Niek Timmers, Riscure B.V.
Cristofaro Mune, Independent Embedded Security Consultant
Fault injection attacks have been historically perceived as high-end attacks not available to most hackers. They used to require expensive tooling and a mysterious mix of skills which resulted them being out of reach for even the most skilled attackers. These days are over as low-cost fault injection tooling is changing the capabilities of the hacking masses at a rapid pace.
Historically, fault injection attacks are used to break cryptographic implementation (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis) or bypassing security checks like performed by a pin verification function. However, nothing prevents them to be used on richer systems like embedded devices or IoT devices. Fault injection attacks can be used to change the intended behavior of hardware and software, due, among the others, to corrupted memory reads and instructions execution.
In this talk we show that fault injection attacks and, more specifically, voltage fault injection, allow escalating privileges from an unprivileged context, in absence of logically exploitable software vulnerabilities. This is demonstrated using practical examples where the control flow of the Linux kernel is influenced in order to gain root privileges. All practical examples are performed on a fully patched Linux operating system, executed by a fast and feature rich System-on-Chip. A live demonstration of Fault Injection is part of the talk.
Gunter Ollmann, Microsoft
As reverse engineering tools and hacking techniques have improved over the years, software engineers have been forced to bury their secrets deeper down the stack – securing keys and intellectual property first in software, then drivers, on to custom firmware and microcode, and eventually as etchings on the very silicon itself.
For the hackers involved, the skills and tooling needed to extract and monetize these secrets come with ever increasing hurdles and cost. Yet, seemingly as a corollary to Moore’s Law, each year the cost of the tooling drops by half, while access (and desire) doubles. Today, with access to multi-million dollar semiconductor labs that can be rented for as little as $200 per hour, skilled adversaries can physically extract the most prized secrets from the integrated circuits (IC) directly.
Understanding your adversary lies at the crux of every defensive strategy. This session reviews the current generation of tools and techniques used by professional hacking entities to extract the magic numbers, proprietary algorithms, and WORN (Write Once, Read Never) secrets from the chips themselves.
As a generation of bug hunters begin to use such tools to extract the microcode and etched algorithms from the IC’s, we’re about to face new classes of bug and vulnerabilities – lying in (possibly) ancient code – that probably can’t be “patched”. How will we secure secrets going forward?
Rob Turner, Qualcomm Technologies
Almost three decades since the Morris worm and we're still plagued by memory corruption vulnerabilities in C and C++ software. Exploit mitigations aim to make the exploitation of these vulnerabilities impossible or prohibitively expensive. However, modern exploits demonstrate that currently deployed countermeasures are insufficient.
In ARMv8.3, ARM introduces a new hardware security feature, pointer authentication. With ARM and ARM partners, including Microsoft, we helped to design this feature. Designing a processor extension is challenging. Among other requirements, changes should be transparent to developers (except compiler developers), support both system and application code, interoperate with legacy software, and provide binary backward compatibility. This talk discusses the processor extension and explores the design trade-offs, such as the decision to prefer authentication over encryption and the consequences of small tags.
Also, this talk provides a security analysis, and examines how these new instructions can robustly and efficiently implement countermeasures.
Matt Nelson, SpecterOps
A persistent "enlightened" attacker will invest the required resources to bypass any and all security features that might stand between them and their objective, regardless if these features are guaranteed to be serviced as security boundaries or not. This includes researching and developing attacks against Windows security features that may impose a hurdle in their attack chain. This talk will outline recent research into features such as User Account Control (UAC), the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Device Guard and how these bypasses are useful to attackers in an operational context.
Some examples include:
UAC: If an attacker compromises a user that is running as a split-token administrator, bypassing UAC is required in order to perform any administrative actions; such as dumping credentials from memory.
AMSI: With in-memory attacks becoming more prevalent via scripting languages, AMSI is the next logical step to facilitate detection. An attacker will need to bypass AMSI in order to safely operate in memory when using PowerShell, VBScript, or JScript.
Device Guard: As organizations begin to consider whitelisting solutions, an attacker is required to adapt and develop a bypass to these technologies. One such solution is Device Guard, which can be used to heavily restrict what is allowed to execute on the system. In order to accomplish their objective, an attacker would need to bypass User Mode Code Integrity (UMCI). Such research can find novel ways to execute code in ways that are not likely to be detected.
I will also cover some of the fixes that have been implemented in newer versions of the Windows Operating System. Fixing these bypasses will not only make Windows safer, but it will begin to disrupt attackers by raising the cost associated with successfully executing an attack.
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudTjylen Veselyj
In this presentation I'm talking about feature of VMI technology that are vital for malware analysis, intrusion detection and attack prevention in virtualized environment. This presentation is part of my Ph.D. work and contain summary of VMI state in 2013.
Bryan Owen of OSIsoft at S4x15 OTDay.
Bryan shows how to harden a Windows Services generically and then specifically to a service used by OSIsoft's PI Server
Gunter Ollmann, Microsoft
As reverse engineering tools and hacking techniques have improved over the years, software engineers have been forced to bury their secrets deeper down the stack – securing keys and intellectual property first in software, then drivers, on to custom firmware and microcode, and eventually as etchings on the very silicon itself.
For the hackers involved, the skills and tooling needed to extract and monetize these secrets come with ever increasing hurdles and cost. Yet, seemingly as a corollary to Moore’s Law, each year the cost of the tooling drops by half, while access (and desire) doubles. Today, with access to multi-million dollar semiconductor labs that can be rented for as little as $200 per hour, skilled adversaries can physically extract the most prized secrets from the integrated circuits (IC) directly.
Understanding your adversary lies at the crux of every defensive strategy. This session reviews the current generation of tools and techniques used by professional hacking entities to extract the magic numbers, proprietary algorithms, and WORN (Write Once, Read Never) secrets from the chips themselves.
As a generation of bug hunters begin to use such tools to extract the microcode and etched algorithms from the IC’s, we’re about to face new classes of bug and vulnerabilities – lying in (possibly) ancient code – that probably can’t be “patched”. How will we secure secrets going forward?
Rob Turner, Qualcomm Technologies
Almost three decades since the Morris worm and we're still plagued by memory corruption vulnerabilities in C and C++ software. Exploit mitigations aim to make the exploitation of these vulnerabilities impossible or prohibitively expensive. However, modern exploits demonstrate that currently deployed countermeasures are insufficient.
In ARMv8.3, ARM introduces a new hardware security feature, pointer authentication. With ARM and ARM partners, including Microsoft, we helped to design this feature. Designing a processor extension is challenging. Among other requirements, changes should be transparent to developers (except compiler developers), support both system and application code, interoperate with legacy software, and provide binary backward compatibility. This talk discusses the processor extension and explores the design trade-offs, such as the decision to prefer authentication over encryption and the consequences of small tags.
Also, this talk provides a security analysis, and examines how these new instructions can robustly and efficiently implement countermeasures.
Matt Nelson, SpecterOps
A persistent "enlightened" attacker will invest the required resources to bypass any and all security features that might stand between them and their objective, regardless if these features are guaranteed to be serviced as security boundaries or not. This includes researching and developing attacks against Windows security features that may impose a hurdle in their attack chain. This talk will outline recent research into features such as User Account Control (UAC), the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Device Guard and how these bypasses are useful to attackers in an operational context.
Some examples include:
UAC: If an attacker compromises a user that is running as a split-token administrator, bypassing UAC is required in order to perform any administrative actions; such as dumping credentials from memory.
AMSI: With in-memory attacks becoming more prevalent via scripting languages, AMSI is the next logical step to facilitate detection. An attacker will need to bypass AMSI in order to safely operate in memory when using PowerShell, VBScript, or JScript.
