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NATO Summit in Warsaw – outcomes for Ukraine (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv)

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  1. 1. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv)
  2. 2. NATO Summit in Warsaw – Outcomes for Ukraine (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) This publication collects opinions and assessments made in the wake of the Warsaw Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (July 8-9, 2016) by Ukrainian and NATO officials, by Ukrainian and Western defense and security experts. These statements, made 10 days following the above historic event, were called by their authors as pre-estimated. Discussion took place at the international con- ference NATO Summit in Warsaw – Outcomes for Ukraine held on July 19, 2016 organized by the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies with the financial support of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine. The conference was attended by representatives of the Ukrainian government (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and Ministry of Defense of Ukraine), officials and diplomats from NATO member countries, as well as experts, representatives of private business, civil society, and the media. The attendees were greeted by Natalia Nemyliwska, Director of the NATO Informa- tion and Documentation Centre in Ukraine, Oksana Osadcha, Principal Policy Coor- dinator of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine, and Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies. Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine 2016
  3. 3. 3 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) СONTENTS WELCOME ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Successful Domestic Policy Must Be Ukraine’s Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Natalia NEMYLIWSKA Warsaw Summit reiterated NATO’s strong commitment to continue to support Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Alexander VINNIKOV Ukraine in Fact Protects Peace of the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Valentyn BADRAK PRESENTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Warsaw Summit Approved Our Strategy for the Longer Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Dr. Gerlinde NIEHUS A Democratic Ukraine is of Paramount Importance for Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Rafał WOLSKI NATO Is Not Ready to Talk About Granting Membership to Ukraine . . . . . . 14 Borys TARASYUK Military Power Has Been Re-established as the Foundation of the National Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO Through the War in Donbas, Ukraine is Carrying out NATO’s Strategy on Deterrence of Russia in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Ihor DOLHOV The Kremlin is Stepping up Sabotage Efforts by Special Services to Disrupt Ukraine from the Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Yevhen MARCHUK Ukraine Can Receive Benefits, Acting Proactively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Ihor KABANENKO Kyiv Received a Response in Kind from NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Valentyn BADRAK
  4. 4. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 4 On Deterrence – Preventing New Conflict, Not Provoking It . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 George P.KENT The NATO Summit in Warsaw Was a True Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Iulian CHIFU NATO Explicitly Condemns Russia’s Destabilizing Actions and Policies . . . . . 33 Jonas DANILIAUSKAS Lack of Supplies of Weapons to Ukraine is Beyond My Understanding . . . . 36 Janusz Adam ONYSZKIEWICZ NATO and the Issues of Energy Security in the Context of the Warsaw Summit Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Mykhailo HONCHAR
  5. 5. 5 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) F irst of all I would like to under- line that the NATO Summit has clearly shown that independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine which stands on fundamental principles of democracy and rule of law is a guar- antee of Euro-Atlantic security. In this context, Ukraine’s priorities lie in the area of domestic policy trans- formations, including fighting cor- ruption and implementing reforms, particularly in the defence and secu- rity sectors. A good step on the path to these reforms was taken with the approval of the Strategic Defence Bulletin, as a roadmap for Ukraine’s defence sector reforms that aims to achieve full compatibility of Ukraine with NATO’s standards by 2020. Thus, step by step, Ukraine is ap- proaching Euro-Atlantic integration, while expanding and deepening its cooperation with NATO. In reality, over the past 2.5 years, Ukraine has carried out a number of transformations, both qualitative and quantitative  – yet our state’s reporting on these achievements and results requires a more holis- tic vision and approach. Hence, Ukraine and NATO established a new form of strategic communica- tions cooperation involving expert and consulting assistance for the Ukrainian state institutions in that field. Ukraine has set its course to- wards building a democratic and independent state with a strong rule of law, and is steadily proceed- ing along that course. Therefore, it is paramount that Ukraine’s voice is confident, clear and understand- able, and heard throughout the in- ternational arena as well as by its own citizens. First and foremost, Ukraine must im- plement all the above processes for its own benefit, but we can be cer- tain that NATO will provide Ukraine with effective support along its way. WELCOME ADDRESS Successful Domestic Policy Must Be Ukraine’s Priority Natalia NEMYLIWSKA, Director of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine
  6. 6. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 6 S ince the beginning of the crisis in and around Ukraine in 2014 the level of NATO’s engagement with Ukraine  – both political and practical – has been unprecedented. The reason for our commitment to support Ukraine is simple. Allies share the view that an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. This political signal was re- inforced in Warsaw, where Ukraine was the only partner nation to have a separate meeting with Allies at the highest level in the framework of the Summit. The meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government featured two key deliverables for Ukraine: one political and one practical. The first is a Joint Statement, a strong politi- cal message of unwavering support. Support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and for its right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from out- side interference. Allies stressed that Russia continues to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, despite repeated calls by the Alliance and the inter- national community to abide by in- ternational law. These developments have serious implications for the sta- bility and security of the entire Euro- Atlantic area. Allies reiterated that they are com- mitted to a peaceful solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has claimed nearly 10,000 lives, and reintegration of those areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine currently controlled by Russian-backed militants. NATO be- lieves that full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides, based on a comprehensive ceasefire and internationally verified withdrawal of weapons, is the only path to a sustainable peace. In the Joint State- ment Allies called on Russia to desist from aggressive actions and to use Warsaw Summit reiterated NATO’s strong commitment to continue to support Ukraine Alexander VINNIKOV, The Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine / Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine
  7. 7. 7 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) its considerable influence over the militants to meet their commitments in full, especially to allow for the ob- servation of the ceasefire regime, implementation of confidence-build- ing measures, and disarmament. It is stressed that Russia, as a signatory to the Minsk Agreements, bears sig- nificant responsibility. Despite its de- clared commitment to Minsk, Russia continues its deliberate destabilisa- tion of eastern Ukraine, in violation of international law. Allies also recognized that under challenging circumstances, Ukraine’s government is making progress in implementing wide-ranging reforms towards European and Euro-Atlantic standards, which will be essential in promoting prosperity and long-term stability. We welcomed the steps taken by Ukraine to fight corruption, meet International Monetary Fund conditions, reform the judiciary, and move towards decentralisation. To be sure, much still remains to be done. NATO encouraged Ukraine to remain committed to the full implementation of these and other necessary reforms and to ensuring their sustainability.  Also Allies wel- comed the adoption of the Strategic Defence Bulletin as Ukraine’s road- map for defence reform. Thus the Warsaw Summit reiterated NATO’s strong commitment to continue to support Ukraine in carrying out its reform agenda, including through the Annual National Programme in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership.  The second deliverable of the War- saw Summit for Ukraine is the Com- prehensive Package of Assistance (CAP). This is in many ways a unique document. It is aimed at consolidat- ing and enhancing NATO’s support to Ukraine, including by tailored ca- pability and capacity building mea- sures for the security and defence sector, which will contribute to en- hance Ukraine’s resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats. NATO’s support will continue to remain strong, and will even be strengthened in areas that are critical for Ukraine’s defence. We already have many activities ongo- ing through the Trust Funds estab- lished at the Wales Summit, as well as through the further enhance- ment of long-running technical as- sistance programmes. These activi- ties cover areas like cyber defence, logistics, communications, medical rehabilitation of wounded soldiers, and military personnel manage- ment, military education, building integrity, scientific research. In the framework of the CAP we will also launch work in important new ar- eas of cooperation such as counter- ing improvised explosive devices as well as hybrid warfare.
  8. 8. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 8 It is also important to note that the work of NATO’s advisory mission in Ukraine will continue, to help Ukraine modernize and reform its security and defence sector in line with Euro-Atlantic standards and practices. Our advisers work with a variety of institutions in Ukraine’s security and defence sector and be- yond. I believe this Allied expertise has already had a beneficial impact on the reform effort, and will hope- fully continue to grow. NATO-Ukraine cooperation is and will remain an important part of the Alliance’s contribution to the in- ternational community’s efforts to project stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Our focus right now, as I have mentioned, is to help Ukraine reform and modernize in ac- cordance with NATO standards. And Ukraine has a unique variety of tools at its disposal to further deepen its Distinctive Partnership with the Al- liance, including Ukraine’s Annual National Programme, the Compre- hensive Assistance Package and the Planning and Review Process. Building on the above Warsaw deliv- erables, NATO encourages Ukraine to advance with even more deter- mination on the path of reform. And the NATO Representation to Ukraine is here to help, every step of the way. The window of opportu- nity for reform is open, and time is of the essence.
