Putin friends eng-10-05-2016

PUTIN’S FRIENDS
Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament
Laboratory for Personality Analysis
2016
Dmitry A. Kozlov
Project is dedicated to the analysis of the possible reactions and
correcting the foreign policy of a number of states in the field of
political influence Putin’s Kremlin

kraine is going through
one of the most difficult
periods in its historical
development. The
existential challenge issued by Putin’s
regime has already left a permanent
scar in the consciousness of everyone
who identifies as a Ukrainian.
Ukraine of 2014 – 2015 was turned
into a trial laboratory for Russian
weapons and Russian technologies of
influence, becoming a bloody testing
ground for Moscow’s mission project
to redraw the geopolitical map of the
world.
However, it should be noted
that the ongoing war is not limited
to eastern Ukraine and Syria. It also
covers a number of countries where
the Kremlin’s attacks are tacit and
insidious, often barely noticeable
even for professionals. Considering
the dark KGB past of the Kremlin’s
master, this type of warfare is a
particular favorite of his — and
especially dangerous, because of its
ability to strongly affect the balance
of power. Overall, Moscow uses
every opportunity to gain allies and
incite them to cooperate. To this
end, it makes use of some countries’
power and business structures,
as well as some well-known
individuals. For a clear example of
an arrangement with the Kremlin,
consider the disgraceful statement
by the former President of France
Nicolas Sarkozy after the Paris
terror attacks (November 15, 2015),
in which he urged towards more
closely-knit relations with Russia,
and towards creating a coalition
“PUTIN’S FRIENDS,”OR THE
NON-MILITARY DIMENSION OF
CONFRONTATION
U
Valentyn Badrak,
Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies

3
“PUTIN’S FRIENDS,”
OR THE NON-MILITARY DIMENSION OF CONFRONTATION
“that would include the “Russians.”
That is merely one demonstration
of the effect of Russian IO/PSYOP
technologies (possibly combined
with financial leverage), not to
mention their efficiency and speed.
In the international arena, the
political confrontation between
Russia and the West continues to
deepen, while the exchange of tough
statements in November 2015 is
characteristic of the Cold War. The
US defense secretary Ashton Carter
accused Russia of “nuclear saber-
rattling” and endangering world
order, challenging its commitment
to strategic stability. In its next
National Security Strategy, the
United Kingdom named Russia
a major threat. General Mark
Milley, the Chief of Staff of the US
Army made a notable statement
that “Russia is a greater threat to
the USA than ISIS.” “Russia is, by
definition, a threat to the United
States because of their nuclear
capabilities. Other countries have
nuclear weapons, but none as
many as Russia and none have the
capability to destroy — literally
destroy — the United States,”
the General emphasized, when
commenting on the dangers of
Russia’s unpredictable policy.
When considering Putin’s
prospects, it is important to
remember that the stand-off
between Russia and the West
currently spans a large number
of countries whose positions can
have a significant effect on the
turn of events. There is no front
line here — but at the same time,
politicians, diplomats, special
services, and even community
leaders work to win allies among
the official authorities of these
many states. Because a state’s
position is always a derivative of
the views of specific individuals,
the Laboratory for Personality
Analysis of the Center for Army,
Conversion and Disarmament
Studies (CACDS LPA) undertook
an analytical project that aims to
research and forecast the possible
response of countries currently
within the sphere of the Kremlin’s
political influence.
It bears mentioning that
attitudes towards Russia changed
sharply after the unexpected
downing of the Russian SU-24,
and a negative perception of the
unpredictable Kremlin currently
prevails. The relations between
Russia and Turkey entered a
dangerous curve, despite earlier
economic cooperation and
potential projects in the energy
sphere (which were a particularly
threat to Ukraine).
Nevertheless, that does not
stop the Kremlin from using every
available resource and opportunity
to expand its global influence and

4 PUTIN’S FRIENDS
affect the psychological perception
of Russia. This entire political
process is highly interesting and
merits in-depth studies, on the
psychological and personological
level. This is why the CACDS
LPA took the first step towards
systematizing and creating the
background for further deep
research into the cause-and-effect
relationship in this aspect of rivalry
and global struggle for leadership.

Dmitry A. Kozlov
Born in 1986 in Kiev
A graduate from National Academy of Fine Arts and Architecture (2012)
with a degree in Theory and History of Arts. Worked as research fellow
in projects on role of the individual in cultural and historic processes.
Author and columnist.
Expert at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
(CACDS), head of the Laboratory for Personality Analysis which was
established under the auspices of the CACDS in 2014.
Major areas of research include politico-psychological aspects of
personality analysis and related aspects of international politics.
The profiles of individual members of President Vladimir Putin’s inner
circle were drawn up by Dmitry Kozlov as part of research «Putin’s
inner circle» (2015) conducted by the Laboratory for Personality
Analysis. He is also the author of studies on a number of States, which
the Kremlin considers as allies in the war against the Western world
(“Putin’s Friends”, 2015) and of States-members of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (“Kremlin project “The CSTO”. The results of the
implementation and implications for Ukraine”, 2016).
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

he Czech Republic
regularly ends up on the
list of “Russia’s friends
in Europe” — usually
because of the statements and actions
of the Czech President Miloš Zeman,
even he is far from being the only agent
of Moscow’s influence in the country.
However, even taking into account
the presence of a pro-Russian lobby,
all “allies” of the Russian Federation
are sooner a media phantom and
the manifestation of intra-European
tension, rather than real partners of
the Kremlin’s master. Thus, the Czech
Republic, as well as Hungary, does
not really belong on the list of “Putin’s
friends”whenconsideredmoreclosely.
The pro-Russian rhetoric
of some Czech politics is rather
understandable. The Czech Republic’s
current political elite has roots in
the socialist Czechoslovakia. The
Republic’s current president Miloš
Zeman was born in 1944 in Kolin.
As a child, the future Czech leader
had witnessed the consequences of
the Nazi occupation, which clearly
added to his dislike of ring-wing
views. During his education in the
University of Economics in Prague,
Zeman sought to join the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia. However,
after becoming a member in 1968,
Zeman was forced to leave the party
a mere two years later, because of his
public criticism of the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent
tightening in the country’s regime.
During these years and until the
early 90’s, the future President taught
at the University of Economics,
worked in several companies, and
conducted research. Zeman got
involved in politics right before
the liberalization and the Velvet
Divorce, the peaceful dissolution of
Czechoslovakia. Between 1990 and
1992, Zeman was a member of the
last convocation of the Parliament of
Czechoslovakia. After the dissolution
of the country, the future President
would step up his political activity
and build up the center-left Czech
Social Democratic Party, which had
formally existed until the 1940’s.
BETWEEN WEST AND EAST: THE REASONS,
MYTHS, AND REALITY OF THE CZECH
REPUBLIC’S PRO-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS
T

7
BETWEEN WEST AND EAST: THE REASONS, MYTHS, AND
REALITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S PRO-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS
ČSSD would grow in popularity and
eventually become represented in the
Parliament.
Zeman’s distinctive temper and
quarrelsome disposition were already
becoming apparent at that time.
Despite the party’s success, Zeman’s
political career was a series of ups
and downs. Between 1996 and 1998,
he chaired the Chamber of Deputies
of the Parliament of the Czech
Republic, but lost his post as the head
of the ČSSD in 2001. After the Senate
election, which proved unfortunate
for his party, Miloš Zeman voluntarily
left all his posts, and ran for President
in 2003. However, his success was
thwarted by disagreements within
his own party, and Václav Klaus
won the presidential race instead. In
2007, Zeman left ČSSD because of
fierce disagreements with the new
party leaders, only to form a new
political party two years later: the
center-left Party of Civic Rights –
Zemanovci (Strana Práv Občanů
ZEMANOVCI — SPOZ).
It was only ten years later, in
2013, that Zeman would finally
fulfill his ambition and become
President. Even so, the President’s
post in the parliamentary Czech
Republic is secondary to that of the
Prime Minister. The President acts
largely in a representative capacity,
which is often the reason behind
Zeman’s provocative statements —
since everyone, including Zeman
himself, are aware that his words
would not be followed by action.
There would be no point in listing
all of the Czech President’s attacks
against Ukraine, nor his statements in
support of Putin’s politics, as Zeman’s
controversial statements regularly
sends shockwaves through the media.
Essentially, the Ukrainian-
Russianconflictisnotthemainreason
behind Zeman’s position. Instead,
we should consider the President’s
personality: forceful, provocative, and
close-minded. Zeman shares many
personal traits with Vladimir Putin,
while his left-wing ideas and affinity
with the Czech Communist Party
dictate his animosity towards the new
Ukraine, with its anti-communist
initiatives and lack of left-wing forces
in the political sphere. This dislike is
furthered by Russian propaganda,
which paints Ukrainian politics as
dominated by the right-wing radicals
detested by Zeman.
ApartfromZeman,thereareother
more-or-less pro-Russian politicians
in the Czech Republic: such as Jiri
Vyvadil, head of Friends of Russia
in the Czech Republic; or President
Václav Klaus’ former press-secretary
Peter Hajek, with his Protiproud
portal. The ex-President himself, a
known Euroskeptic, has also made
numerous statements in support
of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, even
though his rhetoric is usually softer
and more flexible compared to that of

8 PUTIN’S FRIENDS
other Czech “friends” of Russia, and
is sooner a criticism of the EU and
the new Ukrainian government than
direct support for Putin.
Jaroslav Foldyna, a social-
democratic MP, is another example of
a pro-Russian politician. Known for
his dislike of right-wing forces, this
long-time ally and former party fellow
of Miloš Zeman often makes even
harsher statement than the President
himself. Businesses with interests in
the East are also pragmatically pro-
Russian. Finally, with 15% of seats
in the Parliament, Communists
also have a strong influence, and
recently blocked the ratification of the
Ukraine-EU Association Agreement.
Does Ukraine have any way to
influence these sentiments? Overall,
the anti-Ukrainian position assumed
by the small yet loud part of the Czech
political elite is easily understood. The
problem goes beyond the Russian
propaganda, the lobbies, and the
omnipresent influence of Gazprom —
even through all these factors are
present in the Czech Republic and
many other European countries.
The cause of anti-Ukrainian (yet not
necessarily pro-Russian) sentiments
among the Czechs is the long-
standing image of Ukraine as the
supplier of unqualified immigrants.
In this aspect, everything depends
on the Ukrainian government, whose
ability to carry out reforms and lead
Ukraine out of economic distress
would immediately improve the
attitude towards Ukrainians in the
Czech Republic. Czech businessmen
who have dealings with Russia are not
an immediate concern, since Russia,
balancing on the brink of economic
collapse and sinking into recession,
is becoming less and less attractive
of a business partner for the Czechs.
Gazprom’s pressure will steadily
decrease as fuel prices continue to
drop. Even without these inevitable
trends, Russia’s positions in the Czech
Republic do not present a threat to
Ukraine.
The Czech Republic’s center-left
ruling coalition, which consists of the
Social Democratic Party, ANO 2011,
and the Christian and Democratic
Union, firmly sticks to a unified pro-
Ukrainian position adopted by the
EU and the Visegrad Four, as does the
Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka.
The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
consistently offers comments on the
President’s statements, emphasizing
that they reflect strictly his personal
opinions.AsinHungary,theeconomy
rules the day, and no one in the
Czech Republic wishes to endanger
cooperation with Europe for the
sake of maintaining relations with
a stagnating eastern country. This
rational approach is backed up by
the results of numerous social polls,
which show that most Czechs support

