The document discusses various causes of conflict, violence, and war in the modern world, highlighting factors such as nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and culture. It explores the concept of cultural conflict as a new Cold War, with a focus on interactions between Western and non-Western civilizations, and emphasizes the significance of military power and foreign policy in shaping global dynamics. Samuel Huntington's theories on civilizations and the clash between the West and the rest are central to the analysis presented in the material.

1. Dr. Tabakian’s Political Science 7
Modern World Governments – Spring 2013
Supplemental Power Point Material #7

2. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (1)
• Conflict, Violence & War - Causes Of War:
1. Nationalism
2. Ethnicity
3. Religion
4. Culture
5. Natural Resources
• “Kin-Country” Syndrome
• Redefining Civilization Identity
• West Versus The Rest
• American Military Power
• Unconventional Military Options:
– American Biological Weapons Program

3. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (2)
• Making Foreign Policy
• Models Of Decision Making
• Decision Making As Steering
• Individual Decision Makers
• Group Psychology
• Crisis Management
• Domestic Politics
• Bureaucracies
• Interest Groups
• Military Industrial Complex
• Public Opinion
• Legislatures

4. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (1)
Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War?
Tensions between civilizations are supplanting the political
and ideological rivalries persistent during the Cold War. "As
the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the
cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on
the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the
other, has reemerged. Samuel Huntington concludes after
reviewing 100 comparative studies of values in different
societies to conclude "the values that are most important in
the West are least important worldwide." World politics will be
directed in the future by conflicts that according to Kishore
Mahbubani will be between "the West and the Rest". Samuel
P. Huntington adds "...and the responses of non-Western
civilizations to Western power and values.”

5. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (2)
Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War?
These responses take on or a combination of three
forms:
1. Non-Western civilizations isolate themselves from the
Western-dominated global community.
2. "Band-Wagoning" can lead non-Western countries to join
with the West and accept its values and institutions.
3. Non-Western countries can attempt to "balance" the West
by developing an alternative economic and military power
and ally with one another to effective counter Western
dominance.

6. CAUSES OF WAR (1)
1.Nationalism
2.Ethnicity
3.Religion
4.Culture
5.Natural Resources

7. CAUSES OF WAR (2)
Defensive realists claim that war is today seen by the
great powers as rarely profitable. War is brought forth
from militarism, hypernationalism, or other domestic
factors that over exaggerate potential threats or
exaggerates their military capacity. Offensive realists
believe that great powers are forced into competitive
actions for anarchy remains as long as there is no
overruling bodies that function over the state. This is why
offensive realists believe that the US serves as an
overruling body through NATO and that if she were to
leave that security competition would soon return to
Europe.

8. NATIONALISM MAY BE GOOD
The existence of modern democracies over the last 200 years
demonstrates the success of democratic peace theory. Realists
have either countered these assertions through claims that liberal
democracies were not next to one another or shared a mutual
threat that encouraged them to look past differences. Another
reason provided is that external forces may force a state to
become democratic if it wished to get along with other
democracies. This suggests that power relations have always
remained a viable factor for non-democratic states may desire
good relations with strong democracies like the United States.
Nationalist struggles are welcomed as precursors to the
solidification process of tolerant and democratic societies.
Nationalisms serve to establish unique identities in a world of ever
increasing democratic homogenization. It is a process that the
United States has been a party as were emerging democracies in
Western Europe in the nineteenth century.

9. PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
“I HATE WAR”
On October 6, 1937 in Chicago, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt warns of a steadily-increasing
danger of armed conflict menacing the United
States. Without naming any nation as responsible,
the Chief Executive finds a threat in present attacks
from the air on civilians, and ships attacked and sunk
by submarines in time of peace and without cause or
notice. Gravely, the President asserts that if such
things can happen in other parts of the world,
America cannot feel secure for long. Universal
Newsreel presents the President's speech as a
historic document, and gives with it a dramatic view
of incidents of aggression which called forth Mr.
Roosevelt's impassioned warning." scenes of parade
outdoors, sound of FDR speaking outdoors under
tent, silent scenes of war inserted into FDR's
speech, FDR says, “I Hate War”.