  9. 9. 9 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) N o doubt, the Warsaw Sum- mit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on July 8-9, 2016 was an important mile- stone for the functioning and devel- opment of global security. During the time of rapid changes, fast and well-informed decision-making in security sphere becomes a key fac- tor for deterring aggression and de- structive forces. The summit’s specific decisions per- taining to Ukraine were met with a mixed response from the Ukrainian expert and civil community. On the one hand, it was essential that the actions of present-day Russia were defined as the main destabilizing fac- tor. Ukrainians can also hardly over- emphasize the importance of NATO member countries’ consolidation in maintaining sanctions against Russia and pointing out the mandatory de- occupation of Crimea by Russia. That said, for Ukraine, all decisions of the NATO summit remained at the level of politics and moral support. On the other hand, at the current develop- ment stage of the Ukrainian state, Ukrainians must see a clear way to- wards practical cooperation with NATO, both through implementation of the existing decisions and through creation of new opportunities. The Ukrainian society is particularly con- cerned whether Ukraine is going to become an asset for NATO, or it is viewed as a certain dangerous li- ability. Experts and the civil commu- nity alike are anxious to know: will Ukraine remain in the grey, buffer zone between two powerful forces, or will it finally be included in the Euro-Atlantic security system? The decisions made at the July sum- mit serve to strengthen NATO’s po- sitions, within the military-political bloc’s borders. Meanwhile, we are hoping to move on towards a more practical cooperation in the future, and thus cannot ignore the fact that none of the 139 decisions made at the summit contain a clear message about Ukraine’s prospects for future NATO membership. Ukraine, which is de facto defending the peace of the Western countries, is eager to see them making an ad- equate contribution to the system for deterrence of Russia, which has ruined the existing system of inter- national security. Ukraine in Fact Protects Peace of the West Valentyn BADRAK, Director of the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
  10. 10. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 10 A s I am mindful of the old adage from the poet Shelly quipping in relation to his fellow poet Lord Byron that “he has lost the art of communication but unfortunately not the habit of public speaking” – I shall be concise and seek to give you the broader picture. To set the scene: Responding to Evolving Challenges One thing NATO has done well over the decades is change with the times – and the challenges. We’ve been able to reinvent ourselves and our strate- gies to reflect changing circumstances. The Warsaw Summit like the pre- vious summit in Wales took place amidst a fundamentally changed se- curity environment. With its illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia tore up the international rule- book and challenged our post-Cold War vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. 2014 stands out as a watershed year. Two years later, we face continued Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, and an ongoing, unprovoked military build-up from the Barents Sea to the Baltic, and from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. Terrorism and turmoil across Middle East and North Africa didn’t begin in 2014. But that year witnessed a step change  – for the worse  – with the emergence of the so-called Islamic State or Daesh, and its declared ambi- tion to establish a caliphate, beginning in Iraq and Syria. The effects have been the further es- calation of the civil war in Syria, and a worsening of the arc of crisis across the Middle East and North Africa, with direct consequences for our own se- curity in the form of brutal terrorist attacks – including Istanbul, Orlando, Brussels and Paris  – and the biggest migrant and refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. In addition to these major challenges to the East and South, we face long- standing threats such as cyber-at- PRESENTATIONS Warsaw Summit Approved Our Strategy for the Longer Term Dr. Gerlinde NIEHUS, Head of Engagements Section, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO HQ
  11. 11. 11 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) tacks, nuclear proliferation and long- range ballistic missiles. As the world changes, NATO must continue to adapt – and Warsaw was fundamen- tally about adaptation and change. Preparing for Warsaw The Wales Summit in September 2014 was NATO’s immediate response to these evolving security challenges. Following Wales, we have delivered the biggest reinforcement of our col- lective defence in a generation. A few concrete examples: • We tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000, with a Spearhead Force at its core, able to move within days. • We set up eight new headquar- ters to facilitate training and rein- forcements in the eastern part of our Alliance. • We augmented the defences of Turkey, the Ally most affected by the turmoil in the south, with AWACS planes and defensive mis- sile systems. • We sped up our decision-making, and developed strategies to deal with hybrid threats and complex challenges from the south. • And we agreed to increase our ca- pacity for intelligence sharing and being able to act on that intelli- gence. We will soon create a new Intelligence division at NATO. We will better coordinate intelligence gathering, to increase efficiency and situational awareness. Warsaw Summit: Shaping the Future of NATO Warsaw Summit approved our strat- egy for the longer term, based on rec- ognition that these challenges will be with us for a long time to come. Two overarching themes of the sum- mit will determine NATO’s direction for many years: • Strengthening our collective de- fence and deterrence and • projecting stability beyond our borders. Both are long-term policies that will require determination and persistence in implementation. Let me map out each briefly: To protect our nations by strengthen- ing collective defence and deterrence: We have agreed on an Enhanced Forward Presence: that means a NATO deployment, by rotation, of a robust, multinational battalion in each of most exposed countries in North East – Estonia, Latvia, Lithu- ania and Poland – and bolster pos- ture in South East.This will make it clear that an attack against one Ally will be met by forces from across the Alliance.
  12. 12. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 12 Allies committed to boosting their re- silience, improving civil preparedness, and ensuring we have the right mix of capabilities to meet new challenges, including hybrid warfare. Cyber Security: We recognised cyber- space as a new operational domain, joining land, air and sea. And Allies pledged to strengthen their own cyber defences, and share more information and best practices. Relations with Russia: they have been high on agenda in Warsaw. We pursue a two-track policy: defence and dia- logue. NATO does not seek confronta- tion. Everything we do is defensive, proportionate, and in line with our in- ternational commitments. • In the long term, we still seek a constructive relationship if Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine and returns to compliance with in- ternational law. • In near term, dialogue is needed to manage a difficult relationship, re- store predictability, transparency, and measures for risk reduction. We want to ensure that a misun- derstanding or an accident doesn’t spiral out of control. To project stability beyond our borders – east and south: We will step up support for partners in ourneighbourhood.Ifourpartnersare more stable, we are more secure. This means doing more to help our part- ners provide for their own security, build resilience against outside pres- sure, and fight terrorism. All 28 NATO Allies are contributing to the US-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. At Warsaw Summit, we decided that NATO AWACS aircraft will provide direct support to this Coalition. We also agreed to expand our cur- rent training and capacity building programs for Iraqi military officers into Iraq. We will continue enhancing our cooperation with Jordan and our preparations to assist Libya, if request- ed.And we will sustain our long-term commitment to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In addition, NATO will provide more support to Georgia, to continue to as- sist the Republic of Moldova and to enhance support to Ukraine. For Ukraine, Heads of State and Gov- ernment of the NATO-Ukraine Com- mission endorsed the comprehen- sive Assistance Package for Ukraine. This is a significant package to sup- port Ukraine in its reform efforts. To make your country more resilient and able to better provide for your own security. We will also deepen our engagement with partners in the Black and Baltic Sea regions, and in the Western Bal- kans. We will also maintain our impor- tant operation in Kosovo.
  13. 13. 13 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) Projecting stability touches on over- lapping issues: countering terrorism and turmoil, capacity building, work- ing with partners, addressing the migrant and refugee crisis, and mari- time security. Security and stability will be enhanced through greater cooperation between NATO and the European Union. It will take time before we know the full con- sequences of the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, but we know this: the UK remains a staunch NATO ally and NATO-EU cooperation has be- come even more important. So we are taking our cooperation to the whole new level. NATO and the EU will enhance civil preparedness, boost cyber defense capabilities and address broader maritime security issues in the central Mediterranean – building on NATO’s cooperation with the EU to cut lines of international human smuggling in the Aegean. Goals include countering trafficking and terrorism, upholding freedom of navigation, and contributing to re- gional capacity building. The security we need: Defence Spending Pledge and Progress Modern challenges require a mod- ern Alliance. And they require the right resources. The Warsaw Sum- mit reviewed and reconfirmed the Defence Investment Pledge made at the Wales Summit. 2015 was the first year in many with a small increase in defence spending. Estimates for 2016 show a further in- crease of 3% across European Allies and Canada. This amounts to $8 billion US dollars in extra defence spending. We still have a long way to go. We need to keep up the momentum. But we have turned an important corner. Concluding Thoughts: Evolving Challenges, Enduring Values Our 67-year history has taught us the importance of evolving as the threats evolve. But some things haven’t changed – nor should they. Like our unbreakable bond between Europe and North America, our com- mitment to defend each other from attack – under Article 5 of our trea- ty – and our dedication to our funda- mental values: democracy, individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law. These are NATO’s enduring val- ues that keep us united and strong. And we stand firm in our political and practical support to Ukraine. We have again underpinnedthat an “independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democ- racy and the rule of law is key to Euro- Atlantic security.” We stand united in our support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integ- rity and its inherent right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference.
