In this series we’ll be discussing about Public Choice. Public Choice Theory is directed toward the study of politics based on ecomonic principles. We generally, tend to think that politicians and government officials are benevolent “public servants” who faithfully carry out the “will of the people.” In tending to the public’s business, voters, politicians, and policymakers are supposed somehow to rise above their own self-interests. However it is not true at all.
This presentation deals with the economic theories in correlation with Politics which is the basic idea of Public Choice Theory. It also briefly discuss the Schools of Public Choice theory with the use of it in Law. This presentation explores the real life situations of this theory in India.
A lecture on the theory and practices of strategic urban planning through City Development Strategies given at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles in December 2017.
An Urban Design Approach to a Sustainable Compact City in New Growth Potentia...drboon
Existence of Cities always depends on the region for the resources-land, food, water, energy or maybe cheap labor. The resource base is vital for the survival of the cities. With increasing urban sprawl there is a great impact on the future of cities and their sustenance. The primary intent of the study is to demonstrate an Urban Design approach towards a sustainable compact urban model in new growth potential areas (case of Cyberabad, Hyderabad, India) as a means to counteract city’s faceless sprawl and environmental degradation by generating compact high density, low energy, mixed-use living and integrating it with the existing city fabric reducing the ecological footprint for future generations. As the selected site offers good natural features, ecologically sensitive areas of the site i.e. Steep slope areas, catchment channels and climatically unsuitable areas from the open space system of the development. The sustainable compact city design approach balances the environmental loads and the growth of city saving resources, conserving energy and enhancing the quality of life.
This presentation deals with the economic theories in correlation with Politics which is the basic idea of Public Choice Theory. It also briefly discuss the Schools of Public Choice theory with the use of it in Law. This presentation explores the real life situations of this theory in India.
A lecture on the theory and practices of strategic urban planning through City Development Strategies given at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles in December 2017.
An Urban Design Approach to a Sustainable Compact City in New Growth Potentia...drboon
Existence of Cities always depends on the region for the resources-land, food, water, energy or maybe cheap labor. The resource base is vital for the survival of the cities. With increasing urban sprawl there is a great impact on the future of cities and their sustenance. The primary intent of the study is to demonstrate an Urban Design approach towards a sustainable compact urban model in new growth potential areas (case of Cyberabad, Hyderabad, India) as a means to counteract city’s faceless sprawl and environmental degradation by generating compact high density, low energy, mixed-use living and integrating it with the existing city fabric reducing the ecological footprint for future generations. As the selected site offers good natural features, ecologically sensitive areas of the site i.e. Steep slope areas, catchment channels and climatically unsuitable areas from the open space system of the development. The sustainable compact city design approach balances the environmental loads and the growth of city saving resources, conserving energy and enhancing the quality of life.
ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public participation
Stakeholders in spatial planning
A continuum of participation
History of Public participation-Global
Advocacy Planning
Indian context public participation
Amendments toward public participation
Current Scenario-Indian Context
Merits of Public participation
Importance of Public Participation.
Differances between Public Administration and Urban ManagementDrashti Chovatiya
Public administration is an aspect of the larger field of administration.
It exists in a political system for the accomplishment of the goals and objectives formulated by the political decision-makers.
It is also known as governmental administration because the adjective public in the word “public administration” means government.
Hence, the focus of public administration is on public bureaucracy, that is, bureaucratic organisation (or administrative organisation) of the government.
Urban Management is a broad term covering a large set of functions.
To understand urban management you have to first understand the components of urban fabric.
A City or an urban settlement is not merely a set of roads, buildings, parks, etc.
The core function of a city is to provide inhabitants a liveable environment be it shelter, livelihood, entertainment, food and other stuff required for a healthy living.
Urban management is a combination of all streams converging together to provide citizens above listed elements. Historically cities evolved largely because of financial activities. When people see earning opportunities they move to a city from rural areas.
Practically, there is no difference between Urban management and Public administration. Every manager is concerned with both—administrative and management function and operative function.
However, the managers who are higher in the hierarchy denote more time on administrative function and the lower level denote more time on directing and controlling worker’s performance.
New Public Management, is it a reality?Ashiki_Elahi
New Public Management (NPM) is a global paradigm in lieu of traditional public administration. There was hope that gradually NPM would solve core problems of traditional public administration accepting market management tool in public service delivery. On that sense, NPM holds market friendly principles as a conception. Since its emergence, a long time has already passed and we have seen a lot of practice of NPM in both developed and developing countries. All the way through its emergence and implementation, NPM faced a lot of criticisms. The question is, NPM is here to stay or not until we focus on market. This study is conducted to know the answer by reviewing existing literatures on NPM. As market economy is a reality and almost every powerful world leaders have taken it positive, crises in market is not going to be a great concern. Besides, now there are no such alternative that can occupy the place NPM is holding. So, as long as market remains in our policy, obviously there will be NPM as an effective concept.
Aidarbek Chalbaev and Bekbolot Zhaparov from International Relations Department of International Ataturk Alatoo University is talking about the Neo -Marxism history and theory of IR .Subject: History and Theory of International Relations Lecturer: Dr. Ibrahim Koncak
ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public participation
Stakeholders in spatial planning
A continuum of participation
History of Public participation-Global
Advocacy Planning
Indian context public participation
Amendments toward public participation
Current Scenario-Indian Context
Merits of Public participation
Importance of Public Participation.
Differances between Public Administration and Urban ManagementDrashti Chovatiya
Public administration is an aspect of the larger field of administration.
It exists in a political system for the accomplishment of the goals and objectives formulated by the political decision-makers.
It is also known as governmental administration because the adjective public in the word “public administration” means government.
Hence, the focus of public administration is on public bureaucracy, that is, bureaucratic organisation (or administrative organisation) of the government.
Urban Management is a broad term covering a large set of functions.
To understand urban management you have to first understand the components of urban fabric.
A City or an urban settlement is not merely a set of roads, buildings, parks, etc.
The core function of a city is to provide inhabitants a liveable environment be it shelter, livelihood, entertainment, food and other stuff required for a healthy living.
Urban management is a combination of all streams converging together to provide citizens above listed elements. Historically cities evolved largely because of financial activities. When people see earning opportunities they move to a city from rural areas.
Practically, there is no difference between Urban management and Public administration. Every manager is concerned with both—administrative and management function and operative function.
However, the managers who are higher in the hierarchy denote more time on administrative function and the lower level denote more time on directing and controlling worker’s performance.
New Public Management, is it a reality?Ashiki_Elahi
New Public Management (NPM) is a global paradigm in lieu of traditional public administration. There was hope that gradually NPM would solve core problems of traditional public administration accepting market management tool in public service delivery. On that sense, NPM holds market friendly principles as a conception. Since its emergence, a long time has already passed and we have seen a lot of practice of NPM in both developed and developing countries. All the way through its emergence and implementation, NPM faced a lot of criticisms. The question is, NPM is here to stay or not until we focus on market. This study is conducted to know the answer by reviewing existing literatures on NPM. As market economy is a reality and almost every powerful world leaders have taken it positive, crises in market is not going to be a great concern. Besides, now there are no such alternative that can occupy the place NPM is holding. So, as long as market remains in our policy, obviously there will be NPM as an effective concept.