Device Guard: As organizations begin to consider whitelisting solutions, an attacker is required to adapt and develop a bypass to these technologies. One such solution is Device Guard, which can be used to heavily restrict what is allowed to execute on the system. In order to accomplish their objective, an attacker would need to bypass User Mode Code Integrity (UMCI). Such research can find novel ways to execute code in ways that are not likely to be detected.
I will also cover some of the fixes that have been implemented in newer versions of the Windows Operating System. Fixing these bypasses will not only make Windows safer, but it will begin to disrupt attackers by raising the cost associated with successfully executing an attack.
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudTjylen Veselyj
In this presentation I'm talking about feature of VMI technology that are vital for malware analysis, intrusion detection and attack prevention in virtualized environment. This presentation is part of my Ph.D. work and contain summary of VMI state in 2013.
Bryan Owen of OSIsoft at S4x15 OTDay.
Bryan shows how to harden a Windows Services generically and then specifically to a service used by OSIsoft's PI Server
Over-the-Air: How we Remotely Compromised the Gateway, BCM, and Autopilot ECU...Priyanka Aash
We, Keen Security Lab of Tencent, have successfully implemented two remote attacks on the Tesla Model S/X in year 2016 and 2017. Last year, at Black Hat USA, we presented the details of our first attack chain. At that time, we showed a demonstration video of our second attack chain, but without technical aspects. This year, we are willing to share our full, in-depth details on this research.
In this presentation, we will explain the inner workings of this technology and showcase the new capability that was developed in the Tesla hacking 2017. Multiple 0-days of different in-vehicle components are included in the new attack chain.
We will also present an in-depth analysis of the critical components in the Tesla car, including the Gateway, BCM(Body Control Modules), and the Autopilot ECUs. For instance, we utilized a code-signing bypass vulnerability to compromise the Gateway ECU; we also reversed and then customized the BCM to play the Model X "Holiday Show" Easter Egg for entertainment.
Finally, we will talk about a remote attack we carried out to successfully gain an unauthorized user access to the Autopilot ECU on the Tesla car by exploiting one more fascinating vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge, this presentation will be the first to demonstrate hacking into an Autopilot module.
Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware by Claud XiaoShakacon
Since 2014, fifteen new malware or riskware families successfully attacked non-jailbroken iOS devices (e.g., WireLurker, Oneclickfraud, XcodeGhost, InstaAgent, ZergHelper, AceDeceiver), affected thousands of iOS apps and tens of millions users around the world. Ten of them even bypassed Apple’s code vetting and occurred at App Store. In this presentation, we will systematically study how could these malware, riskware and some Proof-of-Concepts infect non-jailbroken devices via practical vectors and approaches including abusing development certificates, bypassing code review by obfuscation, performing FairPlay MITM attack, abusing MDM solution, abusing private APIs, exploiting design flaws or app level vulnerabilities, and stealing privacy data. For each topic, we will introduce its implementation, explore real world cases, analyze its risky and consequences, explain Apple’s countermeasures, and discuss why some problems will still exist in near future. We will also share some stories of how we discovered those interesting iOS malware. Through this topic, audiences could make more effective policies to protect iOS devices in their organizations, build their own systems/tools to evaluate security risks in iOS apps, and hunt more iOS malware in the future.
Corey Thuen of Digital Bond Labs describes in technical detail how Havex/Dragonfly enumerated OPC servers.
Havex is the second ICS malware ever seen in the wild.
IDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty by Masaaki ChidaCODE BLUE
IDA Pro is an advanced disassembler software and often used in vulnerability research and malware analysis. IDA Pro is used to analyse software behavior in detail, if there was a vulnerability and the user is attacked not only can it have impact in a social sense but also impact legal proceedings. In this presentation I will discuss the vulnerabilities found and attacks leveraging the vulnerabilities and Hex-rays's remediation process and dialogue I had with them.
http://codeblue.jp/en-speaker.html#MasaakiChida
Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems Ollie Whitehouse
This talk briefly discusses strategies and methodologies than can be employed when assessing IoT devices. We look at how to develop credible threat scenarios for different IoT device and systems, perform static and dynamic attack surface mapping, perform static firmware analysis, perform static hardware analysis, undertake a dynamic device security analysis, sources of supporting information, supporting capability requirements and establishment, Execution of dynamic device analysis and approaches around network protocol analysis.
IoT Malware: Comprehensive Survey, Analysis Framework and Case StudiesPriyanka Aash
Computer malware in all its forms is nearly as old as the first PCs running commodity OSes, dating back at least 30 years. However, the number and the variety of "computing devices" dramatically increased during the last several years. Therefore, the focus of malware authors and operators slowly but steadily started shifting or expanding towards Internet of Things (IoT) malware.
Unfortunately, at present there is no publicly available comprehensive study and methodology that collects, analyses, measures, and presents the (meta-)data related to IoT malware in a systematic and a holistic manner. In most cases, if not all, the resources on the topic are available as blog posts, sparse technical reports, or Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) papers deeply focused on a particular IoT malware strain (e.g., Mirai). Some other times those resources are already unavailable, or can become unavailable or restricted at any time. Moreover, many of such resources contain errors (e.g., wrong CVEs), omissions (e.g., hashes), limited perspectives (e.g., network behaviour only), or otherwise present incomplete or inaccurate analysis. Hence, all these factors leave unattended the main challenges of analysing, tracking, detecting, and defending against IoT malware in a systematic, effective and efficient way.
This work attempts to bridge this gap. We start with mostly manual collection, archival, meta-information extraction and cross-validation of more than 637 unique resources related to IoT malware families. These resources relate to 60 1 IoT malware families, and include 260 resources related to 48 unique vulnerabilities used in the disclosed or detected IoT malware attacks. We then use the extracted information to establish as accurately as possible the timeline of events related to each IoT malware family and relevant vulnerabilities, and to outline important insights and statistics. For example, our analysis shows that the mean and median CVSS scores of all analyzed vulnerabilities employed by the IoT malware families are quite modest yet: 6.9 and 7.1 for CVSSv2, and 7.5 and 7.5 for CVSSv3 respectively. Moreover, the public knowledge to defend against or prevent those vulnerabilities could have been used, on average, at least 90 days before the first malware samples were submitted for analysis. Finally, to help validate our work as well as to motivate its continuous growth and improvement by the research community, we open-source our datasets and release our IoT malware analysis framework and our IoT malware analysis framework.
2012 B-Sides and ToorCon Talk Offensive Defense
Blog Post - http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/01/offensive-defense.html
Cyber-criminals have had back-end infrastructures equivalent to Virus Total to test if malware and exploits are effective against AV scanners for many years, thus showing that attackers are proactively avoiding detection when building malware. In this day of age malicious binaries are generated on demand by server-side kits when a victim visits a malicious web page, making reliance solely on hash based solutions inadequate. In the last 15 years detection techniques have evolved in an attempt to keep up with attack trends. In the last few years security companies have looked for supplemental solutions such as the use of machine learning to detect and mitigate attacks against cyber criminals. Let's not pretend attackers can't bypass each and every detection technique currently deployed. Join me as I present and review current detection methods found in most host and network security solutions found today. We will re-review the defense in depth strategy while keeping in mind that a solid security strategy consists of forcing an attacker to spend as much time and effort while needing to know a variety of skills and technologies in order to successfully pull off the attack. In the end I hope to convince you that thinking defensively requires thinking offensively.
