Migration Group Presentation

1. Adriana Hummel
Tyler Kubik
Maureen Spillane
June 30, 2015
HIST 7030 – Dr. Baker

2. WHY STUDY POPULATIONS AND MOVEMENT?
• Economics
• Geography
• Political science
• Sociology
• Demography
• Linguistics

3. DIMENSIONS OF MIGRATION STUDY
• Within nations or between nations
• Coerced or voluntary
• From or to
• Push or pull
• Economic or other
• Initiation or continuation

4. MARRIAGE AS MIGRATION
Quale studied the historical trends of marriage
from hunter/gatherer societies to agricultural:
Spiraling trend of individual choice
• Importance of establishing cultivation rights
• Marriage as an alliance

5. HISTORY OF THE FAMILY
Haraven overthrows some beliefs about traditional
family history:
• Nuclear families existed in Medieval Times
• Families consciously limited during economic hard
times
• Kinship ties strengthened through migration
• Industrial Revolution = Social breakdown?

6. WHY MARRY?
In A Treatise on the Family, Becker explores the
economic reasons people marry:
• Gains must be better from marrying
Division of labor
• Economic reasons behind having children
Security in old age
Cost of child worth the benefits

7. HOW HAVE ECONOMIC CHANGES AFFECTED
MODERN MARRIAGES?
• Women in the work force
Marriage is not always beneficial/appealing so
divorce might be better (Becker)
• Welfare programs
Security in old age not dependent on children
Reduced cost of a child (Becker)

8. ECONOMIC MIGRATION INITIATION THEORY - 1
Neoclassical macro economic theory:
Unskilled individuals migrate “from labor-abundant to labor-
scarce countries.”
• If wage differentials end, so will the movement of labor;
therefore, to control migration flows, change the labor
markets in sending and/or receiving jurisdictions.
• Highly skilled worker migrations are “flows of human
capital [and] respond to difference in the rate of return…
which may be different from the overall wage rate.”

9. ECONOMIC MIGRATION INITIATION THEORY - 2
Neoclassical micro economic theory:
Individuals rationally decide to migrate because they expect
a positive return: the costs of moving are less than the
expected benefits.
• Individual factors that improve expected returns
(education, language skills) or reduce expected costs
(access, technology) can increase migration.
• Differentials in expected returns determines the size of
migrant flows.

10. ECONOMIC MIGRATION INITIATION THEORY - 3
New economics of migration theory:
Households or families, not individuals, make rational
decisions to have one or more members migrate.
• Migrant worker remittances are a form of insurance
against crop failure, inflation and unemployment, and a
source of capital in the sending country.
• Risk mitigation drives migration - not wage differential -
so labor market controls may not affect migration.

11. ECONOMIC MIGRATION INITIATION THEORY - 4
Dual labor market theory:
“International migration is caused by a permanent demand
for immigrant labor that is inherent to the economic
structure of developed nations.” (Massey referencing Piore)
• Because recruitment of immigrant labor is demand-based
in the receiving country, social and institutional
mechanisms do not allow wages to increase when labor
supply drops but wages may decrease when labor supply
increases.
• Labor flows are not influenced by wage change policies
in either the sending or receiving countries.

12. ECONOMIC MIGRATION INITIATION THEORY - 5
World systems theory:
“International migration follows the political and economic
organization of an expanding global market.”
• Previous colonial links (linguistic, administrative,
transport, etc.) contribute to transnational markets and
cultural systems.
• Labor, like other raw materials, flows from the
periphery to the core, opposite from the flow of capital
and goods.
• To influence migration rates, flows of capital and goods
must be controlled.

13. ECONOMIC MIGRATION PERPETUATION THEORIES
• Network Theory
• Institutional Theory
• Cumulative Causation Theory
• Migrations Systems Theory

14. 4000 years of Urban
Growth
• Overview of the
population of cities
from 2250 BCE to
present
• Maps show where the
most populous cities
were in the world
during a historical
period
(Tertius Chandler)
URBANIZATION – DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES

15. • Admits that his
numbers cannot be
100% accurate but
has taken into
account as much as
possible
• Better to look at the
tapestry as a whole
than focus on the
smaller holes
Censuses were not
popular until around
1850; how did he
find all this data?
 Reports of war or natural
disaster (how many
killed or captured) used
to determine the
population of the whole
city
 Journals of travelers and
their estimations
 Tax reports
CHANDLER’S METHODS

16. EXAMPLE OF CHANDLER DATA SHEET

17. • Majority located in
Asia
• As industrialization
occurs, the larger
cities begin to
cluster in northern
Western Europe
WHERE WERE THE LARGEST CITIES?

18. CITIES AND CIVILIZATION
• Cities, especially planned cities, are a sign of a
‘civilized culture’
• Allowed rulers to consolidate power
• Growth of cities seen as progress usually

19. Medieval Towns
• Most people believe
that they were
unhygienic and poorly
planned
• Middle Ages considered
the “Dark Ages” and the
cities reflected this
• Cities did not properly
develop or planned until
the industrial Revolution
IDEAS ABOUT THE MIDDLE AGES

20. CULTURE OF CITIES – LEWIS MUMFORD
Bursting some myths:
• Medieval towns/cities were formed during the middle ages
• Towns were properly planned out according to their needs
(narrow, winding tunnels to cut off winds; overhanging buildings
to increase space for inhabitants as well as cover streets for
pedestrians walking)
• More open - agricultural gardens and common land
• Unhygienic - most medieval cities were open enough to allow
for hygienic practices

21. HOW CITIES CHANGED PRIOR TO INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
Baroque cities:
• Focused on the ruler and court (centralized power)
• Started to become overcrowded; fewer cities
created, focus on the capital city
• Emphasis on luxury and privacy

22. Centered around the
factory
Improvised as
population grew
quickly: slums
Unhygienic
• Life expectancy dropped
• High infant mortality rate
INDUSTRIAL CITIES

23. CLIMATE
• Impetus for both internal and international
migration
• Not voluntary; survival driven
• Historic example of Estonia 536-541
• Disproportional impact of climate on migrants

24. DISEASE
• Impetus for both internal and international
migration
• Survival driven
• Disproportional impact of disease on migrants

25. 20TH
CENTURY GENOCIDE
187 million killed by
political violence (Levene,
305)
Rummel: 169,198,000
murdered in the Twentieth
century (through 1987);
later revisions would bring
his total into the two
hundred millions.