Aidarbek Chalbaev and Bekbolot Zhaparov from International Relations Department of International Ataturk Alatoo University is talking about the Neo -Marxism history and theory of IR .Subject: History and Theory of International Relations Lecturer: Dr. Ibrahim Koncak
Over the last 10 years, design has gained strategic importance, design thinking has become the norm in many fields outside R&D such as product management, sales or even strategic planning. None of this has any meaning without the thorough understanding of the customers’ needs (a concept which has become known as ‘empathic design’), and the notion that all business efforts should be based on these. However, empathic design is only a starting point, I have experienced that it is essential to develop a common company mentality to really make it work.
Oligarchy rules democracy: Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Int...Sadanand Patwardhan
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. The study is by Martin Gilens, Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page, Northwestern University.
Surname 1
Name
Course
Instructor
Date
Politics
Outline
THESIS: The aspect of politics affects our everyday lives in one way or the other. There is the positive side of politics which is seen when the democratic process is followed and there is the negative side of it which is seen when we let politics rule every aspect of our lives.
I. Politics is important in the society since it helps with decision making processes in the society.
A) For effective decision making in the society, people came up with the idea of electing individuals to manage their affairs and making political decisions for them.
B) No matter how humans try to ignore it, the field of politics influences most happenings in the world, as it can be seen in newspapers and news on TV news.
II) Decisions made by politicians determine a lot in terms of what people are supposed to do and how he law permits to do it.
A) Politicians make laws which control people on what to drink, eat or smoke and the right places to do such activities.
III) The main question is still unanswered which is, do people really want to live in a world where our everyday’s decision is made through political aspects?
A) The decisions regarding who will occupy a certain political seat is determined by people who have the sufficient political power to influence these decisions. That’s why the decisions made are not always in the interest of the citizens.
B) Currently, politics resemble rival sports fans that are willing to die for their favorite team even if it means winning by violence. There is so much rivalry in politics such that it’s safe to say politics have just worsened the society.
Politics
Politics is an aspect of life which includes all the ideas, processes, theories and entities which concern themselves with dividing power and controlling and managing social groups. The study of politics is called political science and this branch focuses on how individuals create a society by balancing power to hold it together. For effective decision making in the society, people came up with the idea of electing individuals to manage their affairs and making political decisions for them. Most of these decisions influence the way of living of people in all aspects from what to dress and eat to how they associate with other people. To enable fair representation, societies and nations hold elections to determine who will represent them and help in making decisions for them (Tocqueville, 17).
Increasing the sphere of involvement in politics may result to bad policies which in turn lead to increased vice in the society. No matter how humans try to ignore it, the field of politics influences most happenings in the world, as it can be seen in newspapers and news on TV news. It is also seen in how people discuss it all the time and at some points shouting about it openly. Politics are applied in everyday life. They are used in creating friendships, choosing enemies and also showing who to respect and w ...
1 Week 3 Rational and Expressive Choice .docxMARRY7
1
Week 3
Rational and Expressive Choice
Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Voter Model (P = B > C; or
Participation or voter choice (P) = perceived benefits of participation or
choice (B) > perceived costs of participation or choice (C)) became popular
in the 1970s. Pursuant to this theory and model, voters decide whether to
vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis, usually on the
basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits. The model lends
itself more than others to predicting what effects changes in external
conditions will have on the vote. A major contribution of the model was to
emphasize the role of issues in voter choice.
The paradox of participation calls into question this theoretical
perspective. The paradox theorizes that the rational individual will not
waste resources by bearing the costs of taking part in the voting process but
will instead take a free ride on the efforts of others. This is known as the
free rider problem. The problem is especially acute when the individual
does not perceive their vote as being decisive to the election outcome.
Some have used rational choice theory to argue that those in a high
socio-economic class would be less active “because they have the education
and intellectual sophistication to comprehend the free-rider problem and
2
because their high salaries raise the opportunity cost of participation” (Verba
1995, 284). The facts however suggest this hypothesis is false. In fact,
strong empirical evidence demonstrates that those in a high socio-economic
class are actually the most likely to be active.
Other rational choice proponents, including Anthony Downs, have
argued that lower information and transaction costs for the well educated
imply that it is actually easier for them to participate in politics. Verba
(1995) notes “[t]his approach has the virtue of fitting the facts but seems
somewhat post hoc” (284).
Overall, rational choice theory must be praised for its theoretical
elegance. But, the theory has done a poor job of predicting political
participation. More specifically, the theory has failed to predict how much
political activity and who will take part.
Some have argued that expressive choice theory can provide a more
compelling explanation of voter behavior. According to Schuessler in A
Logic of Expressive Choice (2000), individuals do not necessarily participate
in collective action in order to produce outcomes but instead often do so in
order to express who they are by attaching themselves to such outcomes.
Because under Schuessler’s perspective the value of participation
emerges not from the outcome but from the process of participation itself,
3
the free-rider problem is no longer a concern. Participation therefore is not a
form of investment but rather a form of consumption. Schuessler wrote,
“Consumption ben ...
A presentation on Political Science on the subject "Public Opinion". A presentation filled with information and diagrams for North South University or any university students. It shows how public opinion might defer from the real world and how it effects the national politics.
political ideology Essay
My New Political Ideology Essay
Essay about Defining Politics
Political Ideologies Essay
Essay on Ideology
Feminist Political Ideology Essays
Political Ideologies
Political Ideology Paper
Political Ideology
Answer the questions that follow in a short paragraph each 3-4 sen.docxamrit47
Answer the questions that follow in a short paragraph each 3-4 sentences Be sure to cite materials from the course. For example, if you are referring to an article that has an author, use the following citation format (Author’s Last Name, Year). If the article has no author, you can use the title of the article, or the title I’ve given it, in quotation marks (“Six Characteristics of a Democracy”, n.d.). Note that you use “n.d.” if the article or post has no date/year associated with it.
Discussion Questions:
1. In what ways are the values of individualism and communitarianism, although seemingly in opposition, both critical to a liberal democracy?
2. After reading the article on communitarianism, do you feel you follow the philosophical tradition of liberalism or of communitarianism when it comes to your view of democracy (note: Don’t confuse “liberalism” with “liberal” in American politics – you have to read the article to understand the meaning of liberalism in American political history).
3. In your opinion why did citizens vote in the latest 2018 elections in higher numbers than past mid-term elections? (Please consider your view in light of the trends noted in the FiveThirtyEight article in Week 1 e-resources (Dottle et al., 2018)
4. Why do you think other western societies vote at higher levels than Americans?
Commentary
According to sociologists, Bellah et al. in Habits of the Heart (2007) and social commentator E.J. Dionne (2012) in Our Divided Political Heart, there are two strains in U.S. history and the underlying set of values that are important to us as member of that society – individualism and communitarianism. Both have shaped our values and sense of who we are as Americans.