This presentation talk about some of the challenges in detecting advanced malware which uses evasion techniques such as inline assembly or previously unknown approaches. The presentation also focuses on leveraging the static code analysis as an opportunity to detect these evasive malware in the sandbox
System-level Threats: Dangerous Assumptions in modern Product SecurityCristofaro Mune
Current devices are complex products: a result of an ecosystem effort, with HW and SW components provided by several manufacturers, across long supply chains.
System-level threats may materialize in the interaction of diverse sub-systems and components, due to assumptions occurring at different stages of the production chain. This encompasses not only the design phase, but also (HW & SW) development, threat modeling and even security testing.
This presentation explores some classes of such assumptions, as distilled by presenter’s experience.
Relevant attacks such as "Timing Attacks against IoT devices" or "Bypassing an encrypted Secure Boot with Fault Injection" are also discussed.
If you are involved in securing modern digital products, as a Developer, HW or SW System Architect, Product Security Manager or as a Security Researcher, you may find them interesting
This talk has been presented at HITB Dubai 2018 security conference.
IoT (Internet of Things) and OT (Operational Technology) are the current buzzwords for networked devices on which our modern society is based on. In this area the used operating systems are summarized with the term firmware. The devices by themself, so called embedded devices, are essential in the private, as well as in the industrial environment and in the so-called critical infrastructure. Penetration testing of these systems is quite complex as we have to deal with different architectures, optimized operating systems and special protocols. EMBA is an open-source firmware analyzer with the goal to simplify and optimize the complex task of firmware security analysis. EMBA supports the penetration tester with the automated detection of 1-day vulnerabilities on binary level. This goes far beyond the plain CVE detection. With EMBA you always know which public exploits are available for the target firmware. Beside the detection of already known vulnerabilities, EMBA also supports the tester on the next 0-day. For this EMBA identifies critical binary functions, protection mechanisms and services with network behavior on a binary level. There are many other features built into EMBA, such as fully automated firmware extraction, finding file system vulnerabilities, hard-coded credentials, and more. EMBA is an open-source firmware scanner, created by penetration testers for penetration testers.
Project page: https://github.com/e-m-b-a/emba
Conference page: https://troopers.de/troopers22/agenda/tr22-1042-emba-open-source-firmware-security-testing/
Over-the-Air: How we Remotely Compromised the Gateway, BCM, and Autopilot ECU...Priyanka Aash
We, Keen Security Lab of Tencent, have successfully implemented two remote attacks on the Tesla Model S/X in year 2016 and 2017. Last year, at Black Hat USA, we presented the details of our first attack chain. At that time, we showed a demonstration video of our second attack chain, but without technical aspects. This year, we are willing to share our full, in-depth details on this research.
In this presentation, we will explain the inner workings of this technology and showcase the new capability that was developed in the Tesla hacking 2017. Multiple 0-days of different in-vehicle components are included in the new attack chain.
We will also present an in-depth analysis of the critical components in the Tesla car, including the Gateway, BCM(Body Control Modules), and the Autopilot ECUs. For instance, we utilized a code-signing bypass vulnerability to compromise the Gateway ECU; we also reversed and then customized the BCM to play the Model X "Holiday Show" Easter Egg for entertainment.
Finally, we will talk about a remote attack we carried out to successfully gain an unauthorized user access to the Autopilot ECU on the Tesla car by exploiting one more fascinating vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge, this presentation will be the first to demonstrate hacking into an Autopilot module.
Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware by Claud XiaoShakacon
Since 2014, fifteen new malware or riskware families successfully attacked non-jailbroken iOS devices (e.g., WireLurker, Oneclickfraud, XcodeGhost, InstaAgent, ZergHelper, AceDeceiver), affected thousands of iOS apps and tens of millions users around the world. Ten of them even bypassed Apple’s code vetting and occurred at App Store. In this presentation, we will systematically study how could these malware, riskware and some Proof-of-Concepts infect non-jailbroken devices via practical vectors and approaches including abusing development certificates, bypassing code review by obfuscation, performing FairPlay MITM attack, abusing MDM solution, abusing private APIs, exploiting design flaws or app level vulnerabilities, and stealing privacy data. For each topic, we will introduce its implementation, explore real world cases, analyze its risky and consequences, explain Apple’s countermeasures, and discuss why some problems will still exist in near future. We will also share some stories of how we discovered those interesting iOS malware. Through this topic, audiences could make more effective policies to protect iOS devices in their organizations, build their own systems/tools to evaluate security risks in iOS apps, and hunt more iOS malware in the future.
Corey Thuen of Digital Bond Labs describes in technical detail how Havex/Dragonfly enumerated OPC servers.
Havex is the second ICS malware ever seen in the wild.
IDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty by Masaaki ChidaCODE BLUE
IDA Pro is an advanced disassembler software and often used in vulnerability research and malware analysis. IDA Pro is used to analyse software behavior in detail, if there was a vulnerability and the user is attacked not only can it have impact in a social sense but also impact legal proceedings. In this presentation I will discuss the vulnerabilities found and attacks leveraging the vulnerabilities and Hex-rays's remediation process and dialogue I had with them.
http://codeblue.jp/en-speaker.html#MasaakiChida
Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems Ollie Whitehouse
This talk briefly discusses strategies and methodologies than can be employed when assessing IoT devices. We look at how to develop credible threat scenarios for different IoT device and systems, perform static and dynamic attack surface mapping, perform static firmware analysis, perform static hardware analysis, undertake a dynamic device security analysis, sources of supporting information, supporting capability requirements and establishment, Execution of dynamic device analysis and approaches around network protocol analysis.
IoT Malware: Comprehensive Survey, Analysis Framework and Case StudiesPriyanka Aash
Computer malware in all its forms is nearly as old as the first PCs running commodity OSes, dating back at least 30 years. However, the number and the variety of "computing devices" dramatically increased during the last several years. Therefore, the focus of malware authors and operators slowly but steadily started shifting or expanding towards Internet of Things (IoT) malware.
Unfortunately, at present there is no publicly available comprehensive study and methodology that collects, analyses, measures, and presents the (meta-)data related to IoT malware in a systematic and a holistic manner. In most cases, if not all, the resources on the topic are available as blog posts, sparse technical reports, or Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) papers deeply focused on a particular IoT malware strain (e.g., Mirai). Some other times those resources are already unavailable, or can become unavailable or restricted at any time. Moreover, many of such resources contain errors (e.g., wrong CVEs), omissions (e.g., hashes), limited perspectives (e.g., network behaviour only), or otherwise present incomplete or inaccurate analysis. Hence, all these factors leave unattended the main challenges of analysing, tracking, detecting, and defending against IoT malware in a systematic, effective and efficient way.
This work attempts to bridge this gap. We start with mostly manual collection, archival, meta-information extraction and cross-validation of more than 637 unique resources related to IoT malware families. These resources relate to 60 1 IoT malware families, and include 260 resources related to 48 unique vulnerabilities used in the disclosed or detected IoT malware attacks. We then use the extracted information to establish as accurately as possible the timeline of events related to each IoT malware family and relevant vulnerabilities, and to outline important insights and statistics. For example, our analysis shows that the mean and median CVSS scores of all analyzed vulnerabilities employed by the IoT malware families are quite modest yet: 6.9 and 7.1 for CVSSv2, and 7.5 and 7.5 for CVSSv3 respectively. Moreover, the public knowledge to defend against or prevent those vulnerabilities could have been used, on average, at least 90 days before the first malware samples were submitted for analysis. Finally, to help validate our work as well as to motivate its continuous growth and improvement by the research community, we open-source our datasets and release our IoT malware analysis framework and our IoT malware analysis framework.