26. HOW DO WE ACCOUNT FOR GENOCIDE?
1. Return to Barbarism
2. Out of Control Bureaucracy
3. Modernity
4. Ordinary Citizens

27. DEFINING GENOCIDE - 1
• Can the Revolutionary Jacobin killings of French on
French be considered genocide—people of the same
ethnic/cultural group?
• Is mass killing itself genocide?
• Do we need killing at all for something to be genocide?
• Do those committing genocidal acts have to have the
intent to exterminate a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group on the basis of this group status?

28. DEFINING GENOCIDE - 2
Genocide v. Genocidal Process
Democide v. Politicide v. Genocide
Crimes Against Humanity v. Genocide

29. DEFINING GENOCIDE - 3
• Genocide codified on December 9, 1948 by the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, accepted by 142
countries
• Defined as “the intent to destroy ‘in whole or in
part’ a population defined by race, nationality,
religion, or ethnicity.” (Weitz, 9)
• The definition adopted by the convention
excluded groups defined by their political or
class orientation
• Alienation

30. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE - 1
• Allan W. Cooper argues that while groups are
targeted based on their affiliation to some particular
community, it isn’t that there’s something “about
these constructions of social identity that lend
themselves to genocide”.
• Genocides never begin in industrial centers or
coastlines
• Always begin in territorial interiors
• But it doesn’t necessarily begin in interiors
• Emasculating moment sparks the genocidal
campaign

31. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE - 2
• Government-sponsored mass killing does
increase the size of a state’s displaced
population
• 1979 Myanmar: 160,000 displaced
• 1988 Burundi: 500,000 displaced
• 2003-2010 Sudan: 400,000 displaced
• Afghanistan: 8 million displaced, 700k/yr.

32. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE - 3
The women [from Aleppo] would put one or two mecidiyes
in the husband’s hand and, putting the child in a carriage,
mother would cry, regret what they did, and wish to run
after the carriage, but it would already have left. ... I saw a
woman go mad a few hours after selling her two children.
Others fell into a sort of lethargic, stupid state, silent, their
gaze distant, sitting for hours on the ground. You’d think
that their feelings and consciousness were dead; they’d
become animal-like. ... Thousands of boys and girls were
sold in Sabil in this way to Arabs, Turks and Jews from
Aleppo. The small children of about 7–10 years old were
usually considered to be valuable, especially the girls.
(Watenpaugh, 285 [Odian 2009: 99–100])

33. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE - 4
• There is “no statistically significant relationship
between genocide and forced migration.”
(Uzonyi, 237)
• “On average, genocides generate 688,000
forced migrants per year, while politicides
create 1.92 million displaced persons each year.
These patterns indicate that politicides tend to
create 279% more forced migrants than
genocides.” (Uzonyi, 236)

34. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE - 5
• Human rights abuse, civil war and numerous avenues for
escape abroad increase the number of individuals within
a state willing to flee their homes in search of better
security.
• Economic development decreases the size of a state’s
forced migrant population.
• Large geographical spaces reduce the number of forced
migrants.
• Democracy, population size or neighborhood democracy
is not significantly correlated with the size of the
displaced population.” (Uzonyi, 238)

35. Afghanistan 1978–1992 Politicide
Angola 1975–1994, 1998–2002 Politicide
Argentina 1976–1980 Politicide
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–1995 Genocide
Burundi 1988, 1993–1994 Genocide
Cambodia 1975–1979 Genocide
Chile 1975–1976 Politicide
China 1975 Politicide
Democratic Republic of Congo 1977–1979 Politicide
El Salvador 1980–1989 Politicide
Equatorial Guinea 1975–1979 Politicide
Ethiopia 1976–1979 Politicide
Guatemala 1978–1996 Genocide
Indonesia 1975–1992 Politicide
Iran 1981–1992 Genocide
Iraq 1975, 1988–1991 Politicide
Myanmar 1978 Genocide
Pakistan 1975–1977 Politicide
Philippines 1975–1976 Politicide
Rwanda 1994 Genocide
Somalia 1988–1991 Politicide
Sri Lanka 1989–1990 Politicide
Sudan 1983–2010 Politicide
Syria 1981–1982 Politicide
Uganda 1975–1986 Genocide
Vietnam 1975 Politicide
(Uzonyi, 235)
CASES OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE 1975-2010

36. WAS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?
1960s Ernst Nolte wrote Fascism in its Epoch
• It asserted that Nationalist Socialism was the result of a
revolt against modernity, with the Jewish people for Hitler
as the embodiment of these elements of modernity Hitler
despised, like Bourgeois, Capitalism, Communism, and
Liberalism.
• Later criticized from the left for ignoring social and
economic motivations, but it did displace many of the
class-based hypotheses--such as that National Socialism
was a revolt of the middle class (Marxist and Liberal
views).
• He would later turn to seeing Nazism as a mere image of
Soviet communism.

37. COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE
• Similarities between ideologies underpinning
regimes
• Numbers?
• Lethality/Rate/Percentage of Population?
• Technology?
• Unrestrained?