This document discusses rational and expressive choice theories of voter behavior. It summarizes that rational choice theory became popular in the 1970s and viewed voters as making rational calculations to vote based on perceived costs and benefits. However, the paradox of participation questioned this by arguing voters may not participate due to free rider problems. Some evidence suggests expressive choice theory provides a better explanation, viewing participation as a way to express identity rather than produce outcomes.

1. 1
Week 3
Rational and Expressive Choice
Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Voter Model (P = B
> C; or
Participation or voter choice (P) = perceived benefits of
participation or
choice (B) > perceived costs of participation or choice (C))
became popular
in the 1970s. Pursuant to this theory and model, voters decide
whether to
vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis,
usually on the
basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits. The
model lends
itself more than others to predicting what effects changes in
external
conditions will have on the vote. A major contribution of the
model was to

2. emphasize the role of issues in voter choice.
The paradox of participation calls into question this theoretical
perspective. The paradox theorizes that the rational individual
will not
waste resources by bearing the costs of taking part in the voting
process but
will instead take a free ride on the efforts of others. This is
known as the
free rider problem. The problem is especially acute when the
individual
does not perceive their vote as being decisive to the election
outcome.
Some have used rational choice theory to argue that those in a
high
socio-economic class would be less active “because they have
the education
and intellectual sophistication to comprehend the free-rider
problem and
2
because their high salaries raise the opportunity cost of
participation” (Verba

3. 1995, 284). The facts however suggest this hypothesis is false.
In fact,
strong empirical evidence demonstrates that those in a high
socio-economic
class are actually the most likely to be active.
Other rational choice proponents, including Anthony Downs,
have
argued that lower information and transaction costs for the well
educated
imply that it is actually easier for them to participate in politics.
Verba
(1995) notes “[t]his approach has the virtue of fitting the facts
but seems
somewhat post hoc” (284).
Overall, rational choice theory must be praised for its
theoretical
elegance. But, the theory has done a poor job of predicting
political
participation. More specifically, the theory has failed to predict
how much
political activity and who will take part.
Some have argued that expressive choice theory can provide a
more

4. compelling explanation of voter behavior. According to
Schuessler in A
Logic of Expressive Choice (2000), individuals do not
necessarily participate
in collective action in order to produce outcomes but instead
often do so in
order to express who they are by attaching themselves to such
outcomes.
Because under Schuessler’s perspective the value of
participation
emerges not from the outcome but from the process of
participation itself,
3
the free-rider problem is no longer a concern. Participation
therefore is not a
form of investment but rather a form of consumption.
Schuessler wrote,
“Consumption benefits are inextricably tied to expression: the
sports fan’s
expression of team support is required for him to enjoy his
participation.

5. Similarly, participation in politics, under a consumption-benefit
regime, is
inextricably tied to the expression of partnership, or the
expression of
preference toward one of the candidates” (46) (emphasis in
original). So
while participation was often seen as a cost under the rational
choice
perspectives, expressive choice theorists see participation as a
huge benefit
logically driving the individual voter when making voting
choices.
Mobilization
Mobilization is the process by which candidates, parties,
activists and
groups induce other people to participate. Two types of
mobilization: (1)
Directly – leaders mobilize people directly when they contact
citizens
personally and encourage them to take action and (2) Indirectly
– leaders
mobilize people indirectly when they contact citizens through
mutual

6. associates (family, friends, neighbors or colleagues).
Political leaders do not try to mobilize everyone, and not all the
time.
For maximum effect, they target their efforts on particular
people, and they
time them for particular occasions. When targeting, political
leaders are (1)
4
more likely to mobilize people they already know; (2) more
likely to
mobilize people who are centrally positioned in social
networks; (3) more
likely to mobilize people whose actions are most effective at
producing
political outcomes; and (4) more likely to mobilize people who
are likely to
respond by participating. Thus, political leaders are more likely
to mobilize
(1) people who are employed, especially in large workplaces;
(2) people
who belong to associations; (3) leaders of organizations,

7. businesses and
local government; and (4) the wealthy, educated and partisan.
Timing
becomes critical when we consider that (1) people participate
more when
salient issues top the agenda; (2) people participate more when
other
concerns do not demand their attentions; (3) people participate
more when
important decisions are pending; (4) people participate when
outcomes hang
in the balance; and (5) people participate more when issues
come before
legislatures rather than before bureaucracies and courts.
Social Capital
Social capital is the features of social life – networks, norms
and trust
– that enable participants to act together more effectively to
pursue shared
objectives. Putnam (2000) in his famous work Bowling Alone
advances a
theory of social capital that presumes that generally speaking
the more we

8. connect with others the more we trust them. Social trust and
civic
5
engagement are strongly correlated. Significantly, education is
the strongest
correlate of civic engagement. However education has
increased with time
but yet, civic engagement has declined.
Putnam (2000) examined a number of potential factors to
explain the
decline in social capital, social trust and civic engagement.
These factors
included pressure of time and money; mobilization and
suburbanization; the
changing role of woman; marriage and family; the rise of the
welfare state;
the race and civil rights revolutions; age; and television.
Putnam concluded
that television and generational effects are the most likely
culprits to explain
the decline.