2012 B-Sides and ToorCon Talk Offensive Defense
Blog Post - http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/01/offensive-defense.html
Cyber-criminals have had back-end infrastructures equivalent to Virus Total to test if malware and exploits are effective against AV scanners for many years, thus showing that attackers are proactively avoiding detection when building malware. In this day of age malicious binaries are generated on demand by server-side kits when a victim visits a malicious web page, making reliance solely on hash based solutions inadequate. In the last 15 years detection techniques have evolved in an attempt to keep up with attack trends. In the last few years security companies have looked for supplemental solutions such as the use of machine learning to detect and mitigate attacks against cyber criminals. Let's not pretend attackers can't bypass each and every detection technique currently deployed. Join me as I present and review current detection methods found in most host and network security solutions found today. We will re-review the defense in depth strategy while keeping in mind that a solid security strategy consists of forcing an attacker to spend as much time and effort while needing to know a variety of skills and technologies in order to successfully pull off the attack. In the end I hope to convince you that thinking defensively requires thinking offensively.
This presentation talk about some of the challenges in detecting advanced malware which uses evasion techniques such as inline assembly or previously unknown approaches. The presentation also focuses on leveraging the static code analysis as an opportunity to detect these evasive malware in the sandbox
System-level Threats: Dangerous Assumptions in modern Product SecurityCristofaro Mune
Current devices are complex products: a result of an ecosystem effort, with HW and SW components provided by several manufacturers, across long supply chains.
System-level threats may materialize in the interaction of diverse sub-systems and components, due to assumptions occurring at different stages of the production chain. This encompasses not only the design phase, but also (HW & SW) development, threat modeling and even security testing.
This presentation explores some classes of such assumptions, as distilled by presenter’s experience.
Relevant attacks such as "Timing Attacks against IoT devices" or "Bypassing an encrypted Secure Boot with Fault Injection" are also discussed.
If you are involved in securing modern digital products, as a Developer, HW or SW System Architect, Product Security Manager or as a Security Researcher, you may find them interesting
This talk has been presented at HITB Dubai 2018 security conference.
IoT (Internet of Things) and OT (Operational Technology) are the current buzzwords for networked devices on which our modern society is based on. In this area the used operating systems are summarized with the term firmware. The devices by themself, so called embedded devices, are essential in the private, as well as in the industrial environment and in the so-called critical infrastructure. Penetration testing of these systems is quite complex as we have to deal with different architectures, optimized operating systems and special protocols. EMBA is an open-source firmware analyzer with the goal to simplify and optimize the complex task of firmware security analysis. EMBA supports the penetration tester with the automated detection of 1-day vulnerabilities on binary level. This goes far beyond the plain CVE detection. With EMBA you always know which public exploits are available for the target firmware. Beside the detection of already known vulnerabilities, EMBA also supports the tester on the next 0-day. For this EMBA identifies critical binary functions, protection mechanisms and services with network behavior on a binary level. There are many other features built into EMBA, such as fully automated firmware extraction, finding file system vulnerabilities, hard-coded credentials, and more. EMBA is an open-source firmware scanner, created by penetration testers for penetration testers.
Project page: https://github.com/e-m-b-a/emba
Conference page: https://troopers.de/troopers22/agenda/tr22-1042-emba-open-source-firmware-security-testing/
chap-1 : Vulnerabilities in Information SystemsKashfUlHuda1
Introduction to Cyber Security. Chapter #1. Vulnerabilities in Information Systems. What is a vulnerability?
Cyberspace: From terra incognita to terra nullius.
Cyberspace performance expectations. Measuring vulnerabilities. CVSS XCCDF OVAL
Avoiding vulnerabilities through secure coding
PANDA2018 - Advancing FI attacks - Fault Models opportunitiesCristofaro Mune
My presentation on "Advancing FI attacks" at PANDA2018.
The talk explores the advantages of properly selecting the right fault model.
This is independent of the chosen injection technique (e.g. Voltage, Clock, Laser, EM,...), hence the talk content is widely applicable to several contexts and attacks.
It is shown, as a working example, how bypassing a encrypted secure boot without a key becomes possible, just by choosing the proper fault model.
This was the first time the attack was publicly elaborated in details.
The attack has then been demonstrated live on-stage at BlueHat IL 2019 in our "Hardening Secure Boot on Embedded Devices for Hostile Environments" talk
Kernel Memory Protection by an Insertable Hypervisor which has VM Introspec...Kuniyasu Suzaki
IWSEC2014(The 9th International Workshop on Security 弘前) で"Kernel Memory Protection by an Insertable Hypervisor which has VM Introspection and Stealth Breakpoints"
Piratng Avs to bypass exploit mitigationPriyanka Aash
"Put a low-level security researcher in front of hooking mechanisms and you get industry-wide vulnerability notifications, affecting security tools such as Anti-Virus, Anti-Exploitations and DLP, as well as non-security applications such as gaming and productivity tools. In this talk we reveal six(!) different security issues that we uncovered in various hooking engines. The vulnerabilities we found enable a threat actor to bypass the security measures of the underlying operating system. As we uncovered the vulnerabilities one-by-one we found them to impact commercial engines, such as Microsoft's Detours, open source engines such as EasyHook and proprietary engines such as those belonging to TrendMicro, Symantec, Kaspersky and about twenty others.
In this talk we'll survey the different vulnerabilities, and deep dive into a couple of those. In particular, we'll take a close look at a vulnerability appearing in the most popular commercial hooking engine of a large vendor. This vulnerability affects the most widespread productivity applications and forced the vendor to not only fix their engine, but also that their customers fix their applications prior to releasing the patch to the public. Finally, we'll demonstrate how security tools can be used as an intrusion channel for threat actors, ironically defeating security measures."
(Source: Black Hat USA 2016, Las Vegas)
Captain Hook: Pirating AVs to Bypass Exploit MitigationsenSilo
In this talk we reveal six(!) different security issues that we uncovered in various hooking engines. The vulnerabilities we found enable a threat actor to bypass the security measures of the underlying operating system. As we uncovered the vulnerabilities one-by-one we found them to impact commercial engines, such as Microsoft’s Detours, open source engines such as EasyHook and proprietary engines such as those belonging to TrendMicro, Symantec, Kaspersky and about twenty others.
Domain 3: Security Engineering
Virtualization and Distributed Computing
System Vulnerabilities, Threats and Countermeasures
Cornerstone Cryptographic Concepts
History of Cryptography
Types of Cryptography
Cryptographic Attacks
Implementing Cryptography
In this talk I explore the concepts of Failsafe Design and an example of implementing failsafe at the firmware/hardware interface, using LTSpice as a system tool to model and verify the failsafe approach. This has been applied to real systems that really exhibit the modeled failsafe behavior.
RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things) by Jacob HolcombPriyanka Aash
The recorded version of 'Best Of The World Webcast Series' [Webinar] where Jacob Holcomb speaks on 'RIoT (Raiding Internet of Things)' is available on CISOPlatform.
Best Of The World Webcast Series are webinars where breakthrough/original security researchers showcase their study, to offer the CISO/security experts the best insights in information security.