On the one hand, we are individualistic - intent in meeting our individual needs and pursuing our individual instrumental (material success) and expressive (personal non-material happiness) needs and goals.
On the other hand, we seek community - the sense of belonging to and active in a larger group and fulfilling the needs of the community and its members.
While individualism is more concrete and easier to identify, communitarianism is more abstract (though see the article on communitarianism in the readings, particular what the authors says about views toward political systems ability to achieve a “good life” other than democracy).
Social institutions fulfill social needs that drive both individualistic and communitarian tendencies in American Society.
Sociologists view social institutions (family, government, economic, education, religion, media) as socially created structures or organizational systems that function to satisfy basic social needs by linking the individual to the larger culture.
Today, some might argue that extreme individualism has become dominant. [Another position is that our society is currently dominated by tribalism or a sense of community based on in-group identities (those like "us"), and often at the expense and derogation of.
Improving Business Environment at Sub-National LevelAkash Shrestha
The capital of State 4, Pokhara - Lekhnath Metropolitan City (PLMPC) – the largest city by area and second largest city by population in Nepal – has immense potential for growth. Its rich abundant natural resources and scenic landscapes have helped promote the region as a tourist hub. However, there is an urgent need to improve the overarching macroeconomic indicators and regulatory barriers that pose a serious threat to the city’s economic development. To the same end, promoting enterprises with the highest-growth potential by creating a conducive business environment also becomes extremely vital.
Rising property ownership among women in Kathmandu, Nepal: an exploration of ...Akash Shrestha
There is evidence that property ownership empowers women
by increasing their self-confidence, ability to contribute to
decisions, control over their reproductive behaviour, ability to
borrow and economic independence. Yet, women around the
world own negligible assets. It is not surprising that assets
ownership among Nepalese women is insignificant. In urban
areas of Nepal, however, women’s assets holdings have
increased dramatically over the last four decades. The article
analyses the institutions that resulted in increased asset hold-
ings among women in Kathmandu, Nepal, and shows how
strategic action by some men and women has given rise to new
norms which favour property ownership among women. The
findings are based on a sample of 193 women who legally own
property (home or land) in Kathmandu, Nepal.
In this chapter, we won’t try to prove that trade is good for growth and that liberalisation is good for trade, so liberalisation is always good for growth whatever the circumstances. But we will demonstrate that an open trade policy is more likely to contribute to economic growth than alternative policies. We’ll start by looking at the different factors that contribute to economic growth and how trade affects them, and then we’ll look at the relationship between trade and R&D, trade and the diffusion of new technologies, and trade and investment.
The anti-globalization movement had its coming-out party in Seattle in 1999, when thousands of activists and trade union members protested against a new round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation. Millions were drawn to these protests because of a preceding anti-WTO statement that was circulated on the internet, and signed by about 1 500 different groups, from churches to militant communists.
China is passing through massive transformation; from a command to a market economy, from an economy based on agriculture to one based on manufacturing and services, from one with high fertility and low longevity to one faced with OCDE style low fertility and high longevity, and from an economy that was almost totally closed to one that, today, even before her accession to the WTO, is much more open than most countries at the same level of income. This vast movement of transformation started on a very simple principle frequently stated by Deng Xioaping: “Poverty is not socialism”. Prosperity was the new face of the socialism according to Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum: to get rich is glorious. In the past socialism used to mean government planning, for the new China, it means common prosperity.
How indias liberalization shaped a generation of entrepreneursAkash Shrestha
Since India began liberalizing its economy in 1991, entrepreneurship in the country has been on the upswing. Some of the most respected companies in the business community today are considered children of liberalization. Take information technology firm Infosys: In the first decade of its existence, from 1981 to 1991, Infosys grew to less than $5 million. In the 20 years since liberalization began, the company has grown to become a $6 billion-plus entity, and one that is well established in the global arena.
There has been widespread criticism that the reforms of the last 20 years have bypassed poor regions; have bypassed poor sections of the population like dalits (formerly called untouchables); that poor people have in desperation taken to Maoism, which now affects almost a quarter of all districts; and that social and poverty indicators have not improved fast enough. These criticisms are mostly exaggerations or falsehoods.
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to society . . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, and in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention.
- Adam Smith
सरकार एउटा संस्था हो, जोसँग निश्चित भौगोलिक क्षेत्रमा सामाजिक आचरणका नितिनियमहरु लागु गर्ने शक्ति हुन्छ । के व्यक्तिलाई यस्तो संस्था आवश्यकता पर्छ? पर्छ भने किन?
There cannot be a second opinion when we say that human civilization has profited immensely by opening up markets and fostering the spirit of entrepreneurship. Before the last two centuries, almost every human kind lived in poverty. Suddenly everything changed. After the industrialization in United Kingdom and capitalist approach in United States of America, the globe witnessed increase in wealth of people along with the rise in their life expectancy rate. But how was this suddenly possible? Maybe the answer is quite relevant and required for our country.
Should the minimum wage be abolished (i.e. reduced toAkash Shrestha
In presidential and Congressional campaigns, the issue of raising the minimum wage workers is often brought up. Most Republicans and many Democrats oppose a rise in the minimum wage. Some economists believe it should be abolished altogether; in other words, businesses would be able to pay $1 or $7 per hour if they wanted, assuming they could find people to hire at the specified rate. This analysis examines the pros and cons of the economists' suggestion.
The social costs of monopoly and regulationAkash Shrestha
The traditional analysis of the costs of monopoly concentrates on the deadweight loss involved, monopoly rents being considered merely a transfer to the monopolist from the consumer surplus that would exist under competition. Some years ago, that analysis was challenged by Posner (1975), who presented an ingenious argument that monopoly rents in fact measure the resources lost to society through rent seeking activities and thus should be counted in the costs of monopoly. That argument has recently been used by staff members of the Federal Trade Commission (Long et al. 1982, chap. 3, esp. pp. 77, 97, 104; see also Tollison, Higgins, and Shugart 1983, pp. 23-44) in an attempt to estimate the benefits potentially flowing from the use of the FTC's line-of-business program in antitrust enforcement.
Foreign Direct Investment. Political Economic Digest Series - XVIAkash Shrestha
In this issue, we will be discussing about Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Foreign Direct Investment has been a very productive tool for the economic growth of many countries. Recently after the government made the decision to celebrate 2012/13 as investment year and after the agreement with India i.e. Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, the topic of Foreign Direct Investment has been highly discussed among the lawmakers, policymakers and general public. The examples provided in this issue of different countries regarding FDI has shown how the growth rate is positively affected by the investment from outside the country.
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Acetabularia Information For Class 9 .docxvaibhavrinwa19
Acetabularia acetabulum is a single-celled green alga that in its vegetative state is morphologically differentiated into a basal rhizoid and an axially elongated stalk, which bears whorls of branching hairs. The single diploid nucleus resides in the rhizoid.