9
BETWEEN WEST AND EAST: THE REASONS, MYTHS, AND
REALITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S PRO-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS
the European and Euro-Atlantic
course. Despite a certain antipathy
for Ukraine, most are not sympathetic
to Russia, either, believing it to be an
aggressive state with a low standard of
living. This fear of Russia is common,
even among citizens with leftist and
Communist views.
All these factors indicate that in
ordertomaintainanddevelopbilateral
relations with the Czech Republic,
Ukraine should continue cooperating
with the ruling coalition, do more to
combat Russian propaganda, and step
up its informational and diplomatic
effort to promote a positive image of
Ukraine in the Czech media space.
Overcoming the economic crisis
and putting a start to sustainable
growth of the Ukrainian economy
will also positively contribute to
pro-Ukrainian sympathy – not just
in the Czech Republic, but in other
European countries as well.
The only factor that remains hard
to influence is the strong Communist
party, whose sentiments are not
necessarily pro-Russian, but definitely
strongly anti-Ukrainian, because
of the new Ukrainian government’s
anti-Communist initiatives. A partial
solution for that problem would be
the emergence of at least one left-wing
political force with socialist or social-
democratic views in the Ukrainian
political field, with a constructive
agenda aimed towards the interests of
a unified, pro-European Ukraine. For
the same reason, more effort should
be focused on cooperation with
Czech politics and media, to combat
the image of Ukraine imposed by
Russian propaganda. Otherwise, said
image — that of a lair of the victorious
ultra-rights—willinevitablycontinue
inspiring animosity in the Czech
Republic’s strong left-wing political
forces and their voters.

ince the start of
Russian aggression
in Ukraine, Hungary
has been rightfully
considered the main outpost of
Russian influence in the EU. The
ruling Euroskeptics headed by
the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
are regularly issuing provocative
statements in support of Putin’s
policy and demonstrating their
animosity to the European foreign
policy in general and the EU’s
sanctions in particular. Russia has
other allies in Europe, but Hungary
can be rightfully considered
number one among them (bar the
non-EU Serbia). However, is the
pro-Russian orientation of Orbán
and other Hungarian politics as
straightforward as it seems? To
answer this question, let us consider
Hungarian political strongmen,
starting with the European Union’s
main enfant terrible, the Prime
Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán.
The political career of the
current head of the Hungarian
government is rooted in the times
of the socialist Hungarian People’s
Republic. The future Hungarian
leader appeared on the political
arena in the late 1980’s, the crisis
time for the socialist camp.
Viktor Orbán was born May 31,
1963 in Székesfehérvár. After doing
military service between 1981 and
1982, he went to study law in the
Budapest University, from which
he graduated in 1987, on the
eve of the revolutionary events.
While working as a sociologist
in an institute of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food, Orbán
started taking an interest in the
progressively livelier political life
of the country. In March 1988,
he became one of the founding
members of the Fidesz party. In
1989, the last year of János Kádár’s
communist regime, Viktor Orbán
becomes a nationally known after
making a speech at the reburial
of Imre Nagy and other activists
executed in 1958 after the quelling
of the anti-Communist uprising.
VIKTOR ORBÁN’S HUNGARY — PUTIN’S
OUTPOST IN EUROPE OR A EUROPEAN
BELARUS?
S

11
VIKTOR ORBÁN’S HUNGARY —
PUTIN’S OUTPOST IN EUROPE OR A EUROPEAN BELARUS?
Orbán’s call for a free election
and removal of Soviet forces from
Hungary struck a chord with many
of his compatriots.
By 1990, Orbán, now a member
of the Parliament, becomes head
of Fidesz, transforming the party
from a liberal political force to
a right-wing conservative one.
After waiting out the rebirth of
the previous ruling Hungarian
Socialist Party, caused by the
public’s disappointment in the
liberal reforms and a drastic drop
in the quality of life, Orbán leads
Fidesz to a parliamentary election
victory, with 44% of votes. Thus, in
1998, after forming and becoming
head of the government, the 35-
year Orbán becomes the youngest
Prime Minister in Hungary’s
modern history.
The rule of Fidesz brought
certain improvements: primarily,
decreased inflation and budget
deficit, and sustainable economic
growth achieved through lower
taxes and social fees. However, the
political changes were much more
tangible. Promoting the German
government model, where the
Prime Minister has the leading
role, Orbán carried out a radical
reform of the government staff,
greatly increasing the importance
of the Prime Minister’s office and
government, and weakening the
Parliament. This received strong
criticisms from the opposition,
which perceived saw authoritarian
aspirations in the Prime Minister’s
actions, and not without cause.
In 2002, Fidesz loses the
elections, and Orbán retires from
his position to join the opposition
to the social-liberal coalition. His
conservative and populist rhetoric
becomes more and more inclined
towardsethno-nationalism.Orbán’s
pan-Hungarian statements start
stirring unease in the neighboring
countries with large Hungarian
expat communities – first of all,
Slovakia.
In 2010, still reeling from
the global economic recession,
Hungary votes for Fidesz again,
along with their more radical
right-wing populism allies, the
nationalist party Jobbik. Viktor
Orbán becomes Prime Minister
again.
Orbán’s “Second Coming”
is hallmarked by increased
nationalist tendencies and an all-
round crackdown. Unwilling to
share power with Jobbik, Orbán
decides to outdo them in terms
of nationalism and thus win a
larger share of voters. The first
and the most symbolic step on
this new course is the change in
the name of the state: from “the
Hungarian Republic” to “Hungary.”
This change aimed to expand the
Hungarian community’s orbit

12 PUTIN’S FRIENDS
beyond the country’s population,
and to include all Hungarians living
abroad. June 4th, the day of the
1920’sTreatyofTrianon,afterwhich
Hungary ceded parts of its territory
to Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia,
is proclaimed the National Unity
Day. Constitutional amendments
established the dominance of
Christianity in the country, which
contributed to clericalization of
the society and the resulting legal
ban on abortions. Monuments
to Communist figures were
summarily torn down, replaced
by images of Miklós Horthy, an
ultra-right dictator and an ally
of Hitler. The finishing touches
of Orbán’s great-power policy
included restrictions for the media
(a mandatory demand to share
the ideas of Hungarian solidarity
and identity), and legalization of
firearms, which gave a great boost
to informal paramilitary groups
with largely nationalist and anti-
Romani sentiments. With the start
of the Ukrainian crisis, Orbán
made several loud statements
about the need to grant autonomy
to Hungarians in Zakarpattia
(the Transcarpathian region),
and spoke out in support of the
annexation of Crimea and of
Putin’s policy in Ukraine. The April
2014 parliamentary election showed
a drop in Fidesz’ popularity, but did
not take the Prime Minister’s seat
away from Orbán. However, at the
same election, Orbán’s ideological
“partners” in Jobbik were even more
popular,whichshowsthatHungarians
may be growing weary of Orbán,
but the seeds of his nationalism had
landed on fertile soil.
Let us turn our attention to
another well-known Euroskeptic,
another of Fidesz’ founding
fathers — László Kövér, the Speaker
of the Hungarian Parliament. This
ally of Orbán’s was born in 1959
in Pápa. In the power architecture
constructed by Orbán, where the
Parliament is weak and pliable,
Kövér is a purely technical figure,
and any statements made by him
can be readily attributed to the all-
powerful Prime Minister himself.
In October 2014, Kövér caused
a media uproar by showering
criticisms on the EU and NATO,
accusing Brussels of dictatorial
ambitions, attacking the sanctions
policy, and speaking about the
possible departure of Hungary
from the EU — which, he believes,
is becoming more reminiscent
of the USSR. Kövér’s statements
were backed by Tamás Deutsch,
Hungary’s representative in the
European Parliament. Deutsch
noted, among others, that
“European values are very far from
us.” This statement was widely
criticized by the opposition parties,
who wanted a response from

13
VIKTOR ORBÁN’S HUNGARY —
PUTIN’S OUTPOST IN EUROPE OR A EUROPEAN BELARUS?
Orbán, demanding that he makes
it clear whether Hungary’s main
partner is Brussels or Moscow.
And yet, Orbán remained
silent.
AnotheroneofOrbán’s“talking
heads” is János Áder, a Fidesz
member elected as the President
of Hungary in 2012 through
a parliamentary vote. Being a
symbolic figure with very little
real authority, Áder has frequently
acted as a yes-man for Viktor
Orbán’s nationalist statements.
In 2013, at the celebration of the
National Unity Day instituted by
the Prime Minister, the President
announced that Hungarians cannot
come to terms with the Treaty
of Trianon. It bears noting that
this statement was made during a
tour of the President’s Budapest
residence, organized for children
of Hungarian expat communities,
including those from Ukraine.
One does not require much
specialized knowledge or expertise
to see the parallels between the state
model created by Viktor Orbán in
Hungary, and a certain country
located some 1000 kilometers
to the east. A conservative and
nationalist rhetoric combined with
unbridled populism, authoritarian
governance methods, crackdown
on the media, and the feeding of
revanchist hysteria – all of these
are equally present in the regime of
Viktor Orbán and that of Vladimir
Putin. Extra similarities come
in the form of disregard for law,
total corruption, and the cynical
pragmatism of the ruling elite.
Orbán and Putin are similar in their
prioritization of personal gain and
cold calculation for any decision,
above and beyond any norms of
law or moral principles. However,
this very same pragmatism also
conceals the main hurdle in the
way of a Russian-Hungarian union.
The Hungarian ruling clique,
Orbán included, are extremely
rational. Similarly to the Russian
elite, they equate their personal
interests and those of the state.
This means that Hungarian politics
clearly view any real alliance with
Moscow as a dead end. Orbán
definitely sees the prospects of
some collaboration with Russia,
particularly in the fuel and energy
sector. He also is unwilling to lose
his biggest trading partner outside
the EU – especially knowing that
Putin, after hitting some troubled
waters, will readily offer Budapest
many favors and preferences
in exchange for ostentatious
benevolence. However, a closer
look will show that Orbán’s “anti-
European” rhetoric is purely
populist, with zero economical
or political foundation. Cold
pragmatic logic tells the autocratic
Prime Minister that an EU and

