
of ethnically Ukrainian Red Guard
soldiers.
The Russian Federation’s plan of
action today is strongly reminiscent
of the Soviet-Ukrainian war of 1917-
1920. After over 160 thousand troops
were concentrated in the Kharkiv,
Homel, and Bryansk regions in early
December 1917, the Red Guard de-
tachments from Petrograd and Mos-
cow joined the local Red Guard groups
and captured Kharkiv on December
22. As early as December 25, 1917,
the so-called “All-Ukrainian Congress
of the Soviets” was held in the occu-
pied city, proclaiming the creation of
the “Soviet Ukrainian People’s Repub-
lic.” The government of the Ukrainian
People’s Republic in Kyiv was declared
“illegitimate,” and the Red Guard ad-
vanced on Kyiv the very next day.
Another surge of Russian aggres-
sion took place in November 1918.
After power in Ukraine was seized
by the Directory of Ukraine, Moscow
proclaimed the creation of the “Provi-
sional Workers-Peasants Government
of Ukraine.” In December 1918, the
regular forces of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic started a
new advance on Kyiv, presenting it as
actions of the “Ukrainian Red Guard.”
Russia’s official government spoke of a
“civil war” in Ukraine, a “struggle of
Ukrainian workers against the UPR,”
and, most importantly, of the “absence
of Russian troops in Ukraine.” There-
fore, according to Russia, there was a
war in Ukraine between the UPR and
the “Soviet Ukrainian People’s Repub-

7. 7
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lic,” and “Russia was not party to the
conflict.”
The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-
1940 saw the creation of Finnish
“people’s” armed formations, formally
subordinated to the so-called “Finn-
ish Democratic Republic” (FDR),
which was created by the USSR and
proclaimed on December 1, 1939. Cu-
riously enough, creation of the first
corps of the so-called “Finnish Peo-
ple’s Army” (FPA) began on Novem-
ber 11, 1939, even before the start of
the Soviet-Finnish war (November
30, 1939) and proclamation of the
puppet “FDR.” The “FPA,” originally
called the 106th Mountain Rifle Di-
vision, was titled Ingermanland and
staffed by Finnish and Karelian Red
Guards from the troops of the Len-
ingrad military district of the USSR.
On November 26, the first corps of the
“FPA” counted 13,405 military ser-
vicemen, while at the end of the war,
in February 1940, the number of the
“FPA” was close to 25 thousand. The
plan for the “FPA” was to act in the
rear of the Soviet troops within the
occupied Finland, and to eventually
become the basis for the “sovereign”
armed forces of the “FDR.” However,
starting from late December 1939,
the “FPA” was directly involved in
combat operations against the Finn-
ish Army. Its units took part in battles
near Lunkulansaari and Vyborg, and
carried out special operations and di-
version in the Finnish rear: conduct-
ing reconnaissance, mining transport
routes, and destroying military and
infrastructural objects.
Thus, the Soviet Russia, the USSR,
and the Russian Federation as their
successor have extensive experience
in creating “people’s republics” and
“democratic republics” with “people’s
armies” and “national units,” with the
aim of capturing other countries’ ter-
ritories and establishing puppet gov-
ernments.
At this time, the Russian leader-
ship is attempting to make the most
use of post-Soviet countries for its
neo-Imperial interests. This is fur-
ther apparent from the statement of
Lt. General Yuri Netkachev, a Russian
military expert, who voiced Russia’s
interest in recruiting foreign con-
tract soldiers due to the “changes in
the geopolitical situation of the post-
Soviet region, and clarified provisions
of the Military Doctrine, according to
which, Russia is creating a joint de-
fense space together with a number of
former Soviet republics.” This state-
ment, combined with the attempt to
implement the USSR-2 project, has al-
ready caused a lot of concerns among
the ruling circles of countries in the
Central Asia and Caucasus region, as
well as in Moldova.
We should note that if large num-
bers of CIS citizens are recruited to
contract military service in the Rus-
sian Armed Forces, Russian leadership
will receive strong military leverage
against those countries, which can be
used as part of its neo-Imperial policy,
and for “hybrid” war waged through
illegal armed formations, which can
turn into open armed aggression of
the Russian army at any point.