The Roman Empire A Historical Colossus.pdfkaushalkr1407
The Roman Empire, a vast and enduring power, stands as one of history's most remarkable civilizations, leaving an indelible imprint on the world. It emerged from the Roman Republic, transitioning into an imperial powerhouse under the leadership of Augustus Caesar in 27 BCE. This transformation marked the beginning of an era defined by unprecedented territorial expansion, architectural marvels, and profound cultural influence.
The empire's roots lie in the city of Rome, founded, according to legend, by Romulus in 753 BCE. Over centuries, Rome evolved from a small settlement to a formidable republic, characterized by a complex political system with elected officials and checks on power. However, internal strife, class conflicts, and military ambitions paved the way for the end of the Republic. Julius Caesar’s dictatorship and subsequent assassination in 44 BCE created a power vacuum, leading to a civil war. Octavian, later Augustus, emerged victorious, heralding the Roman Empire’s birth.
Under Augustus, the empire experienced the Pax Romana, a 200-year period of relative peace and stability. Augustus reformed the military, established efficient administrative systems, and initiated grand construction projects. The empire's borders expanded, encompassing territories from Britain to Egypt and from Spain to the Euphrates. Roman legions, renowned for their discipline and engineering prowess, secured and maintained these vast territories, building roads, fortifications, and cities that facilitated control and integration.
The Roman Empire’s society was hierarchical, with a rigid class system. At the top were the patricians, wealthy elites who held significant political power. Below them were the plebeians, free citizens with limited political influence, and the vast numbers of slaves who formed the backbone of the economy. The family unit was central, governed by the paterfamilias, the male head who held absolute authority.
Culturally, the Romans were eclectic, absorbing and adapting elements from the civilizations they encountered, particularly the Greeks. Roman art, literature, and philosophy reflected this synthesis, creating a rich cultural tapestry. Latin, the Roman language, became the lingua franca of the Western world, influencing numerous modern languages.
Roman architecture and engineering achievements were monumental. They perfected the arch, vault, and dome, constructing enduring structures like the Colosseum, Pantheon, and aqueducts. These engineering marvels not only showcased Roman ingenuity but also served practical purposes, from public entertainment to water supply.
How to Make a Field invisible in Odoo 17Celine George
It is possible to hide or invisible some fields in odoo. Commonly using “invisible” attribute in the field definition to invisible the fields. This slide will show how to make a field invisible in odoo 17.
June 3, 2024 Anti-Semitism Letter Sent to MIT President Kornbluth and MIT Cor...Levi Shapiro
Letter from the Congress of the United States regarding Anti-Semitism sent June 3rd to MIT President Sally Kornbluth, MIT Corp Chair, Mark Gorenberg
Dear Dr. Kornbluth and Mr. Gorenberg,
The US House of Representatives is deeply concerned by ongoing and pervasive acts of antisemitic
harassment and intimidation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Failing to act decisively to ensure a safe learning environment for all students would be a grave dereliction of your responsibilities as President of MIT and Chair of the MIT Corporation.
This Congress will not stand idly by and allow an environment hostile to Jewish students to persist. The House believes that your institution is in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the inability or
unwillingness to rectify this violation through action requires accountability.
Postsecondary education is a unique opportunity for students to learn and have their ideas and beliefs challenged. However, universities receiving hundreds of millions of federal funds annually have denied
students that opportunity and have been hijacked to become venues for the promotion of terrorism, antisemitic harassment and intimidation, unlawful encampments, and in some cases, assaults and riots.
The House of Representatives will not countenance the use of federal funds to indoctrinate students into hateful, antisemitic, anti-American supporters of terrorism. Investigations into campus antisemitism by the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means have been expanded into a Congress-wide probe across all relevant jurisdictions to address this national crisis. The undersigned Committees will conduct oversight into the use of federal funds at MIT and its learning environment under authorities granted to each Committee.
• The Committee on Education and the Workforce has been investigating your institution since December 7, 2023. The Committee has broad jurisdiction over postsecondary education, including its compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, campus safety concerns over disruptions to the learning environment, and the awarding of federal student aid under the Higher Education Act.
• The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is investigating the sources of funding and other support flowing to groups espousing pro-Hamas propaganda and engaged in antisemitic harassment and intimidation of students. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the US House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X.
• The Committee on Ways and Means has been investigating several universities since November 15, 2023, when the Committee held a hearing entitled From Ivory Towers to Dark Corners: Investigating the Nexus Between Antisemitism, Tax-Exempt Universities, and Terror Financing. The Committee followed the hearing with letters to those institutions on January 10, 202
Welcome to TechSoup New Member Orientation and Q&A (May 2024).pdfTechSoup
In this webinar you will learn how your organization can access TechSoup's wide variety of product discount and donation programs. From hardware to software, we'll give you a tour of the tools available to help your nonprofit with productivity, collaboration, financial management, donor tracking, security, and more.
TESDA TM1 REVIEWER FOR NATIONAL ASSESSMENT WRITTEN AND ORAL QUESTIONS WITH A...
Public Choice. Political economic digest series - 5
1. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
1
Political Economic Digest Series 5
Dear Political Economic Digest Series participant,
Welcome to the fifth series of the Political Economic Digest. In the last series we discussed about
economic freedom and its role in economic growth. We also discussed the state of economic freedom in
Nepal and the measures Nepal could take to enhance its status. Economic Freedom is one of the
prerequisites for economic growth and development of any country. A close look at the economic
freedom index reveals that regardless of their natural resources or their size or their population,
countries with higher level of economic freedom enjoy higher rates of economic growth and high living
standards. We hope you are now able to realize that Nepal’s economy is far from being liberal or free-
market though our politicians usually term it to be so.
In this series we’ll be discussing about Public Choice. Public Choice Theory is directed toward the study
of politics based on ecomonic principles. We generally, tend to think that politicians and government
officials are benevolent “public servants” who faithfully carry out the “will of the people.” In tending to
the public’s business, voters, politicians, and policymakers are supposed somehow to rise above their
own self-interests. However it is not true at all.
Politicians do not devote their lives for your and our benefits anymore than Coca Cola (or Wai wai for
that matter) does. Strangely, however, many people think so -- including university professors that teach
politics and philosophy. The most important contribution of Public Choice Theory is that it recognizes
that politicians are motivated by self interest -- just like you and me. In fact, more so than you and me! If
that is so, and it is, then our expectations of politicians changes dramatically.
One of the major reasons that we are having so much trouble with our government is that we have
forgotten the fact that politicians are self-interested. Knowledge of public theory makes us look at
politics more realistically. We have selected a couple of readings related to public choice theory.
The first reading is an introduction to public choice theory. In this the author describes about public
choice theory and the various parties and events involved such as bureaucracy, politicians, legislature,
elections etc. The reading is a bit complex so you can actually SKIP the first reading if you want.
The second reading is a chapter from the book called “Free your Mind: a beginners guide to political
economy” by Sauvik Chakraverti. In this chapter, the author discusses about the interests of politicians,
bureaucrats and lobbyists and how that affects our well-being. He also mentions about Milton
Friedman’s theory of spending which is a very interesting concept to understand how governments
spend money.