NATO member sitting smack in
the middle of a united Europe
has no alternative attraction
poles — at least until some systemic
disintegration becomes apparent in
the EU. But even in that unlikely
scenario, Budapest is much more
likely to find a major partner in the
financially equipped Washington
rather than in the economically
beleaguered Moscow. Orbán’s
skilled political games put one in
mind of the Belarusian President
Lukashenko, who is doing similar
dances within the Moscow-created
Eurasian Economic Union. But, just
like Lukashenko, Orbán is tied to
the “mothership” by many economic
strings, and his talk of anything
bigger than situational political
maneuvers should not be taken
seriously. Further proof of this
came during multiple votes for the
next set of sanctions against Russia,
when Orbán’s “pro-Putin” Hungary
would vote in favor of the measures
previously denounced by it as
“counter-productive.” Meanwhile,
statements in support of Putin’s
actions in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine are thrown into sharp
contrast by the official position of
the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs — which does not accept the
Crimean referendum as legitimate.
Perhaps, on a personal level,
Orbán, being a pragmatic cynic,
is drawn to the similarly cynical
and pragmatic Putin — but his
final choice is never in favor of the
second best.
Considering all of the above,
it becomes clear that in order to
keep Hungary within the EU’s
generally pro-Ukrainian foreign
policy course, Ukraine must simply
raise this issue in Brussels more
often. Even without any diplomatic
efforts on our behalf, Orbán’s
real policy in most key issues will
remain anti-Russian. Different
scenarios are only possible in case
of serious economic trouble in the
EU combined with stabilization
and/or growth in Russia (while the
opposite remains true at this time).
This is the only profitable option –
and for the ruling leaders of Fidesz,
profit remains above all.
It is just good business.

n August 20, 2015,
the Prime Minister of
Greece Alexis Tsipras
resigned, announcing
early elections scheduled for Sep-
tember 20. That marked the end of
another act of the lingering Greek
tragedy, as well as the end of the brief
but politically intense rule of the in-
flammatory radical left populists of
the Syriza party, over whom the os-
tentatious Prime Minister, after ar-
riving at the painful agreements with
the EU, had de facto lost control.
Overall, Tsipras’ brief triumph
turned out to be a failed bluff, in al-
most every aspect. The road to pow-
er is often paved with populism, yet
the harsh realities are often quick to
bring the winner back to the ground,
and the realities of today’s Greece are
harsher than ever. But even though
Tsipras’ cooperation with Putin’s
Russia turned out to be more show
than real foreign policy — as did
many of his other moves — the ques-
tion of Greece’s sympathies remains a
certain risk for Ukraine. Recent deci-
sions to provide air corridors for Rus-
sian aviation en route to Syria, made
after Tsipras’ resignation and despite
the US pressure, point to the presence
of a powerful Russian lobby and the
remaining pro-Russian sympathies
among the ruling elite. For Ukraine,
Greece’s current foreign policy is a
relevant concern: first of all, because
of Greece being one of the countries
blocking the Ukraine-EU associa-
tion agreement, and because of this
country’s general animosity towards
European unity. There is also another
important aspect to consider: Greece,
with its colossal, chronic economic
troubles and unmanageable debt,
can serve as a textbook of sorts for
Ukraine, which is at the risk of facing
the same challenges for a number of
reasons. To avoid repeating the same
sad Hellenic story, we should closely
consider today’s Greece and its most
recent history.
Strong leftist sympathies among
the population of Greece are hardly
news. The current Greek state has
formed after WW2, when Greece,
THE GREEK TRAGEDY,
OR THE PRICE OF POPULISM
O

newly liberated from the German,
Italian, and Bulgarian occupants,
immediately sank into a bloody civil
conflict between the pro-Communist
powers supported by Stalin’s USSR,
and the monarchist government’s
troops, backed by the USA and Great
Britain. The government’s triumph
set the course for the country: NATO
membership and European integra-
tion. However, it was not long before
the cradle of democracy abandoned
Western values. After the 1967 coup,
the country was ruled by a military
junta, the so-called Regime of the
Colonels. This military dictator-
ship was only overthrown in 1974.
Following the transitional period
dubbed the Metapolitefsi, Greece
became a parliamentary republic.
In 1981, leftist forces — the social-
ist party PASOK — came to power,
ready to make up for the long years
of being banned and forced under-
ground. A course towards the social-
ist state was announced.
During the decades that followed
the fall of the Regime of the Colonels,
socialistandright-wingforces(theNew
Democracy party) took their turns in
the government, but in their attempt
to look better than the other before
the voters, both essentially pursued the
same course – populism. Global eco-
nomic growth allowed both left- and
right-wing populists to inflate social
programs to ridiculous proportions,
while Greece’s real economy remained
vulnerable and poorly diversified. The
peak of this ephemeral prosperity
came around 2004. The global real es-
tate bubble was still growing, and with
it, Greece’s pensions, benefits, bureau-
cracy and corruption. Then, as soon as
2008, the US mortgage credit crunch
brought Greece to the brink of disaster
and to the endless economic nightmare
that is still not over. Thus started the
long stand-off between the Greek gov-
ernment, the Greek and European bu-
reaucracy, the growing debt, the credit
and budget problems… New Democ-
racy’s right-wing government fell, to be
replaced by the lefts, who, in turn, gave
way to New Democracy again. Finally,
along came Alexis Tsipras’ Syriza.
Thefutureenfantterribleofmod-
ern European politics and the leader
of the radical left coalition started his
political career while still in school.
Born in 1974, the year of the military
dictatorship’s fall, Tsipras grew up to
become a typical representative of
the new-wave politicians. Like many
others, he was molded by the rejuve-
nated social and political landscape
that followed the end of the Regime
of the Colonels, and plunged head-
first into the leftist ideas that became
the next big thing after many years of
ultra-right authoritarianism.
Greece’s future Prime Minister
was the youngest child in the family,
growing up with two older siblings
and doting parents. Young Alexis
spent his childhood in the Ambelok-

17THE GREEK TRAGEDY, OR THE PRICE OF POPULISM
ipi district of Athens, where he grad-
uated from a regular local school.
Tsipras became interested in politics
at a very young age, and avidly read
all political newspapers and maga-
zines that his father brought home.
In late 1980’s, Tsipras joined the
youth chapter of the Communist Par-
ty of Greece, and first drew attention
to himself in early 1990’s, when he
took part in student protests against
the education reform. After getting a
taste for popularity as a protest activ-
ist and street politician, Tsipras was
active in the student union during
his time in the National Technical
University of Athens, where he ma-
jored in civil engineering.
After the dissolution of the
Communist Party of Greece, Tsipras
joined Synaspismos, a movement
of radical lefts and “greens,” which
would eventually become the foun-
dation for Syriza. Starting out as
the secretary of the youth chapter
of Synaspismos, Tsiprar quickly
moved through the party’s ranks,
with the help from the Synaspismos
leader Alekos Alavanos. In 2006,
the young and charismatic radical
ran for the Mayor’s office in Athens
and, to everyone’s surprise, came in
third in that race. In 2008, Alavanos
backed Tsipras again, surrendering
to him the post of the leader of Sy-
naspismos, which Alavanos himself
would leave — ironically, because
of the disagreements with Tsipras
about Greece’s European perspec-
tives. Tsipras, not too saddened by
the departure of his sponsor, breezed
through the elections in the capital
and soon became the leader of his
party’s parliamentary faction.
Once comfortable in his role as
the party leader, Tsipras showered
his opponents with leftist popu-
list rhetoric, which quickly gained
him popularity and attracted the
attention of his leftist European
colleagues. Tired of the right-wing
government’s austerity measures,
Greeks quickly took Tsipras’ critical
statements to heart. After a success-
ful election in 2012, Tsipras’ party,
now called Syriza (the Coalition
of the Radical Left), becomes the
largest opposition force in Greece.
Tsipras, with his great experience in
street protests and soapbox rhetoric,
never ceases telling people exactly
what they wish to hear: he prom-
ises an increase in social standards,
as well as help for the unemployed
and the socially vulnerable, while
blaming the prolonged economic
crisis on the EU and the IMF. Con-
tinuously dodging the questions
about the real causes of the reces-
sion, Tsipras easily takes advantage
of the disappointment in the ranks
of voters, who do not see any posi-
tive effect of the unpopular neolib-
eral reforms. Syriza’s election victo-
ry comes easy, but its leader would
soon realize that actually running a

debt-ridden state is much more dif-
ficult than sweet-talking his voters.
At first glance, Tsipras’ ascent to
power did not bode well for Ukraine,
in light of the conflict with Russia.
Syriza has long cooperated with the
Kremlin; the Greek Prime Minister
frequently visited Moscow and met
with Putin; and one of the radical
lefts’ declared goals was the refusal of
sanctions against Russia. The Greek
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nikos
Kotzias, a close friend of the Russian
ultra-nationalist Alexander Dugin,
said he did not understand the EU’s
position, and was quoted speaking
in support of the federalization of
Ukraine. His words rang in unison
with the statements of other Syriza
representatives, who on multiple oc-
casions supported Russia and pro-
Russian militants in Ukraine, as well
as Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Nevertheless, the political sym-
pathies of Tsipras and his loyalists
turned out to be the same as his
campaign rhetoric – a grandiose
and desperate bluff. During his short
term in office, Tsipras was constantly
upping the stakes in his confronta-
tion with European institutions,
pandering to Moscow, threatening
the destruction of the eurozone, and
attempting to blackmail the EU, un-
derstanding that Greece’s collapse
would be a heavy ordeal for the
entire European Union. As befits a
politician tracing his roots to street
protests, Tsipras won the voters’ sup-
port at the referendum, which gave
him grounds to keep dropping hints
that the people are with him, that
his threats are serious, and that he
is prepared to go the distance. How-
ever, in the end, hiding behind the
mask of a radical left was a rational,
level-headed politician, who was
forced to accept the reality. There is
nothing shocking about that. Mem-
bers of Tsipras’ circle describe him
as a calm and composed person, one
who can both listen and keep the di-
alogue rolling. The greatest strengths
of the Greek Prime Minister are said
to be his ability to keep his eye on
the prize, and the skill to pick the
right team, where everyone’s tasks
perfectly match their talents. Far
from his public image of a radical
madman and dreamer, it is unlikely
that a man like this was truly consid-
ering pushing Greece into a gamble
with an uncertain outcome.
After agreeing to the creditors’
terms, Tsipras lost the support of a
part of his electorate and was forced
to resign, announcing early elections
for his replacement. Thus ended the
dream of social fairness and easy
solutions for complicated problems,
and Syriza, built upon populism, fell
apart. The mandate for creating a
temporary government went to Van-
gelis Meimarakis, Tsipras’ counter-
part from the competing right-wing
New Democracy.