8. 8
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
An additional and very real threat
lies in the recruitment and training
of foreign individuals and groups by
Russian special services, to be used as
extremists/terrorists (individually or
as part of groups and organizations).
The missions of these foreign recruits
may include destabilizing the situa-
tion in their own countries, or in other
countries where special operations are
being conducted.
Following the “controlled chaos”
pattern, Russian special services may
recruit these terrorist groups and or-
ganizations to create an artificial in-
flux of refugees from the conflict area
to Western European countries and
other competing states, thus under-
mining their domestic security and
socioeconomic stability.
The potential increase of this risk
can be seen from increasing numbers
of Russian and CIS militants that take
active part in the extremist and ter-
rorist acts of ISIS (the Islamic State) in
Syria and Iraq, and of the Taliban in
Afghanistan; as well as from partici-
pation of Russian and Serbian citizens
in the preparation of terrorist attacks
in Montenegro in October 2016. The
Soufan Group, a US consulting com-
pany providing intelligence services
to governments and international or-
ganizations, has identified over 2,400
Russian militants (mainly of Chechen
and Dagestan origin) and 1,000 mili-
tants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
operating in Syria.
The Combating Terrorism Center
in West Point, USA, has also identified
at least 141 Russian militants, 72 mili-
tants from Uzbekistan, and 47, from
Kyrgyzstan.
Militants from the CIS countries
even hold leadership positions in ISIS:
such as one of its militant chiefs in
Syria, Gulmurod Khalimov, former
officer and head of the special forces
police in Tajikistan, who took his post
in July 2016 after the death of his pre-
decessor Russian Chechen Omar al-
Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili).
Colonel Khalimov’s biography pre-
sents a lot of interesting facts about his
service, special training, and his start
with ISIS.
We know that Khalimov has a long
service record with the Tajik power
structures. In 1997, he started service
in the Presidential Guard of Tajikistan,
commanded by the local crime boss,
and later Lt. General Gauor Mirzoyev.
The latter’s career, ever since 1992, has
been closely connected with the Pop-
ular Front of Tajikistan, created with
the help of Russian special services to
fight against the Islamic opposition.
This “Front,” in turn, was headed by
another henchman of Russian special
services, crime boss Sangak Safarov
(also known as Bobo Sangak), who
spent 23 years in prison and, when
speaking in the national parliament in
November 1992, promised “restora-
tion of the Soviet Union.”
It merits separate note that during
escalation of the confrontation be-
tween the post-Soviet administration
and the opposition forces in Septem-
ber 1991, a Russian conflict regulation
group arrived in Dushanbe, the capital
of Tajikistan. The group, in addition to

9. 9
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Anatoliy Sobchak, Alexander Yanov,
and Yevgeniy Velikhov, included the
future FSB head and Russian presi-
dent Vladimir Putin. With the help
of Russian special services and the
military, this group successfully estab-
lished a post-Communist dictatorship
headed by Emomali Rahmonov, for-
mer director of a middling Lenin State
Farm. A “Popular Front” was hastily
put together for Rahmonov’s admin-
istration, with key positions occupied
by crime bosses kept on the hook by
Russian special services. Weapons and
instructors for Rahmonov’s rule were
supplied from Russia’s 201st motor
rifle division, which currently has the
status of a Russian military base.
Under the management of these
“authorities,” Gulmurod Khalimov
successfully ascended through the
ranks of the Tajik law enforcement,
completed several anti-terrorist train-
ing courses in the USA, and did a uti-
lization tour in Russian specialized
centers in 2003. Until April 23, 2015,
he had served successfully in the
law enforcement system, including a
three-year spell as the head of an elite
special force police unit, and received
the rank of a Police Colonel.
Following that, the news of Khali-
mov’s new “appointment” as an ISIS
militant leader in Syria was all the
more incredulous. This is likely a
typical scenario for the deployment
of Russia-controlled militants in the
region.
In this context, there exists a pos-
sibility of the reincarnation and mass
training of militants for Kurdish or-
ganizations, as well as for other illegal
military groups in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, which were receiving
military and special training at Soviet
military facilities during the USSR
times.
The USA and Western Europe, in-
cluding Germany, France, Great Brit-
ain, and Spain are at the risk of seeing
a new wave of externally-orchestrated
extremist acts and terrorist attacks
carried out by Islamist terrorists, Irish
and Spanish separatists, and other ex-
tremists. Evidence of this being pos-
sible can be seen from the results of
the large-scale anti-terrorist operation
carried out by German special servic-
es on October 25, 2016 in five federal
states of Germany: Thuringia, Ham-
burg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Sax-
ony, and Bavaria. The operation had
resulted in the arrest of 13 Russian
citizens of Chechen ethnicity, with
links to the clan of Ramzan Kadyrov,
the pro-Russian head of the Chechen
Republic. The arrested, ten men and
three women aged between 20 and
30, arrived to Germany in the guise of
refugees and were preparing to carry
out terrorist acts presented as “attacks
by ISIS.”
Preventing contract soldiers from
refusing to participate
in the aggression against Ukraine
by ensuring harsh court prosecution
of those who refuse.
High casualties among the con-
tract personnel of the Russian Armed
Forces had resulted in the widespread
avoidance of “tours to the Ukrainian