  14. 14. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 14 F or Poland, security is imple- mented through cooperation within NATO and with Ukraine. In this context, Ukraine holds funda- mental importance for Poland, and the latter will continue providing the Ukrainian side with necessary as- sistance, including that required to increase the combat potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The assis- tance package for Ukraine approved by the NATO summit is unprece- dented, as no non-member country in NATO’s history has ever received support on such scale. The Warsaw summit made it clear that Russia itself is a destabilizing factor, and we must emphasize that a democratic, independent Ukraine plays a paramount role in the func- tioning and development of Europe. Among the summit’s results of par- ticular importance to Ukraine are the Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO, as well as the bilateral agreement on military and technical cooperation and weap- ons supply. As for the Agreement on Military Cooperation between Ukraine and Poland, it was signed in Warsaw during the NATO summit, by the heads of defence ministries of Poland and Ukraine: Antoni Ma- cierewicz, the Minister of National Defence of Poland, and Stepan Pol- torak, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine. That Agreement on Military and Technical Cooperation stipulates supplies of armaments and military equipment to Ukraine, and provision of military and technical services. Po- land will be investing in Ukraine for the sake of its own security, because a safe Poland is not possible without a safe and independent Ukraine. In addition to that, Ukrainian soldiers are participating in joint military ex- ercises and trainings in Yavoriv, Lviv Region, together with the USA, Great Britain, Canada, and Lithuania. A Democratic Ukraine is of Paramount Importance for Europe Rafał WOLSKI, Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of the Republic of Poland to Ukraine (Deputy Head of the Diplomatic Mission)
  15. 15. 15 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) W hat are the results of the NATO Warsaw summit for Ukraine? In terms of the form and content of the decisions made, the NATO War- saw summit was unprecedented  – both as regards the relations be- tween NATO and Ukraine, and the strategic decisions made by NATO at the summit. To describe briefly the NATO Warsaw summit’s decisions and their impact on the interests of Ukrainians, I believe we can use two words. One is a hope. The second one is disappointment. If we speak of hope: the Warsaw summit made unprecedented deci- sions related to Ukraine. We are once again grateful to NATO for showing their solidarity with Ukraine in our struggle against the Russian aggres- sor. We are thankful for the com- prehensive assistance package ap- proved by NATO, the scope of which is really unprecedented. That said, a certain portion of this comprehen- sive package repeats NATO’s past decisions concerning Ukraine. This summit was also unique in terms of the level, format, and subject mat- ter of the meetings attended by the President of Ukraine. The level of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, the 5+1 format of the summit – all those are NATO’s nods of respect towards Ukraine. All these are positive things. Now, concerning disappointment. We did not hear the words that were recorded in the final declara- tion of the NATO Bucharest sum- mit, which, and I quote, said that “Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.” We did not hear anything along those lines in War- saw, even though that summit made reference to the decisions of some previous summits, including the Bucharest one. From that, we can indirectly conclude that NATO sup- ports, or rather, adheres to the deci- sions that were approved, including those made in Bucharest concerning Ukraine. We did not hear a single word about MAP. These are issues that can be defined through certain messages that were not sent to us in NATO Is Not Ready to Talk About Granting Membership to Ukraine Borys TARASYUK, Member of Parliament of Ukraine, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (1998-2000, 2005-2007)
  16. 16. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 16 Warsaw. At the same time, as a re- minder: back in 2006, we were nego- tiating with NATO leaders Ukraine’s invitation to MAP. The speech by [Viktor] Yanukovych on September 14, 2006, had essentially ruined those plans and achievements. Dur- ing the first two years of the Russian aggression, we did not see any of those steps, which is naturally dis- appointing. Obviously, the calls for solidarity with Ukraine, the calls for Russia to cease its aggression against Ukraine and observe the norms of the international law – those are of some help, but not much. Especially not in the area of actual warfare, of the armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia. At the summit we also did not hear anything about supplies of modern weaponry to Ukraine. This is also disappointing. Behind this, we can see the political decisions made in Washington, whose administration keeps to the principle: no weapons supply to Ukraine regardless of the US Congress’ decision. To sum up the above, I will say that today, NATO is not ready to address the question of Ukraine’s member- ship. However, the good news is that NATO gave Ukraine an opportunity to demonstrate that it is ready to re- form its economy as well as its de- fence and security sectors. I consider that fact as positive, because any future relations between Ukraine and NATO will depend on Ukraine’s ability to carry out in-depth reforms, including those in the defence and security sectors.
  17. 17. 17 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) W e must accept the fact that the world is chang- ing rapidly, with the de- stabilization already spanning the Caspian-Black Sea region, even with- out regard for the 425-km front line in the ATO zone in Donbas. The Cas- pian-Black Sea region is destabilized, as is evidenced, among other things, by the recent events in Turkey and Armenia. A real war is underway in Ukraine, where the enemy continues deploying heavy artillery day and night, and where Ukrainian soldiers die every day. This is why the future of Ukraine’s prospective Euro-Atlan- tic integration is being decided in the combat zone. The summit is important for Ukraine because it indicates the re-emerging power of NATO as the security foun- dation, which Russia is trying to ruin. This is of paramount importance. In that context, it is feasible for Ukraine to create its own military leverage as an argument for additional defence capacity. To that end, we need to reform our defence sector. Ukraine has already completed a cycle of defence planning, with the drafting and adoption of the new Military Doctrine, National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence Bulletin, and the Strategy for Cyber Security. Thus, we have every prerequisite and op- portunity for successful reformation and development of our country’s defence sector. By and large, we should bear in mind several key conclusions of the War- saw NATO summit. One: Military power has been re- established as the foundation of the national security policy. In the cur- rent environment of global trans- formations, the military factor has become the main tool of the foreign policy. Thus, military power becomes the main foreign policy tool. This is a fundamental change, and we must clearly understand this. Two: Only those who can help them- selves as much as possible may count on outside assistance. Lack of funds for full-fledged reforms and Military Power Has Been Re-established as the Foundation of the National Security Policy Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine
  18. 18. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 18 rearmament puts a damper on creat- ing a modern army in Ukraine in the nearest future. The emergence of a compact, but well-equipped army with modern armaments is a matter of the future. War costs money, and today’s Ukraine is, let’s face it, one of the poorest countries in Europe, so it will not be able to afford large-scale rearmament in the next few years. Thus, when working with a limited defence budget, the following fac- tors are critical for increasing an army’s combat readiness: efficient use of the available arsenal of weap- ons and military equipment; deep modernization of Soviet-made ar- maments; and a qualitative increase in the efficiency of all defence and security bodies, starting with com- mand, control and intelligence. Three: NATO has already made an unprecedented move in providing Ukraine with increased opportunities to effect institutional reforms, and Ukraine must use them. I should em- phasize that there are realistic ways of applying the existing mechanisms of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, so let us start working on specific projects. In particular, Kyiv’s plans to shift Ukraine’s defence sec- tor to NATO standards need to be taken to the practical level. This said, the military reform must focus on a comprehensive change in the ideology of the needs of the army and a soldier. If a soldier is regarded as nothing but a tool, no Euro-Atlan- tic integration will be possible. There is one final point I would like to make. Ukraine highly appreci- ates the assistance provided by NATO and its member countries at all levels, including in the sphere of reforms. However, and this is im- portant, the latter is being carried out in the situation of an ongoing information war. Ukraine is meet- ing many of its allies’ requirements rather precisely, and there is good reason to say that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are being changed dra- matically and for the better.
  19. 19. 19 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) T oday, it’s important to rec- ognize that the strategy of deterring the Russian Federa- tion is a dominant geopolitical fac- tor that will continue shaping the actions of NATO member countries and other defence actors for a long period of time. An important role in this process is reserved for Ukraine, even though for us, such deterrence means an everyday war of attrition. Nevertheless, this is our way of im- plementing NATO’s strategy. This is something we must realize, and use that fact as the basis for any future plans concerning Ukraine’s direction of movement and respective steps to that effect. In the context of de- terrence, the partnership between NATO and Ukraine becomes particu- larly meaningful. Thus, in the context of NATO part- nership, Ukraine is located at the very front line of strategic deter- rence of the aggressor. It is defend- ing not only itself, but the defence space of NATO countries. We must also emphasize that the distinctive partnership status granted to our country and the “comprehensive assistance” package are crucial for enabling our domestic reforms. Ide- ally, we would like to see the stra- tegic document package approved by the President to be followed by documents that set the goals of our partnership with NATO, the annual NATO Cooperation Plan, etc. In ad- dition, in line with NATO practices, each item on our programs must be backed financially. This is something we are often missing, that is why even perfectly drafted plans fail to be implemented. Going back to the significance of the latest NATO summit’s decisions for Ukraine, I would like to highlight three documents that, in my opinion, point to the Alliance’s drastic change of heart as relates to its commitment to defending itself and deterring the aggressor. These are such important documents as “Assessment of the Situation in the Baltic Sea Region,” “Assessment of the Situation in the Black Sea Region,” and the recogni- Through the War in Donbas, Ukraine is Carrying out NATO’s Strategy on Deterrence of Russia in Europe Ihor DOLHOV, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine
  20. 20. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 20 tion of the cyber space as the fourth dimension of the operational war- fare. Indeed, we are already being subjected to cyber attacks, the ag- gressor is actively testing new cyber warfare methods, and cooperation with allies in this field will allow us to build up our own defence capacity. Finally, another greatly important summit decision was to create a joint intelligence and data exchange sys- tem. Given the increasing threat on the part of Russia and international terrorists, this step is very timely, even if it does destroy certain stereo- types and existing limitations typical for the secret services of every single NATO member and partner country. Thus, the Warsaw summit created real possibilities for a deeper part- nership between Ukraine and NATO. Moreover, we are offered assistance with a prospect of its expansion, on the principles of “more for more.”