The third reading is an essay by famous economist Russell D. Roberts. In the essay, he explains how
pressure groups and lobbyists coupled with politician’s self-interest tend to bring out the worst in
politicians and why things are better left to the individuals.
2. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
2
Happy reading! If you are interested to further explore this issue, we have lots of texts and visuals on
the subject at Political Economic Resource Center of Samriddhi. Feel free to drop by!
Note: Scroll below to find the readings!
3. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
3
Public Choice
by William F. Shughart II
Foundational Principles
As James Buchanan artfully defined it, public choice is “politics without romance.” The wishful thinking it
displaced presumes that participants in the political sphere aspire to promote the common good. In the
conventional “public interest” view, public officials are portrayed as benevolent “public servants” who
faithfully carry out the “will of the people.” In tending to the public’s business, voters, politicians, and
policymakers are supposed somehow to rise above their own parochial concerns.
In modeling the behavior of individuals as driven by the goal of utility maximization—economics jargon
for a personal sense of well-being—economists do not deny that people care about their families,
friends, and community. But public choice, like the economic model of rational behavior on which it
rests, assumes that people are guided chiefly by their own self-interests and, more important, that the
motivations of people in the political process are no different from those of people in the steak, housing,
or car market. They are the same human beings, after all. As such, voters “vote their pocketbooks,”
supporting candidates and ballot propositions they think will make them personally better off;
bureaucrats strive to advance their own careers; and politicians seek election or reelection to office.
Public choice, in other words, simply transfers the rational actor model of economic theory to the realm
of politics.
Two insights follow immediately from economists’ study of collective choice processes. First, the
individual becomes the fundamental unit of analysis. Public choice rejects the construction of organic
decision-making units, such as “the people,” “the community,” or “society.” Groups do not make
choices; only individuals do. The problem then becomes how to model the ways in which the diverse
and often conflicting preferences of self-interested individuals get expressed and collated when
decisions are made collectively.
Second, public and private choice processes differ, not because the motivations of actors are different,
but because of stark differences in the incentives and constraints that channel the pursuit of self-
interest in the two settings. A prospective home buyer, for example, chooses among the available
alternatives in light of his personal circumstances and fully captures the benefits and bears the costs of
his own choice. The purchase decision is voluntary, and a bargain will be struck only if both buyer and
seller are made better off. If, on the other hand, a politician proposes a project that promises to protect
the new homeowner’s community from flooding, action depends on at least some of his neighbors
voting for a tax on themselves and others. Because the project’s benefits and costs will be shared, there
is no guarantee that everyone’s welfare will be improved. Support for the project will likely be
forthcoming from the owners of houses located on the floodplain, who expect to benefit the most. Their
support will be strengthened if taxes are assessed uniformly on the community as a whole.
4. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
4
Homeowners far from the floodplain, for whom the costs of the project exceed expected benefits,
rationally will vote against the proposal; if they find themselves in the minority, they will be coerced into
paying for it. Unless the voting rule requires unanimous consent, which allows any individual to veto a
proposal that would harm him, or unless those harmed can relocate easily to another political
jurisdiction, collective decision-making processes allow the majority to impose its preferences on the
minority. Public choice scholars have identified even deeper problems with democratic decision-making
processes, however.
The Institutions and Mechanisms of Public Choice
It has been recognized at least since the time of the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) that voting among
three or more candidates or alternatives may fail to select the majority’s most preferred outcome or
may be prone to vote “cycles” producing no clear winner.1 Indeed, Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility
theorem” shows that there is no mechanism for making collective choices, other than dictatorship, that
translates the preferences of diverse individuals into a well-behaved social utility function. Nor has any
electoral rule been found whose results cannot be manipulated either by individuals voting insincerely—
that is, casting their ballots strategically for less-preferred candidates or issues in order to block even
worse outcomes—or by an agenda setter who controls the order in which votes are taken.
Elections
Studying collective decision-making by committees, Duncan Black deduced what has since been called
the median-voter theorem. If voters are fully informed, if their preferred outcomes can be arrayed along
one dimension (e.g., left to right), if each voter has a single most-preferred outcome, and if decisions are
made by simple majority rule, then the median voter will be decisive. Any proposal to the left or right of
that point will be defeated by one that is closer to the median voter’s preferred outcome. Because
extreme proposals lose to centrist proposals, candidates and parties in a two-party system will move to
the center, and, as a result, their platforms and campaign promises will differ only slightly. Reversing
1964 presidential hopeful Barry Goldwater’s catchphrase, majority-rule elections will present voters
with an echo, not a choice. If the foregoing assumptions hold, the median voter’s preferences also will
determine the results of popular referenda. As a matter of fact, anticipating that immoderate proposals
will be defeated, the designers of ballot initiatives will strive to adopt centrist language, in theory
moving policy outcomes closer to the median voter’s ideal point than might be expected if decisions are
instead made by politically self-interested representatives.
Modeling the decision to vote in a rational choice context, Anthony Downs pointed out that the act of
voting itself is irrational. That conclusion follows because the probability of an individual’s vote
determining an election’s outcome is vanishingly small. One person’s vote will tip the scales in favor of
the preferred candidate or issue only if the votes of all other voters are evenly split. As the number of
voters becomes large, the chances of that happening quickly approach zero, and hence the benefits of
voting are likely to be less than the costs. Public choice reasoning thus predicts low rates of voter
participation if voters are rational. Indeed, if there is an unsolved puzzle, it is not why turnout in U.S.
elections is so low, but why it is so high.
5. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
5
Downs and other public choice scholars also conclude that voters in democratic elections will tend to be
poorly informed about the candidates and issues on the ballot. Voter ignorance is rational because the
cost of gathering information about an upcoming election is high relative to the benefits of voting. Why
should a voter bother to become informed if his vote has a very small chance of being decisive?
Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, among others, have suggested that people vote because it is a
low-cost way to express their preferences. In this view, voting is no more irrational than cheering for
one’s favorite sports team.
Legislatures
Ballot initiatives, referenda, and other institutions of direct democracy aside, most political decisions are
made not by the citizenry itself, but by the politicians elected to represent them in legislative
assemblies. Because the constituencies of these representatives typically are geographically based,
legislative officeholders have strong incentives to support programs and policies that provide benefits to
the voters in their home districts or states, no matter how irresponsible those programs and policies
may be from a national perspective. Such “pork barrel” projects are especially likely to gain a
representative’s endorsement when they are financed by the taxpayers in general, most of whom
reside, and vote, in other districts or states.
Legislative catering to the interests of the minority at the expense of the majority is reinforced by the
logic of collective action. Small, homogeneous groups with strong communities of interest tend to be
more effective suppliers of political pressure and political support (votes, campaign contributions, and
the like) than larger groups whose interests are more diffuse. The members of smaller groups have
greater individual stakes in favorable policy decisions, can organize at lower cost, and can more
successfully control the free riding that otherwise would undermine the achievement of their collective
goals. Because the vote motive provides reelection-seeking politicians with strong incentives to respond
to the demands of small, well-organized groups, representative democracy frequently leads to a tyranny
of the minority. George Stigler, Sam Peltzman, Gary Becker, and others used that same reasoning to
model the decisions of regulatory agencies as being influenced by special-interest groups’ relative
effectiveness in applying political pressure.