19THE GREEK TRAGEDY, OR THE PRICE OF POPULISM
Born in 1953 in Athens, Mei-
marakis joined New Democracy
in 1974, the year when Tsipras was
born and the Regime of the Colonels
fell. Similarly to his opponent, Mei-
marakis was active in student unions
during his years in Athens’ Panteion
University, and then held multiple
positions in New Democracy’s right-
wing governments. Meimarakis took
over New Democracy after the par-
ty’s leader and former Prime Minister
Antonis Samaras resigned following
the referendum in which the major-
ity of Greeks supported Tsipras. At
the time, the vote seemed like a pain-
ful defeat for New Democracy — but
in the end, Tsipras’ bluff resulted in a
triumph for the rights. Meimarakis,
being a level-headed and composed
old-school politician, immediately
announced an end to the lefts’ exper-
iments with the country, and a return
to the policy of compromise and co-
operation with European and global
financial institutions.
Yet this lull may be short-lived.
The rights’ victory at the up-
coming election will be relative. It
is most likely that the new govern-
ment will be a coalition of New De-
mocracy and Syriza, in which the
lefts and the rights will have to co-
operate. It is possible, while not very
probable, that Tsipras will return as
Prime Minister, unless, of course, he
chooses to remain in the more fa-
miliar role of the universally critical
opposition populist. Either way, the
uniting factor for Greek politicians
right now is the need to accept real-
ity – the inevitable cooperation with
the EU and international financial
organizations, the continued painful
transformations, and the Euro-At-
lantic course as the single option for
the country. However, it is too early
to celebrate Greece’s departure from
the radical lefts’ pro-Russian rheto-
ric and Euroskepticism, because the
reasons behind those trends are still
present. Besides, the right wing of
Greek politicians is also prone to Eu-
roskepticism. This applies even to the
moderate part of the political spec-
trum, let alone such clearly neo-Nazi
movements as Nikolaos Michalolia-
kos’ “Golden Dawn,” which is rep-
resented in both the Greek and the
European Parliaments, and openly
supported by the Kremlin.
The Hellenic Republic remains
a state suffering from systemic eco-
nomic problems, blatant corruption,
and bureaucracy — which makes
its elite psychologically similar to
those of Ukraine’s aggressive eastern
neighbor. In the end, Tsipras’s actions
were guided by simple calculation.
After driving the Russian economy,
already ailing from the dropping
hydrocarbon prices, further into
the sanction pit, Putin would never
be able to offer the chronically poor
Greece anywhere as much as the EU.
However, the European refugee crisis

might give a new nudge to Greece’s
search for alternative foreign policy
landmarks. For the EU, which is
already suffering from centrifugal
processes and the growing influ-
ence of Euroskeptics, this trial may
become fatal. For the first time in its
history, EU is facing a real threat of
disintegration or rebirth into a CIS-
like amorphous structure. Should
this unfortunate scenario unfold,
the powerful Russian lobby will
definitely increase its pressure on
Greece, acting, among others, via
Cyprus. Combined with the elite’s
strong pro-Russian sympathies and
the growing radicalization of the
population, those efforts might push
Greece into Putin’s embrace — and
his decreased economic resources
might still look more appealing
than those of the collapsing Euro-
pean Union. Whether this negative
scenario will be avoided depends
on the European leaders’ ability to
tackle the latest challenge without
destroying European unity for rea-
sons of national ego, as Tsipras had
nearly done. In the meantime, re-
gardless of the prospects faced by
Greece and the EU, Ukraine should
draw valuable lessons from the lat-
est act of the ongoing Greek tragedy,
and learn to keep within its means,
despite any discomfort that brings.
Otherwise, the price of many years
of populism and irresponsibility
may turn out too high in the end.

government pursuing a
“multi-vector course” is
deposed. The new au-
thorities declare a turn
of the foreign policy in the western
direction. A powerful neighbor, tak-
ing advantage of the instability, con-
fusion, and the sympathies of a large
part of the country’s population,
performs a military intervention and
annexes a share of the territory…
All of the above can be read as
an episode of Ukraine’s contempo-
rary history — however, the exact
same scenario unfolded in Cyprus.
Considering the events of the recent
years in Ukraine, Cyprus’ recent his-
tory and current situation can be
viewed as one of the possible courses
of our ongoing conflict with Russia,
as well as one of the ways for its sta-
bilization. It is particularly important
now, when Cyprus, for the first time
in decades, appears to have a shot at
reunification.
The schism of this island state is
rooted in the 1970’s, even through
inter-communal conflict was al-
ready brewing in the previous dec-
ade, at least since Cyprus declared
independence in 1960. Disagree-
ments between Turkish and Greek
politics, spurred on by both coun-
tries, resulted in the creation of
radical armed groups — the Greek
EOKA and the Turkish TMT —
and brought the island to the brink
of civil war. Sporadic inter-ethnic
clashes started in 1964. The tightly
wound spring of this conflict finally
gave way when the Greek military
junta took a radical step and staged a
coup in Cyprus. The moderate Pres-
ident Archbishop Makarios III was
deposed, to be replaced by Nikos
Sampson, the leader of the radical
EOKA and an advocate of “enosis,”
or reunification with Greece, an idea
that was popular among the Greek
population. In response to that and
under the pretext of protecting the
Turkish community, Turkey started
a full-scale military intervention,
occupying the northern part of the
island after brief combat. Direct
conflict between the two NATO
THE ISLE OF DISCORD.
THE BROKEN CYPRUS AS A CASE STUDY
FOR UKRAINE
A

members was avoided through the
efforts of the USA and the UK – but
Greece temporarily left NATO as
protest against the organization’s in-
ability to resolve the situation.
In 1983, the territories occupied
by Turkey proclaimed themselves as
the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, a state that remains unrec-
ognized by everyone but Turkey to
this day. Under international law, the
Republic of Cyprus retains sover-
eignty over its entire territory within
the pre-1974 borders. According to
the United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 541 of November 18,
1983, the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus is an illegal formation,
and Turkish troops must be removed
from the territory of Cyprus. De fac-
to, the conflict has been frozen ever
since.
Naturally, several attempts were
made to leave this longstanding
dead end, but all of them failed. The
highest-profile failure was the An-
nan Plan, proposed by the UN Sec-
retary General at the time, which
entailed de facto federalization of
the island. At the 2004 referendum,
the Turkish population of the un-
recognized republic voted their ap-
proval of Kofi Annan’s plan – while
the Greek population largely voted
no. Thus the status quo remained.
While this was happening, the di-
vided island’s economic model be-
came closely intertwined with off-
shore investments, which became
an important factor for Cyprus’ for-
eign policy.
Another massive influence on
the foreign policy of the Republic of
Cyprus comes from its nearest neigh-
bor and ally, Greece. However, one
cannot claim that Cyprus’ political
vector fully follows that of Athens —
that would mean disregarding the
influence of Turkey, which still occu-
pies the northern part of the island.
After often landing between a rock
and a hard place in the past, Cyprus
has settled in a tradition of seeking
support from major powers capable
of influencing Greece and Turkey
alike, suppressing their conflict po-
tential. Such powers include the UK,
a former colonial power that still has
several military bases on Cyprus, as
well as the USA and Russia.
The Russian lobby in Cyprus is
immensely powerful. By the EU’s
standards, Russia’s level of influence
here is truly unprecedented. The rea-
sons behind it are the huge amounts
of Russian offshore capitals, as well
as by Russian tourism (Russian tour-
ists, were a massive contribution to
the island republic’s budget, account-
ing for up to a quarter of all tourists
in Cyprus back in the day). The re-
lations between Moscow and Nico-
sia reached the highest point during
the administration of the previous
President of Cyprus, the Communist
Dimitris Christofias.

23
THE BROKEN CYPRUS AS A CASE STUDY FOR UKRAINE
Born in 1946 in the village of
Dhikomo in the northern part of
Cyprus, Christofias held leftist views
from an early age, and joined the
youth chapter of the Progressive
Party of Working People of Cyprus
(AKEL). In his adolescent years, he
spent his summer holidays working
and was no stranger to hardships. At
fourteen, Christofias joined the Pan-
cyprian National Organization of
Pupils (PEOM). In 1964, he became
member of the Progressive Party of
Working People of Cyprus (AKEL),
the Pancyprian Federation of Labor
(PEO), and the United Democratic
Youth Organisation (EDON). In
1969, at the 5th Congress of EDON,
the future president was elected
member of the Central Council.
Between 1969 and 1974, Christo-
fias studied in Moscow, and got his
Ph.D. in history in the Academy of
Social Studies in Moscow. From the
1960’s, he had moved through the
ranks of AKEL until becoming the
party’s leader in 1988, after the death
of his predecessor and mentor Eze-
kias Papaioannou.
On June 7, 2001, Christofias was
elected Member of the House of Rep-
resentatives of Cyprus, and success-
fully re-elected six years later. Two
years after that, Christofias became
President.
The main items of his program
were reuniting the island through
constructive dialogue, preserving a
neutral foreign policy, and refusing
NATO membership. In 2011, Christ-
ofias vetoed the Parliament’s resolu-
tion to join the Partnership for Peace
program. In 2014, no longer Presi-
dent, he met with the head of the an-
nexed Crimea and recognized it as
belonging to the Russian Federation.
Christofias’ rule did not bring
reunification, even though his nego-
tiations with Mehmet Ali Talat, the
president of the unrecognized Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus did
warm up the inter-communal rela-
tions and contributed to looser ac-
cess and trade control at their joint
border. Cyprus’ friendly attitude to-
wards Moscow also facilitated trade,
and by 2008, Cyprus was among the
top investors in the Russian econo-
my. The amount of investment into
Russia from Cyprus (and, more sig-
nificantly, through Cyprus) was over
USD 40 billion in 2008, out of the
USD 200 billion total.
The same year’s banking crisis
shoot Cyprus’ economy to its very
core, which only increased the Rus-
sian influence. Christofias, blamed
for the economic collapse, refused to
run for office the second time, and
was replaced by Nicos Anastasiades
in 2013.
Unlike his predecessor, Anasta-
siades holds pro-Western views. The
current President was born in 1946,
the same year as Christofias, in the
southern part of Cyprus, studied

law in the University of Athens, and
got a postgraduate degree from the
University College London. Anasta-
siades was first voted into the Parlia-
ment of Cyprus in 1981, and has been
the leader of DISY (the Democratic
Rally) since June 8, 1997. He was
the initiator of the resolution to join
Partnership for Peace (which was ve-
toed by Christofias), and promised
to immediately start the process of
Cyprus’ accession to NATO if elected
President. Today, Cyprus remains
the only EU state that is not a mem-
ber of the PfP.
After winning the election, Ana-
stasiades made some changes to his
rhetoric, promising to increase coop-
eration with the USA, but “without
prejudice towards Russia,” and drop-
ping the question of NATO member-
ship. Furthermore, in the middle of
the EU’s sanction policies and the
ongoing Western campaign to iso-
late Russia because of its aggression
against Ukraine, Anastasiades point-
edly maintains friendly relations
with Putin. In February 2015, the
two presidents met in Moscow. The
meeting was followed by a number of
loud assurances of cooperation, up to
and including Russian military bases
on Cyprus. Soon after that, the Cyp-
riot President denied these claims,
saying that the discussion only con-
cerned providing additional capaci-
ties for Russian humanitarian opera-
tions (read: transfer of supplies and
weapons to Syria) at the Paphos air-
port and the port of Limassol. Putin
faced a new challenge from his big-
gest and most dangerous enemy —
the economy.
Mutual trade between Cyprus
and Russia started inevitably decreas-
ing due to the latter’s sharp economic
decline. Numbers of Russian tourists
fell as well. Even the possibility of
lobbying Russian interests through
oligarch’s capitals shrunk somewhat,
due to Putin’s “deoffshorization”
policy – which, decorative though it
may be, shook up the oligarch’s po-
sitions in Cyprus. Meanwhile, the
island republic is undergoing diffi-
cult times. Its economy has been in
recession since 2011, and chances for
growth remain tenuous even today.
Cyprus has been receiving economic
aid since 2013 — from the EU, rather
than from its Russian “partners” who
are not doing too well themselves.
As a result, Cyprus is pursuing a
policy typical for Russia’s so-called
“friends” in Europe. It slams sanc-
tions publicly, while doing noth-
ing to hamper their adoption and
extension, and does not follow its
loud statements by actions. Overall,
the role of the Republic of Cyprus
in European politics should not
be overestimated. It is a clearly pe-
ripheral state which is undergoing a
grave economic crisis, together with
the rest of the EU’s south. Besides,
Cyprus’ current focus is indisput-