  21. 21. 21 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) T he importance of NATO sup- port for Ukraine in our con- frontation with the aggres- sor cannot be overestimated, as we would have had a much more dif- ficult time going it alone. Consider- ing the ongoing negative changes in Russia (deteriorating economy, rehabilitation of Stalinism, rampant, shameless and lying propaganda and anti-NATO rhetoric, to name a few), the Kremlin is stepping up sabotage efforts by its special forces, striving to disrupt Ukraine from the inside. In this context, I would like to say about the efficient work of the Se- curity Service of Ukraine (SBU), which, in the conditions of the on- going war with Russia, successfully prevented numerous terrorist at- tacks that were being prepared by the enemy in our cities, and did not allow for the implementation of scenarios that would have created new hotbeds and seats of sepa- ratism. Maybe the worst of them could have been the creation of the “Bessarabian People’s Republic.” These successes reveal Ukraine’s own potential, which can be useful for its Western partners, especially now that recent terrorist attacks in France and Belgium showed that the Western law-enforcement struc- tures are not yet able to prevent the spread of terrorism through their territories. The attempted coup in Turkey, the NATO member state, also is worth mention. With this in mind, the deterrence of the aggres- sor is a function that reaches into the future, especially in the current situation, which will be our reality for the years to come. As a representative of the Ukrainian side in the security subgroup of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group, I speak in favour of experience shar- The Kremlin is Stepping up Sabotage Efforts by Special Services to Disrupt Ukraine from the Inside Yevhen MARCHUK, Prime Minister of Ukraine (1995-1996), Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (1999-2003), Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2003-2004), Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (1991 – 1994)
  22. 22. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 22 ing between the special services of Ukraine and those of NATO coun- tries. However, I must also caution against an immediate reform of Ukrainian special services. Let us be honest: we have much to learn from the special services of NATO coun- tries, but our colleagues also have much to learn from us, because de- cades of peace in Europe served to relax its special services. Which Eu- ropean country has recent warfare experience? None. Meanwhile, we have colossal practice that no other European country had the chance to accumulate. Because of this, I am not in a hurry to insist that we implemented the existing recom- mendations on reforming the Secu- rity Service of Ukraine. What exactly are they? They are based, for ex- ample, on peaceful Switzerland. In other words, the recommendations for reforming the SBU are based on the calm situation in Europe. We can speak about reforming our special services when the war is over, and peace has been around for 10-15 years. That will be the time to con- sider and implement such reforms.
  23. 23. 23 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) I would like to take rather a contro- versial view of the decisions made by the NATO Warsaw summit. Our media are engaged in a lively discus- sion of the summit’s results. Natu- rally, these include a comprehensive assistance package, an increased number of joint events, advisory support, and so on. No doubt, those things are important and of funda- mental value. They carry two mes- sages. First, Ukraine must continue reforming its defence and security sectors. Second, we need to start practical implementation of the Stra- tegic Defence Bulletin, get the neces- sary operational combat capabilities, and so on. However, I would like to discuss the summit’s decisions related to the Al- lied countries, specifically, in the as- pect that translates to a more active policy of deterrence of Russia and strengthening collective security. Why are they important? I believe that Ukraine is currently at the front line of deterring Russia. That is why our country may claim certain ben- efits and additional assistance – if we are proactive. Proactive in terms of participation in NATO events, full uti- lization of our potential, offering our capacities, experience, etc. What does this entail? First of all, I am talking about decisions dealing with a more active deterrence poli- cy, strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, creating of appropriate collec- tive capabilities, and the use of vari- ous instruments to expand those ca- pabilities in the context of collective security. In particular, this concerns capacities in the maritime defence zone. Before the Warsaw summit, Romania proposed the creation of a NATO joint naval group in the Black Sea, which would serve as a deter- rent for Russia against increasing its combat capabilities in this region. Unfortunately, as we know, this de- Ukraine Can Receive Benefits, Acting Proactively Ihor KABANENKO, President of UARPA, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2014), First Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2012-2013), Admiral of the Naval Forces of Ukraine
  24. 24. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 24 cision was not approved. Instead, it was stated that the proposal would be studied in more detail, but also that there would be an increase in naval exercises. Ukraine can partici- pate in those developments. The same refers to the development of NATO’s air forces. Poland will take part in those events, and, accord- ingly, Ukraine can also try to be more proactive and offer its capacities, which are unfortunately limited, but still, might be useful for the Alliance. As a positive example of Ukraine’s proactive position, let me remind you of the successful Measures of Strengthening Trust & Security in the Black Sea Region initiative proposed by Ukraine. That initiative became the basis for the creation and im- plementation of the BLACKSEAFOR project. The BLACKSEAFOR docu- ments laid down the basic operat- ing principles of that initiative, also suggested by Ukraine. BLACKSEAFOR was rather successful, up until Rus- sia’s occupation of the Crimea. This example shows that we can be at the forefront of similar projects, that contribute to our own interests and those of our partners alike. Other initiatives of the summit’s concern, for example, the increase of early warning capabilities. Those initiatives included exercises in which Ukraine took part in 2005- 2008. Increased early warning ca- pabilities will provide for a more active and efficient response to changes in circumstances and al- low employment of the joint early warning system to detect changes in the situation. Such format can be useful for both sides. Another item raised at the summit was presented by joint exercises based on collective defence scenar- ios. I believe that Ukraine has a great potential here, to join and share ex- perience with our NATO colleagues. I also believe that this format requires a proactive approach, because we do possess considerable experience of inter-compatibility in such exercises, inter-compatibility within operation- al capability concepts, and in other programs that existed in the past. However, our knowledge requires practical implementation with real actions in the context of decisions made at the summit. Other potentially interesting deci- sions for Ukraine are those dealing with the adaptation of infrastruc- ture, and delegation of additional authority from military-political to military structures: from the North Atlantic Council to the North At- lantic Supreme Command. We can start similar transitions on our end, changing our governance system asynchronously.
  25. 25. 25 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) Another aspect I would like to em- phasize is sharing experience. Again, it would be advisable for us to create an inter-compatibility field, with the common understanding of the ongo- ing situation, which we call hybrid warfare, or new-generation armed confrontation. Unfortunately, I guess that in this respect, there are some discrepancies in terminology, as well as in priorities and selection of effi- cient mechanisms. Meanwhile, it is a very important area for the concen- tration of efforts on important direc- tions, and for the maximum use of the existing potential. Unfortunately, at this point of time, we have not yet fully utilized all the capacities we have, namely, in the field of public- private partnership: both in Ukraine and in bilateral or multilateral use of such opportunities. Some efforts are underway, but I would like to empha- size that we are still under-utilizing our potential, at multiple levels: stra- tegic, operational, and tactical. We understand that this war is waged by more than just the classic means of armed confrontation. The ratio of military and non-military ac- tions in this war is 1 to 4. The latter include, among others, information warfare and cyber security. This is a field that, in my opinion and pro- ceeding from the current evidence, will growth further, along with the naval sector. These are the two spheres in which Ukraine and NATO should cooperate more productively and more regularly, relying on pub- lic-private partnership. Another aspect is presented by stra- tegic communications. I believe that in this issue, we still have a problem with shared terminology, common understanding, and clear definition of the very concept of strategic com- munications. Some think that stra- tegic communications are nothing but counter-propaganda but I be- lieve those are two entirely different things. Again, it will take the form of specific, practical, and realistic joint projects involving the state authori- ties and civil society, to help us stand strong in the current difficult situa- tion, make progress, and build a so- ciety we wish to have – founded on the values of a liberal, democratic, and market economy.