For more signup(it's free): www.cisoplatform.com
Santiago Pontiroli
With more than 2.5 billion gamers from all over the world, it's no wonder that at least a fraction of them would bring into action additional tools to gain an unfair advantage over their opponents in the virtual world. This is one of the many reasons behind the existence and rapid growth of a multi-million dollar industry that thrives on selling cheats, hacks and modifications to desperate gamers seeking to gain the upper hand in their next match. Let's dissect these tools and understand how modern games and anti-cheating technologies can be easily bypassed, all while we get a glimpse of the dubious market and supporting crews that develop, sell, and maintain the commodities in this illegal economy. It's not unusual for cheats to be more expensive than the actual games they are trying to profit from, or for players to buy a single title over and over until they can avoid being banned by the protective measures implemented in the first place. Fortnite? Overwatch? League of Legends? If you've heard about these games but you don't know what an aim-bot, a wall-hack, or an ESP means, then you might finally understand why all those competitive matches you played have made you feel like a fish out of water. Join me in this presentation and learn the inside-out of an industry that has remained in the shadows for a very long time. I will be presenting real world cheats used by gamers worldwide that in some cases closely mimic techniques that would rival numerous advanced threat actors in the malware ecosystem. Game over? Maybe not….
Tony Chen
Every game console since the first Atari was more or less designed to prevent the piracy of games and yet every single game console has been successfully modified to enable piracy. However, this trend has come to an end. Both the Xbox One and the PS4 have now been on the market for close to 6 years, without hackers being able to crack the system to enable piracy or cheating. This is the first time in history that game consoles have lasted this long without being cracked. In this talk, we will discuss how we achieved this for the Xbox One. We will first describe the Xbox security design goals and why it needs to guard against physical attacks, followed by descriptions of the hardware and software architecture to keep the Xbox secure. This includes details about the custom SoC we built with AMD and how we addressed the fact that all data read from flash, the hard drive, and even DRAM cannot be trusted. We will also discuss the corresponding software changes needed with the custom hardware to keep the system and the games secure against physical attacks.
Jay Beale
We will attack a real Kubernetes cluster called Bust-a-Kube, which was released in 2019 as a free learning tool. The demonstration will start by compromising a real application running in a Kubernetes pod's container, gaining low privileged remote code execution inside that container. Next, we will explore what that compromised container can see on the cluster, finding the boundaries of its privileges. We will move laterally from that container to attack microservices on the cluster, gaining remote code execution in other containers, with higher privilege. We'll find that one of those can interfere with a final highest-privilege container. That highest privilege container will permit us to abuse the Kubernetes API to compromise the entire cluster. This demonstration will involve graphic "flags," allowing attendees to repeat the attack afterward as a downloadable solitaire "capture the flag" game. We'll then discuss and perform a second demo to teach defenses, working backward to defeat necessary steps in the first demo's chain of attacks. We'll demonstrate using pod security policies to force an AppArmor profile onto any pod (container) being deployed. We'll show how volume whitelists can block an attack, then demonstrate an evasion that defeats this defense. We'll then weaken this attack with root capability limits and AppArmor. We'll demonstrate an attack path where a bad actor can use a low-privilege Kubernetes cluster compromise to abuse the cloud provider APIs. This, in turn, leads to compromising the Kubernetes cluster more fully. We'll discuss how to break this attack using a cloud metadata API security feature that's Kubernetes-specific. In the course of these demonstrations, we'll conduct the attacks both manually and with an open source attack tool called Peirates. Finally, we'll discuss defenses that we did not use, including seccomp syscall whitelists, read-only root filesystems, and freely-available service meshes.
Nico Waisman
Open source has won and is here to stay, but it comes with challenges. Open Source security is one of them that we face as an industry. We all consume it but what about its code quality, security practices, … Over the last 3 months, Github's Semmle Security Research Team has been triaging all open source CVEs and engaging on a subset of those performing variant analysis trying to uncover what it was missed. During this talk we will present some of these cases where we used QL to perform variant analysis, in addition to some others where we performed the full research (seed vulnerability and variant analysis) such as u-boot.
Jordan Wiens & Peter LaFosse
Modern binary analysis, whether for discovering vulnerabilities or analyzing malware needs automation to deal with the volume of code under inspection. And yet, while Intermediate Languages (ILs) have been used for decades in compiler design and implementation, too few reverse engineers have any experience with them even though many reverse engineering tools (Binary Ninja, Ghidra, IDA) are built on top of ILs. Given that, it's time to demystify this space and make it accessible beyond just computer scientists and researchers. There's many potentially unfamiliar concepts related to ILs: single-static assignment, value-set analysis, three argument form versus tree-based designs, and others. But what matters is how these ILs can help you build better binary analysis tools. This talk not only gives you an overview of existing ILs used in reverse engineering, but more importantly, shows you how your tooling can benefit from them. From cross-platform analysis (follow a botnet from an x86-64 desktop to a mobile arm, to an embedded MIPS), to leveraging existing data-flow capabilities that brings some of the benefits both dynamic and static analysis together, this talk will demonstrate several examples of plugins that leverage ILs to improve your ability to automatically reason over compiled code.
Elvis Collado
This talk is about how an unauthenticated heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered and exploited within a router distributed by a market-leading ISP. Despite the targeted process utilizing mitigations such as DEP and ASLR, it still fell prey to known exploitation techniques. This talk will go over the thought process, failures, and road-blocks that were encountered and how they were overcame.
Dirk-jan Mollema
How does one research the cloud? With solutions such as Azure AD and Office 365, the underlying platform architecture and designs are not publicly documented or accessible in the same way as on-premise. This makes analyzing the security of the platform harder for external researchers. In this talk I will explain the journey and discoveries of a year of trying to understand Azure AD, including the vulnerabilities discovered in the process. This ranges from gathering information about Azure AD via undocumented APIs to installing invisible backdoors and escalating privileges via limited roles or via the link with on-premise. While some of these vulnerabilities have been resolved, several of these are unintended consequences of Azure AD's architecture and thus are important to consider when evaluating the security of your Azure AD environment. A basic understanding of Azure AD, Office 365 and its terminology is assumed for this talk.
John-Luke Peck
This presentation will review in hindsight and retrospect several recent incident response engagements performed over the last 12 months by a 3rd-party (non-Microsoft affiliated) security and incident response services provider. During the talk the presenter will review what went well and what did not go well during the various engagements, with a particular focus on the data, services , and support available from Microsoft & Office365/AzureAD, and how they were and were not able to be leveraged during the various engagements.
This will include a focus on areas where:
* Necessary data was not available because the client had not taken, or were unaware of the need to take, steps to enable collection of the data
* The data & services available were successfully used during response efforts
The presentation will highlight:
* Lessons learned about Office365/AzureAD and Incident Response
* How Office365, AzureAD, and ATP services and data were used in the response efforts
* Recommendations for Office365/AzureAD tenants to improve their security & IR capabilities /before/ an incident occurs
All presented examples and incidents will be de-identified to maintain and protect privacy and operational security.
What this is NOT:
* A service provider's sales presentation
Li Chen & Ravi Sahita
In this talk, we juxtapose the resiliency and trustworthiness of composition of DL and classical ML algorithms for security, via a case study of evaluating the resiliency of ransomware detection via the generative adversarial network (GAN). We propose to use GAN to automatically produce dynamic features that exhibit generalized malicious behaviors that can reduce the efficacy of black-box ransomware classifiers. We examine the quality of the GAN-generated samples by comparing the statistical similarity of these samples to real ransomware and benign software. Further we investigate the latent subspace where the GAN-generated samples lie and explore reasons why such samples cause a certain class of ransomware classifiers to degrade in performance. The automatically generated adversarial samples can then be fed into the training set to reduce the blind spots of the detectors.
There has been a surge of interest in using machine learning (ML) particularly deep learning (DL) to automatically detect malware through their dynamic behaviors. These approaches have achieved significant improvement in detection rates and lower false positive rates at large scale compared with traditional malware analysis methods. ML in threat detection has demonstrated to be a good cop to guard platform security. However it is imperative to evaluate - is ML-powered security resilient enough?