10. 10
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
border” by Russian military person-
nel. The 12th Reserve Command of
the Russian Armed Forces (currently
known as the Center of the Territorial
Forces of the Southern Military Dis-
trict, Novocherkassk, Russia) is con-
sidered one of the worst assignments.
The Center of the Territorial
Forces of the Southern Military Dis-
trict was specifically created in the
second half of 2015 to “officially de-
ploy” (i.e. legendize) Russian military
servicemen to the “LNR” or “DNR”
as alleged armed “miners” and “trac-
tor drivers” who “volunteered” to
perform their duty in defense of the
pseudo-republics. The names and
military documents of the service-
men identified them as associated
with the “LNR” or “DNR.”
The Center’s organizational struc-
ture matches the staffing structure of
the 1st Army Corps (Donetsk) and the
2nd Army Corps (Luhansk).
The logic and practical execution
of this assignment are more reminis-
cent of special services than the mili-
tary. Officially (from the legal stand-
point), servicemen are assigned to the
Center of the Territorial Forces. In
reality, they are part of units and de-
tachments of the Center’s 1st and 2nd
Army Corps, which are engaged in
combat in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions of Ukraine.
Those servicemen who try to avoid
serving in the Center of the Territorial
Forces invariably find themselves on
the receiving end of the government’s
repressions. In an attempt to suppress
any resistance, Russian courts fast-
track resolutions to discharge from
military service and convict such ser-
vicemen. To this end, they use provi-
sions of the Federal Law “On Con-
scription and Military Service” that
regulate contract military service, es-
pecially the duty to “perform all gen-
eral, official, and special obligations.”
A number of servicemen have al-
ready become victim of the Russian
court system on charges of violating
their contract terms – that is, refusing
to accept placement in the 12th Com-
mand and carry out unlawful orders
by engaging in combat in Ukraine.
Among them are former Russian
military servicemen A. Stolyarov, A.
Kislenko, and M. Zakharov. Another
military serviceman, K. Kanaply-
anyk, officer of the 18th separate mo-
tor rifle brigade, attempted to avoid a
compulsory “tour of duty” to Ukraine
by contesting Order of the Minister
of Defense N 0049 of 22.02.2015 in
court, but was threatened with pros-
ecution and forced to follow the un-
lawful order.
Typically, Russian courts’ verdicts
and resolutions do not quote the real
reason for dismissal or penalty, and
any mention of Ukraine is strictly for-
bidden during proceedings.
For example, Russian citizen A.
Stolyarov addressed the Zaozersk
Garrison Military Court (Murmansk
region) with a request to declare un-
lawful his superiors’ decision to dis-
miss him early due to his alleged vio-
lation of contract terms.
In this application, the plaintiff
states that he would like to continue

11. 11
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military service, and that the review
board’s negative assessment of him
was based solely on his refusal to ac-
cept assignment in the 12th Com-
mand of the Russian Armed Forces.
The court, referencing Article 32
of the aforementioned Federal Law,
issued their resolution in case N
2-268/2015 of July 25, 2015, noting
that “the refusal to accept assignment
constitutes sufficient grounds for early
dismissal,” and refused Stolyarov’s re-
quest to declare his superiors’ treat-
ment of him as unlawful.
The Kaliningrad Garrison Military
Court passed a similar resolution in
case N 2-215/2015 on June 3, 2015, re-
fusing to satisfy the claim of a former
military serviceman (whose data has
been redacted to cover up the court’s
iniquity) to declare unlawful his early
dismissal, which had resulted from
his refusal to accept an assignment:
formally, as an officer of the 5th de-
partment in the 12th Command of the
Southern Military District; in reality,
as a commander of one of the detach-
ments of the 5th separate motor rifle
brigade (Makiivka) in the 1st Army
Corps (Luhansk).
Another representative example of
how the 12th Command is staffed is
case N 2A-470/2015, reviewed by the
Grozny Garrison Military Court fol-
lowing the claim by military service-
man Andrey Kislenko. In his claim,
Kislenko states that after a lengthy pe-
riod of service in the Chechen Repub-
lic, he addressed his superiors with
a request for routine replacement.
The superiors offered him a choice
of transfer: the 136th separate motor
rifle brigade stationed in the moun-
tainous area of the Republic of Dag-
estan (an area with increased threat
of sabotage and terrorism) or the 2nd
department of the 12th Command
of the Southern Military District (de
facto, a tour to the 2nd separate motor
rifle brigade of the 2nd Army Corps
(Luhansk). Understandably, Kislenko
refused both offers and demanded an
early dismissal from military service.
After reviewing the case, the court de-
clared that the superiors had commit-
ted no violations against Kislenko that
would entitle him to early dismissal.
The mechanism for compulsory
staffing of the Russian Armed Forces
units engaged in combat in the tempo-
rarily occupied territory of Ukraine is
also clearly seen in case N 2-99/2015,
reviewed by the Krasnorechensk Gar-
rison Military Court following the
claim of unlawful dismissal made
by former military serviceman M.
Zakharov. Zakharov had been offered
promotion to an officer in the 4th de-
tachment of the 12th command – in
reality, a commander of one of the
detachments of the 4th separate mo-
tor rifle brigade (Alchevsk) in the 2nd
Army Corps (Luhansk). The offer stat-
ed that the serviceman’s high profes-
sional credentials and commendable
moral qualities were valued by the
unit command and made him suit-
able for his duties in the higher rank.
When the officer refused this “bless-
ing” and requested to be dismissed
upon expiration of his contract, the
military unit’s review commission

