The document discusses the limitations of the traditional paradigm of industrial relations and employment regulation. It argues a new paradigm is needed to address the decline of trade unions, changes in production strategies, and dualism in labor markets. Specifically: - The traditional model focused on interactions between workers, employers and the state, relying on collective bargaining, but trade union membership and influence have declined. - It operated at the national and company levels but did not account for multinational corporations or new forms of employment. - Existing weaknesses, like lack of representation for some groups, were exacerbated by economic and political shifts since the 1970s. - A new approach is required that considers developments at the margins of the old

1. Regulating work and employment:
in search of a more comprehensive
paradigm
Ida Regalia
University of Milan

2. Decline of TUs and collective action and
crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER
For some time now an important strand of study has been
emphasising the limitations of the traditional paradigm of
IR/ER, according to which
• work and employment in the advanced economies are
regulated on interactions among 3 groups of IR actors
(labour, capital, and the state)
• rely largely upon three exchange mechanisms: individual
exchange, collective bargaining, political exchange
• although with the predominance of collective, trade-
union-controlled logics of action, based on worker
representation

3. Decline of TUs and collective action and
crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER – 2
To be noted that the industrial relations field had
historically consolidated as an arena of national
dimensions.
Within this space, two canonical levels of relations among
actors
• a central or national level
• and/or a decentralized level (the company).
to which corresponded a twofold logic of action
– the centralized bargaining for the settlement of distributive
conflict (at the centre)
– the bargaining/control of specific working conditions in
firms (within workplaces)

4. Decline of TUs and collective action and
crisis of traditional paradigm of IR/ER -3
• during the glorious 30 the extraordinary success
of this system of interaction rooted in a collective,
union-based logic of action, and worker
representation, more or less substantially
supported by intervention of the state, appeared
long uncontested
• The subsequent widespread “decline” of TUs and
collective bargaining put under stress also the
field and theory of IR and ER
need for a revitalization of collective action and
readjustment of theory.

5. Weaknesses of the traditional paradigm
Less attention paid to other shortcomings and
weaknesses, that characterised the model even
during the “Glorious 30”
At micro and meso levels
 not all groups of workers were adequately represented and
protected: women, white collars, ethnic/migrant workers,
part-timers.
 Not all kind of firms were covered by mechanisms through
which employment rights were generally implemented: SF, co-
operatives
 Not all sectors were properly covered by systems of regulation
established through collective bargaining

6. Weaknesses of the traditional paradigm
While at macro level,
• the national dimension of the IR field de facto
prevented the possibility of devising ways to
regulate work and employment in MNCs
outside each national state – or even the
imagination of such possibility.

7. Crisis of the model
Since the mid-1970s, in consequence of
• macroeconomic and political changes (oil shocks, economic crises,
growing exposure to international competition, financialisation of
the economy, decreasing capacity of governments to intervene
autonomously in the economic and social spheres, etc)
• the firms’ production strategies ( search for alternatives to
Fordist production models),
• changing dynamics of labour markets (with regard to both supply
and demand)
the structural conditions which had allowed the virtuous development
of the model gradually disappeared

8. Crisis of the model
The already existing gaps and limitations of the regulatory
model emerged together with new ones:
• the dualism in the labour market between workers well
protected and the others.
• the difficulties for the unions to reach and organize
younger, or highly skilled, IT & knowledge workers;
• the limited possibility in protecting even strong workers
against the consequences of economic crises or
relocation processes in the new global context
reduced ability of the system to maintain its promises in
its traditional strongholds  crisis of the system

9. What can be done?
Does this crisis signal the end of the possibility of
a positive, sustainable, socially fair, regulation of
work and employment in the post-fordist
globalized economy, and inevitable decline of
collective action and TUs? Is there something
that can be done?
• Perhaps the more popular solution is the one
discussed by the literature on the revitalization
of Tus and collective action.