To generate reliable traces of system activity, we can utilize CPU-based telemetry such as Intel Processor Trace which can be extracted via a hypervisor without guest instrumentation. We advocate that file I/O events extracted from Intel processor trace together with algorithmic improvements have shown potential stronger defense in ML -based model deployment in the wild to combat ransomware attack. Our results and discoveries should pose relevant questions for defenders such as how ML models can be made more resilient for robust enforcement of security objectives.
Chris Eng
Why does it take so long to fix insecure code? We pair new data about the lifecycle of a vulnerability with learnings from application security programs to answer this perennial question. This analysis is not based on a survey – it's real data from real application scans. The data set contains 85,000 unique applications and 1.4 million individual assessments over a 12-month period, easily the largest application security data set of its size.
Chris will describe the analysis process and some of the techniques, such as survival analysis, that were applied to the data set in order to measure and visualize outcomes. We'll focus specifically on identifying the factors that correlate most strongly (or not at all!) with fix rates. Finally, we'll provide data-backed insights on the contentious question of whether DevOps practices are a boon or a burden for security.
Anamitra Dutta Majumdar & Anubhav Saini
Increasing adoption of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence by data-driven organizations like LinkedIn is posing some important challenges related to data security and privacy. On the one hand, member data is an asset that unlocks unlimited business potential whereas, on the other hand, the consumption of the data must happen in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. This poses an interesting challenge for security and operations teams in the organization. In this presentation, we will walk through all the well-known use cases of machine learning at LinkedIn and also the phases of a machine learning pipeline. We will identify key security gaps and the corresponding security controls to address the gaps at each phase of any machine learning pipeline. The associated scalability and operational challenges for the application of security control will be explained. Controls in each phase would be put into the perspective of the Productive Machine Learning pipeline phases being built at LinkedIn There will be a section on how Blueshift will impact the application of security controls once compute and data have been decoupled. By the end of the talk, we would have described what a secure machine learning pipeline looks like and what are the key security patterns to be put in place to secure the pipeline.
Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
Frédéric Vachon, ESET
BIOS rootkits have been researched and discussed heavily in the past few years, but sparse evidence has been presented of real campaigns actively trying to compromise a system at this level. Our talk will reveal such a campaign successfully executed by STRONTIUM.
Earlier this year, there was a public report stating that the infamous Sofacy/APT28/Sednit APT group successfully trojanized a userland LoJack agent and used it against their targets. LoJack, a controversial anti-theft software, was scrutinized by security researchers in the past because of its unusual persistence method: a module preinstalled in many computers' UEFI/BIOS software. Several security risks were found through the years in their product, but no large in-the-wild activity was ever detected until the discovery of the STRONTIUM group leveraging some of these vulnerabilities affecting the userland agent. However, through our research, we now know that they did not stop there: they also tried, and succeeded, in installing a custom UEFI module directly in the systems' SPI flash memory.
In this talk, we will detail the full infection chain showing how STRONTIUM was able to install their custom UEFI module on key targets' computers.
Additionally, we will provide an in-depth analysis of their UEFI module and the associated trojanized LoJack agent.
Anthony LAOU HINE TSUEI, Tencent, Keen Security Lab
Peter Hlavaty, KeenLab, Tencent
Fuzzing has become a cheap and fast process for any entity looking to test the robustness of a system. In this talk we will consider the Windows Subsystem for Linux, which is a brand new subsystem implemented in the Windows Kernel. It features a compatibility interface with most of the Linux Kernel’s APIs and File systems that allows Linux developers to run their code directly on Windows. Due to the complexity and the originality of this attack surface, Microsoft has thoroughly put it under Trinity’s stress testing. Our purpose will be to provide insights on how to improve upon previous attempts in order to discover new bugs and review the architecture of WSL for further research.
Christiaan F Beek, McAfee
Jay Rosenberg, Intezer Labs
The Lazarus, Silent Chollima, Group 123, Hidden Cobra, DarkSeoul, Blockbuster, Operation Troy, 10 Days of Rain attacks are all believed to originate from North Korea. But how can they be attributed with certainty? And what connection does a DDoS and disk wiping attack from July 4 2009, have with WannaCry, one of the largest cyber-attacks in the history of the cyber-sphere?
We have conducted a comparative research over more than 10 years of malware and tools being used by North Korean adversaries. The results were intriguing and we will share our discoveries but also hunt tactics during our talk. We discovered new links between campaigns and were able to group malware families towards actor groups and discovere interesting patterns.
Andrea Allievi, Microsoft
Spectre and Meltdown CPU have been one of the biggest security problem of the year 2018. Mitigations have already been delivered to the customers by both CPU manufacturers and OS developers. While the mitigations for Spectre type 1 and Meltdown have been successfully delivered, the mitigation for Spectre type 2, Retpoline, has been deferred for various problems. This talk will describe the implementation details of Retpoline in Windows 10 (19H1) and all the problem that we faced while testing it. Designing Retpoline has requested the collaboration of different teams in Microsoft, especially between the Kernel and the Compiler team. This talk will explain how we overcame all the implementation issues and allow all the involved Windows Kernel components to work with Retpoline in a retro-compatible way. At the end we will analyze the performance issues and explain how the Kernel team has found a solution for them
Luke Jennings, Countercept
Attackers have been avoiding disk and staying memory resident for over a decade and this has traditionally proven an Achilles heels for security products and the teams that operate them. The boom in both EDR products and memory forensics toolkits in more recent years have helped defenders to fight back but attackers are already adapting their approaches.
This talk will cover both classic and modern techniques for injecting code into legitimate processes on Microsoft Windows systems, as well as several techniques for detecting them. This will include both system tracing methods, good for proactive detection, as well as memory analysis techniques that have the added benefit of allow detection of pre-existing compromises in real-world incident response scenarios, with a brief case study example. As part of this, practical examples will be given showing how Microsoft’s ATP and Sysmon help in this area as well as other techniques. Finally, the future of this area will be considered, including how the .NET runtime already complicates detection techniques in this area and how this will likely become increasingly challenging as more attackers discover and exploit this.
By the end of the talk, the audience should understand the importance of code injection in the context of memory-resident implants, the key techniques for performing it and detecting it and the challenges of achieving this in the real-world at enterprise scale.
Zhuo Ma, Tencent
USB is one of the most common interface supported on modern computer. Modern OSes offer tons of USB drivers to support frequently used USB device classes. For other 3rd party USB device, Microsoft provide automatic driver downloading and installation via Windows AutoUpdate Service. In this talk, we consider this as a novel attacking surface exposed by Windows.
We are trying to assess the vulnerability in those USB drivers provided via Windows AutoUpdate Service, which can be automatic installed and run after device plugged in. Obviously, these drivers are all designed for real USB device, which have to talk to device during running.
So, the biggest obstacle for assessing these drivers is we can not prepare real USB devices for all of these drivers. To overcome this, We developed a system to emulate these USB device, further, we are trying to fuzz these drivers against our emulated USB device. By using this system, we can fuzz device drivers without the real USB device. In further, we can also precisely fuzz every stage of driver loading. We can feed any custom data to the drivers to trigger vulnerabilities. Also, this system supports IO Control Code fuzz as well. And all in all, all of this progress can be done automatically.
We tested about 6000 drivers, yielded hundreds of crash by fuzzing. IO Control Fuzz also gave a reasonable result. We are going to divide our talk into three parts: the first part is about how we get the list of automatic installed USB drivers, and how to analyze these drivers in automatic ways; the second part is about the fuzzing system we designed, including the architecture of system, ways to emulating devices, key points for designing; the last part will show some vulnerabilities we found by this system.