12. 12
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
reversed their assessment of him to a
polar opposite, stating that he was un-
fit even for his current position, and
ruled to “dismiss [Zakharov] early due
to contract violation.”
Thus, Russia has created a formally
legal mechanism under which refus-
ing an assignment in the 12th Reserve
Command of the Russian Armed
Forces (later, the Center of the Terri-
torial Forces of the Southern Military
District) results in an early dismissal
“due to contract violation” for those
Russian military servicemen who are
unwilling to engage in combat in the
Ukrainian territory and kill Ukrainian
servicemen or civilians.
Nevertheless, this situation (the
unlawful dismissal of military service-
men) is not hopeless, since members of
the Russian Armed Forces dismissed
in this manner become entitled to
contest the falsified resolutions of the
Russian justice system in the Europe-
an Human Rights Court in Strasburg
and the International Criminal Court
in The Hague. In fact, they are within
their rights to demand considerable fi-
nancial and moral compensation from
the Russian state.
For more examples of such pros-
ecution, we can look to the court
cases against contract servicemen of
the 33rd separate motor rifle brigade,
military unit 22179 of the Russian
Armed Forces (Maikop), who cat-
egorically refused to take part in ag-
gression against Ukraine, and in late
September – mid-November 2014
went absent without leave from the
training grounds in the Rostov region
of Russia, which is located near the
state border of Ukraine.
The Maikop Garrison Military
Court ruled that contract servicemen
who refused to engage in combat in
Ukraine will be convicted to incarcera-
tion in penal colony for terms ranging
from 6 to 18 months – despite the fact
thattheservicemenhadfiledofficiallet-
ters of resignation, which were ignored
by their superiors. In those letters of
resignations, the contract servicemen
stated the reasons for termination of
their contract: “inhumane service con-
ditions” and “persistent offers to serve
in Ukraine as part of the illegal armed
formations LNR and DNR.”
The testimony of Sergeant Panel
Tinchenko (arrested in 2015 under
Article 337, part 4 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, “Un-
authorized Leave from Unit”) states,
“After studying the court’s resolution,
I must conclude that it does not re-
flect my testimony in the part of my
“failure to fulfill my order.” I refused to
fulfill an unlawful order, because I was
unwilling to violate my military oath
and engage in combat in the territory
of Ukraine. Please include this note in
the court resolution.”
Nevertheless, according to the of-
ficial version of the investigation, the
contract servicemen in question “were
unwilling to bear the hardships of mil-
itary service,” resulting in the proces-
sion of criminal cases under Article
337, part 4 of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation, “Unauthor-
ized Leave of Unit,” and Article 338
“Desertion.”

13. 13
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Another typical example is the
resolution to accuse Private Ivan
Shevkunov: “On 30.09.2014, Private I.
N. Shevkunov, while being a service-
man in contract military service, and
while being on official tour of duty to
the “Kadamovsky” training ground
with his detachment, stationed in the
Oktyabrsky (rural) district of the Ros-
tov region, being displeased with his
assignment outside of Maikop and the
Republic of Adygea, and unwilling
to bear the hardship and severity of
military service … left without leave
from his place of service, namely, the
“Kadamovsky” training ground, and
departed to his place of residence.”
According to the statistics of the
Maikop Garrison Military Court, 62
servicemen were convicted under Ar-
ticle 337 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation in the first half of
2015 alone. By comparison, the num-
ber of such convictions in the five
years between 2010 and 2014 was 35.
Among the persons convicted by
the Maikop Garrison Military Court
in 2015 were: Sergeant Khabokhov,
Junior Sergeants Yevenko, Yenenko,
Sychev, and Devchev; Corporal Aga-
janyan; and Privates Kudrin, Shevku-
nov, Yefimov, Romanov, and Sergeyev.
Most contract servicemen received
verdicts with suspended sentences or
sentences with subsequent amnesty
“to celebrate the 70th anniversary of
Victory in the Great Patriotic War.”
Typically, most servicemen under
investigation were clearly afraid to
give true testimony. Almost none of
them contested the final verdict, and
during the trial, resorted to Article
51 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, which states that “no one
can be made to testify against them-
selves.” The main reason for that is
heavy intimidation by investigators
and special services, who threaten the
accused with hard time in standard
penal colonies, should they disclose
the real reasons for their leave from
the “Kadamovsky” training grounds.
Namely, the mentioned contract ser-
viceman Pavel Tinchenko was threat-
ened with a lengthy prison sentence.
He was the first one to give truthful
official testimony about the attempts
to send the servicemen to the DNR,
about the forms that persuasion took,
and why he refused to follow an un-
lawful order. According to him, “…
people from different power struc-
tures came to my cell, and promised
me up to 13 years of prison if I don’t
recant my testimony.”
At the same time, the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation cur-
rently in effect states that “if a person
following an order was aware of the
order being unlawful, they become
complicit in the crime, with the su-
perior being held as the organizer of
the crime, and the subordinate, the
executor.” This is further proof that all
Russian military servicemen falsely
prosecuted for refusing to follow un-
lawful orders and engage in combat in
the territory of Ukraine have the right
to contest the court verdicts in Rus-
sian courts as well as in the European
Human Rights Court and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.