The logic of collective action explains why farmers have secured government subsidies at the expense of
millions of unorganized consumers, who pay higher prices for food, and why textile manufacturers have
benefited significantly from trade barriers at the expense of clothing buyers. Voted on separately,
neither of those legislatively enacted special-interest measures would pass. But by means of logrolling
bargains, in which the representatives of farm states agree to trade their votes on behalf of trade
protectionism in exchange for pledges of support for agricultural subsidies from the representatives of
textile-manufacturing states, both bills can secure a majority. Alternatively, numerous programs of this
sort can be packaged in omnibus bills that most legislators will support in order to get their individual
pet projects enacted. The legislative pork barrel is facilitated by rational-voter ignorance about the
adverse effects of legislative decisions on their personal well-being. It also is facilitated by electoral
6. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
6
advantages that make it difficult for challengers to unseat incumbents, who, accordingly, can take
positions that work against their constituents’ interests with little fear of reprisal.
Bureaucracies
Owing to the benefits of specialization and division of labor, legislatures delegate responsibility for
implementing their policy initiatives to various departments and agencies staffed by career bureaucrats,
who secure their positions through civil service appointment rather than by democratic election. The
early public choice literature on bureaucracy, launched by William Niskanen, assumed that these
agencies would use the information and expertise they gained in administering specific legislative
programs to extract the largest budget possible from relatively uninformed, inexpert legislators. Budget
maximization was assumed to be the bureaucracy’s goal because more agency funding translates into
broader administrative discretion, more opportunities for promotion, and greater prestige for the
agency’s bureaucrats.
More recently, public choice scholars have adopted a “congressional dominance” model of bureaucracy.
In that model, government bureaus are not free to pursue their own agendas. On the contrary, agency
policy preferences mirror those of the members of key legislative committees that oversee particular
areas of public policy, such as agriculture, international trade, and the judiciary. These oversight
committees constrain bureaucratic discretion by exercising their powers to confirm political appointees
to senior agency positions, to mark up bureau budget requests, and to hold public hearings. The
available evidence does suggest that bureaucratic policymaking is sensitive to changes in oversight
committee membership.
Other Institutions
Public choice scholars, such as Gary Anderson, Mark Crain, William Shughart, and Robert Tollison, have
not neglected the study of the other major institutions of democratic governance: the president or chief
executive officer and the “independent” judiciary. They model the occupants of these positions as self-
interested people who, by exercising the power to veto bills, on the one hand, and by ruling on the
constitutionality of laws, on the other, add stability to democratic decision-making processes and
increase the durability of the favors granted to special-interest groups and, hence, the amounts the
groups are willing to pay for them.
The Lessons of Public Choice
One key conclusion of public choice is that changing the identities of the people who hold public office
will not produce major changes in policy outcomes. Electing better people will not, by itself, lead to
much better government. Adopting the assumption that all individuals, be they voters, politicians, or
bureaucrats, are motivated more by self-interest than by public interest evokes a Madisonian
perspective on the problems of democratic governance. Like that founding father of the American
constitutional republic, public choice recognizes that men are not angels and focuses on the importance
of the institutional rules under which people pursue their own objectives. “In framing a government
7. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
7
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Federalist, no. 51).
Institutional problems demand institutional solutions. If, for example, democratic governments
institutionally are incapable of balancing the public budget, a constitutional rule that limits increases in
spending and taxes to no more than the private sector’s rate of growth will be more effective in curbing
profligacy than “throwing the rascals out.” Given the problems endemic to majority-rule voting, public
choice also suggests that care must be exercised in establishing the domains of private and collective
choice; that it is not necessarily desirable to use the same voting rule for all collective decisions; and that
the public’s interest can be best protected if exit options are preserved by making collective choices at
the lowest feasible level of political authority.
8. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
8
CHAPTER THREE
WHY POLITICAL MARKETS DON’T WORK
Suppose you went to your town’s main market. You would find plenty of shops selling all kinds of
things, and many vendors of food. But you would have only a limited amount of money in your
pocket. You cannot buy everything on offer. Because resources are limited and wants are not, you
would have to make choices. You would have to decide whether you would prefer to spend on a bar
of chocolate and forego a milkshake or the other way around.
The central problem of Economics is Choice.
There are limited resources and unlimited wants, and so we must make choices as to how to spend
these resources.
[The freedom to choose is also the most important freedom we possess in a free market;
with protectionism and trade restrictions, we lose much of this important freedom, and are
‘forced’ to spend our hard-earned money on goods we would otherwise have rejected (if we
had the free choice) – like Bajaj autorickshaws or Old Monk rum or Wills Navy Cut. Do read
Milton Friedman’s great book Free to Choose, also available as a documentary.]
There are two kinds of choices we make: private choice and public choice.
Private choices are made in the private market and the main players in this market are consumers
and suppliers. This is how we buy our food, clothes, toys, music, and books.
Public choices refer to those made in the POLITICAL MARKET and the main players in this market
are POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS and VOTERS. This is how we get our
roads, our garbage clearance, our police and national defense. Remember, even in the political
market, resources are limited. If we spend more on defense we have less for education. PUBLIC
CHOICE THEORY is that branch of Economics that looks into how choices are made in the political
market (in a liberal, democratic setting).
In the private market, consumers spend their money and choose between various options. Because
they are directly affected by each choice they make – and they suffer if they make wrong choices –
they take great care to seek out information and to correct past mistakes. If you had to make an
important purchase of a consumer durable like a television, refrigerator or car, you would ask
people you know about their experiences with various makes, read product reviews, compare
features mentioned in advertisements and so on before making your purchase. You would spend
your own hard-earned money very, very carefully. Thus, in the private market, money is usually well
spent. If most spending decisions were to take place through the private market, most of society’s
money would be well spent.
In the Political Market, there are certain reasons why money is not well spent, even in the best of
democracies, with the best personnel serving the State:
9. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
9
• Politicians are primarily interested in re-election. They will spend a lot of public money in ways
that ensure them votes. The 2 rupee per kg rice scheme in Andhra Pradesh is a good
example. As is free water and free power to farmers. The huge advertisements that
inevitably appear each and every day in the papers featuring politicians are paid for by
taxpayers. Such spending cannot possibly be in the public interest. But such spending occurs
simply because politicians are more interested in getting re-elected than they are in the
public interest!
• Bureaucrats are primarily interested in Budgets. They will always attempt to ensure that their
departments get more money from the tax kitty. The Budget Deficit – which shows how
much the government spends ABOVE what it extorts in tax revenue – is not going down
because bureaucratic departments at all levels want to go on spending more money.
• Special interest groups and voters are both interested in free lunches: some gain for
themselves at a cost to others. They will look for ways that public money is spent on them –
they get something free – while the costs are borne by other taxpayers who are not
politically organized. A good example is the high import duties that protect India’s
industrialists. They are few, vocal and organized; the consumers are many, but unorganized,
and they pay the duties.