10. What can be done?
• But this approach is limited in that it aims at
reproducing – under different forms – an
order substantially similar to the previous one.
• What is at stake goes beyond the efforts and
subjective capacities of the unions, at least as
we have been knowing them.
• What is needed is instead a paradigm change,
broad enough as to take account of both old
and new shortcomings of the traditional order.

11. A complex research programme
More fruitful and promising would be to start again from
careful inquiry on developments that are taking place
exactly at the weaker points of the previous system or on
still unexplored fields.
 A complex research programme
• But hints can already be found drawing on results of
empirical research on topics such as:
– regulation of new forms of employment/nonstandard work
– regulation of work and employment in small firms
– trade union initiatives at the territorial level and the social
domain
– trade union initiatives at international level (IFAs, etc)

12. Preliminary hints and suggestions
Issues and practices are different. But common features can be stressed:
• Not necessarily they take place at sectoral and/or workplace level.
the traditional limits of IR playfields tend to become porous or
frayed. New territorial spaces, with open, fluid boundaries, tend to
emerge;
• Not necessarily they are based on TUs initiative. Other actors –
traditional and/or new, especially civil society organization – may come
in and even take the lead.
• Unconventional forms of action and protest –enhanced by the new
communication technologies – tends to supplement the traditional
repertoire
• Communication, networking and virtual participation may become
more important than real face-to-face participation

13. Lacking many of mechanisms through which employment rights are
generally operationalized, ER in SF are difficult to be assessed .
• Earlier debates trapped between the two opposite poles of:
 “small is beautiful”
 Because of the quality and characteristics of personal, face-to-face,
relationships within them, small firms seen as the reign of harmonious
employment relations (Bolton 1971 and Ingham 1970)
 “the bleak house”
 Because of the disproportionate and unbalanced amounts of power
enjoyed by employers, small firms seen as the reign of managerial
autocracy (the sweatshop) (Rainnie 1989)
An example: The regulation of work
and employment in small firms

14. An example: The regulation of work and
employment in small firms
But the topic can be approached from 2 viewpoints:
a. Whether labour in SF is protected, its terms and
conditions sufficiently and satisfactorily regulated
b.Whether labour in SF is represented by
representative organizations
• The 2 perspectives can be interrelated. But they
do not overlap. Neither are they mutually
exclusive

15. • The first regards the quality of employment relations in SF, and
more particularly, the possibility for workers to enjoy socially
acceptable levels of employment security and welfare.
– Very often these are employment relations without (explicit) employee
representation.
• The second regards the possibility – even the desirability – of
employees’ representation by collective agents in such firms.
• By combining the two perspectives, the following ideal types of
possible ER configurations will be figured out.
An example: The regulation of work
and employment in small firms

16. The regulation of labour in small firms
Labour protection, security
- +
Labour
representation
-
I
Bleak
House
II
Paternalistic
“small
is beautiful”
+
Ritual
representation
III
Collectively
mediated IR
models
IV

17. The regulation of labour in small firms
What can we learn from the results of the investigation
on the ways in which the use of labour is regulated in
the Italian SFs?
– The picture is variegated. It does not correspond
simply to either the “sweathouse” or the “small is
beautiful model”.
– Games are not played within workplaces only:

18. The regulation of labour in small firms
• Not only/simply autocracy:
– Although not compulsory, managements resort systematically to
sectoral collective agreements
– Sometimes (1/3) they negotiate collective (informal/formal)
agreements within workplaces
– They may directly come to term with employees, through
negotiations
• on aspects related to the organisation of work and allocation of
opportunities and constraints (participative style of managerial
decision-making)
• on wages

19. The regulation of labour in small firms
Games are not played within workplaces only:
• Besides the benchmark function of sectoral
collective agreements (socially legitimated
framework/ template coming from outside)
relationships with territorial institutions (that can
provide different kind of resources to approach
problems
– representative organisations of both sides
– governmental organisations
– mutualistic/cooperative organisations

20. Comments
Returning to our scheme:
Me may easily show how data fit within the
quadrants I, III, IV:
- the area of SF enjoying poor conditions (I
quadrant)
- the situation in which a not very effective presence
of TUs is recorded (III quadrant)
- the small group where a more effective presence
of TUs is apparent (IV quadrant) = the case more
similar to the traditional model of IR. What is
however different is the possibility for the actors to
benefit from external resources.