14. 14
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
Moreover, Article 33 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal
Court (July 17, 1998) provides for the
“intelligent bayonet” doctrine in in-
ternational law. According to it, “sub-
ordinates have to appreciate the legal-
ity of orders given by their superior,
and are liable for following obviously
unlawful orders. If an unlawful order
was followed due to physical or moral
coercion, the subordinate may be held
not liable.” Thus, military servicemen
can refuse to follow unlawful orders,
and this may be part of the reason why
the Russian Federation still refuses to
recognize the jurisdiction of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal
Court.
Therefore, in their wish to please
the Russian leadership and cover up
the Russian Armed Forces’ participa-
tion in the armed aggression against
Ukraine, the Russian Federation’s ju-
dicial bodies are committing gross vi-
olations of international and national
laws.
Russian judicial authorizes are bla-
tantly manipulating the law, and there
is no possibility of a fair outcome for
cases related to Russia’s covert aggres-
sion against Ukraine. With this in
mind, it would be feasible to provide
some recommendations to service-
men of the Russian Armed Forces and
other Russian power ministries who
are being coerced to commit unlawful
acts and military crimes in the terri-
tory of Ukraine.
Specifically, according to the stat-
utes currently in effect, military ser-
vicemen are obligated to follow lawful
orders. Most orders must be given in
writing. In case of any doubt, a mili-
tary serviceman should demand a
written order from their superior.
Otherwise, the subordinate becomes
a war criminal. An example of that
would be the actions of the Russian
crew operating the BUK anti-aircraft
missile system that had destroyed the
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 air-
craft over the Ukrainian territory, re-
sulting in the deaths of 283 innocent
civilians (including 80 children), and
turning members of that crew war
criminals.
However, with an understanding
that events in Ukraine are being or-
chestrated by the top leaders of the
Russian Federation, Russian military
servicemen have another way to pro-
tect themselves in the future trials –
by collecting proof of being coerced
into following unlawful orders and
engaging in combat in the territory of
Ukraine. Such proof can be:
• originals and photocopies of battle
orders and instructions that confirm
their unlawful nature, including let-
ters of assignment;
• video and audio recording of their
superiors issuing orders on tours of
duty to Ukraine and assigning mis-
sions in the territory of Ukraine;
• documents used for cover-up (leg-
endizing) of Russian military ser-
vicemen for missions in Ukraine;
• maps and schemes of military opera-
tions and of Russian troop locations
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
• documents confirming the supply
of weapons and military equipment

15. 15
CACDS’s
RESEARCH
from the Russian Federation, and
other documents related to logisti-
cal support of the 1st and 2nd Army
Corps of the Central Territorial
Command of the Southern Military
District of the Russian Federation;
• other documents.
It is worth remembering that
while the Russian judicial authori-
ties are fully controlled by the state
government, military servicemen can
use such documents (especially bat-
tle orders, maps, and charts) to seek
political asylum in Ukraine and other
foreign states (including the EU and
the USA). To do that, they have to
contact representatives of relevant in-
ternational organizations, or the state
authorities of Ukraine or other foreign
states. Such organizations and author-
ities would be able to provide them
with legal aid and financial assistance,
and implement a witness protection
program.
For example, programs are cur-
rently underway to protect witnesses
of the destruction of the flight MH-17
aircraft by the Russian military, and
provide them with legal and financial
assistance.
2. LEGAL ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN
AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS
PARTICIPATION IN THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN
ARMED FORCES AND ILLEGAL
ARMED FORMATIONS IN THE
TERRITORY OF UKRAINE –
ANALYZED BY PHASE OF CONFLICT.
The Russian legislation emphasizes
“the need to adhere to international
and national law during participation
in international military operations,”
while in December 2015, the State
Duma of the Russian Federation has
declared “supremacy of the national
legislation of the Russian Federation
over international law.” With this in
mind, it would be feasible to analyze
the legal situation at different phases
of Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The initial covert phase: conflict
preparation and deployment,
February – July 2014
The main legally relevant facts are
as follows:
• illegal invasion of Russian mili-
tary detachments to the territory
of Ukraine, in violation of the UN
Charter and other major interna-
tional laws. Russia has violated (dis-
regarded) international agreements
and treaties regulating international
security, preservation of statehood,
and the protection of independence
and territorial integrity of sovereign
states (UN Charter / Chapters I, VI,
VII, VIII; Helsinki Final Act, 1975;
Memorandum on Security Assur-
ances in connection with Ukraine’s
accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons (Budapest Memorandum),
05.12.1994);
• violation (disregard) by Russia of
interstate treaties and agreements
with Ukraine (Agreement between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine
on the Status and Conditions of
the Russian Federation Black Sea
Fleet’s Stay on Ukrainian Territory,

16. 16
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
28.05.1997; Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation, and Partnership be-
tween Ukraine and the Russian Fed-
eration, 31.05.1997; Treaty Between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine
on the Russian-Ukrainian State Bor-
der, 28.01.2003);
• annexation of the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea, involving the use
of Russian military detachments
without insignia on uniforms and
machinery, in violation of interna-
tional law on the rules of warfare;
• large-scale infiltration of armed citi-
zens of the Russian Federation to the
territory of Ukraine and their ter-
rorist activities within the sovereign
territory of Ukraine, in violation of
international laws and the Criminal
Code of Ukraine.
The distinguishing features of this
phase include:
• the Russian leadership’s official and
absolute denial that military service-
men of the Russian Armed Forces
and other armed formation are en-
gaged in combat in the territory of
Ukraine;
• the use of operational units of the
Main Intelligence Agency of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation (GRU GSh),
the Federal Security Service (FSB),
and the special forces of the GRU
GSh in the territory of the Autono-
mous Republic of Crimea; as well as
the use of units of the Black Sea Fleet
of the Russian Federation, forces
and reinforcements from the South-
ern Caucasus and other regions of
the Russian Federation;
• the use of “useful idiots” and mer-
cenaries from Russia and other
countries, including Serbia, France,
Spain,Brazil,etc.ThebulkofRussian
mercenaries is made up by members
of nationalist and neo-Nazi groups,
employees of foreign private mili-
tary companies, and members of
private security structures. Most of
foreign militants consist of members
of Serbian ultra-nationalist groups.
These militants have no formal links
to the Russian state military;
• Russia’s use of specific terms to re-
fer to its combatants: “volunteers,”
“internationalists,” “servicemen on
leave,” “militia,” “miners and tractor
drivers,” “lost servicemen,” “patriots
of the Russian World,” etc.
Thus, there are no international
legal grounds for Russian Federation’s
intervention in Ukraine’s affairs. There
is a gross violation of international
law, including the UN Charter, the
OSCE Charter, and other internation-
al agreements, including the bilateral
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation,
and Partnership between Ukraine and
the Russian Federation.
At this stage, Russia’s main gamble
was on covert action, blanket denial of
uncovered facts on all official levels,
the use of its influence in the UN and
the OSCE, and powerful information
and propaganda attacks.
The following laws and bylaws of
the Russian Federation are used to sup-
port the use of Russian power structures
against Ukraine:
• current decisions made by the Rus-
sian higher military-political com-