10. CAUSES OF WAR – RELIGION
RUSSIAN EXAMPLE
Religion stimulates ethnic identifications. It also arouses Russian
fears over the security of its southern borders. Archie Roosevelt
details this concern: "Much of Russian history concerns the struggle
between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, which
dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a
thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with
their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of
Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian
realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic
group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.” Kenneth
Waltz insists that sovereign states with fixed borders are the best way
to maintain the peace domestically. When a state is no longer
competent it may fall into a state of disrepair with separate territories
breaking apart becoming autonomous, but unable to correlate to
transnational developments.

11. CAUSES OF WAR – CHECHNYA
The principle of national self-determination
holds that populations have the right to
determine their own futures and establish
governments of their own making. The right
was articulated after World War I, but its
implementation has been uneven, and many
peoples who desire national self-
determination have yet to receive it. In
Chechnya, ethnic Chechens declared their
independence from the Russian Federation
after the collapse of communism. Russian
intervention, designed to stave off
independence, has led to a long-standing
war between the Russian military and
Chechen separatists, with neither side able
to claim total victory.

12. CAUSES OF WAR – IRAN?
Recent developments with respect to
Iran’s nuclear program illustrate this
tension. Iran maintains that it has the
right to develop nuclear power for
civilian use without outside
interference. The United States,
however, contends that Iran’s nuclear
program is developing nuclear
weapons in violation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, creating a
security dilemma for countries
neighboring Iran and—pending
successful development of missile
technology—around the world.

13. “KIN-COUNTRY” SYNDROME
States try to rally support from other states belonging to the same
culture when they are involved in a war with people from another
civilization. This is the "kin-country" syndrome. This terminology
replaces political ideology and traditional balance of power as the
principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. Post-Cold War conflicts
like those in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia involved
elements of civilization rallying. First, the 1991 Persian Gulf War
begun as a result of one Arab state invading a neighbor Arab state.
Second, Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 swayed
Turkey to increase its support of Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union
originally supported Azerbaijan as the republic was dominated with
communist leaders. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reversal
of Russian policy as it shifted support to Armenia due to a change of
concern from political considerations to religious ones. Third,
Western public may have shown sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims
over their suffering from Serbs, but little concern was given to
Croatian attacks on Muslims.

14. REDEFINING CIVILIZATION IDENTITY
Samuel P. Huntington lists three requirements a
torn country must meet before it can redefine its
civilization identity:
1. The country's economic and political elites
have to enthusiastically endorse the transition.
2. Second, its public has to endorse whatever
new definition is adopted.
3. Third, dominant groups in the recipient
civilization have to embrace the convert.

15. CAUSES OF WAR – CULTURE
Culturalist approaches are likely to accept the arguments of rational
choice or structural analysis as both are seen as helping to construct
societal norms. Culturalism begins with the premise that culture
matters in any explanation. It is important to not make grand
assumptions when using culture as a variable. For example,
statements like “Muslim countries are resistant to democracy,” or
“Confucianism helps explain capitalist development in East Asia” are
not appropriate. The problem with these claims is that it represents a
decontextualized generalization that portrays culture as clear-cut,
uniform, and basically static. Most Culturalists would argue today that
culture is multi-vocal and multidimensional. Comparativists depend
on cultural analysis. It helps them to understand those particular
identities that someone identifies with, as it discerns the political
behavior that they are likely to pursue. Understanding societal norms
for instance would assist in almost any case study, as cultural
variables may be identified as having a primary effect on a particular
dependent variable.

16. CULTURE / CIVILIZATION
Samuel P. Huntington defines a civilization according to its
cultural entity "villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities,
religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of
cultural heterogeneity...A civilization is thus the highest cultural
grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity
people have short of that which distinguishes humans from
other species. It is defined both by common objective
elements, such as language, history, religion, customs,
institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people."
Huntington argues that people can refine their identities,
resulting in their identification being redefined and the
composition and boundaries of civilization. Civilizations can
blend or even overlap. The can also encompass include sub-
civilizations.

17. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (1)
Cultural commonalities are becoming stronger following the
end of the Cold War. Murray Weidenbaum gives an example of
this effect on the East Asian economic bloc. "Despite the
current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based
economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for
industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains
substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing
capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and
service acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network
(Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three)
and very large endowments of land, resources, and labor
(mainland China)...From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala
Lumpur to Manila, this influential network - often based on
extensions of the traditional clans - has been described as the
backbone of the East Asian economy.

18. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (2)
The European Community continues to resist including non-
Arab-Muslim countries into its fold, thus encouraging them to
create the Economic Cooperation Organization. There are ten
countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Afghanistan. Samuel P. Huntington argues that the clash of
civilizations occurs at two levels: at the micro-level and the
macro-level. At the micro-level, adjacent groups residing along
the fault lines between civilizations battle one another over the
control of territory as well as each other. At the macro-level,
states possessing different civilizations compete for military
and economic superiority as well as fight over control of
international institutions and third parties, all while promoting
their respective political and religious values.

19. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (3)
Realists view the world as being wrought with anarchy. There
is no legitimate authority above the nation-state. One may
argue from a realist perspective that even American allies are
prone to act according to their own interests, even if it goes
against Washington’s. Israel, a nation that has maintained a
policy of not openly declaring itself a nuclear power, has begun
to openly defy US national security by selling the People’s
Republic Of China military hardware and technology, as well as
a United States Patriot Missile. As the United States focuses its
attention on the prevention of rogue states developing
weapons of mass destruction, US allies are willingly selling
deadly military hardware and technology. Israel has long
cooperated with China, accepting funding for the co-
development and production of various strategic weapons.

20. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (4)
Students may be interested in reading the
1999 Cox Report that details espionage
practices of the People's Republic Of China
(PRC) against the United States of America.
PRC modernization strategies are discussed
throughout the report. Two versions were
produced by the select committee with the first
citing classified information. A second
unclassified report was released that only cites
information one can locate in the public
domain. The second report was procured from
the House Of Representatives database and
recompiled by your instructor. Students may
download the report from our supplemental
course site: www.tabakian.com.

21. WEST VERSUS THE REST (1)
Samuel P. Huntington stresses that civilization-
consciousness is increasing and that global politics will
be focused on "the West and the Rest". This applies to
conflicts between the Western powers, especially the
United States, against "others". However, Huntington
stresses that the first conflict(s) will be between the West
and several Islamic-Confucian states. He further argues
that the West should strive towards greater cooperation
among its members while promoting further incorporating
into the West those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin
America whose cultures are more adaptable.

22. WEST VERSUS THE REST (2)
The West should also coordinate its relations with Russia and Japan;
prevent minor conflicts from developing into major inter-civilization
wars; limit the military capacity of Confucian and Islamic states; resist
drastic reductions in Western military capabilities and maintain
military superiority in the East and Southwest Asia; exploit differences
and conflicts that exist between Confucian and Islamic states;
support those civilizations and their respective groups that admire
Western values and interests; bolster those international institutions
that reflect and legitimize Western interests and values and
encourage non-Western states to participate in these institutions.
Many non-Western states have pursued a goal of modernization
without becoming Western. Japan is the only country that has
succeeded. Samuel P. Huntington infers that the West has to
maintain its economic and military strength to protect its interests
against any possible threats from alien civilizations. The fact is that
the world will consist of various civilizations and each has to find
some way to coexist with one another.

23. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (1)
In 1991, for the United States to overcome Iraqi
forces in order to liberate Kuwait with minimum
casualties, they in effect spent nearly 7 times
the amount that Iraq had spent preparing for the
invasion of Kuwait. United States estimates
were $6 billion for airlift and sealift; $30 billion
for global command control, communications,
computers, and intelligence; and nearly $20
billion each for the portion of the expeditionary
forces of the three military departments required
to proceed with the war.. For the Iraqi estimates,
assuming 100 percent of Iraq’s annual defense
expenditures leading up to the invasion of
Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s total investment
would be some $13 billion per year, concluding
the United States spent nearly seven times the
amount of the Iraqi regime.

24. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (2)
The main reasons for the US to maintain such a
high military expenditure are:
1. US commitments on a global basis. US
military forces must be able to project power to
regions located thousands of miles away.
2. US forces require high technology in order to
defeat its enemies with limited casualties.
3. US maintains a much more expensive all-
volunteer force.

25. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (3)
In order for the United States to defeat the People’s
Republic of China in a conventional invasion, the annual
US military budget must be at least 7 times that of the
PRC, between $2.65 and $5.30 trillion. Given that the
PRC military budget is currently utilized to upgrade a
depressingly archaic military, the current United States
military budget is acceptable. However, when the PLA
has achieved a level that either matches or surpasses
that of the United States, then the only possible option
available for a future US President would be a nuclear
first strike. It is this reason that the People’s Liberation
Army has concentrated nearly 50% of their annual
budget on their Strategic Rocket Force division.

26. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (1)
Human beings are the ultimate weapon. Biological
weapon development is presented in this PBS Special
“The Living Weapon. All slides from this point
incorporate information from the PBS website
dedicated to “The Living Weapon”:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/weapon/index.html.
Chapter 1: (2:37)
"Teaser" introduction for The Living Weapon on
American Experience.
Chapter 2: (3:15)
In December 1942, the U.S. government
holds a secret meeting at the National
Academy of Sciences to discuss a
biological warfare program.

27. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (2)
Chapter 3: (4:16)
During the summer of 1942, the British
conduct secret anthrax tests on the Scottish
island of Gruinard.
Chapter 4: (5:11)
American scientists begin secret biological
warfare research at Camp Detrick in Maryland.
Chapter 5: (4:00)
New weapons of mass destruction are
deployed during World War II.
Chapter 6: (10:32)
Surprising news of German and Japanese
biowarfare research emerge at the end of
World War II.

28. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (3)
Chapter 7: (5:59)
The U.S. biological weapons program escalates
during the Cold War.
Chapter 8: (10:05)
In 1954, American scientists begin testing
biological agents on human subjects.
Chapter 9: (5:13)
The U.S. biological weapons program comes
under public scrutiny.
Chapter 10: (1:38)
The United States ratifies international
agreements leading to the end of the U.S.
biological weapons program.

29. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (4)
Title Unknown (Botulism) (9:43)
This experiment was conducted to determine whether
primates would make suitable research subjects in a
study of botulism. Researchers inject a monkey with
botulisum toxin to determine if he will exhibit the same
effects as human victims.
Operation Cover Up (9:04)
This film questions how long military personnel
would be able to remain in protective suits and
gas masks in the event of an operation within a
biological or chemical weapons area.
Incapacitation by Enterotoxin (5:40)
The film shows the effect of enterotoxin, a
form of food poisoning, when delivered as an
aerosol spray to monkeys.

30. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (5)
SECRET TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES
The start of the Cold War brought new foes and
new fears for the officials running America's
biological weapons program. Determined to
anticipate possible Soviet attacks, the U.S.
staged more than 200 domestic tests aimed at
assessing national vulnerabilities to biological
warfare. Ira Baldwin, Camp Detrick's scientific
director during World War II, left his position after
the Allied victory in 1945 and returned to
teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He
continued to advise the government on issues
concerning biological weapons, however,
particularly the threat that might be posed by
enemy spies releasing biological agents in
American cities.

31. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (6)
In an October 1948 report, Ira Baldwin posited that the
U.S. was "particularly vulnerable to this type of attack." But
in order to determine the precise nature of these
vulnerabilities, secret field tests would have to be done to
ascertain the vulnerability of targets of potential interest to
the enemy. The Army's Chemical Corps, which ran Camp
Detrick, agreed with Baldwin's assessment and set up a
Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick to carry out
the tests. Its first target was to be the Pentagon. In August
1949, the Special Operations Division operatives infiltrated
the world's largest office building and sprayed bacteria into
the Pentagon's air handling system, which then spread
them throughout the structure.

32. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (7)
The operatives moved to larger scale
testing, releasing clouds containing
supposedly harmless bacteria from Navy
ships off Norfolk, Virginia, in April 1950,
and the San Francisco coast in
September 1950. The San Francisco
experiments showed exposure among
almost all of the city's 800,000 residents.
Had the bacteria released been anthrax
bacteria or some other virulent pathogen,
the number of casualties would have been
immense.

33. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (8)
The St Jo Program and Large Area Concept
The success of the first field tests only increased demand for more
experiments. In response to an Air Force request, in 1953 the Chemical
Corps created the St Jo Program and operatives staged mock anthrax
attacks on St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Winnipeg. The bacteria were
released from generators placed on top of cars, and local governments
were told that "invisible smokescreen[s]" were being deployed to mask
the city on enemy radar. The next stage was to increase dispersal
patterns, dispensing particles from airplanes to find out how wide of an
area they would affect. The first Large Area Concept experiment, in
1957, involved dispersing microorganisms over a swath from South
Dakota to Minnesota; monitoring revealed that some of the particles
eventually traveled some 1200 miles away. Further tests covered areas
from Ohio to Texas and Michigan to Kansas. In the Army's words, these
experiments "proved the feasibility of covering large areas of the country
with [biological weapons] agents.”

34. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (9)
Airports and Subways
Open-air testing continued through the
1960s, with the Special Operations Division
operatives simulating even more audacious
assaults. In 1965 they spread bacteria
throughout Washington's National Airport; a
year later, agents dropped light bulbs filled
with organisms onto the tracks in New
York's subway system. "I think it spread
pretty good," participant Wally Pannier later
said, "because you had a natural aerosol
developed every few minutes from every
train that went past.”

35. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (10)
President Nixon's 1969 termination of the United States
offensive biological weapons program brought an end to
the open-air testing, but the American public did not
learn of this testing until 1977. Relatives of one elderly
man Edward Nevin who had died of a nosocomial
infection six months after the San Francisco tests sued
the government in 1981, arguing that the supposedly
harmless Serratia marcescens bacteria used in that test
had in fact caused his death. In the event, the courts
ruled against them, the main reason being that the
plaintiffs could not prove that the bacteria used in the
test were the same as those that killed Mr. Nevin.

36. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (1)
• Foreign policies are the strategies
governments use to guide their actions in
the international arena.
– Spell out the objectives state leaders
have decided to pursue in a given
relationship or situation.
– Foreign policy process: How policies
are arrived at and implemented.

37. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (2)
• Comparative foreign policy.
– Study of foreign policy in various states
in order to discover whether similar
types of societies or governments
consistently have similar types of foreign
policies.
• Foreign policy outcomes result from
multiple forces at various levels of
analysis.

38. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1)
• Rational model:
– Decision makers set goals, evaluate
their relative importance, calculate the
costs and benefits of each possible
course of action, and then choose the
one with the highest benefits and lowest
costs.
– Role of uncertainty.
– Accepting of risk versus averse to risk.

39. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2)
• Organizational process model:
– Foreign policy makers generally skip the labor-
intensive process of identifying goals and alternative
actions, relying instead for most decisions on
standardized responses or standard operating
procedures (sop).
• Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model:
– Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining
process among various government agencies with
somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.

40. DECISION MAKING AS STEERING

41. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1)
• Study of individual decision making revolves
around the question of rationality.
– To what extent are national leaders (or citizens)
able to make rational decisions in the national
interest and thus conform to the realist view of
IR?
• Difficulties of oversimplification
– Individual decision makers have differing values
and beliefs and have unique personalities.
– Idiosyncrasies.

42. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (2)
• Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual
decision making diverges from the rational model
in at least three systematic ways:
• Decision makers suffer from misperceptions
and selective perceptions when they compile
information on the likely consequences of their
choices.
• The rationality of individual cost-benefit
calculations is undermined by emotions that
decision makers feel while thinking about the
consequences of their actions (affective bias).

43. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (3)
• Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of
rational calculations based not on emotional
feelings but simply on the limitations of the
human brain in making choices.
• Cognitive dissonance
• Justification of effort
• Wishful thinking
• Mirror image
• Projection
• Historical analogies

44. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (4)
• Two specific modifications of the rational model of
decision making have been proposed to accommodate
psychological realities.
– Bounded rationality:
• Takes into account the costs of seeking and
processing information.
– Optimizing.
– Satisfying.
– Prospect theory:
• Decision makes go through two phases: editing
phase and the evaluation phase.
• Holds that evaluations take place by comparison
with a reference point, which is often the status
quo but might be some past or expected situation.

45. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY
• Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but
they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into
the decision-making process.
• Groupthink
– Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions
without accurately assessing their consequences,
because individual members tend to go along with
ideas they think the others support
– Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances
of success and are thus more willing to take risks.
• Iran-Contra scandal

46. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
• Crises are foreign policy situations in
which outcomes are very important
and time frames are compressed.
–Time constraints
–Groupthink
–Psychological stress

47. DOMESTIC POLITICS
• Foreign policy is shaped not only by the
internal dynamics of individual and group
decision making but also by the states
and societies within which decision
makers operate.

48. BUREAUCRACIES
• Diplomats:
– Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or
foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign
capitals.
– Political appointees.
– Career diplomats.
– Tension common between state leaders and foreign
policy bureaucrats.
• Interagency tensions:
– Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy
challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the
international system.

49. INTEREST GROUPS
• Coalitions of people who share a common interest in the
outcome of some political issue and who organize
themselves to try to influence the outcome.
• Lobbying:
– The process of talking with legislators or officials to
influence their decisions on some set of issues.
– Three important elements:
• Ability to gain a hearing with busy officials.
• Ability to present cogent arguments for one’s case.
• Ability to trade favors in return for positive action
on an issue.

50. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1)
• Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies,
industrial corporations, and research institutes, working
together to supply a nation’s military forces.
• Response to the growing importance of technology
• Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has
an interest in military spending.
– Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific
institutes that receive military research contracts.
– Revolving door.
– PACS from the military industry.

51. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2)
The phrase, “Military Industrial Complex” was
first used by President Dwight D. Eisenhower
during his farewell address to the nation on
January 17, 1961. He warns against the
increasing influence of corporate influence in
all areas of government. More significant is
the fact that before the presidency, Dwight
Eisenhower’s was a five-star general in the
United States Army. During the Second World
War, he served as Supreme Commander of
the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility
for planning and supervising the successful
invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45.
In 1951, he became the first supreme
commander of NATO.

52. PUBLIC OPINION (1)
• Range of views on foreign policy issues
held by the citizens of a state.
• Has a greater influence on foreign policy in
democracies than in authoritarian
governments.
– Legitimacy
– Propaganda
– Journalists as gatekeepers

53. PUBLIC OPINION (2)
• In democracies, public opinion generally
has less effect on foreign policy than on
domestic policy.
– Attentive public
– Foreign policy elite
– Rally ’round the flag syndrome
– Diversionary foreign policy

54. LEGISLATURES (1)
• Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion
can wield influence.
– Presidential systems; separate elections.
• Legislatures play a direct role in making foreign
policy.
• Different rules apply, however, to the use of military
force.
– Rally ’round the flag.
– May challenge the president if they have power
of the “purse”.

55. LEGISLATURES (2)
– Parliamentary systems; political parties are
dominant
• Often parliamentary executives do not need
to submit treaties or policies for formal
approval by the legislature.
• Call elections; new executive
• Legislatures play a key role in designing
and implementing foreign policy.