25
THE BROKEN CYPRUS AS A CASE STUDY FOR UKRAINE
ably turned to internal issues, and
any radical moves can get in the way
of the island’s possible reunification,
which remains the Cypriot politi-
cians’ major focus. That is particu-
larly relevant now that the elections
in the north of Cyprus have been
won by Mustafa Akıncı, who leans in
favor of reunification. The possible
federative reorganization of Cyprus
will clearly contribute to Turkey’s
increased influence on the future
unified state. Russian-Turkish rela-
tions merit their own research, but
the two are far from being allies, and
a greater pull of Istanbul in Nicosia
will hardly increase the Kremlin’s
role in Cyprus.
It is obvious that relations with
Cyprus are far from being a top pri-
ority in Ukraine’s foreign policy, and
neither do they need to be. However,
considering certain trends in the
south of Europe, such as the rule of
radical lefts in Greece and the pos-
sible ascension to power of similar
forces in Spain, there exists a poten-
tial for emergence of a Mediterrane-
an belt of countries that will oppose
Brussels. One of the ways to do so
would be by playing the Russian card
now and again, therefore weakening
the unified (if with caveats) Europe-
an position on the Russian-Ukrain-
ian conflict. Cyprus may easily end
up among these countries, and that
is something we should do our best
to prevent.
After all, Ukrainian oligarchs also
store their money in Cyprus-based
offshore companies, so Ukraine also
has certain leverage in this region.
The story of the Cypriot struggle
for a reunified state deserves separate
mention. Whatever the outcome of
this struggle, we must pay attention
to the actual process, where no one is
chasing after immediate “restoration
of territorial integrity” at the cost of
national interests — provided the
two parts of the once-united country
remain at peace with each other and
continue cooperating. At the same
time, Cyprus is showcasing another
risk that is relevant for Ukraine, the
gradual devaluing of its sovereignty
under the influence of external forc-
es and in the light of ongoing inter-
nal dissent. Retaining one’s political
identity in a divided state influenced
by powerful external forces is a chal-
lenge, one that Cyprus addressed by
creating a favorable investment cli-
mate and an economy that allowed it
to remain afloat without foreign debt,
up until the most recent economic
cataclysms. Even now, economically,
Cyprus is faring much better than
the neighboring Greece.
In this aspect, Ukraine should
definitely take a leaf out of Cyprus’
book.

fallgeographicallyEuro-
pean countries that were
notpartoftheSovietUn-
ion, Serbia is traditional-
ly considered Russia’s most consistent
and loyal ally. Serbia views Russia as
its historical ally, and the reasons be-
hind that are more than historical. The
emergence of Serbia and the Russian
Federation as sovereign states took
place under similar conditions. The
two countries’ leaderships perceive
themselves as the “wronged” descend-
ants of larger formations — the USSR
and Yugoslavia, respectively — where
they used to play a dominant cultural,
economical, and political role. Serbia
and Russia also share their traditional
animosity towards the West in gen-
eral and NATO in particular. Serbia,
whose leaders often positioned their
state as an Orthodox Slavic stronghold
besieged by the hostile West, would
invariably seek support from Russia,
a powerful eastern state with a similar
flavor of ideology.
Mutual diplomatic curtseys be-
tween the two became common-
place. On a lower level, “coopera-
tion” manifested in Russia sending
its militant units sent to the war-torn
Bosnia and Croatia in the nineties —
a favor which Serbia returned by re-
cently sending its radicals to Donbas,
where they actively assisted pro-Rus-
sian separatist armed gangs. Howev-
er, is the Serbian-Russian alliance as
strong as it seems, and does their co-
operation extend past nostalgia and
symbolic gestures?
After the animosity with the West
reached its peak in the late 1990’s,
followed by the removal of Milošević
several years later, Serbia (still “third
Yugoslavia” at the time) became ruled
by relatively pro-Western forces. The
new President of the federation, Vo-
jislav Koštunica, held generally con-
servative and nationalist views, simi-
larly to Milošević — but the executive
power was concentrated in the hands
of the Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić,
one of the most pro-Western politi-
cians in Serbia’s history. Never par-
ticularly popular among Serbian
politicians, Đinđić preferred to keep
SERBIA: THE ROCKY ROAD TO THE EU AS A
LESSON FOR UKRAINE
O

27
SERBIA: THE ROCKY ROAD
TO THE EU AS A LESSON FOR UKRAINE
a relatively low profile. He managed
Koštunica’s successful presidential
campaign, but the two later took op-
posing sides, especially after the ex-
tradition of the former Serbian lead-
er Slobodan Milošević to the Hague
Tribunal (done by Đinđić’s decision,
which ran contrary to the President’s
will). These actions caused uproar in
nationalist circles. In February 2003,
Koštunica left his post due to the dis-
solution of the confederate union of
Serbia and Montenegro. A month
later, Đinđić was assassinated by a
sniper — a nationalist radical, ac-
cording to the official version.
The President’s post went to Bo-
ris Tadić of the Democratic Party
(which Đinđić and Koštunica also
represented), who continued a West-
bound course for the country.
Tadić was born in 1958 in Sa-
rajevo. He studied social psychol-
ogy in the University of Belgrade,
taught psychology at the First Bel-
grade Gymnasium, and was the
founder and first Director of the
Center for the Development of De-
mocracy. Tadić had been a member
of the Democratic Party since 1990,
and was elected its head in 2004, a
year after the assassination of Zoran
Đinđić.
After the Bulldozer Revolution
and the fall of Milošević, Boris Tadić
served in the government of Yugo-
slavia as the Minister of Telecommu-
nications, between November 2000
and June 2001. In the Council of
Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro
that came next, he was the Minister
of Defense.
Ever since his appearance on the
political arena, Tadić has been and
remains a strong proponent of Ser-
bia’s European integration.
The Prime Minister’s post went
to Koštunica, who calls himself a
“moderate nationalist,” but also says
that “there is no other path except to
Europe.” Despite the powerful and
influential nationalist opposition,
the pro-European government ruled
without much incident up until the
Kosovo conflict in 2008. Kosovo’s
proclaimed independence, recog-
nized by the USA and a number of
EU countries, resulted in a nation-
alist uproar and an acute political
crisis. Koštunica, who demanded to
sever links with the European Un-
ion, was opposed by the majority
of the government and resigned. At
the next presidential election, Boris
Tadić overtook his opponent Tomis-
lav Nikolić from the ultra-nationalist
Radical Party of Serbia (who also
ran against him in 2004), albeit by a
small margin, and remained in pow-
er. However, it soon became appar-
ent that Serbia’s ruling pro-Western
forces and their opposition are virtu-
ally equal in strength, and the level of
support for European integration in
Serbia dropped noticeably after the
EU’s policy in respect of Kosovo.

Tadić successfully followed a
cautious policy where he formally
refused to recognize Kosovo’s inde-
pendence,whileactuallymaintaining
working relations with the adminis-
tration in Pristina — but opponents
of the pro-Western course viewed
his actions as a blatant surrender of
Serbia’s national interests. The global
recession also struck a blow against
Serbia, fanning the flames. Eventu-
ally, the growing Euroskepticism re-
sulted in the 2012 Presidential victo-
ry of Tomislav Nikolić, who had lost
the election twice before.
Nikolić was born February 15,
1952 in the Serbian town of Kraguje-
vac. Until 1992, the future President
worked in construction, and only
went into politics during the politi-
cal crisis and dissolution of Yugo-
slavia. He first became a member of
the People’s Radical Party and then,
in 1991, moved to the Serbian Radi-
cal Party, where he quickly advanced
to the post of the first deputy head.
In 1992, Nikolić was elected to the
Parliament, where he led a group of
radical deputies. In 1998, he became
the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia,
and in 1999, Deputy Prime Minister
of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via. He ran for President in the early
elections of 2000, and earned 5.79%
votes, coming in third after Slobodan
Milošević and Vojislav Koštunica.
On September 2008, Nikolić re-
signed as deputy head of the Serbian
Radical Party because of intraparty
disagreements about the Skupština
vote on the ratification of the Stabi-
lization and Association Agreement,
signed between the EU and the Ser-
bian government in late April 2008.
On October 21 of the same year,
Nikolić created and led his own Ser-
bian Progressive Party.
Having a radical for President
brought expectations of an im-
pending cooldown in the relations
between Serbia and the EU — per-
haps going as far as refusing Euro-
pean integration and strengthening
the traditionally friendly connec-
tions with Moscow. However, as it
often happens, reality was not as
straightforward, and Nikolić con-
tinues pursuing the “two chairs at
once” policy typical for the post-
Yugoslavia Serbia.
Undoubtedly, the Serbian-Rus-
sian relations are more than purely
symbolic. Russia holds a lot of influ-
ence and a lot of property, including
key corporations (especially in the
energy sector). It also does every-
thing to hamper the process of in-
ternational recognition of Kosovo,
which remains unacceptable for
any Serbian government. Serbia, in
turn, refuses to join the EU’s sanc-
tions against Moscow, despite the
pressure from Brussels. Serbia is the
only non-CIS country that has a free
trade agreement with Russia. How-
ever, these strong bonds are soured