Brian Gorenc, Trend Micro
Much like their six-legged counterparts in nature, bugs in software have a lifecycle. They are discovered, they get exploited, they get reported, they get patched, and usually, they go away. At each stage of this lifecycle, information about the vulnerability equates to a monetary value, and, depending on how this information is disseminated, that monetary value can drastically change. Various marketplaces exist for security research, and the current gray and black markets can be as robust as their white market counterparts. Different agents within these markets influence research trends by shifting finances to or away from specific areas, resulting in more bugs discovered and reported in that area.
Even if you don’t directly participate in this economy, it impacts you and the systems you defend. Bugs bought and sold in the marketplace often become security patches and sometimes get wrapped into exploit kits or malware. Administering the world’s largest vendor agnostic bug bounty program puts us in a unique position to examine the inner workings of these transactions. While firmly in the white market, our experience and relationships provide us with insight across the entire exploit landscape. Some of these factors might not be obvious to those outside of the marketplace until exposed through data leaks or compromise.
These hidden factors can shift prices and send researchers – and thus exploits – in new directions. Like any open market, various factors can spur changes in supply and demand, and market actors can shape what types of research either becomes public – or finds its way into an exploit kit. This presentation covers the inner-workings of the exploit marketplace, the main players in various sectors, and the winding, often controversial lifespan of a security bug. We include real-world examples of how effectively run programs have disrupted nation-state exploit usage in the wild, and take a look at how existing and impending legislation could irrevocably affect the exploit marketplace – and maybe not for the better.
Ross Bevington, Microsoft
In ‘The Matrix’ sentient machines subdue the population by developing a highly sophisticated simulation. High interaction honeypots are a lot like The Matrix, designed to convince an attacker to execute an attack so we can monitor them. But these honeypots are flawed!
Attackers are continually adapting in order to evade our defenses - meaning that it’s often not enough to just set up a honeypot and watch the results roll in. Is a new approach better?
Did you know that 40% of IaaS VMs in Azure are Linux? For Microsoft to protect itself and its customers Linux is a priority.
At MSTIC we’ve developed a new type of Linux honeypot that allows us to deceive and control the behavior of an attacker. We are using this to understand the person behind the attack, examining them as they examine us. Using these techniques, we are able to better track the person behind the threat, build better protections and ultimately protect more Linux users - whether they are using Azure or not.
In this presentation I’ll show some of the successes of running a Matrix like environment, failures where a glitch was spotted as well as deception approaches that could be applied to other domains. Finally I’ll show how easy it is to leverage Azure’s big data capabilities to build and ultimately query all this data at scale as well as how you can immediately reap the benefits of this work by connecting your Linux box to Azure Security Center.
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Albert Hoitingh
In this session I delve into the encryption technology used in Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Purview. Including the concepts of Customer Key and Double Key Encryption.
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA ConnectKari Kakkonen
My and Rik Marselis slides at 30.5.2024 DASA Connect conference. We discuss about what is testing, then what is agile testing and finally what is Testing in DevOps. Finally we had lovely workshop with the participants trying to find out different ways to think about quality and testing in different parts of the DevOps infinity loop.
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersSafe Software
Are you looking to streamline your workflows and boost your projects’ efficiency? Do you find yourself searching for ways to add flexibility and control over your FME workflows? If so, you’re in the right place.
Join us for an insightful dive into the world of FME parameters, a critical element in optimizing workflow efficiency. This webinar marks the beginning of our three-part “Essentials of Automation” series. This first webinar is designed to equip you with the knowledge and skills to utilize parameters effectively: enhancing the flexibility, maintainability, and user control of your FME projects.
Here’s what you’ll gain:
- Essentials of FME Parameters: Understand the pivotal role of parameters, including Reader/Writer, Transformer, User, and FME Flow categories. Discover how they are the key to unlocking automation and optimization within your workflows.
- Practical Applications in FME Form: Delve into key user parameter types including choice, connections, and file URLs. Allow users to control how a workflow runs, making your workflows more reusable. Learn to import values and deliver the best user experience for your workflows while enhancing accuracy.
- Optimization Strategies in FME Flow: Explore the creation and strategic deployment of parameters in FME Flow, including the use of deployment and geometry parameters, to maximize workflow efficiency.
- Pro Tips for Success: Gain insights on parameterizing connections and leveraging new features like Conditional Visibility for clarity and simplicity.
We’ll wrap up with a glimpse into future webinars, followed by a Q&A session to address your specific questions surrounding this topic.
Don’t miss this opportunity to elevate your FME expertise and drive your projects to new heights of efficiency.
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...Ramesh Iyer
In today's fast-changing business world, Companies that adapt and embrace new ideas often need help to keep up with the competition. However, fostering a culture of innovation takes much work. It takes vision, leadership and willingness to take risks in the right proportion. Sachin Dev Duggal, co-founder of Builder.ai, has perfected the art of this balance, creating a company culture where creativity and growth are nurtured at each stage.
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithyg2nightmarescribd
Have you ever wanted a Ruby client API to communicate with your web service? Smithy is a protocol-agnostic language for defining services and SDKs. Smithy Ruby is an implementation of Smithy that generates a Ruby SDK using a Smithy model. In this talk, we will explore Smithy and Smithy Ruby to learn how to generate custom feature-rich SDKs that can communicate with any web service, such as a Rails JSON API.
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object CalisthenicsDorra BARTAGUIZ
After immersing yourself in the blue book and its red counterpart, attending DDD-focused conferences, and applying tactical patterns, you're left with a crucial question: How do I ensure my design is effective? Tactical patterns within Domain-Driven Design (DDD) serve as guiding principles for creating clear and manageable domain models. However, achieving success with these patterns requires additional guidance. Interestingly, we've observed that a set of constraints initially designed for training purposes remarkably aligns with effective pattern implementation, offering a more ‘mechanical’ approach. Let's explore together how Object Calisthenics can elevate the design of your tactical DDD patterns, offering concrete help for those venturing into DDD for the first time!
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 4. In this session, we will cover Test Manager overview along with SAP heatmap.
The UiPath Test Manager overview with SAP heatmap webinar offers a concise yet comprehensive exploration of the role of a Test Manager within SAP environments, coupled with the utilization of heatmaps for effective testing strategies.
Participants will gain insights into the responsibilities, challenges, and best practices associated with test management in SAP projects. Additionally, the webinar delves into the significance of heatmaps as a visual aid for identifying testing priorities, areas of risk, and resource allocation within SAP landscapes. Through this session, attendees can expect to enhance their understanding of test management principles while learning practical approaches to optimize testing processes in SAP environments using heatmap visualization techniques
What will you get from this session?
1. Insights into SAP testing best practices
2. Heatmap utilization for testing
3. Optimization of testing processes
4. Demo
Topics covered:
Execution from the test manager
Orchestrator execution result
Defect reporting
SAP heatmap example with demo
Speaker:
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdfCheryl Hung
Keynote at DIGIT West Expo, Glasgow on 29 May 2024.
Cheryl Hung, ochery.com
Sr Director, Infrastructure Ecosystem, Arm.
The key trends across hardware, cloud and open-source; exploring how these areas are likely to mature and develop over the short and long-term, and then considering how organisations can position themselves to adapt and thrive.
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Frank van Harmelen
Neuro-symbolic (NeSy) AI is on the rise. However, simply machine learning on just any symbolic structure is not sufficient to really harvest the gains of NeSy. These will only be gained when the symbolic structures have an actual semantics. I give an operational definition of semantics as “predictable inference”.