  26. 26. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 26 T he NATO Summit in Warsaw on July 8-9, 2016, did not re- sult in any breakthroughs that could give Ukraine an edge over its external aggressor. However, we must admit that by and large, Kyiv got a response in kind from NATO, being, to an extent, a logical continu- ation of the West’s strategy of deter- ring Russia. We believe that the NATO summit’s decisions concerning Ukraine  – namely, the adoption of the new Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, the prospect of Ukraine’s participation in the Enhanced Op- portunities Programme, and the ex- tension of sanctions against Russia – were just some of the steps NATO could have taken. On its part, the Ukrainian Govern- ment has also carried out only some oftheexistingtasks,whenitcomesto defence reforms and preparation for military-technological cooperation with NATO countries  – that is why we cannot yet expect a real increase in practical cooperation in creation of armaments, or a near prospect of lethal military aid for Ukraine. Mov- ing on to specific military-techno- logical cooperation (MTC) projects requires significant modernization of Ukraine’s regulatory-legal frame- work, and a change in the principles of governance in the defence sector. These changes did not take place in Ukraine. The Ukrainian state must reconsider its approach and create a new playing field, the one that would make investors interested in working in Ukraine, especially in its defence industry. We should also be more active on the international scene, making attractive offers to investors. It is not normal that, in spite of the current situation, NATO countries are using the Russian Volga-Dnepr airlines for airlift, France continues manufacturing thermal scopes for Russian military equipment, and Ita- ly supplies SKD sets for Russia’s Rys armoured vehicles. Besides, I am sure that European NATO countries are acting mainly within the paradigm of their own security interests, and giving increas- ingly more frequent signals about their willingness to improve relations Kyiv Received a Response in Kind from NATO Valentyn BADRAK, Director of the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
  27. 27. 27 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) with Russia, including at the expense of Ukraine’s interests. In practice, these sentiments are seen in contin- ued military-technological coopera- tion between Russia and some NATO countries. For example, despite the sanctions, Italy and France continue implementing joint MTC projects with Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian defence manufacturers and devel- opers often face refusal, when try- ing to buy certain components for weapons and military equipment. This does not just complicate the idea of practical cooperation with companies from NATO countries, but also casts doubt about the plans to phase out imports and fully give up MTC with the Russian Federation in the future. In the current conditions, Ukraine could make the most valuable achievements in specific military- technological cooperation projects, involving joint production with Western defence companies, receiv- ing defence technologies, etc. For now, we can expect from NATO such things like: additional structures in hybrid defence, intensified military exercises and discipline for Ukrainian defence forces; NATO will probably provide assistance in the develop- ment of the Special Operations Force and the Ukrainian Naval Forces, as well as in the creation of cyber de- fence departments. Cooperation with NATO may also develop in the context of the trust funds created to assist Ukraine. However, the most important step for Ukraine in cooperation with NATO would be to start practical cooperation in creation of new ar- maments, which is the only way for our Western partners to become our real and practical allies. This shift can happen only after a change of the mindset, both of the NATO lead- ers and the Ukrainian government, and the resulting transformation of Ukraine’s defence market into a clear and transparent playing field for the West. This would include adoption of the necessary laws and programs, beginning of transparent privatisa- tion of some defence industry enter- prises, and protection of private and foreign investments. At this point of time, the Ukrainian government is not ready to make such steps, just as it is not ready to step away from “manual control” of the defence sec- tor. Ukrainian society is in fact much more ready for Ukraine’s integration into NATO than its government. We must emphasize that Ukraine must break away from Russia, once and for all, when it comes to defence technologies and manufacturing of weapons and military equipment. Without such a break, we cannot expect a realistic full-scale coopera-
  28. 28. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 28 tion in armaments with NATO coun- tries. In this context, assistance from NATO is a fundamental element for Ukraine’s transformation. Thus, the possibility of the full-scale Euro-Atlantic integration, implemen- tation of practical defence projects, and creation of joint defence capa- bilities remain unanswered ques- tions for Ukraine. And the whole na- tion is eager to hear the answers as soon as possible. UkraineshouldnotcometotheWest asking for weapons, but rather, act as a partner that possesses defence technologies, proposing joint pro- duction of modern armaments at its facilities, through cooperation and investments into the Ukrainian de- fence sector. For example, resump- tion of production of An-124 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft would make it possible to launch a number of new projects and to bar Russia from the international airlift market at a time. Moreover, even as we speak, the aggressor is looking for oppor- tunities to modernize its heavy car- go aircraft fleet, and poach experts in that field, including from Ukraine. On one hand, this is an attempt to rescue Russia’s technologically ob- solete aircraft production, on the other, a threat for Ukraine, which may lose a number of engineering professionals. We cannot let that happen. Other promising projects may include target missile devel- opment for the US National Missile Defence, and subsequently, for the European missile defence shield. Creating capacities in Ukraine for manufacturing of communication technologies, strike drones, and other military equipment would also give way for important and lu- crative projects. Thus, the NATO summit became an- other indication that cooperation between Ukraine and NATO is a two- way street that requires efforts and decision-making from both sides, which is not always easy. However, this is an approach that can pro- vide for practical transformation in Ukraine, while giving the Alliance a reliable and dependable ally on its eastern border.
  29. 29. 29 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) I will share some thoughts on the wider security environment, and what NATO is doing to counter cur- rent threats, through deterrence and projecting stability.  • The strategic goal for the alliance remainsthesame:AEuropewhole, free, and at peace.  • As the world changes and threats evolve, our nations are more se- cure when we stand together. NATO members are more than just military allies and Article 5. We are united by our enduring commit- ment to shared values  – democ- racy, pluralism, and inclusive soci- eties strengthened by our rich di- versity of backgrounds and faiths. • Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, and subsequent aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk, trans- formed the strategic security envi- ronment of Europe in the first ma- jor shift since the breakup of the Soviet Union 25 years ago.  • As President Obama said in his news conference in Warsaw: “This is a pivotal moment for the alli- ance.” If that word sounds famil- iar, you may recall when President Obama came into office 7 years ago, the U.S. administration talked about a “pivot” to Asia. The cur- rent focus on events in Europe is crystal clear. He continued: “In the nearly 70 years of NATO, perhaps never have we faced such a range of challenges all at once – security, humanitarian, political.” • Thus, we are not merely talking about a clear threat from a more aggressive Russia. The new secu- rity environment is not a simple return to the 20th century Cold War East vs. West dynamic in NA- TO’s early years. • There is also the growing threat from transnational terrorist or- ganizations based in northern Af- rica and the Middle East, as well as the destabilizing force of mass migration. We have seen over the past year that terrorist groups, including ISIL, have the ability to strike at the heart of Europe, even as their zones of insecurity in the Middle East have led to un- precedented waves of migrants fleeing conflict. Cyber attacks threaten Allied infrastructure as much as Ukrainian infrastructure. On Deterrence – Preventing New Conflict, Not Provoking It George P.KENT, Deputy Chief of Mission, the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine
  30. 30. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 30 • The recent Warsaw Summit fo- cused on adapting to new reali- ties. NATO Allies will respond in two major ways: deterrence; and projecting stability beyond NA- TO’s borders.  On Deterrence – preventing new con- flict, not provoking it. The core of the “new security environ- ment” in 2016 and NATO prepared- ness reflect Russian actions in Ukraine, and the fear that Russia may repeat such actions within the territory of NATO countries. NATO’s Readiness Ac- tion Plan includes the tripling in size of the NATO Response Force with a bri- gade-sized high-readiness spearhead force at its core able to move within in a matter of days.  • In Warsaw, the Allies agreed to en- hance their force posture up and down the eastern flank of the Alli- ance that borders Russia.  • To the northeast, in the Baltic Sea region, we have agreed to rotate four battalions to Estonia, Lithua- nia, Latvia, and Poland in enhanced forward presence. All four allies have long requested deployments for their defense, long seen by oth- er members as not necessary. The threat environment has changed, and so has our posture. • To the southeast, the Black Sea region, NATO also agreed to cre- ate a new multinational brigade that we hope will become opera- tional in the coming years.  • Finally, NATO agreed to the cre- ation of a 13,000- strong NATO Rapid Reaction Force, stationed in Spain to be sure, but one that could be deployed to the eastern flank of Europe in a matter of days to deter an offensive from Russia. It is not just deterrence that NATO is seeking to enhance, but rapid deterrence.  On Projecting Stability Beyond NATO’s Borders. The other key theme of the Summit was projecting stability beyond NA- TO’s borders. While events in Ukraine were a clear primary driving force, the Summit also considered transnational threats from northern Africa, the Mid- dle East, and Afghanistan.  • Ukraine must be a key partner in this effort. A democratic, stable Ukraine that successfully imple- ments economic and political reforms, and is assured of its ter- ritorial integrity and sovereignty, is a key element of Euro-Atlantic security. • AndasPresidentObamastressed: “Our alliance must do more on behalf of global security, espe- cially on Europe’s southern flank. NATO should intensify its commit- ment to the campaign to destroy Isis and do more to help the EU shut down criminal networks that are exploiting desperate migrants crossing the Mediterranean and Aegean seas.”