29
by the fact that the relations between
the two countries have not developed
much over the decade and a half that
followed the fall of Milošević. The
reason for that is obvious: Moscow,
stuck as a self-imposed backward
resource-based economy, simply has
nothing else to offer Serbia, or any
of its other “friends.” As a result, not
only did Tadić’s obviously pro-West-
ern administration gave the West
a lot of ground to join the EU, but
even Nikolić, formally a nationalist,
continues the same policy. However,
Serbia showcases a process typical
for many “second echelon” EU mem-
bers — flirting with Moscow to win
concessions from the EU. In Serbia’s
case, these political games are tightly
intertwined with the Kosovo ques-
tion, which is the cornerstone of to-
day’s Serbia policy, both foreign and
domestic.
The Kosovo situation presents a
heavy moral and psychological di-
lemma to the entire Serbian com-
munity, as well as any leader of the
country. The forced removal of Ser-
bian territory was approved by the
EU and the USA, and the majority of
the UN members recognized of the
self-proclaimed republic. This placed
Serbia before an impossibly difficult
choice: to denounce its own territo-
rial integrity for the sake of potential
integration into the European com-
munity – or to continue fighting to
re-establish control over the rogue
autonomy, at the price of worsening
relations with its neighbors and at
the risk of economic isolation? For a
weak country with a devastated, in-
effectual economy, cooperation with
the EU is vital, but to officially recog-
nize the loss of control over Kosovo
is tantamount to political suicide for
any Serbian leader. Aware of these
risks, all Serbian Presidents — what-
ever values they preach — usually
try to pass between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis without many radical moves.
Over time, this policy has resulted in
Serbia and Kosovo de facto having
relations as two independent states,
which irritates a lot of the popula-
tion. However, the reward for this
difficult choice came in the form of
the long-awaited EU candidate status
granted to Serbia in 2012.
After Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, Serbia, as might have been
expected, took a controversial stand.
On one hand, with Kosovo in mind,
there is an unequivocal support for
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. On
the other, there are Nikolić’s visits
to Moscow, Putin’s return visits to
Belgrade, and some opposition to
anti-Russia sanctions. Nikolić speaks
about Russian military bases and the
possible recognition of sovereignty
of the Republika Srpska in the neigh-
boring Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Then he sends Prime Minister Alek-
sandar Vučić to Washington, fol-
lowed by statements about “lowering

Serbia’s dependence on Russian gas
and diversifying their gas sources.”
Essentially, today’s Serbia is try-
ing to play the same game as Mar-
shall Tito’s Yugoslavia after WW2:
becoming a “bridge between East
and West.” In practice, this means
reaping benefits from all geopoliti-
cal players, whose confrontation has
aggravated again, forcing them to be
generous to all potential allies. The
problem with this position is that
modern-day Serbia is a pale shadow
of Yugoslavia, with none of the lat-
ter’s economic power or political
gravity. Sooner or later, the Serbian
leaders will have to pick one “chair”
to sit on.
Someideaofthischoiceisalready
in the works. Despite its attempts to
exploit the “imperial” nostalgia and
pan-Slavic solidarity, Belgrade is
drifting further and further towards
the West. Europe, despite all of its
current problems, can offer Serbia a
future, while Putin’s stagnating state
clearly has no intention to share its
dwindling resources with a weak
and ephemeral “ally” that is Serbia.
In this, modern-day Russia is rather
consistent – its oligarchic neo-feudal
top is quick to spew great-power
propaganda, but as quick to show
the door to Russia’s post-Soviet allies
when it comes to money.
Therefore, we do not have to
fear a real increase of Russian influ-
ence on Serbian policy – first of all,
because today, Russia itself is not in-
terested (or cannot afford) such an
increase. Nevertheless, Nikolić’s and
Vučić’c steps in the Kosovo issue,
which many in Serbia interpret as a
national humiliation, can be viewed
as a form of sacrifice made by Ser-
bian leaders in exchange for some
generous gestures from the West. If
no such gestures are forthcoming
in the next few years, Belgrade may
try playing the “Slavic brotherhood”
card for real this time. Especially see-
ing as Serbian political leaders can be
as two-faced as Ukrainian ones, and
yesterday’s ardent supporters of the
European course tomorrow can re-
vert into passionate defenders of the
“the southern Slavs’ Orthodox for-
tress” against “NATO’s bloody dicta-
torship.” This would not be the first
turnaround like this since the fall of
the Communist regime of the Social-
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
For Ukraine, Serbia is interest-
ing predominantly because it com-
bines certain elements of modern
Russia and Ukraine within one
state. On one hand, Serbia is the re-
maining centerpiece of a collapsed
empire, and had assisted Serbian
separatists in neighboring republics
of the former Yugoslavia. On the
other, it is a state that suffered exter-
nal aggression and lost a part of its
territory as a result of internal forces
and external influences. This second
aspect is the more important one for

31
us today. Serbia’s gradual and pain-
ful farewell to the lost territories for
the sake of joining a unified Europe
could be a projection of the possi-
ble future for Ukraine, which lost
a part of its territory as a result of
the neighboring Russia’s aggression
and internal separatist challenges.
Watching Serbia and pressured into
observing the Minsk Agreements by
the West and by Moscow, Ukrain-
ian society and government must
ask themselves the question that all
Serbian politicians must have been
asking themselves for the past fif-
teen years: is it worth sacrificing the
foundations of national identity to
draw closer to Europe?

n October 2015, Rus-
sia, amid all the ac-
cusation its diplomats
threw at the West for
“aiding a coup in Ukraine,” suddenly
received a similar blow from an un-
expected direction. The government
of Montenegro, another “brotherly”
Orthodox ex-Yugoslavian republic,
accused Russia of attempted organi-
zation of a coup.
The Montenegrin government,
in the person of the Prime Minister
Đukanović, presented the recent un-
rest in Podgorica as attempts to pre-
vent the republic’s impending NATO
membership by efforts of “Moscow
proxy” protesters. It is worth noting
that the protesters’ ranks did include
many citizens with anti-NATO senti-
ments, while their financial support
by Russia is not outside the realm of
probability. However, as it often hap-
pens, these accusations may stem
from two factors. One being the
Montenegrin higher-ups’ inability to
“see the forest for the trees,” and the
other, a conscious wish to tailor the
reality to fit the trendy, and largely
mythical, stereotype of “all-encom-
passing Russian influence” — so as
to detract the domestic and inter-
national attention from a certain
troubling fact. Namely, that Milo
Đukanović has been in power since
the late 1980’s, alternating his runs as
President and Prime Minister — not
unlike Vladimir Putin.
Technically, Đukanović has been
in power for a longer time than Mon-
tenegro has been a sovereign state.
Milo Đukanović, a key and mo-
mentous figure in contemporary
Montenegrin politics, was born Feb-
ruary 15, 1962 in Nikšić, a town in
the western part of what was then
the People’s Republic of Montenegro,
part of the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In 1986, he
earned a diploma in tourist studies
from Veljko Vlahović University’s
Faculty of Economics in Titograd
(today, the University of Montenegro
in Podgorica). His fellow students
recall that Đukanović, 190 cm tall,
was a strong basketball player. As a
MONTENEGRO. THE“ETERNAL”PRIME
MINISTER ON THE WAY TO NATO
I

33
MONTENEGRO.
THE“ETERNAL”PRIME MINISTER ON THE WAY TO NATO
politician, he would retain many of
the qualities that made him a good
athlete – a direct, even aggressive na-
ture, and a steely character.
In 1976, Đukanović, aged four-
teen, joined the Yugoslav Commu-
nist League, the SFRY’s ruling party,
where his father was already an in-
fluential member. The future leader’s
political career advanced quickly, in
part owing to his father’s patronage.
By 1986, Đukanović became a presi-
dency member of Socialist Youth Al-
liance (the Yugoslav version of Pio-
neer and Komsomol organization) as
well as the president of the Alliance’s
Montenegrin branch.
Nicknamed Britva (“Straight Ra-
zor”) for his direct and forceful char-
acter, Milo rode the wave of demo-
cratic processes that swept through
the country, and started the so-called
“anti-bureaucratic revolution,” aimed
to force the “oldies” out of the repub-
lic’s government. The power-hungry
Đukanović received a lot of support
from the new leader of the neighbor-
ing Serbia, none other than Slobodan
Milošević.
After chairing the presidium
of the local Communist Party by
the late 1980’s, the 26-year-old
Đukanović became a de facto ruler
of the republic – formally, holding
no important position in the govern-
ment, but with his people on all key
posts. In 1990, Yugoslavia moved to a
multi-party system, but Đukanović’s
Communist party earned an easy
victory at the first free elections. In
1991, Đukanović, aged 29, became
the head of the Montenegrin govern-
ment and the youngest Prime Minis-
ter in Europe.
A year later, going along with
the anti-Communist transforma-
tions, Đukanović renamed his party
the Democratic Party of Socialists
of Montenegro, and won another
election. Enjoying his close rela-
tions with the Yugoslavian President
Slobodan Milošević and the Monte-
negrin President Momir Bulatović,
Đukanović would remain Prime
Minister until 1998.
Duringtheseyears,thefuturefer-
vent supporter of NATO and Monte-
negrin sovereignty spoke out against
the dissolution of the federation, and
supported the sending of the Mon-
tenegrin military contingent, as part
of Yugoslavian troops, to Croatia,
which was striving for separation.
At the time, the Western press often
quoted Đukanović as saying he had
a passionate hatred for chess: a fairly
transparent allusion to the Croatian
coat of arms, dominated by a red and
white checkered shield.
Continuing to reap the benefits of
his alliance with Slobodan Milošević,
Đukanović ran for President in the
1997 election and won, despite losing
the first round to Bulatović. After be-
coming President, Đukanović con-
tinued supporting a “united and in-

divisible Yugoslavia.” In 1999, he said
that “Montenegro is not Slovenia. We
are an integral part of Yugoslavia and
choose to remain that way.”
However, Đukanović would
change his tack when his Belgrade
ally was deposed by the pro-Western
VojislavKoštunicaandZoranĐinđić.
Failing to come to an understanding
with the new leaders of the neighbor-
ing Yugoslav republic, Đukanović
changed course and headed towards
Montenegrin sovereignty. In 2002,
Milo left the Presidential post, only
to become Prime Minister again.
After gradually loosening the
union state to a state of shaky con-
federacy, Đukanović held a refer-
endum in 2006, and Montenegro
became independent. The shift of
the public opinion in favor of in-
dependence was furthered by the
paradoxical support of Đukanović’s
loyal ally Svetozar Marović. Being
President of the confederacy at the
time, Marović publicly supported
Montenegro’s independence, essen-
tially calling for dissolution of the
state he presided over.
In 2006, the opposition show-
ered Đukanović with criticism when
the near-eternal leader tried to be-
come Minister of Defense. In re-
sponse, Đukanović announced his
retirement from politics, despite his
party’s victory in the parliamentary
elections. The former Prime Min-
ister indeed would spend the fol-
lowing few years as a businessman,
while his fellow party member Željko
Šturanović chaired the government.
According to the media and the op-
ponents of the eternal leader of Mon-
tenegro, Đukanović’s “business” has
been and remains directly connected
to organized crime gangs, based in
Montenegro and smuggling Balkan
tobacco to Italy.
Milo’s “retirement” did not last
long, and he became Prime Minister
again in 2008. In 2010, he went on a
“sabbatical” again, handing over his
post to another DPS member, Igor
Lukšić. In 2012, despite loud protests
against the permanent rule of DPS
(which formally lasted since 1992,
and in reality, goes as far back as
1948) and of Đukanović personally,
“Britva” took back the already-famil-
iar government post for the fourth
time.
Clearly, Đukanović must not be
underestimated. He is an autocratic
Prime Minister with strong criminal
connection and a long trail of cor-
ruption scandals, who is not par-
ticularly burdened with ideas and
values of European or Euro-Atlantic
solidarity. His country’s right-wing
culture (typical for all Balkan states)
is reminiscent of the post-Soviet
political field – and in this familiar
ocean of corruption, nepotism, brib-
ery, and unscrupulous opportunism,
Milo Đukanović is an experienced
and dangerous fish. Cold and cyni-