9. Life-cycle effects are differences attributable to a stage of
life. Period
effects affect all people who live in a given era. With
generational effects
individuals do not change, but society does; like life cycle
effects,
generational effects show up as disparities among age groups at
a single
point in time, but like period effects they produce real social
change.
Citizen Engagement
Scholars debate whether the general decline in civic
participation
since the 1960s represents a disengagement from political
activity, including
voting. Niemi et al. (2010) note that academics have become
concerned
about the decline in voter turnout and other forms of political
participation.
6

10. Signs of disengagement appeared in the 1960s, and at a time
when trust in
the American government lessened. Disengagement was also
observed in
other nations (2010).
Moreover, political knowledge also appears to be declining.
The
quality of news coverage has worsened. The development of
many
specialized cable channels and web sites gives individuals the
ability to
either fully pay attention to politics or avoid it entirely. It is
expected that
these developments will widen the knowledge gaps between
those who
regularly follow political news and those who merely use new
technology
for entertainment (Niemi et al. 2010).
As noted above, Putnam concluded that the observed decline
was
“generational in nature” (Niemi et al. 2010, 23). For example,
it was
observed that the decline in participation and political
knowledge is

11. especially acute in young people (2010).
Niemi et al. (2010) also acknowledge that other academics see
disengagement as a myth. These scholars agree that cable
channels and the
internet are replacing network television as the primary news
source. But,
they also argue a change in values has occurred, which young
people were
eager to adopt. Prior to the 1960s, the World War II generation
placed an
emphasis on civic duty. Later generations focused instead on
engagement,
7
which emphasizes individual autonomy and non-electoral
behavior such as
community service and directly helping others (2010). “These
changes in
modes of communication, news dissemination, and values have
naturally
caused changes in some kinds of political behavior” (2010, 30).

12. Niemi et al. (2010) also make an important point about the
difference
in calculating voter turnout. Historically, the base was
calculated using the
VAP (voting age population). Since the 1970s, however, many
individuals
in the voting age population have become ineligible to vote,
including large
numbers of legal or illegal non-citizens and felons or ex-felons
who were
denied the voting franchise by state laws. A more accurate
measure appears
to be the VEP (voting eligible population), which actually
shows that after
1972, the decline in voting turnout was much smaller than
previously
observed (2010). A challenge with using the VEP, however, is
that each
state’s laws must be taken into account so as to capture the most
accurate
picture of the voting eligible population.
Putnam (2000) acknowledged that it was too early to tell the
true

13. impact of the internet on social capital and citizen engagement.
Even if we
accepted the arguments from the academics that believe
disengagement is a
myth, the quality of the experience is ultimately very important
to political
participation. The time spent viewing cable channel news and
web sites is
8
increasingly becoming an individual activity. This
contemporary experience
contrasts with the pre-1960s experience of families listening to
the radio
together and individuals enjoying face-to-face bridge games
where they
would discuss the issues of the day collectively (2000). As
Putnam (2000)
states, “More and more of our time and money are spent on
goods and
services consumed individually, rather than those consumed
collectively”

14. (245).
Civic engagement is subject to criticism. Some scholars have
argued:
(1) the lack of involvement may signal widespread satisfaction
with the
status quo rather than a crisis of democracy; (2) participation
sparks feelings
of powerlessness and frustration; (3) citizen participation may
encourage
unwise decisions (due to lack of expertise); and (4) highly
engaged
majorities may repress minorities and produce other injustices.
In response,
others have argued: (1) there has never been non-self-interested
elites who
could be trusted to advance the common good; (2) those who are
active do a
poor job of representing the interests of the inactive; (3)
through institutional
design, it may be possible to reconcile tensions between just
and good
government and enhanced participation; (4) civic debate is the
best way to
discern the truth; and (5) higher turnouts produce electorates

15. less dominated
by extremes.
9
Regardless of one’s position with respect to civic engagement,
most
agree political participation in the United States is dangerously
low. I do not
argue that extremely high rates of participation must be
achieved, but when
government legitimacy is perceived as low and indifference to
government
and collective life too common, then increased engagement is
needed. We
must remember that the amount, quality and distribution of
political and
civic engagement are mostly the product of our political
choices.
Youth Participation
Regardless of whether youth participate as much as older
individuals,

16. the nature of their participation is clearly different. Instead of
traditional
political activity such as working for a campaign and voting,
youth are
engaging in activities such as boycotting and protesting (Niemi
et al. 2010).
However the quality of these political activities may not yield
the same
benefit to the newer generations that more traditional political
activity had
for previous generations.
Verba et al.’s work only deepens the concern. Verba et al.
(1995)
argue that resources such as time, money and skills are required
for political
participation. The origins of such resources were traced back to
the
involvement of individuals in major social institutions such as
the family,
school, workplace, voluntary associations and religious
institutions (1995).
10