  31. 31. 31 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) M y report will address some strategic issues. I would like to emphasize the impor- tance of this conference. NATO rep- resentatives permitted me to speak more openly than in front of our diplomatic friends. As I am a former advisor to the President, I can be more candid. The first and most important point: the NATO summit in Warsaw was a true breakthrough. It showcased a complete change of attitude to- wards defence and deterrence, compared to the Wales summit. Despite any pessimistic assessment by a number of experts, the changes seen there were drastic. Russia is mentioned in the Communi- qué 52 times. This summit was very much focused on the Russian prob- lem, and the messages sent by it, even the wording in the declaration, became the part of the process for the deterrence of Moscow. The final text of the declaration was approved by all parties, even the President of France who recently said that Rus- sia is France’s partner. The speech of the NATO Secretary General was very telling. In fact, this was the first time when an Alliance leader “chal- lenged” the head of the state who addressed them. All these things pertain to Russia. The final declara- tion (the Communiqué) mentions the threats caused by Russia’s actions, namely: violation of its obligations, military challenges, annexation, use of force, and violence. In fact, these are the case not only at the Europe- an level, but also at the level of the CIS, because none of the documents signed by Russia in the CIS region mentions its right to protect “Russian patriots” in other countries. De facto, Moscow’s own actions undermine its proposals for further integration with these countries. Let me emphasize several im- portant messages of the Warsaw summit. The first one relates to the NATO member countries. Ar- ticle 14, relating to the northern partners at the Alliance’s eastern flank, addresses the issues of de- terrence and countering a whole range of risks. In this context, the The NATO Summit in Warsaw Was a True Breakthrough Iulian CHIFU, President of the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Romania)
  32. 32. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 32 four battalion battle groups are be- ing brought up. If you really wish to deter something, you simply need to move forward. The process was symbolically balanced to be a proportionate response. We have four international battalion battle groups, in addition to the multina- tional Romanian-Bulgarian brigade. It is important that the Alliance’s obligations to everyone are upheld. Another issue discussed at the sum- mit involved movement of NATO troops through the Allies’ territo- ries. If a NATO member country is attacked, there will be no restric- tions or borders for the movement or troops. I would like to emphasize that this is not about allocating large numbers of troops to prevent an at- tack on the Alliance’s border coun- tries – but visible messages are being sent to show the Alliance is ready to defend its members. I believe that this was the first time that NATO stated that aggression and threats against neighbour coun- tries and partner countries consti- tute a threat against the Alliance’s operation. This refers to the use of violence, military action, and the an- nexation of Crimea. In fact, Crimea is mentioned in the Communiqué 4 times, and the east of Ukraine, 12 times. We argued on every punctua- tion mark in the final document to make our stand on Russia as unam- biguous as possible. True, it might have been difficult to highlight cer- tain points we saw as necessary… Four official documents and eight public addresses of the Alliance con- tain all these statements dealing with Ukraine. This also means a threat to our own security. Because of this, we are designing our security, and creat- ing capabilities in the defence indus- try in a number of countries. How are we helping these countries? We train their troops, we help them create defence and security insti- tutions to enable them to defend themselves properly, if the exist- ing aggression is aggravated or the country is subjected to new attacks… Another important point I would like to emphasize is the definition of the relations between NATO and Russia. There are four separate articles that regulate who can communicate with Russia, who can take part in these re- lations, for how long, and to what ex- tent. All those things are very clearly stipulated; we have military channels that must deal with the conflict, mit- igate risks, and avoid certain critical points that may escalate into a con- flict or incident. However, all these pertain to the mili- tary dimension. In the diplomatic field, the articles say that we communicate
  33. 33. 33 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) our opinion, but cannot be involved in discussion. Our conditions are: respect for the international law, respect for prior commitments, changes within the Russian Federation, particularly in how it treats international rela- tions... Concerning Ukraine, it is very clearly stipulated that troops must be removed, weapons laid down, and Ukraine must be given back control over its borders. Those are the condi- tions for normal relations. I believe that we can all clearly see these de- mands, as well as the obligations that the Alliance undertakes in relation to Russia, while helping Ukraine. In addition to the Communiqué, I would like to draw your attention to the Warsaw Declaration on Transat- lantic Security, as it contains certain obligations of NATO related to part- ners. That document clearly states that the Alliance supports not only the deterrence policy, but also the countries’ capabilities. We do have a declaration on deterrence, by the way. That document, the Declara- tion of Transatlantic Security, states that NATO assists with the creation of conditions that contribute to quick restoration of vital activities in Ukraine. These are only some of the commitments. This is one of the items that cre- ate great opportunities for Ukraine, which it must make use of. We also have reform-related com- mitments. Among the forty-plus pro- posals are those made by NATO to Ukraine, to create appropriate insti- tutions, and develop certain capabili- ties in security and defence. I believe that those commitments regarding Ukraine are powerful ones, and we simply need Ukraine to take up a part of those commit- ments as well. It is clearly stipulated that the implementation of these proposals must go hand-in-hand with reforms. At this time, virtually every document involving Ukraine mentions the reforms that Kyiv should implement. Another point I would like to high- light concerns our commitments related to Ukraine’s ability to de- fend itself. Dear friends, all NATO countries do respond to threats that the situation in Ukraine poses. However, Ukraine itself must be the first to respond to these threats to its defence and security. The com- mitment means that your country must be the first to respond, and NATO troops may respond subse- quently. However, Kyiv must be the first to respond to hybrid threats, which include cyber-attacks and the entire range of hybrid warfare. This is why we must contribute to Ukraine’s ability to quickly rebuild in crisis conditions.
  34. 34. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 34 F irst of all, I propose that we take a closer look at the deci- sions made in Warsaw. They are presented in the three principal documents: 1. The Warsaw summit Commu- niqué. 2. The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security. 3. The Joint Declaration by the President of the European Coun- cil, the President of the Euro- pean Commission and the Secre- tary General of NATO. The main conclusions of those docu- ments are as follows: 1. NATO’s main mission remains un- changed: to guarantee that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values. 2. NATO’s three core tasks as speci- fied in the Strategic Concept of 2010 remain unchanged: collec- tive defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. 3. At the same time, global and regional security trends and the security environment are under- going changes that call for an ap- propriate response from NATO. As the result, NATO is responding by reinforcing collective defence, enhancing capabilities, strength- ening resilience, continuing insti- tutional adaptation, and enhanc- ing cooperation with partners. 4. The main threats and challeng- es currently faced by NATO are: terrorism, Russia’s actions and policies, cyber threats, and hy- brid warfare. 5. The summit’s Communiqué clearly defines terrorism as an immediate and direct threat. NA- TO’s most direct response to that is that all NATO allies are making their contribution to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In addi- tion to that, NATO provides intel- ligence and logistics support to the EU Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean. NATO Explicitly Condemns Russia’s Destabilizing Actions and Policies Jonas DANILIAUSKAS, Minister Plenipotentiary, The Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in Ukraine
  35. 35. 35 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 6. The second gravest threat, even though the term “threat” is not used in NATO’s documents in this case, for reasons of political cor- rectness, is formed by Russia’s ac- tions and policies. Russia is given considerable attention in the War- saw documents. Its destabilizing actions and policies include: the annexation of Crimea, violation of sovereign frontiers by force, destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, large-scale exercises, provocative military activities near NATO’s borders, irresponsible and aggres- sive nuclear rhetoric, violation of NATO’s airspace, and military in- tervention in Syria, complete with its support for Assad’s regime. 7. NATO’s response to this is to in- crease its deterrence and defence capabilities, which includes a num- ber of important components: increasing defence expenditures; forward presence in the territories of NATO’s Eastern European mem- bers; and suspension of any practi- cal cooperation with Russia. Letme briefly elaborate on each of these. 8. Concerning defence expenditures: at the Wales summit in 2014, it was decided to increase the mili- tary budgets of NATO member countries – the so-called Defence Investment Pledge. To be more specific, the decision was to re- verse the trend of decreasing de- fence budgets. Considerable prog- ress has been made since then: NATO allies defence expenditures increased in 2016, for the first time since 2009. Looking back to 2010, only 8 allies increased their defence budgets, while collective defence expenditures dropped by 5.48%. Today, in 2016, we have a new situation, where 22 allies in- creased their defence budgets, and collective expenditures grew by 2.65%. Even though, even to- day, only 5 of them meet 2% of NATO’s guideline, the positive trend is obvious, and if the current trend persists, there will be more of such allies after several years. 9. Concerning forward presence: in 2014, Russia’s aggressive actions and the war against Ukraine in- creased the feeling of vulnerabil- ity among the eastern members of the Alliance. Two things were clearly necessary: first, to allevi- ate these feelings of vulnerability with some assurances; and sec- ond, to send Russia a clear mes- sage, in case it decides to test NATO’s solidarity. As the result, at the Wales summit and following it, the Readiness Action Plan was approved, NATO Response Force strengthened, 8 multinational NATO Force Integration Units cre- ated, and a more ambitious NATO exercise program was unveiled. The Warsaw summit added more
  36. 36. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 36 decisions in these issues, in par- ticular, to increase the forward presence in the Baltic countries and in Poland (allocation of 4 bat- talion-sized battlegroups). In ad- dition to that, similar efforts were made as relates to NATO’s Black Sea members. 10. Concerning suspending any practi- cal cooperation with Russia: com- munication channels with Russia remain open, primarily, to put pressure on Russia to change its aggressive policy, especially in Ukraine; at the same time, there can be no “business as usual” in terms of practical cooperation. 11. Concerning increased coopera- tion with partners, we must note several important trends reflected in the Warsaw documents: first of all, increased cooperation with Finland and Sweden; secondly, in- tensified cooperation with and as- sistance for Ukraine and Georgia; and thirdly, expanded cooperation between NATO and the EU. 12. In Warsaw, it was decided that NATO and the EU have to resolve several issues as a matter of ur- gency: provide for the ability to deflect hybrid threats; expand and adapt operational coopera- tion, including at sea and in the issues of migration; and expand coordination in the issues of cy- ber-security and defence. 13. The last two issues that must be noted are cyber defence and hy- brid warfare. Anew and crucial decision made in Warsaw was to recognize the cyber space as an area of which NATO must defend itself. In other words, a cyber- attack is legitimate grounds to apply Article 5. 14. Concerning hybrid warfare: while the main responsibility to respond to hybrid threat or attack rests with the affected country, NATO is prepared to grant assistance to defend against hybrid warfare, and the North Atlantic Council can make a decision to apply Article 5. To sum up, the Summit’s main deci- sions were: 1. To create strengthened forward presence in the Baltic Countries and Poland. 2. The cyber space is now an area in which NATO must defend itself. 3. Joint assurance of NATO and the EU to expand cooperation and joint projects. 4. Explicit condemnation by NATO of Russia’s destabilizing actions and policies. 5. Clear political and practical assis- tance for Ukraine, including the approval of the Comprehensive Assistance Package.
