Japan faces growing isolation in East Asia due to tensions over historical issues and territorial disputes with its neighbors such as China and South Korea. These tensions are fueled by competing historical narratives and the instrumental use of these narratives by politicians for domestic political gain. Efforts at reconciliation have faced challenges due to the volatility created by the combination of deep historical memories, cultural discourses around victimization, and opportunistic politics.

1. History, Territory and Japan’s
growing isolation in East Asia
Thomas U Berger
Associate Professor
Department of International relations
Boston University
For Presentation at Temple University, Tokyo
November 27, 2012

2. The Basic Problem
• Despite:
A) growing regional interdependence, and
B) a military balance that strongly favors the
US and its allies
We have growing regional acrimony, fueled by
tensions over history and minor territorial issues
Why?

3. A vigorous Dispute over historical
commemoration

4. and the portrayal of history

5. Tensions spill over into maritime
disputes with China
The 2010 Trawler Incident

6. and Korea…

7. …with Russia in the mix as well

8. The intensity has increased

9. Efforts to re-establish harmony seem
to not meet with enduring success
Premier Wen Jiao Bao in Yoyogi Park, May 31, 2010

10. Three Questions:
• What is the basis of the ways countries think
about history and territory (the Official
Narrative)?
• When and why do differing historical
narratives become the source of inter-state
conflict?
• What – if anything – can be done about it?

11. Forces shaping the Official Narrative
• Historical Determinist – historical memory
based on individual experiences
• Instrumentalist – historical memory
manipulated by cynical elites for their own
gain
• Culturalist – historical memory part of the
larger political culture of a society
• Combination of the above

12. Historical Determinism
• Powerful experiences can create powerful
memories
• Memories can be suppressed both by
individuals or society, but they often
resurface, even after many decades
• Individuals and groups press to have their
memories reflected in the official narrative

13. The Carriers of Memory
Atomic Bomb survivor

14. Instrumentalism
• Politicians and other elites manipulate official
narrative to promote their own agendas
• The balance of power between politicians and
interest groups determines the official
narrative

15. The Political Uses of History
Nazi Era Postcard

16. Culturalism
• The interpretation of events and interest are
central elements of a society’s political culture
• Each generation is socialized with a particular
historical narrative – through
education, movies, plays, etc.
• Over time, the historical narrative evolves as each
generation reinterprets events in its own way
• The existing historical narrative set the boundarie
for the kind of historical narrative a state can
adopt

17. Cultural Vectors of Memory – novels
plays, movies and popular history

18. The History of the History issue in Asia
• 1945-1951 – Initial Settlement
• 1951-1982 – Successful Japanese damage
control
• 1982 – 1992 – the beginning of the “history
issue”
• 1992-2002 – era of apology diplomacy
• 2002 –Deadlock over history – apology fatigue

19. Period 1 - Initial Settlement
• The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal
• Reverse Course in US occupation policy
• Ascent of the Conservative LDP in Japan
• The Treaty of San Francisco –
Article 11 – Japan accepts the IMTFE Verdict
Articles 14-21 – limited reparations
regime, Western Allies give up further claims
• Ambiguous Boundaries created

20. Trial and Rehabilitation
The International Military Tribunal in the The Treaty of San Francisco signed
Far East – 1946-1948 November 1951-

21. Ambiguous Boundaries left open

22. Period 2 - 1951-1978 Successful
Japanese Damage Control
• Japan chooses to focus on damage control
• Taiwan and South Korea unsuccessfully push
for compensation and concessions by Japan
• Japan signs normalization treaties with all
major Asian nations except the DPRK
1952 Taiwan
1965 South Korea
1978 The PRC

24. Things were more orderly in Beijing

25. Reasons for First Equilibrium
• Politics in Command - Instrumental factors
predominate historical memory and cultural
discourse
• PRC, ROK, Taiwan all authoritarian states
• The Left in Japan focuses on Japanese
victimization
• Japanese conservatives not interested in
pursuing “War Responsibility”

26. Period III – History Issue Resurfaces
• 1982 – The First textbook Controversy
• New MOE guidelines on textbooks
• Nakasone apology in Korea
• 1985 – Nakasone visits Yasukuni

28. Drivers for the Emergence of the
History Problem
• Strong, historically rooted Anti-Japanese
discourse in China and Korea (Cultural
discourse)
• Pluralization allows victims groups to come to
the fore (Historical memory)
• Increased interdependence of Asian countries
– First strategic (Cold war)
– Then economic
• Use of human rights norms by victims groups

29. The Birth of Modern Chinese and
Korean Nationalism
The March 1rst, 1919 Movement in Korea

30. Korea – Colonial Modernity –
authoritarianism made in Japan
Park Cheung Hee – as an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army, ca. 1944
and as President of the Republic of Korea

31. Replacing Mao with “Patriotic
Education”

32. Period IV – Groping for Reconciliation
• 1991 - Kaifu in Singapore – history key to a more
active role in Asia
• 1992 – Emperor visits China
• 1993 – Kono statement on the Comfort Women
• 1995 – Asian Women’s Fund
Murayama Statement
• 1998 – Kim Dae Jung-Obuchi Keizo Summit
• 2002 – Korea-Japan host the World Cup

33. Limited Reconciliation with Korea

34. Develop into powerful Narratives of
Victimization

35. Japan also feels victimized

36. Period IV – Deadlock over history
• 2001-2006 Under Koizumi tensions flare up
• Collapse of territorial negotiations with Russia
• Korean-Japanese reconciliation founders
under Lee Myun Bak
• Anti-Japanese riots in 2005 in China
• Japanese Apology fatigue
• Escalates into territorial disputes

37. Reasons for Deadlock
• Japanese conservative backlash and “apology
fatigue”
• Lack of active support for reconciliation from the
Korean government
• Lack of interest in reconciliation by the Chinese
government
• Temptation to utilize popular sentiments for
domestic political agenda
• Inability of governments (China, Korea and Japan)
to re-establish control over the diplomatic
agenda

38. China’s diminishing leaders

39. Aggressively Patriotic Sentiments
Translation: Even if the whole of China is covered with tombs, [we]
must kill all Japanese; even if no grass grows in China, we must
recover Diaoyudao [the Senkakus]

40. Sentiments are hard to control

41. In Japan as well populist sentiments
intrude on Foreign Policy

42. Politicians can use for their own
agendas

43. Bottom Line – a Paradox
• The broad framework of international
relations – balance of power and
interdependence - favors general stability
• The political dynamics of the history issue –
the combination of historical memory, cultural
discourse and instrumental use of the issue by
opportunistic politicians – creates volatility

44. Risks for Japan and the US-Japan
Relationship
• Japan risks diplomatic isolation in East Asia
• Lack of sympathy on the part of the US –
especially with regard to the Comfort women
issue
• Danger of accidental escalation in the
Senkakus

45. US Sympathy for the Comfort Women

46. US Fears of entanglement

47. Possible Counter measures
• Greater flexibility on territorial issues
• Damage control on history with China/
reconciliation with Korea – if Korea is ready
• CSBMs on Senkakus – when China is ready
• Is this politically possible for Japan and its
neighbors?