21. Comments
But the most interesting situation is the one of
quadrant II.
 participative style of decision-making
 individual wages negotiation
 bonuses
 direct contacts with management
 welfare benefits
not necessarily paternalistic
= a case of (individually) negotiated order

22. Comments
Labour protection, security
- +
Labour
represen
tation
-
I
Bleak
House
II
Not
necessarily
paternalistic
“small
is beautiful”
+
Ritual
(ineffective)
representatio
n
III
Collectively
mediated IR
models
grounded of
external
resources
IV

23. Points for reflection
a) forms and levels of decision-making and negotiation
 within workplaces:
- from managerial autocracy (without negotiations) to collective bargaining
passing through individual negotiation (Pizzorno’s distinction)
 from outside
- the fundamental role also of collective bargaining from above/outside: the
normative framework of sectoral collective negotiations
- the possibility of political exchange: intervention of institutions from
outside
 possibility as well of institutionalised cooperation between the IR parties
outside workplaces (bilateral bodies) providing resources to and
influencing patterns of relations within workplaces

24. Points for reflection
 need to consider the interplay between different normative
forms and levels in negotiation and regulation
 need to reflect on the alternative/complementarity of
individual exchange/collectively mediated regulation
– not simply autocracy vs collective bargaining
• Does labour in SF require representation to enjoy
protection and security?
• How and under which conditions the intervention of a
representation agency can improve labour’s terms and
conditions?
 The cases of self-organisation of protest by employees
(without representation) the importance of social dimension

25. Final remarks
• It is not simply a problem of the effectiveness
of TU role (as we are used to imagine it)
• You may imagine socially acceptable and
positive ways of setting the rules of work
– without collective representation – at least as we
know it
– That may take place in spaces different from
workplaces
– Involving a vast array of representative, and
especially not representative, actors, whose logic of
interaction needs to be investigated

26. Final remarks
• In this perspective the way we have been
accostumed to imagine a positive regulation
of work (as it happened in the 30 glorious) is
not simply a traditional vision, that needs to
be updated.
• More generally, also with respect to the past it
is only one possibility among others that
require to be empirically investigated.

27. appendix
Other fields and topics might/should be considered
 The role of social networks in IFAs – the strategic use of
attacking MNCs reputation as a new form of action and
protest
 The possibilities of regulating the labour market to
protect workers through forms of security outside the
standard forms of contract
 The possibilities for Tus to intervene beyond workplaces
and industries (on the territory)

28. Patterns of Intervention, According to the
Type of “Security” Sought
Security through
membership within
organized settings
Security through
permanence on the
labor market
Job security
and skills
development
low
I
Promotion of paths
leading to a
standard contract in
a firm
II
Compensated
promotion of
opportunities for
atypical work
high
III
Programs for the
shared use of
human resources by
several firms
IV
Invention of
protections and
rights independent
from stable
memberships

29. Types of union initiatives and practices at the territorial
level according to the logic and scope of action
logic of
action
in behalf of workers with respect to:
employers, firms local governments,
institutions
both, others
unilateral
initiative,
direct
protection
1
provision of labor
market assistance
and services to
employees and
workers
2
establishment of
specialized offices to
deal with bureaucratic
issues and public
policies
3
- organization of
spaces for
consultation/discussio
n - establishment of
multi-function
territorial structures
negotiation
4
collective
bargaining at local,
territorial level
5
‘social’ negotiation,
negotiation over
welfare policies
6
social, territorial pacts
participation,
cooperation
7
participation in
bilateral employer-
union bodies
8
participation in
committees set up by
local authorities,
welfare institutions
9
involvement in tri/
multi-partite
institutions