  37. 37. 37 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) O ver 20 years ago, a famous US politician said that NATO faced a dilemma: ei- ther the Alliance will act out of its area, or it will be “out of business”. Today, especially after the NATO Warsaw summit, the options have changed: either NATO operates within its territory, or it loses its relevance altogether. These serious changes are related to the changes in Russia’s policy. Today, the Alliance is viewing Russia as an important participant in the resolu- tion of certain issues in the Middle East or North Korea. However, when it comes to Europe, Russia is seen as a source of the problem rather than a mechanism for its solution. There can be no argument that the decisions made during the NATO Warsaw summit were historic and very significant. However, there are numerous questions left about their practical implementation – and these questions are really difficult. Which countries will allocate units to mul- tinational battalions? Who will com- mand them? When will the process of their formation be over? What rules of engagement will be used during joint combat operations? This list is not exhaustive. For a minor example: I recall that when I first became the defence minister, there was an urgent need to deploy a company of servicemen to the Balkans, due to the crisis in Al- bania. Everything was prepared and the unit was aboard the train, when it turned out that there is a problem with the permission to cross the Hungarian border, because Hungar- ian Parliament could not pass such a resolution at the time. The problem is that certain countries have legal norms that forbid the presence of Lack of Supplies of Weapons to Ukraine is Beyond My Understanding Janusz Adam ONYSZKIEWICZ, Advisor to the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Poland, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland (1992-1993, 1997-2000), Deputy of the Sejm of X, I, II and III convocations, Vice President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (2007 -2009)
  38. 38. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 38 foreign contingents of a certain size at their national territories, at any time. Resolving problems like this requires amendment of the legis- lation of European countries, and in some cases, even their consti- tutions. There is a whole range of other problem issues that must be resolved. Otherwise, NATO’s entire process of rapid response to exter- nal threats and challenges will be in vain. Why have units be ready to de- ploy in 48 hours, if all necessary ap- proval formalities are going to take two weeks or more? By and large, NATO’s Warsaw sum- mit became a breakthrough in terms of the change of attitudes and approaches to defence expen- ditures, in particular, spending on armaments, materiel, and equip- ment. Many Allies are going to face problems meeting the specified cri- teria, which means that we must be patient and comprehend all pro- cesses at hand. Naturally, the Ukrainian question is crucial. A lot has been said at dif- ferent levels about the assistance we must provide to Kyiv. Mr. Yevhen Marchuk (Ukrainian civil activist and the Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1995-1996 – Ed.) drew attention to an important fact: we can learn a lot from Ukraine, because your coun- try possesses unique experience of an ongoing struggle with an enemy that deploys modern equipment and weapon systems. This experience would be priceless for the Alliance. We are talking about a specific war, some aspects of which might not re- peat again – for example, the lack of the aviation component. This experi- ence definitely must be studied by other countries. Ukraine must receive the complete required assistance package. We must realize and remember that Rus- sia is considering the possibility of a large-scale war as a tool of pressure on Kyiv. Moscow will not abandon its attempts to destabilize Ukraine and to disrupt the functioning of all its state systems and institutions. At this time, this process is going on. We in Europe must understand that Kremlin is providing support, includ- ing financial, to various extremist groups in many European countries. The geography of such support is expanding, and that is a fact. The political leanings of such groups are irrelevant. Countering this “expan- sion” requires new and comprehen- sive approaches. Among other areas, the Internet space is also under attack. We are actually dealing with an attack on a system of values by weapons of pro- paganda. We must understand that we cannot counter such intervention
  39. 39. 39 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) from far away, as no country in Eu- rope can withstand this on its own, and neither can Ukraine... We have to join efforts to counter non-mili- tary types of attack. It is entirely logical that cyber secu- rity is mentioned more and more of- ten at all levels. Meanwhile, Ukraine has considerable capabilities and po- tential in the sphere of information technologies. Another sphere of cooperation that must be promoted both ways is the exchange of intelligence informa- tion. I will be frank: this exchange is necessary to convince NATO mem- bers that Ukraine is a reliable part- ner, and there are no information leaks (that is a separate problem). Now, a few words about NATO’s spe- cific assistance to Ukraine. First of all, I believe that we should lift the restriction on supply of weapons to Ukraine. I personally cannot under- stand why this process is hindered. In particular, I do not understand the reasoning behind the claim that the conflict will be intensified in case Ukraine receives supplies of lethal weapons. In fact, after everything that happened, we appear to be afraid of strengthening the victim country, and afraid of calling Russia an aggressor... If the Ukrainian Army is not strong enough to fight the aggressor, losses will only increase over time. The absence of weapon supplies to Ukraine is absolutely beyond my un- derstanding. Generally, I believe that the Western countries must do much more for Ukraine: not only supplying Ukraine with weapons on an almost daily ba- sis, but making an open statement that in case of a large-scale conflict with Russia, Kyiv will receive mas- sive and comprehensive assistance as part of the new land-lease policy. After all, if your neighbour’s house is on fire, you must help him to put it out. Finally, there is one more important point I would like to draw your at- tention to. A number of countries, which are not NATO members, have a similar defence and security vi- sion with the Alliance, for example, Finland and Sweden. I believe that NATO should work out a mechanism for cooperation with those countries, perhaps establish a certain status for them, like an associated NATO mem- ber – a status that would cover the first four articles of the Washington Treaty and clearly define situations and cooperation mechanisms in case if the security situation deteriorates.