35
MONTENEGRO.
cal calculation is the main motive
behind any and all of his actions, and
that makes him similar to the Rus-
sian higher-ups. However, as is the
case with Putin’s other “allies,” such
calculation may play not in favor of
Russia, but against it.
For Montenegro, surrounded by
NATO countries, Alliance member-
ship is largely an obvious and inevita-
ble step. Podgorica frequently speaks
of NATO as of “the best guarantee
for our crucially important inves-
tors.” If one wished, one could follow
the lead of Russian media and view
this statement as rife with political
and economic blackmail – invest-
ments in exchange for membership.
One could also see similar senti-
ments in the NATO leaders’ attitude
towards Đukanović, who seem un-
bothered by the latter’s endless rule
and frequent crime-related scandals.
But this is the exact Realpolitik that
the Kremlin loves so much, and one
at which the Kremlin is also losing
due to Russia’s economic weakness
and stagnation that make even the
currently-troubled EU look like the
better option. To confirm this, the
media recently spoke about a leaked
offer made by Moscow: investments
in exchange for a Russian military
base in Montenegro. Đukanović re-
jected that offer, because the West
can always offer more.
For NATO, today’s Montenegro
is a great opportunity to deliver a ge-
opolitical slap to Putin. While wary
that further expansion into post-
Soviet space may provoke the para-
noid Kremlin into further aggres-
sion, NATO still does not wish to
show weakness. And the best show
of strength — done in Moscow’s
best traditions, in fact — would be
to grant membership to a state that
Russia considers as “brotherly” and
“pro-Russian” as the neighboring
Serbia.
Of course, the Kremlin can also
play at this game. Taking advan-
tage of the real discontent among
the Montenegrin population, who
are unhappy with Đukanović’s pro-
longed semi-dictatorial rule, and
relying on the largely Serbian anti-
NATO opposition, Moscow can at-
tempt to remove the “inconvenient”
government currently ruling out of
Podgorica. In that case, the Kremlin
would find the best partner in An-
drija Mandić, head of the influential
New Serbian Democracy opposition
party, popular with the vast (31%)
Serbian minority.
Mandić was born in January
1965 in Šavnik, west Montenegro,
and graduated from the Metallur-
gic-Technical Faculty of the same
University of Montenegro as his rul-
ing opponent. Unlike Đukanović,
during the last years of the SFRY
Mandić became one of the most
influential social-democratic and
liberal activists, opposing the domi-

nant Communist party and then its
successor, the DPS.
In the years that followed,
Mandić took part in various po-
litical projects geared towards the
Serbian population, which did not
achieve much. On the other hand,
his metallurgical business was a
success. A curious fact: before be-
coming the owner of the largest alu-
minum producers in the republic,
Mandić owned a bar where his fu-
ture opponent Đukanović was a reg-
ular. In the future, the Western me-
dia would often dub the “aluminum
baron” Đukanović’s “godfather,” one
who funded the latter and many
other influential Montenegrin poli-
ticians during the chaotic 1990’s.
By 2015, Mandić, who had pre-
viously maneuvered between na-
tionalism and the Belgrade’s pro-
Western policy with limited success,
finally decided on a political plat-
form. His New Serb Democracy
joined political battle with slogans
that called for Serbian-Montenegrin
unionism, urged to turn Montene-
gro onto an anti-Western course,
and opposed the “assimilation of
Serbs.” Using the discontent of the
Serbian population caused by the
very fact of Montenegro’s inde-
pendence and by the generally pro-
Western course of the ruling party
(particularly their recognition of
Kosovo), NSD took the protest to
the streets.
One does not need to search for
“Moscow’s hand” in the Podgorica
protests. After all, the republic’s citi-
zens (and not just the Serbian pop-
ulation) have plenty of reasons for
discontent. The rule of one political
power for almost 70 years, the “eter-
nal” Prime Minister shrouded in ru-
mors of strong criminal connections,
and the vague economic situation —
those things alone are enough to
create social upheaval. Whereas for
Đukanović and his colleagues, blam-
ing foreign forces for organizing the
protests is also natural, especially
considering the current geopolitical
situation.
Even so, it would be out of char-
acter for Moscow to refrain from
fanning the flames. In this aspect,
the suspicions of the Montenegrin
leaders are a good illustration of the
saying that goes: just because you’re
paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t af-
ter you.
Time will show how successful
the Montenegrin opposition will be,
along with its potential supporters in
the Kremlin. However, the greatest
irony of the situation lies in the fact
that even the possible victory of “Pu-
tin’s friends” with their anti-NATO
and pan-Slavic rhetoric is unlikely
to cause radical changes in Monte-
negro’s foreign policy. Similar “allies”
of Russia and “decisive anti-West
forces” are in power in the neighbor-
ing Serbia — who is not in a hurry to

37
MONTENEGRO.
provide any real assistance to Mos-
cow. Similar forces also came to pow-
er in Greece, to the same result. Plus,
the Montenegrin opposition has the
same values as the current govern-
ment — values centered around ma-
terial valuables. Should these forces,
as equally corrupt and criminalized
as the current administration, come
to power, they will act within their
familiar system of coordinates – one
which, as usual, will not accommo-
date Putin.
The reason for that is simple.
Unless Russia’s leader has some eco-
nomic “secret weapon” to help him
turn around the depressing trends of
the Russian economy (which is un-
likely), Putin will soon have to face
the harsh fact: geopolitics is a game
best suited for those with deeper
pockets.

rom the very start
of Russian aggres-
sion against Ukraine,
Ukrainian, Russian, and
Western media often mention the so-
called “Finlandization” as a possible
way to end the crisis and restore peace
between all warring sides. What does
this term truly mean, and can “Fin-
landization” indeed be a geopolitical
panacea for Ukraine?
After two Soviet-Finnish wars,
Finland as a country was on the
brink of extinction. The young Finn-
ish state was at great risk of being
crushed among the growing con-
frontation between the two world
military and political blocs: either
swallowed by Moscow or turned into
a dependent western border state.
However, the Finns chose another
way — which was dubbed “Finlandi-
zation.”
This term described a special
model of interstate relations, where
the weaker state makes a number
of concessions to its more powerful
neighbors, while retaining its sover-
eignty and not becoming a puppet
protectorate. During the Cold War,
Finland had to balance between the
Soviet Union (whose ability to eas-
ily strip away Finland’s independence
called for special relations) and the
West (to which Finland was tightly
connected culturally and economi-
cally). According to the doctrine of
the Prime Minister Juho Paasikivi,
Finland signed an agreement with
the USSR in 1948, which, essentially,
preserved the state’s democratic free-
doms at the cost of certain restric-
tions to its foreign policy. In practice,
this meant that Finland would refuse
NATO membership and remain free
from the future Warsaw Pact. As a re-
sult, Finland became a neutral coun-
try with a market economy and rela-
tive political freedom, and landed in
the “gray area” between two opposed
military and political systems. Since
then, an extended model of Finland’s
experience has been applied to states
that are forced to agree to certain re-
striction of foreign policy choices for
the sake of preserving their statehood.
FINLAND. WHY“FINLANDIZATION”IS NOT
POSSIBLE FOR UKRAINE
F

39
FINLAND.
WHY“FINLANDIZATION”IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR UKRAINE
However, the advocates of “Fin-
landization” of Ukraine tend to focus
on the Suomi experience during the
Cold War, ignoring today’s Finland’s
trend to gradually overcome the
fear of Moscow and step away from
a policy of complacency. As is often
the case with modern Russia, Russia
itself is mostly to blame for this.
In the fall of 2014, the Finnish
Prime Minister Alexander Stubb ex-
plained his country’s political course
as follows: “Finland chose its team
back in 1995, and that is Team EU.
Because of this, we cannot be the in-
termediary between the EU and Rus-
sia.” Back then, Stubb also supported
sanctions against Russia and showed
solidarity with the EU’s position
on the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.
However, the Finnish establishment’s
stance has several nuances. For in-
stance, in February 2015, President
Sauli Niinistö said that while sanc-
tion pressure should remain unified,
Russia must not be isolated. Another
sign of Finland’s persisting “spe-
cial position” was the delay with the
tightening of sanctions in the fall of
2014, following Ilovaisk. At the time,
after an urgent meeting of ambas-
sadors, Helsinki withdrew its pro-
tests — yet certain disagreements on
the Russian question remain among
the Finnish leadership.
The coalition cabinet of Juha
Sipilä continues the policy of Alex-
ander Stubb’s government. The new
coalition government, which came
to power after the parliamentary
elections in April, includes the Cen-
tre Party of Finland, the True Finns,
and the National Coalition Party
(while Stubb became the Minister of
Finance). Even before being elected,
Sipilä noted that his Centre Party
of Finland supports the EU’s anti-
Russia sanctions, but Finland must
preserve good neighboring relations
with Russia. His political opponent,
Stubb (then Prime Minister), who
had made similar statements in the
past, noted that the Centre Party is
being too accommodating to Russia.
However, those words of the center-
right leader should be attributed to
election rhetoric. In reality, all Finn-
ish politics continue the “Finlandiza-
tion” policy, which remains popular
among the population. However, so-
cial polls show certain ongoing shifts
in the Finnish public perception of
the country’s course.
According to the report pub-
lished by the Finnish Business and
Policy Forum EVA in March 2015,
83% of surveyed Finns believe Rus-
sia to be unstable and unpredictable.
One out of two Finns believes that
Russia represents a military threat —
that ratio is 20% higher than in 2005.
26% of surveyed Finns think that
Finland should join NATO, while
43% still speak against it. However,
in 2012, only 14% of Finns supported
NATO membership, and 65% were