17. 17
CACDS’s
RESEARCH
mand, including the Security Coun-
cil of the Russian Federation headed
by the Russian President, are the
leading factor for escalating aggres-
sion against Ukraine. In this context,
the Security Council and the Presi-
dential Administration bodies are
the defining and strategic control-
ling bodies, while the government
plays a secondary role;
• resolution of the State Duma per-
mitting the President of the Russian
Federation to deploy the Russian
Armed Forces in the territory of
Ukraine;
• the principal legislation of the Rus-
sian Federation regulating military
service, including the Federal Law
N53-FZ of March 28, 1998 “On
Conscription and Military Service,”
and amendments to the “Provision
on the Procedure of Military Ser-
vice,” of September 16, 1999, adopt-
ed by Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation;
• agency-level Decrees, regulations
and instructions of the Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation,
including branches of the Armed
Forces, GRU GSh, FSB, Foreign In-
telligence Service (SVR), Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emer-
gency Situations, and other state
bodies.
Responses to the violation of inter-
national and national laws:
International response: formal
condemnation of the violation of in-
ternational law, and standby for fur-
ther developments; UN and OSCE
structures are paralyzed by Russia’s
strong influence in the UN Security
Council and the OSCE.
Official response of the Russian
leadership: the rules of law are used
to support aggression, while criminal
liability for terrorism, extremism, and
mercenarism applies only to citizens
who support Ukraine.
Social response in Russia: propaga-
tion of the cult of the “polite people”
dressed in uniforms without insignia,
who “efficiently” solve problems. Over-
all, despite isolated protests, the public
believes that annexation of the Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea and the
start of military operations in the so-
called “Novorossiya” are signs of Rus-
sia’s reviving national might. Russian
citizens in contract military service, as
well as reservists with military training
(including employees of many private
security firms) view taking part in the
occupation of Ukraine as a quick and
not overly dangerous way of making
money. Due to powerful propaganda,
the question of legality of Russia’s in-
tervention practically does not arise
within Russia, and does not deter peo-
ple from military service and from tak-
ing part in the occupation of Ukraine.
Failure of the covert phase
of Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine in late July-August 2014
Facts affecting the legal status of
the conflict parties:
• destruction of the Malaysia Airlines
Flight MH-17 Boeing-777 passenger
aircraft by an anti-aircraft system of
the Russian Armed Forces Air De-
fense;

18. 18
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
• direct admittance of the use of the
Russian Armed Forces in the an-
nexation of Crimea by the Russian
President in his interview with the
German channel ARD (November),
rationalized by a distorted presen-
tation of the legal precedent of Ko-
sovo’s autonomy (which is not offi-
cially recognized by Ukraine);
• direct use of regular units of the
Russian Armed Forces against the
Ukrainian military in some parts of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
violation of the rules of warfare and
the Hague Convention in the terri-
tory of Ukraine by Russian Armed
Forces and illegal armed formations
controlled by Russia;
• introduction of political and eco-
nomic sanctions against Russia by
Ukraine’s allies;
• due to high Russian casualties,
the undeclared war in Ukraine is
becoming less popular in Russia,
which results in small-scale but sig-
nificant protests and anti-military
activism in the society.
Escalation of the armed conflict in
January-February 2015, large-scale
deployment of battalion
tactical groups of the Russian
Armed Forces in Ukraine to
strengthen the pseudo-republics
Legally relevant facts:
• illegal invasion of Russian Armed
Forces to the territory of Ukraine
in order to capture Debaltseve, in
violation of the UN Charter, other
fundamental international laws, and
Minsk 2 Agreements;
• illegal supplies of weapons and am-
munition, and assignment of the
personnel of Russian Armed Forces
to the units of illegal armed forma-
tions;
• amendment by the Russian Presi-
dent of the “Provision on the Proce-
dure of Military Service” to set the
terms for military service by foreign
nationals and stateless persons aged
18 to 30 in the Russian Armed Forc-
es, and their participation in combat
operations, including abroad, “dur-
ing international conflicts.”
Controlled escalation of the
conflict – since March 2015
• unlawful military operations by the
Russian Armed Forces and illegal
armed formations in the territory of
Ukraine, as part of a low-intensity
conflict;
• further illegal supplies of weapons
and ammunition, and assignment
of the personnel of Russian Armed
Forces to the units of illegal armed
formations;
• de facto illegal formation of the mil-
itary groups, so-called “LNR” and
“DNR” by the Russian Federation in
the sovereign territory of Ukraine,
in violation of international law and
the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
• elimination of the remaining for-
mal legal restrictions in December
2015, when the Russian State Duma
rejected the supremacy of interna-
tional law (one of the principles and
imperative norms of international
law) in the national legislation of
the Russian Federation. This allows