17. “Socially structured circumstances and the constrained choices
affect the
stockpile of time, money and civic skills available for politics”
(271). If
individuals choose to engage in activities either alone or in non-
traditional
organizations and groups, then they may not have the same
quality of access
to the resources that are necessary for effective political
engagement.
Newer generations may prefer to engage in contemporary forms
of
non-electoral political activity, choosing not to vote. But,
evidence exists
that government rewards those who vote (Griffin and Newman
2005).
Elections can be “successful in refocusing public officials’
attention to the
electorate’s desires” (Bennett and Resnick 1990, 800).
If decline in voting continues, even prolonged slight declines
using a
VEP measure, a shift in the voting model may be warranted so
as to better fit

18. this important democratic activity to the non-traditional
paradigm embraced
by newer generations. Compulsory voting or voting via a
secure internet
platform or a platform provided by another technology may
eventually be an
essential change (Niemi et al. 2010). Additional research on the
quality of
contemporary participation may help inform our electoral policy
options.
1
Week 2
Progressive Era Reforms
The Progressive Era (1890 – 1913) was a period of United
States (US) history that sought to curb many of the excesses of
the
patronage period, including the institution of major government

19. reforms such as civil service. Progressives wanted to clean up
government, use government to advance human welfare and
apply
scientific management theories to government.
Famously, during this era (1906), Upton Sinclair wrote The
Jungle chronicling abuses in the meat packing industry, which
led
President Theodore Roosevelt to press Congress to pass laws
regulating the meat industry. In addition, Progressives had
many
other successes: They attacked voting allegiances between US
Senators and the railroad industry; introduced the direct primary
(to avoid party conventions); obtained more equitable taxes;
obtained regulation of railroad rates; secured the passage of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act; and secured the passage of the Pure
Food
and Drug Law.
2

20. Progressives were also successful at introducing the
Australian ballot, which was a secret ballot printed by the state.
Previously, parties had made the ballots and there were charges
of
invasion of privacy and multiple voting. For those opposed to
machine politics, the democratic virtues of secret balloting
seemed
obvious. But, the reform had the unintended consequence of
becoming an obstacle to voting for many illiterate foreign-born
voters in the North and uneducated African-Americans in the
South. In some states, this problem was remedied by having
illiterate voters assisted or by attaching party emblems next to
the
names of candidates.
The situation in Southern states, however, deteriorated for
African-Americans during this era. The year 1890 marked the
beginning of efforts by southern states to disenfranchise
African-
American voters. Faced with recurring electoral challenges,
annoying expense of buying votes and epidemics of fraud and

21. violence, Southern Democrats chose to solidify their hold over
the
region by amending the state voting laws so as to exclude
African-
3
Americans without overtly violating the Fifteenth Amendment.
Mississippi led the way by imposing a stricter residency
requirement, a two-dollar poll tax and a literacy test that
required
voters to demonstrate that they understood the Constitution.
Other
southern states soon followed by including some combination of
these requirements, and eventually Democratic primaries were
restricted to only white voters. Laws were also adopted to
disenfranchise men convicted of minor offenses, such as
vagrancy
and bigamy: The goal was to keep poor and illiterate minorities
(in
Texas this included Mexican Americans) from the polls.

22. Importantly, local election officials were given a great deal of
discretion in implementing the requirements, which often
worked
to the benefit of “gentlemen” whites but was harmful to the
poor
and for minorities.
Sadly, these state laws worked. In Mississippi after 1890,
less than 9,000 out of 147,000 voting-age African-Americans
were
registered to vote. In Louisiana, where more than 130,000
African-Americans were registered in 1896, as little as 1,342
were
4
registered by 1904. Consequently, the African-American
population remained disenfranchised until the 1960s, electoral
participation was low and one-party rule by Southern Democrats
dominated southern politics.
Vote Determinants

23. What determines the choice a voter will select on election
day is an important question asked by many political scientists.
The most widely accepted view of what drives vote choice is
party
identification. Campbell et al. (1960), in their famous work
titled
The American Voter, note that “partisan preferences show great
stability between elections.” The strength and direction of
party
identification are of central importance in explaining political
attitudes and behaviors (such as voting). Campbell et al.,
however,
caution that party identification does not fully explain vote
choice,
stating “party identification could not account for all aspects of
the
image formed by the public of the elements of national politics;
but
it gives to this image a central partisan coherence.” Thus, other
facts likely also influence vote choice albeit to a minor extent
than

24. 5
party identification, and I suggest that such factors may vary for
individuals depending on the nature of any given election.
Niemi and Weisberg draw our attention to many other factors
that can partly explain vote choice. These include the role of
incumbency, media influence, the state of the economy and
group
attachments.
Achen and Bartels (2004) present a creative argument that
natural disasters, including drought, flu and shark attacks, also
can
influence voter choice. The 1916 New Jersey example,
involving
shark attacks, clearly included an economic harm component.
Query whether the true driver of vote choice is the voters’
assessment that the political leaders should have done more to
avoid the damage or is it the damage itself and the economic
consequences that follow from the damage. Achen and Bartels
suggest that a community’s pain and pleasure are key

25. determinants
regardless of how much influence the incumbent really has over
the disaster.