  40. 40. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 40 T he Communiqué of the Warsaw NATO summit singles out the problems of energy security, similarly to the findings of the 2008 Bu- charestsummitandthe2009Rigasum- mit. Paragraph 135 formulates NATO’s consensus on the subject as follows: “Energy developments can have signifi- cant political and security implications for Allies and the Alliance, as demon- strated by the crises to NATO’s east and south. A stable and reliable energy sup- ply, the diversification of import routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and eco- nomic pressure. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organizations, NATO closely follows the security implications of relevant energy developments and attaches particular importance to diversification of energy supply in the Euro-Atlantic region. We will therefore further enhance our stra- tegic awareness in this regard, includ- ing through sharing intelligence and through expanding our links with other international organizations such as the International Energy Agency and the EU, as appropriate. We will consult and share information on energy security is- sues of particular concern to Allies and the Alliance, with a view to providing a comprehensive picture of the evolv- ing energy landscape, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. We will also continue to develop NATO’s ca- pacity to support national authorities in protectingcriticalinfrastructure,aswell asenhancingtheirresilienceagainsten- ergysupplydisruptionsthatcouldaffect national and collective defence, includ- ing hybrid and cyber threats.” This statement shows that the Alliance somewhat underestimates the impor- tance of the problems of energy securi- ty, and does not completely realize how energy resources and infrastructures can be used unconventionally in new- generation warfare. Russia is a case in pointinthisrespect,especiallybeingan aggressively behaving country and the number one challenge for NATO in the modern world. So, what is the driving force of the Rus- sian expansion and aggression? Look- NATO and the Issues of Energy Security in the Context of the Warsaw Summit Decisions Mykhailo HONCHAR, President of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI,” Consultant to the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (1996-2000)
  41. 41. 41 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) ing at statistics in the energy sector and economy, one can see that the engine of the Russian aggression is fuelled by petro- and gas dollars, which the Rus- sian Federation receives as revenues from fuel exports. Here is the reason why the West’s sanc- tions are not always efficient enough, being able to hinder Moscow’s aggres- sion but not to deter it. Its sanctions have not affected the vital force of the aggression: Russia’s energy exports. Stopping Russian aggression requires a combination of low oil prices and strict sanctions, similar to the case of Iran (EU restrictions on purchases of Russian oil, disconnection from SWIFT, etc.), cou- pled with the EU’s refusal to take part in politically motivated projects (such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline), which servetoexportbothgasandcorruption to the EU. Corruption is a very effective weapon that can successfully be used in place of tank corps and air forces. The Russian Federation is relatively successful using energy resources and the infrastructure for their delivery to achieve geopolitical and geo-economic goals. Energy-related motives are also present in Russia’s geopolitical, geo- economic, and military activities. The weaponization of Russia’s energy policy is hardly a new development. Its con- ceptual roots date back to the 2003 Energy Strategy of Russia, which opens with a fairly straight statement: “Russia has at its disposal significant energy resources and a powerful fuel and en- ergy complex, which is the basis for its economic development, and a tool of domestic and foreign policy.” Europe always assessed Russia’s ac- tivities in the energy sector only in the business context, but a look into Rus- sia’s behaviour in the 2000s shows that it has been consistently moving towards using energy resources as a weapon, carefully concealing such use as commercial disputes with the post- Soviet buyers of Russian fossil fuels. Energy weapon is effective in the con- ditions of monopolized external sup- ply, surplus pipeline capacity, and cold Table 1.Russia’s energy exports and their share in total exports of the Russian Federation, USD billion Export item 2012 2013 2014 2015 Oil and petroleum products 280.0 282.9 269.7 157.0 Natural gas 63.0 67.2 55.2 46.4 Black coal 13.0 11.8 11.6 9.5 Electricity 1.0 1.0 0.73 0.74 Total energy exports 366.0 [69.7%] 362.9 [68.9%] 346.1 [69.5%] 213.6 [61.7%] Total exports of the Russian Federation 524.7 526.4 496.9 345.9 Source: Official statistics of the Russian Federation authorities
  42. 42. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 42 winters that drive up demand for fuel and result in its deficit. Fast forwarding to the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, we will see that the Kremlin’s ac- tions had a strong energy background. Considering that Russia has always tended to create anti-competitive and monopolistic schemes, occupation of the Crimean Peninsula allowed Russia to achieve several strategic objectives: • to disrupt promising large-scale Black Sea shelf gas mining projects, previously initiated by Ukraine with participation of major European and US companies, posing a chal- lenge for Russian state companies; • to expel US and European oil and gas companies out of the north- ern regions of the Black Sea, thus eliminating competition for Russian state companies; • to deprive Ukraine of access to the bulk of gas resources on the Black Sea shelf and other prospective off- shore fossil fuel deposits; • to create prerequisites for adjust- ing the trans-Black-Sea gas pipe- line route (at the time, the South Stream, later to become Turkish Stream and then Bulgarian Stream), so as to lay part of it along or across the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea shelf. If we extrapolate from these facts, we can easily see Russia’s perceived ap- proach to its relations with the EU per- taining to the gas industry, which has critical importance for Europe. Russia is working hard to compromise the traditional gas transit route to Europe via Ukraine, resorting to various propa- ganda tools: about Ukraine’s gas transit system being allegedly obsolete and unreliable, the “civil war” in Ukraine, gas theft, and other equally bogus al- legations. In 2014, the start of Russia’s hybression [hybrid aggression] brought several acts of sabotage along the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline, masked as mechanical breakdowns. However,thankstotheuniquestructure of Ukraine’s gas transport system and its high level of interconnectivity, this sabotage did not disrupt the gas supply to the EU even for a second. It is worth noting that, according to our estimates, full disruption of gas supply to the EU from the territory of Ukraine requires simultaneous sabotage at 29 gas transit system sites, being a virtually impossible task in a hybrid war situation. Ukraine’s gas transit system has been successfully passing the “trial by fire” for two years and beyond, ensuring uninterrupted transitofSiberiangastoEurope. Signs of Russian sabotage were also ap- parentinanothercountry:Turkey,which Moscowviewsasanewroutefortransit of non-Russian fossil fuels to Europe, by- passing Russia. In the summer of 2015, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, the product of the KGB First Chief Director- ate the Cold War era Soviet Union) de- cided to sabotage all principal gas pipe- linesintheeastofTurkey,“forunknown reasons.” Both the sudden flare-up of the Karabakh conflict in early April 2016, and the demonstrative missile strikes on
  43. 43. 43 NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) SyriafromtheCaspianSeaaremessages toEurope,theCaspianRegioncountries, and any major Western companies in- vesting in oil and gas extraction in that area: Russia is ready to quickly assume control or simply disrupt any projects of gasandoilsupplytotheEUfromCentral AsiaandAzerbaijan. Russia’s ambitions are global, but pri- marily focused on the neighbouring re- gions and the countries with large fossil fuel deposits, viewed by Moscow as its competitors in the energy sector. Mos- cow is pursuing a biparallel strategy. On one hand, Russia wishes to increase Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels by insistently pushing projects of non-transitpipelines.Ontheother,Rus- sia wants to neutralize its competitors, especially since they are mainly former Sovietrepublics,whichMoscowcontin- ues to regard as “its own domain.” Based on our research, we can argue that such countries as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are at risk of either a coup, potentially initiat- ed by Russia to assume complete con- trol of competitors, or a hybrid aggres- sionfromRussia,aimingtobringchaos to the competing country and disrupt its mineral extraction and exports. Another such country may be Alge- ria. Even though Algeria is not among Russia’s neighbours, and is viewed by Moscow as its anti-crisis partner in the North Africa and the Middle East, Moscow is still interested in its desta- bilization. Algeria is the third largest gas supplier to the EU (after Russia and Norway), and any decrease in its gas exports to Europe will leave a gap that will be quickly filled by Russia. We should also not underestimate Rus- sia’s ambitions in the Arctic Region, which it traditionally claims its own. Fossil fuel reserves in the Arctic Region exceed those of the Persian Gulf, with the bulk of them concentrated in the Euro-Arctic region. Control over the Northern Sea Route is also an impor- tant factor, especially considering that the Arctic Ocean is shedding a lot of its ice due to the global warming. Russia already has an advantage in the Arctic, and is increasing its energy-related and military presence there. Say, the Spits- bergen archipelago (called Svabald in Norway and Grumant in Russia) may end up as the first casualty of the Rus- sianArcticexpansioninthe21st century. Coming back to the military dimension of the hybrid warfare, we must note that Russia pays some heed to the use of civilian infrastructure, particularly in the energy sector, for unconventional delivery of weapons of mass destruc- tion. To name just one example: un- derwater pipelines (specifically under- water, not land-based) can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. A container with a bacteriological agent can be delivered to the enemy territory under the guise of a diagnostic device, and so can a nuclear payload. This is why we should pay less attention to the provocative show flights by Russian strategic bombers, and more, to the technological innovation being devel- oped in strict secrecy.
  44. 44. NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW – OUTCOMES FOR UKRAINE (International Conference, July 19, 2016, Kyiv) 44 Going back to the subject of Ukraine, we should note that we have already been successful in neutralizing the Kremlin’s “gas weapon” in the condi- tionsofthehybridaggression.Ukraine’s gas stocks have always depended on supplies from or through Russia, and the gas sector was Ukraine’s traditional vulnerability in its relations with Russia. Decreased gas consumption and re- versegassuppliesfromtheEUbrought Russia’s gas-related leverage against Ukraine to noughts. The greatest risks for Ukraine during the 2015-2016 winter season were related with electricity industry. Cyber warfare against Ukraine’s energy sector facili- ties was a threat that became a reality: namely, Ukraine faced a massive cyber- attack on December 23, 2015. However, our energy sector proved more resilient than anyone had expected. Without go- ingtoodeepintothedetailsofcyberwar- fare, I will simply quote the US experts whose assessment of the situation was as follows: “the hackers who attacked Ukrainian electric power plants … had been planning their attack for many months.TheyhadresearchedUkraine’s domestic networks, sourced operator data,andcarriedoutasynchronizedat- tack.” Thus, in the conditions of Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine, cyber protection of the critically important energy infrastructure becomes a top priority. The same is true for the EU and NATO, and especially Germany. The Ger- man energy networks are at risk of mas- sive cyber-attacks, especially in winter time, and an artificially created blackout can sabotage further development of renewable energy in Germany. Instead, Russia is ready to offer Germany more gasandNordStream2 –somethingthat the German side is already willing to ac- cept, without fully understanding Rus- sia’sdeep-seatedmotives. Summing up the above, we can say that Russia will use proxy methods to co- vertly hinder the EU’s attempts to diver- sify its energy sources and its projects to receive gas from sources other than Russia. Russian activities within NATO countries and the rest of the EU should be closely monitored. In line with the new-generation warfare methods, a lot of Russian actions will be effected from within, including the use of lobbies and corruption leverage built up during the decades of fossil fuel supply to Europe. Russia will aim cyber-attacks against Eu- rope’s energy networks, attempting to cause a large-scale blackout. Countering hybrid aggression requires alternative models of peace enforcement by non- military means or modelling scenarios of complex crises caused from within. More about the specifics of Russia’s hy- brid warfare can be found in the paper titled Putin’s Hybression: Non-Military Aspects of New-Generation Warfare by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI.” “Hybression” is a portmanteau for “hybrid aggression.” This paper is part ofourAntaresresearchproject,donein cooperation with the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Stud- ies. As part of the Antares project, the expert group of “Strategy XXI” is also researching the energy component of new-generation warfare, with support from the International Monetary Fund.