19. 19
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RESEARCH
Russia to “legitimately” disregard
the obligations it had undertaken
(under its signed and ratified inter-
national agreements and treaties),
as well as the norms and standards
implemented into Russia’s domestic
(national) legislation “…if they are
in conflict with Russia’s national in-
terests;”
• drafting of the new version of the
Federal Law N 53-FZ of March 28,
1998 “On Conscription and Mili-
tary Service” in October 2016, to
expand recruitment of contract ser-
vicemen under short-term contracts
and allow for quick deployment of
conscripts in international conflicts
when necessary.
Overall, analyzing the current le-
gal situation, we can conclude the fol-
lowing:
Since the very start of the conflict
in the territory of Ukraine, the Rus-
sian Federation’s actions bear signs of
war crimes under international law
and criminal offences under the na-
tional legislation of Ukraine.
In order to avoid legal prosecution
for their crimes, the Russian lead-
ership is continuously seeking new
forms and methods of cover-up, mis-
information and deception, aimed at
the international community and its
own citizens, during contract recruit-
ment of Russian servicemen (includ-
ing conscripts of required specialties
who “suddenly” sign contracts under
duress), as well as of Russian and for-
eign mercenaries, to be part of illegal
armed formations.
To this end, the Russian legisla-
tion is being continuously amended,
in line with the decisions made by the
top leadership based on their analysis
of the current and forecasted situa-
tion.
In the context of international
law, this includes rejection of the su-
premacy of international law, inter-
fering with the work of international
courts related to war crimes, and re-
fusal to recognize the legitimacy of
such courts. In the context of Russian
national law, this includes adopting
laws and bylaws that serve the needs
of military planning and the use of the
Russian Armed Forces and other pow-
er structure, including the enabling of
military contract recruitment of many
Russian citizens, stateless persons,
and foreign nationals.
3. POSSIBLE LEGAL MEANS TO
COUNTERACT, CONDEMN,
AND SUPPRESS THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION’S AGGRESSION
AGAINST UKRAINE
Considering the accelerated pace
of amendment of the Russian Federa-
tion’s laws on contract military ser-
vice, and based on our analysis of the
legal aspects of the use of Russian citi-
zens and foreign nationals in the Rus-
sian Armed Forces and illegal armed
formations in the territory of Ukraine,
we suggest a number of legal measures
to counteract and condemn Russia’s
aggression.
Within the Russian Federation,
any actual opposition media outlets,
advocacy groups and foundations
have been almost entirely suppressed

20. 20
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
and replaced by surrogate “human
rights” and “servicemen rights” or-
ganizations, controlled by the Russian
special services. Considering this, it is
pointless to appeal to the representa-
tives of the fake Russian “opposition”
and “advocacy groups” while calling
for a cessation of Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine.
Instead, it would be feasible to call
for representatives of reputable inter-
national organizations to take part in
documenting of the Russian Federa-
tion’s war crimes in Ukraine. This in-
cludes official and non-governmental
organizations, such as the United Na-
tions, OSCE, Human Rights Watch,
Transparency International, Medecins
Sans Frontiers, and other reputable
organizations, as well as international
courts of different competence.
With proper protection and in-
centive programs, Russian witnesses
of war crimes can be involved in the
process. Their testimony can be very
important in the future trials against
Russian war criminals, similar to the
Nuremberg trials and the internation-
al criminal tribunal for the Yugoslavia.
This course of events is entirely
possible, especially judging from the
recent activity of the International
Court of Justice in The Hague, and
the official recognition of the Rus-
sian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine on November 14, 2016.
In this legal context, the crimi-
nal organizations should be defined
similarly to the national-socialist or-
ganizations in WW2 Germany and
the criminal units of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina commanded by
the Serbian General Ratko Mladic.
In the case of Russia, their coun-
terpart is the Center of Territorial
Troops of the Southern Military Dis-
trict, as well as its previous form, the
12th Reserve Command of the Rus-
sian Armed Forces, created and in-
tended for armed aggression against
Ukraine. There are also criminal ac-
complices and collaborators: occu-
pation authorities and “officials” of
the occupied Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and the so-called pseudo-
republics of “DNR” and “LNR.”
Therefore, according to national
and international laws:
• The Russian Federation’s aggres-
sion against Ukraine is unlawful
and criminal both under interna-
tional law and the national laws of
Ukraine. All accomplices of the ag-
gression will be exposed publicly;
• Even under the “edited” 2015 and
2016 versions of the Russian legis-
lation, participation of Russian citi-
zens, stateless persons, and foreign
nationals in unlawful operations
within the territory of Ukraine as
part of their contract military ser-
vice constitutes a war crime without
statute of limitation;
• Participation of any Russian mili-
tary servicemen in combat in the
territory of Ukraine constitutes a
crime even under Russian laws, es-
pecially prior to December 2015.
After the change of regime in the
Russian Federation, these war crim-
inals will be convicted, and denied
entry to the EU, USA, Canada and