It is also important to note that political spending is not directed towards the majority. It is directed
towards small and vocal minorities who are all well organized politically. The politician directs
spending in favor of these minorities, and the majority pays. A good example is agricultural
subsidies in the US, which go to 2 per cent of the population who are farmers, but the costs are
borne by 98 per cent of the people, who are unorganized. Another example is the high import
duties on steel imposed in the USA recently: it benefits a few uncompetitive American steel
producers, but millions of American steel consumers pay.
It is best to examine the difference between the way money is spent in political and private markets
thus:
MILTON FRIEDMAN’S LAW OF SPENDING
There are four ways of spending money:
• You can spend your own money on yourself
• You can spend your own money on others – buy gifts
• You can spend others people’s money on yourself – buy things on the ‘company account’
• You can spend other people’s money on other people: political spending (or central economic
planning).
It follows that maximum reliance on people spending their own money is good for society, in that
most of society’s money is well spent. On the other hand, maximum reliance on the state as a
means of spending money – economic planning – is bad, because most of the money is not well
spent.
Economic planning is some people spending other people's money on other people. This is a sure
way of spending money badly.
Private spending is better than political spending because of the 3I’s: Interest, Incentive and
Information. Consumers have the interest, incentive and information to spend money wisely. The
political market players do not. Indeed, they have an incentive to spend money unwisely!
10. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
10
Pigs Don't Fly: The Economic Way of Thinking about Politics
Russell Roberts
Sometimes it's hard to do the right thing.
Mimi and Richard Farina were husband-and-wife folksingers in the '60s. Richard died in a motorcycle
accident in the aftermath of a party celebrating Mimi's 21st birthday. A horrible tragedy. At Richard's
funeral, Judy Collins sang her signature song, Amazing Grace. It must have been terribly moving.
Unfortunately, Mimi's sister wasn't at the funeral, though surely she would have also sung something
for such a sad occasion. That sister, Joan Baez, was on a concert tour of Europe at the time. She
telegrammed Mimi that she had decided to stay in Europe instead of coming home to comfort her
sister. Why? Because that's what Richard would have wanted, Joan explained. By staying on tour, she'd
be able to talk about his music. Mimi, interviewed years later, explained that actually, Richard would
have preferred for Joan to have a nervous breakdown on hearing of his death and to have been unable
to perform.
A more mundane example occurs when a friend calls to tell you about something important in her life
but you have too much to do. After a while, you end the call by saying, "I'll let you go." What you really
mean is "I have to go," but we try and put it in a more selfless light.
We are a bundle of motives. We are often torn between what is best for ourselves and what is best for
others. We are torn between doing the right thing and doing the easy thing or the convenient thing.
Sometimes we choose the selfless course of sacrifice. The costs and benefits influence our choices. If
Joan Baez had been touring in California instead of Europe, it would have been cheaper to come to the
funeral. Maybe she would have decided in that case to attend. When a friend calls us in tears, we're
more likely to stay on the phone even when we have other things to do.
But when we choose a selfish course, we rarely confess our true feelings. We find a graceful description
to sugarcoat our actions. When the football coach resigns whether because he is failing or because he
thinks a better job is available, he often tells the world that he's quitting because he wants to spend
more time with his family.
Pigs Don't Fly
Politicians are just like the rest of us. They find it hard to do the right thing. They claim to have
principles, but when their principles clash with what is expedient, they often find a way to justify their
self-interest. If they sacrifice what is noble or ideal for personal gain, they are sure to explain that it was
all for the children, or the environment or at least for the good of society.
Pigs don't fly. Politicians, being mere mortals like the rest of us, respond to incentives. They're a mixture
of selfless and selfish and when the incentives push them to do the wrong thing, albeit the self-
11. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
11
interested one, why should we ever be surprised? Why should be fooled by their professions of
principle, their claims of devotion to the public interest?
We call politicians our representatives and they often claim to be fighting for us. But when we think
about it, we understand that our interests are diverse and that no politician can really fight for all of us.
Inevitably, our interests and desires clash and politicians are forced to choose between the general
interest and the special interest. Which wins?
The answer depends on the constraints facing the politicians. So politicians in a system with meaningful
elections and competition are more likely to pursue policies that please the general public. Dictators
have more range to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the people.
For better or worse, it is an unavoidable reality that even when politicians are constrained by real or
potential competition, they still have wiggle room for pursuing their own self-interest because the level
of knowledge among the electorate is imperfect. The electorate can be misinformed. Or rationally
ignorant. It's costly for voters to be well-informed. That gives politicians, even in a democracy, the
chance to pursue special interests at the expense of the general interest.
Bootleggers and Baptists
This wiggle room for politicians in a democracy leads to some strange outcomes. It allows politicians to
do the right thing and the wrong thing at the same time. How is that possible? We shall see below. Even
stranger, the imperfect information available to voters can even allow politicians to do the wrong thing
and pass it off as the right thing if we're not paying close enough attention.
Bruce Yandle uses bootleggers and Baptists to explain what happens when a good cause collides with
special interests.
When the city council bans liquor sales on Sundays, the Baptists rejoice—it's wrong to drink on the
Lord's day. The bootleggers, rejoice, too. It increases the demand for their services.
The Baptists give the politicians cover for doing what the bootleggers want. No politician says we should
ban liquor sales on Sunday in order to enrich the bootleggers who support his campaign. The politician
holds up one hand to heaven and talk about his devotion to morality. With the other hand, he collects
campaign contributions (or bribes) from the bootleggers.
Yandle points out that virtually every well-intentioned regulation has a bunch of bootleggers along for
the ride—special interests who profit from the idealism of the activists and altruists.
If that's all there was to Yandle's theory, you'd say that politics makes for strange bedfellows. But it's
actually much more depressing than that. What often happens is that the public asks for regulation but
inevitably doesn't pay much attention to how that regulation gets structured. Why would we? We have
lives to lead. We're simply too busy. Not so with the bootleggers. They have an enormous stake in the
way the legislation is structured. The devil is in the details. And a lot of the time, politicians give
bootleggers the details that serve the bootleggers rather than the public interest.
12. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
12
In the 1970s, sulfur dioxide released by the smokestacks of American midwestern utility companies
created acid rain in the American northeast. A clamor arose to clean up the air—environmentalists and
everyday citizens demanded legislation. That should have been relatively easy. We know how to get less
of something—make it more costly. So the cheapest solution to the sulfur dioxide problem would have
been to tax smokestack emissions. That would give utilities the incentive to find the cheapest way to
reduce emissions. Over time, better and better technologies would be developed as a way to reduce the
burden of the tax.
But Congress didn't impose a tax. Congress imposed a technology. The 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act required every utility to put a scrubber on its smokestacks. These were incredibly expensive—
about $100 million each. They made the air cleaner. They also made the makers of smokestacks richer.
The makers of scrubbers were the bootleggers. They joined environmental groups in lobbying for the
legislation. That's not so bad. Maybe scrubbers were the best technology and even if a tax had been put
in place, the scrubber makers would have profited.