against it. In his first days as Prime
Minister, Juha Sipilä said, “Our gov-
ernment’s attitude towards NATO
remains unchanged. This means that
Finland is not planning to join the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
leaving this choice to future genera-
tions.” However, should Moscow’s
aggressive trends continue, even the
current generation of Finns may re-
consider the country’s foreign policy.
On one hand, Finland remains
somewhat dependent on Russia —
but progressively less so, due both to
Russia’s economic downturn and the
gradual decrease of Helsinki’s energy
dependence. There is a traditionally
strong Russian energy lobby present
in Suomi. Even though Finland is ac-
tively developing renewable energy
sources, it is still dependent on fuel
imports, including oil, gas, coal, and
electricity. According to the data of
the Embassy of Finland in Ukraine,
two thirds of Finland’s energy im-
ports come from Russia, who also
covers all of Finland’s demand for
natural gas. The website of Gazprom
Export says that the company sup-
plied 3.11 billion cubic meters of gas
to Finland in 2014, under contract
with the Finnish company Gasum
Oy. Russia is also the main supplier
of coal, oil, and petroleum products.
In 2013, 88% and 86% of Finland’s
coal and oil supplies, respectively,
came from Russia. During the past
decade and a half, the share of Rus-
sian oil in Finnish imports greatly
increased – from 43% in 2000 to 86%
in 2013. Finland also remains an im-
portant export market for Russian
electricity.
Helsinki and Moscow also con-
tinue cooperating on the construc-
tion of the Hanhikivi-1 nuclear pow-
er plant in Northern Ostrobothnia,
which will use the Russian VVER-
1200 reactor. This project was sup-
ported by Stubb’s government, and
Sipilä’s cabinet is following the same
course. Just this summer, the Finn-
ish Prime Minister again underlined
that mutual sanctions between Rus-
sia and the West will not endanger
the nuclear power plant construction
project in Pyhäjoki.
The two countries’ economies
are also tightly intertwined in other
industries, reinforced by long-stand-
ing personal contacts in Putin’s close
circle, which had formed back in his
days as a municipal official in St. Pe-
tersburg. The businessmen in Putin’s
circle with interests in Finland are
Dmitry Timchenko, Dmytry Gore-
lov, Boris and Arkady Rotenberg
(plus, Rotenberg and Tymchenko are
Finnish citizens).
Moscow’s strong influence on
Helsinki also shows in its key de-
cision-making vis-à-vis Ukraine.
A particularly telling situation oc-
curred in the summer of 2015,
when Finland denied entry to Ser-
gey Naryshkin, the Speaker of the

41
FINLAND.
Russian State Duma (included in
the sanctions list) when he intend-
ed to attend the annual session of
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
However, following Russia’s protest
and threats to block timber sup-
plies to Finland (13% of Finnish
timber imports come from Russia),
the Finnish government issued a
number of statements, attributing
their decision to the pressure from
Brussels and criticizing the EU’s
policy for souring the relationship
between Finland and its Russian
“partners.”
An equally high-profile story
revolved around Gennadiy Tim-
chenko, owner of Volga Group,
Putin’s friend and business partner,
and a dual citizen of Russia and
Finland. The EU’s sanctions ap-
plied to Timchenko’s companies,
while in March 2014, the USA in-
stituted personal sanctions against
the Russian oligarch. At the time,
the Finnish authorities issued no
public response. However, when
a year later, the United States im-
posed additional sanctions, and the
list now included Kai Paananen,
Timchenko’s partner and head of
SET Group, Helsinki turned to
Washington with a loud demand
for an explanation.
All these are signs that the
Finnish leaders pursue a cautious
policy, understanding who they are
forced to deal with and reluctant
to provoke further conflict with
a progressively more aggressive
neighbor. At the same time, Fin-
land is also working on a “Plan B.”
The end of the USSR offered
Helsinki a wide window of oppor-
tunity, as Moscow was too preoc-
cupied with its own state collapse
to care about Finland. But even if
Russia is no longer a superpower,
it remains a major player on the
global chessboard, even in difficult
times. Thus, in 1991, Finland ter-
minated the Agreement of Friend-
ship, Cooperation, and Mutual
Assistance with the USSR, only to
immediately sign a new one. The
crucial defense-related clause was
paragraph four, under which Mos-
cow and Helsinki both promised to
not grant use of their territory for
the purposes of armed aggression
against the other party, and to not
provide military aid to the aggres-
sor.
In 1995, Finland joined the
EU, essentially putting an end to
its neutral status. Finland’s foreign
policy would now partially depend
on the decisions made in Brus-
sels, and Helsinki approved the
participation of the Finnish mili-
tary contingent in the prospective
European military forces. Finland
also stepped up its cooperation
with NATO: in 1994, it joined the
Partnership for Peace program,
and in May 1997, became a partner

country in the Euro-Atlantic Part-
nership Council. Finnish peace-
keeping contingents were sent to
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
NATO officers believe that the
Finnish army meets the Alliance
standards. However, Finland never
took the final step into NATO, and
the Finnish parliament repeatedly
confirmed its non-aligned status.
Back then, in the post-bloc world,
many came to consider military al-
liances an anachronism.
Russian aggression against
Ukraine changed everything and
sent a shock through the Finn-
ish society and political leaders.
While overall sticking with the
rhetoric typical for the “Finlandi-
zation” policy, the government in
Helsinki turned towards increas-
ing their state’s defensive capabili-
ties. Even though Finland is ready
to preserve good relations with
Moscow, the Kremlin’s actions in
Ukraine and the Baltic region are
worrying for Helsinki. Those wor-
ries are made worse by the fact that
the neo-imperialist ideas of Rus-
sian nationalists, whose influence
in the Kremlin skyrocketed after
the annexation of Crimea, usually
imply that Moscow is entitled to
directly interfere with the affairs
of any state that used to be a part
of Russia at some point in history.
Finland, having been a province
of the Russian Empire until 1917,
is understandably discomfited by
such views. The Finnish political
rhetoric remains very cautious, but
one can easily read between the
lines. For example, Timo Soini, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
head of the True Finns party, said
that in the view of the tensions be-
tween Russia and the West, as well
as Russia’s increased military capa-
bilities, Finland must increase its
defenses appropriately. He added
that “this should not be interpreted
as a militarization against Russia,
but a necessary increase in our de-
fense capacity.”
Today, Finns consider the pros-
pect of a Russian military invasion
to be unlikely — but a short time
ago, Ukrainians used to believe the
same. The increasingly frequent
violation of the Finnish airspace by
Russian military planes only adds
to the Finnish establishment’s wor-
ries. In March 2015, Carl Haglund,
Minister of Defense at the time,
said that if a conflict should break
out between NATO and Russia, he
would find it “hard to imagine that
Russia would respect Finland’s mil-
itary neutrality enough to stay off
its territory.” As a result, Helsinki
began a military reform, creating
rapid deployment forces. The Finn-
ish government is also stepping up
military cooperation with the Baltic
and Scandinavian states. In April
2012, the Ministers for Defense of

43
FINLAND.
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Den-
mark, and Iceland signed a declara-
tion on cooperation and closer de-
fense ties, to safeguard against the
potential Russian threat.
As a result, Finland, while still
reaping every possible benefit from
the political course selected in
mid-20th century, is drifting fur-
ther west when it comes to defense
initiatives. The Finnish govern-
ment understands that no matter
what course they take, Finland’s
economic cooperation with Russia
will weaken in the strategic per-
spective, because the Kremlin’s cor-
rupt kleptocrats are unable to build
even a marginally efficient mod-
ern economy, and can’t stop Russia
from transforming into a backward
petro-state. Finnish leaders also
understand that the Kremlin’s ag-
gressiveness will grow as Russia’s
economic decline continues: Mos-
cow knows that a strong army is
its only bargaining chip, and will
use it more and more often to sup-
port pro-government sentiments
among the public. This means that
a new proverbial Mannerheim Line
should be created — in the form of
deeper cooperation with NATO.
In the light of the above, the
advocates of “Finlandization” in
Ukraine should take several factors
into consideration. Even when one
approaches geopolitical issues with
a perfectly level head, sober calcu-
lation, and zero emotion, the prob-
ability of this course for today’s
Ukraine still appears low. During
the Cold War, Finns succeeded in
turning their limited freedom into
a great chance for impressive eco-
nomic development, welfare, and
national self-respect. Finland’s
loyalty quickly yielded results: the
Soviet army left the leased Hanko
peninsula 40 years earlier than
planned, and USSR respected Fin-
land’s territorial integrity. How-
ever, it is obvious that today’s elite
of Putin’s agonizing Russia lack the
former Soviet leaders’ ability to
choose economic benefits over the
chance to plant a red banner over
Helsinki. Post-WW2 Soviet Un-
ion had real accomplishments that
could be used to placate the society.
Putin’s Russia has nothing except a
military fist. With its actions, the
Kremlin is only pushing Ukraine
further towards the structures that
Kremlin itself does not wish to see
any closer to its borders.
Another regrettable fact that
must be admitted is the qualita-
tive difference between the Finn-
ish and Ukrainian political elites.
Buying a window of opportunity
with political concessions and us-
ing it to build a powerful modern
economy would definitely be a for-
ward-looking move. However, at
this time, Ukraine’s political land-
scape and the progress of reforms

remains disappointing — so we
must understand that if some new,
more reasonable Russian leadership
granted Ukraine such a “window,”
it is doubtful that Ukraine’s current
politicians would be able to make
good use of it. The matter of surviv-
ing and preserving the state is on the
agenda today, and there is simply
not enough time for the Ukrainian
ruling class to evolve and improve.
Thus, Ukraine must find a different
path, one that involves increasing its
own defense capabilities and finding
an “umbrella” in the Euro-Atlantic
security framework.

he conflict between
Russia and Turkey,
which flared up after
the incident with the
Russian SU-24 plane, continues spi-
raling and unfolding, still far from its
“saturation point.” The story of the
downed bomber aircraft has already
been covered in detail, and merits
no further analysis here. However, in
the light of a sudden quarrel between
two states that were close to calling
each other allies, it would be interest-
ing to consider the development of
the modern Turkish state, which has
a number of curious parallels with
Putin’s Russia.
Mustafa Kemal’s “reboot” of Tur-
key after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire was founded on a strategy of
breakthrough modernization, meant
to build a modern and developed
secular state on the ruins of a back-
ward Islamic autocracy. In this wish
to leave the past behind and take a
leap towards a bright future, Kemal-
isms were similar to the Bolsheviks
who came to power in Russia at
the same time and provided a huge
amount of support to Atatürk. How-
ever, the reasons that spurred endless
wars between Russia and Turkey in
the past did not simply disappear.
As time passed, the two states ended
up on opposite sides of ideological
barricades again. Turkey became a
NATO member, but the ideological
climate bequeathed by Kemal re-
mained unchanged: a firmly secular
state, with the army as its guarantee.
However, the early 2000’s
brought a threat to the secular tradi-
tion, which had prevailed for almost
a century. Not unlike Russia, where
Orthodox-chauvinist “spiritual ten-
ets” suddenly grew much stronger,
Turkey saw a return of “political Is-
lam” and something resembling Ot-
toman revanchism. And, not unlike
Putin, Recep Erdoğan, the propo-
nent of these policies, has goals that
are far from the noble motives he de-
clares, such as fighting for traditional
values.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born
in 1954, in Kasımpaşa, a poor neigh-
TURKEY: A MIRROR FOR PUTIN
T

Putin friends eng-10-05-2016

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