21. 21
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most civilized countries for the rest
of their lives;
• Members of the “government” in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the so-called “DNR” and “LNR,”
as well as members of illegal armed
formations are criminal offenders
under Ukrainian and international
laws. They are puppets of the Rus-
sian Federation’s leaders, who do
not make any independent deci-
sions and will face criminal liability.
All real power and responsibility for
the crimes and the overall situation
in the occupied territory of Ukraine
lies with the Russian Federation’s
leaders, including the “assigned”
generals and officers and other ser-
vicemen of Russia’s power struc-
tures;
• The future will see an international
tribunal (similarly to the Nurem-
berg trials and the international
criminal tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia), convicting all leaders
and other servicemen of the Russian
Armed Forces, including foreign
contractors, who took part in the
occupation of Ukraine;
• AllservicemenoftheRussianArmed
Forces, other citizens of the Russian
Federation, and foreign members of
illegal armed formations, who are
found to be in Ukraine illegally, will
be held liable under the Internation-
al Convention against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries;
• All servicemen of the Russian
Armed Forces who refused to follow
unlawful orders of their command
can count on amnesty and legal as-
sistance when necessary. In this is-
sue, Ukraine is closely collaborat-
ing with the opposition democratic
forces of the Russian Federation,
non-governmental organizations
(including regional departments of
the Committee of Soldiers’ Moth-
ers of Russia) and progressive Rus-
sian cultural, creative, and academic
figures (Andrey Makarevich, Boris
Akunin, Vladimir Voinovich, and
others);
• Servicemen of the Russian Armed
Forces who had refused to engage
in combat against Ukraine are true
heroes who abided by their consti-
tutional duty and refused to follow
unlawful orders. They should be
held up as an example for all other
Russian servicemen;
• All Russian and foreign artists, cul-
ture workers and members of non-
governmental organizations who are
unlawfully present in the occupied
territory of Ukraine are in violation
of the law; and those of them who
promote war against Ukraine and
advertise the criminal acts of mer-
cenaries and Russian servicemen
in Ukraine are criminals and will
be prosecuted under international
and Ukrainian law (in the form of
trials, sanctions, and denied entry
to Ukraine and most of the world
countries);
• Ukraine calls on all ethnic Ukrain-
ians, Russians, citizens of CIS coun-
tries and other foreign nationals to
abstain from taking part in the un-
lawful war against Ukraine, and to

22. 22
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACT
RECRUITMENT OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
show support for the Ukrainian peo-
ple’s democratic choice by various
means, including events and rallies
in their countries. If contract service
in the Ukrainian army for foreign
nationals becomes a widespread
practice, the contract terms offered
by Ukraine will be superior to those
offered by the Russian Federation;
• Ukraine is consistently striving to-
wards the resolution of the conflict
and the removal of all occupation
forces from the Ukrainian territory,
including the Autonomous Repub-
lic of Crimea; it also supports the
deployment of international peace-
keeping forces and holding of honest
elections in the liberated territories in
accordance with Ukrainian law.
The suggested list of measures to
counteract Russia’s aggression at the
level of international and national law
is not exhaustive, and will be continu-
ously updated, in line with the new facts
uncovered by the Ukrainian state au-
thorities and the results of investigations
conducted by international official and
non-governmental organizations.
Counteracting Russia’s infor-
mation aggression is only possible
through close cooperation with in-
formation resources and specialized
structures of NATO, including the
NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia,
as well as those of other democratic
countries. Our joint work must be
directed and coordinated, in order to
not only debunk the current informa-
tion attacks by Russia, but also prevent
and actively counteract future attacks.
It is also crucial to join the efforts of
official state structures working in the
field of information warfare with those
of NGOs in Ukraine and other coun-
tries, such as the International Informa-
tion Consortium Bastion, an interna-
tional non-governmental organization
created in June 2016, which closely co-
ordinates its efforts with relevant bodies
of the National Security and Defense
Council of Ukraine and other Ukrain-
ian power structures. The objective of
IIC Bastion is to counteract Russian
propaganda, join efforts to monitor the
media landscape, and discover and pre-
vent the spread of Russian propaganda.
To sum up our assessments above,
we should note that among the key
factors impacting Ukraine’s national
security are the awareness of, and
adequate response to, the legislative
measures carried out by the Russian
leadership to strengthen their power
structures, which include increasing
the number of units and personnel of
the Russian Armed Forces, persecut-
ing those who refuse military service,
and ignoring international and na-
tional law.
Joint structures in the field of stra-
tegic communication and informa-
tion warfare should be created and
supported on the levels of states and
ministries, and work in close coopera-
tion with relevant non-governmental
organizations.
Effective work in this direction
also requires close coordination and
cooperation with respective bodies
of Ukraine’s allies, primarily the USA
and other NATO members.