But the real bootleggers were the West Virginia coal companies. If a tax had been used to reduce sulfur
dioxide emission, there would have been an incentive to clean up the air. One way to clean up the air is
to use technology like a scrubber. A second way is to burn cleaner coal. Cleaner coal (low in sulfur)
comes from out West. Dirty coal (high in sulfur) comes from West Virginia. Senator Byrd is from West
Virginia. He made sure that scrubbers were mandated. For the environment of course. For cleaner air, of
course. For the children, no doubt. But also for his friends in the coal business. We got cleaner air, but
we achieved it at a much higher price than was necessary.
For the Children
In the worst cases of the bootlegger and Baptist alliance, the good intentions don't just get sidetracked
or achieved at a higher cost by the bootleggers—they get thwarted.
The attorneys general in a number of states threatened the tobacco companies with legal action on the
grounds that tobacco companies were imposing costs on state budgets by getting people sick.
Eventually, the tobacco companies settled, a complex legal structure called the master settlement. The
master settlement, applauded by anti-tobacco activists and everyday citizens concerned about their
taxes and the health of their fellow citizens, imposed large tax increases on tobacco companies to fund
children's health programs. It was a proud day all around. Who could be against such a result? Oh, a few
people griped that the whole process was unconstitutional and reduced freedom. But look at the
benefits, the defenders would answer—Big Tobacco punished, smoking discouraged, and more health
for the children.
Jeremy Bulow's analysis of the tobacco settlement can be found in the Milken Institute Review. He calls
the settlement "byzantine." I think he's being kind. But the complexity of the settlement is a common
way to obscure income redistribution and inefficiencies that would otherwise be politically
embarrassing. I have never met an economist (let alone an educated citizen) who understands and can
explain how the price of milk is set in the United States. To call dairy regulations "byzantine" is to insult
an ancient people.
13. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
13
But it didn't turn out that way. There was more to the story. But who noticed? How many citizens who
cared about smoking actually looked to see how the settlement really worked? It seemed enough to
know the broad outlines—tobacco companies punished, children protected. But the bootleggers were
very interested in not just the broad outline, but in the details. Yes, tobacco companies were "punished"
by high taxes. But they passed the tax on in the form of higher prices to smokers. Yes, higher prices
means fewer sales, but profit margins for tobacco companies and tobacco profits actually increased
because of the way the settlement was structured. It made it prohibitively costly for generic cigarettes
and new entrants to expand their market share. That allowed the tobacco companies to raise prices
more than they would normally have been able because their competitors were handicapped.
So the tobacco companies were bootleggers. They actually profited from the settlement. But the real
bootleggers were the trial lawyers who helped the attorneys general with the suits that led to the
settlement. In return for their efforts, they receive $500 million each year. True, they had to work hard.
One lawyer made $92,000 per hour for his work. Per hour. It must have been very demanding work. I'm
sure they earned it. It was all for the children. Remember?
No Child Left Behind
When a piece of legislation is called "No Child Left Behind" you know the bootleggers are going to be out
in force. Saving the children is so popular with so many people that it opens up tremendous possibilities
in the details. One part of No Child Left Behind was called "Reading First" a $1 billion program to help
low-income school districts adopt better reading programs. Who's in favor of that? Everybody!
But how would the program actually be implemented? "Quite simply, Reading First focuses on what
works, and will support proven methods of early reading instruction," according to the Department of
Education.
Sounds wonderful. A reading program for low-income children based on proven methods. It was indeed
a political juggernaut. But I wonder if the enthusiastic backers of the program had any idea of how such
noble goals would be achieved.
The Washington Post reports:
Department officials and a small group of influential contractors have strong-armed states and local
districts into adopting a small group of unproved textbooks and reading programs with almost no peer-
reviewed research behind them. The commercial interests behind those textbooks and programs have
paid royalties and consulting fees to the key Reading First contractors, who also served as consultants
for states seeking grants and chaired the panels approving the grants. Both the architect of Reading First
and former education secretary Roderick R. Paige have gone to work for the owner of one of those
programs, who is also a top Bush fundraiser.
But it is clear that Reading First has been a terrific boon for the textbook publishing industry, and for the
department's favored programs. For example, the company that developed Voyager Passport was
valued at about $5 million in a newspaper article before Reading First; founder Randy Best, whose
14. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
14
Republican fundraising made him a Bush Pioneer, eventually sold it for $380 million. He then put Lyon
and Paige on his payroll.
Pretty depressing, isn't it? But here's a cheerful thought—the glass is really half-full. While the details of
legislation in a democracy get twisted by the bootleggers to their own advantage, at least the overall
thrust of the legislation is usually in the direction that the general public desires. The diversion of
income to special interests is petty cash compared to what dictators are able to channel to their friends
in a less representative system without the constraints of elections.
George Stigler vs. Ralph Nader
We should be realistic about politicians. George Stigler used to contrast his theory of politics with Ralph
Nader's. In Nader's view, all of the ugly aspects of government were caused by the wrong people getting
elected. If we could just elect better people, then we'd get better policies. Stigler argued that it didn't
matter who the people were—once they got in office, they responded to incentives. They would
convince themselves that they were doing the right thing, either because they really thought so or
because doing the wrong thing was necessary in order to be able to do the right thing down the line.
Being a Stiglerian in this area, I expect less of my politicians and I am rarely disappointed. Even those
politicians we think of as principled, pursue the calculus of the bootleggers and Baptists. Ronald Reagan,
an eloquent defender of free trade, imposed "voluntary" quotas on Japanese cars. That is the way the
world works.
In the economist's view of politics, ideology and party matter less than the incentives facing politicians.
Political parties in a democracy differ more by the words they use to justify their actions rather than by
the actions themselves. Republicans talk about economic freedom and the dangers of big government
while making government bigger. Democrats talk about their devotion to labor unions and the dangers
of free trade but they rarely push for tariffs and quotas.
A final lesson for policy advocates and concerned citizens is to be careful what you wish for. What is best
for the general interest is unlikely to survive the sausage factory of the legislative process. What results
is imperfect.
So when you hear the politicians talk about how much they care about the people or the children or the
environment or health, keep your hand on your wallet and keep a lookout for the bootleggers lurking
nearby. They are always there.
15. Political Economic Digest Series 5 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
15
Questions to think about:
Do you still think politicians; bureaucrats and other public officials are benign public servants who are
motivated by public’s benefit rather than their self-interest?
What do you think about Friedman’s law of spending? Can you explain now why governments always
tend to expand their budgets and programs without ever discussing if their spending is the most
efficient one or not?
How do you explain the connection between protectionist policies and public choice theory? Do you
think protectionist policies are infact beneficial to general public?
Why do politicians promise to provide anything and everything to the public free of cost? Is it really
free? Would they make such elaborate promises if their own money was involved?
What are the incentives for a voter to seek out all relevant information before casting his vote?
Are these incentives adequate? That is: Does it make sense for every voter to thoroughly check out each
candidate, each manifesto and so on? Do most voters do this?
If not, how much reliance should be placed on government, even if democratically elected?