All of this illustrated with link prediction over knowledge graphs, but the argument is general.
2. Fault Injection: a definition
“Introducing faults in a target to alter its intended behavior.”
How can we introduce these faults?
3. • A controlled environmental change leads to altered behavior in a target
• They leverage a vulnerability in a hardware subsystem
Hardware fault injection techniques
Clock Voltage EM Laser
5. • Located in hardware
• Cannot be identified by (code) review only
• Can only be identified by performing a successful attack
• Can only be entirely addressed in hardware
Vulnerability
“Susceptibility of a given hardware subsystem to a specific
fault injection technique, which has an impact on security.”
These vulnerabilities lead to faults!
6. • Happens at a specific moment in time
• May be (semi-)persistent
• May be mitigated in software
Fault
“An unintended alteration of a target
as a consequence of a vulnerability.”
These faults potentially lead to compromised systems!
12. • Possible when software can activate hardware vulnerabilities
• The vulnerabilities and faults are still in hardware!
Some recent examples...
• Rowhammer (Kim et al., 2014; many more afterwards)
− Constantly reading a DDR address leads to bit flips in neighboring bits
• CLKSCREW (Tang et al., 2017)
− Manipulating Digital Voltage Frequency Scaling (DVFS) registers
− Operate the chip out of its specifications
Software activated fault injection
You can do this remotely without specialized tooling!
16. Xbox – Bypassing secure boot
• Reset line glitch to reset registers’ content
• Bypass hash comparison used by integrity check
Reference: Video-game consoles architecture under microscope - R. Benadjila and M. Renard
17. Nintendo – Bypassing secure boot
• Use a glitch to bypass length check performed by software
• Code execution leads to dumping decryption key from memory
18. BADFET – Bypassing secure boot
• Using an electromagnetic glitch to bypass secure boot of a Cisco phone
• Not that invasive... (i.e. phone’s housing can remain closed)
19. Trends
• Specialized equipment is becoming cheaper and available to the masses
• Equipment might not be needed at all (e.g. software activated fault injection)
21. • Hardware-based
− Specifically designed hardware logic for redundancy and detection
− Detection by hardware close to the glitch injection moment
− May prevent injection (e.g. shielding)
− Not implemented on standard embedded technology
• Software-based
− Based on computational checks, redundancy and random delays
− Detection by software after the glitch injection moment
− Do not prevent injection
Traditional fault injection countermeasures
Both can be effective at lowering the probability for a successful attack!
22. • They do not prevent fault injection but increase attack complexity
• They require software to be executed after the glitch is injected
• They (often) protect specific parts of the code
− Critical decision points
− Crypto operations
− Data integrity
Notes on software countermeasures
Are software fault injection countermeasures sufficient?
23. Most real world examples target secure boot…
Why not use fault injection at runtime?
25. How is Linux usually compromised?
Kernel software exploit: between $30k and $100k
(Source: Zerodium)
A summary of Linux CVEs
What if they are not known or not present?
26. Others came to the same conclusion…
Fault Injection!
Reference: https://derrekr.github.io/3ds/33c3/#/18
27. Voltage fault injection setup
Target
• Fast and feature rich System-on-Chip (SoC)
• ARM Cortex-A9 (ARM32 / AArch32)
• Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (fully patched)
35. Arbitrary memory mapping - Description
1. Open /dev/mem using open syscall from userspace process
2. Bypass checks performed by Linux kernel using a glitch
3. Map arbitrary physical address in userspace
Full kernel memory access
37. Arbitrary memory mapping - Results
Remarks
• Performed 22118 experiments in 17 hours
• Success rate between 25.5 µs and 26.8 µs: 0.53%
• Kernel “pwned” every 10 minutes
38. Escalating to a root shell - Description
1. Set all registers to 0 to increase success probability (*)
2. Perform setresuid syscall to set process IDs to root
3. Bypass checks performed by Linux kernel using a glitch
4. Execute shell using system function
Shell with full root privileges
39. Escalating to a root shell - Code
• Code running in userspace
• Linux syscall: setresuid (0xd0)
40. Escalating to a root shell - Results
Remarks
• Performed 18968 experiments in 21 hours
• Success rate between 3.14 µs and 3.44 µs: 1.3%
• Kernel “pwned” every 5 minutes
41. • Security boundary bypass
− Full access to kernel memory
− Root shell execution
• Not dependent on software vulnerabilities
• For these attack specific checks are targeted
− No need not know which check exactly
Summary
Traditional SW countermeasures do apply!
43. • Some examples: instruction skipping and bit flipping
• Are used for envisioning new attacks
− Instruction skipping leads to bypassing conditional checks
− Bit flips lead to cryptographic attacks
• Are used for identifying vulnerable targets
• Are used to invent new countermeasures
Fault injection fault model
“A theoretical model for describing the effects of fault injection.”
If it is not modeled…it may have not been researched. Yet.
44. Remarks
• Limited control over which bit(s) will be corrupted
• Also includes other fault models as sub-cases (e.g. instruction skipping)
Our fault model
A generic one: “instruction corruption”
45. • ARM32 has an interesting ISA
• Program Counter (PC) is directly accessible
Direct PC control
Attack variations (SP-control) also affect other architectures!
Valid ARM instructions
Corrupted ARM instructionsCorrupted ARM instructions may directly set PC!
46. Direct PC control – Description
1. Set all registers to a specific value (e.g. 0x41414141)
2. Execute random Linux system calls
3. Load the arbitrary value into the PC register using a glitch
Control flow hijacked
47. Direct PC control – Code
• Code running in userspace
• Linux syscall: initially random
• Found to be more effective: getgroups and prctl
48. Direct PC control – Results
Remarks:
• Performed 12705 experiments in 14 hours
• Success rate between 2.2 µs and 2.65 µs: 0.63%
• Control of PC in Kernel mode gained every 10 minutes
50. • Security boundary bypass
− Kernel level code execution
• Not dependent on SW vulnerabilities
• Any instruction is a potential target
Direct PC control – Summary
51. • New Yields software control with one successful fault
• Global Any software instruction can be a target
• Direct Software control is achieved immediately
• Precise Load arbitrary values into arbitrary registers
• Powerful Bypass security boundaries
• Unpredictable Creates exec primitives out of thin air (e.g. a data only
operation can be turned into an execution primitive)
Why is this attack so special?
52. • Hardware FI countermeasures are fully applicable
− They can target the injected glitch
• Software FI countermeasures are likely not executed
− A successful attack hijacks control flow immediately
• Localized software FI countermeasures are insufficient
− Any instruction is a potential target
Impact
Traditional software FI countermeasures are ineffective!
53. • Effective: Limiting usage of an hijacked control flow
− DEP/NX
− ASLR
− CFI
− …
• Not effective: Preventing control flow hijacking:
− Stack cookies
− SEHOP
− …
Exploit mitigations
55. • Reaching a wider audience
• Equipment is becoming accessible
− May not even be needed!
• Research is increasing
• New powerful techniques subverting software boundaries
• Current fault injection countermeasures are mostly insufficient
• Fault injection attacks can be cheaper than a software exploit
Fault injection attack trends
56. • Include fault injection attacks in your threat model
• Design and implement fault injection resistant hardware
− Start from early design.
− Test during implementation cycles
− Test, test…and test again!
• Implement software with strong exploit mitigations
• Make critical assets inaccessible to software
− E.g. Using “real” hardware
Improving products
57. Conclusions
1. Fault injection attacks are coming to the masses.
(and will not go away)
2. They can easily subvert typical software security models.
(Adjust your threat models)
3. Any unprotected device is vulnerable.
(Factor in countermeasures from the start)