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Securing Assets Against
Malicious Internal Users
Through Tiered Access
Joel M. Leo – 3/22/2018
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
1
Disclaimer
This presentation represents my own experience, thoughts, and
opinions and is not representative of Gap, Inc.’s opinions or positions.
This presentation is not endorsed or approved by Gap, Inc., nor does
Gap, Inc. assume any responsibility or liability for the content, accuracy
or completeness of the information presented.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
2
About me
• Live and work in Honolulu, Hawaii
• Principal Systems Engineer and Active Directory Architect for Gap, Inc.
• Trainer for ADSecurity.org ( https://www.adsecurity.org )
• Principal Consultant for Hi Tech Hui ( https://www.hitechhui.com )
• Consultant for several other organizations, focusing primarily on Active Directory
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
@joelmleo
https://www.linkedin.com/in/joelmleo
3
Contents
 Background
 Addressing the Problem Through Tiered Access
 Important Considerations
 Pitfalls
 Alternatives
 Conclusion
 Q&A
 Resources for Further Research
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
4
Background
What’s the problem Earthman?
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
5
Insider Threats are Real
I’ll take “Things I Already Knew” for $1,000, Alex
• 90% of organizations feel vulnerable to insider attacks [1]
• Organizations surveyed indicate “users with excessive privileges” is the highest risk factor (37%)
for insider threats [2]
• Insider threats are cited as the second highest concern (after ransomware,) while “User
credentials and privileged accounts represented the most common data types” exfil’d [3]
• US CERT has an Insider Threat Center to “conduct empirical research and analysis to develop
solutions that combat insider threats” [4]
• Edward Snowden [no citation needed]
[1],[2] – Insider Threat Report 2018, by Crowd Research Partners http://crowdresearchpartners.com/portfolio/insider-threat-report/
[3] – SANS 2017 Data Protection Survey – SANS https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/sensitive-data-risk-2017-data-protection-survey-37950
[4] – Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute - https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=91513
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
6
Problem Statement
Network deployments often leave administrative resources and accounts
exposed to abuse from inside the organization. Perimeter measures, such as
firewalls, do not mitigate these risks. Other tools, including endpoint
protection, alerting, etc., have varying levels of efficacy taken on their own.
By segregating administrative accounts & resources away from standard
accounts & resources, and separating administrative responsibilities and
infrastructure in to “tiers,” we can greatly improve our organization’s security
posture, helping to prevent internal misuse.
However, there are numerous pitfalls that can result in the feels of security
without actual improved security. I’ll try to help you avoid them.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
7
These concerns are OS agnostic, but I’ll be focusing on Microsoft-based
problems and solutions, with a particular focus on Active Directory and
administrators that have control over the domains. Other operating
systems will have their own concerns and methodologies against which
this conceptual framework can be leveraged
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
8
Killchain
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
Image credit: Microsoft
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/ata-threats
9
Null Tier, aka “The Swamp”
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
10
Null Tier Admin
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
T3h intertubes
11
Null Tier Admin Compromise
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
12
Addressing the Problem Through
Tiered Access
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
13
What Is Tiered Access?
“Tiered access” in this context means
A system by which administrative access to applications and infrastructure is
separated from normal user access through “tiers,” improving security by
controlling the flow of administrative access to, within, and between tiers
A “tier” is a logical collection of roles, responsibilities, resources and infrastructure
that work together to deliver a service in a relatively secure fashion, separated from
other tiers and non-admin users and computers through policy and technical
controls
Fundamental goal is to ensure different tiers and regular users cannot mix to help
protect against PtH/PtT and to limit exposure in the case of a compromise
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
14
Tiered Access High-Level Requirements
• Defined tiers with all elements (servers, software, storage etc.) necessary to
deliver a service
• Based on org’s administrative responsibilities
• AD
• Storage
• Workstations
• Servers
• Etc.
• Clearly-defined administrative boundaries
• Policy controls
• Technical controls
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
15
Security Slide Rule
The more security you have the less usability you have, and vice versa.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
Usability Security
You need to identify the best balance of security and usability for your organization
16
Summary of Tiered Access
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
Yellow Tier
Green Tier
17
Admin Compromise, Interrupted
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
18
Extended Tiering Model
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
19
Important Considerations
Successfully implementing tiered access requires coordination across multiple
domains with orchestration between multiple technologies and concepts
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
20
Important Considerations 0x0
• Security requirements of the org are key
• Reference the security slide rule. Where do your org’s needs lie?
• Requires ongoing executive support
• Should be considered a tactic within a larger security strategy
• Organizational security policies need to be considered and potentially modified
• The first/highest tier should be your domain controllers/domain admins
• Addressing these first nets the biggest bang for the buck (or CHF) from a security perspective
• Scope needs to be reasoned and clearly defined
• “Scope creep” is a real thing
• Language and nomenclature used needs to be consistent and understood
throughout the org
• “Red/Yellow/Green tier” vs. “Tier 0/1/2” vs. “Tier 2/1/0” etc.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
21
Important Considerations 0x1
• Trust needs to be established appropriately
• And revoked! Full role lifecycle management all the way through is requisite
• RBAC is a huge component of this concept
• If a technology doesn’t support RBAC toss it in the bin!
• There will be some bleed-through between tiers that may need to be
addressed
• Ie. virtualized domain controllers – how do you control access to the files that
comprise the VM? Should it be your domain admins, virtualization admins or
storage admins? Root (hint: No)?
• Support stack needs to be clear
• All should know which support group to talk to for issues at the different tiers
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
22
Important Considerations 0x2
• Automate, automate, automate all the things, as much as possible
• Self-service with structured approvals is handy
• Bastion hosts/jump boxes
• Hardened servers available only to members of the appropriate tier, which have
access through technical controls to the appropriate admin interfaces and networks
• Bastion workstations
• Hardened workstations that only allow access to appropriate tier accounts and
bastion hosts over appropriate networks
• Credential Guard, Device Guard, endpoint protection, close monitoring etc.
• Management (updates, config, etc.) should be separate from standard workstations
• Yes, this means admins may need multiple workstations
• SIEM/monitoring/alerting/defense is critical
• Documentation is critical (design documents, role runbooks, etc.)
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
23
Important Considerations 0x3
• Which environments are in-scope?
• AD DFL/FFL, supported DC OS, physical sites, etc.
• Available technical controls
• GPO, startup/shutdown/logon/logoff scripts, SCOM/SCCM, IPSec, MFA etc.
• Which technologies should be considered, utilized, & addressed
• Compute, networking, storage, virtualization, cloud, automation, identity
management, UEBA, SIEM, etc.
• Security is never done. There is no “secured,” only more or less secure
• This is not a panacea – still need to follow general best practices
around automation, user management, patching, configuration
management, endpoint protection etc.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
24
Pitfalls
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
25
Pitfalls 0x0
Or: oh, the things I’ve seen 0.o
•Thinking this makes you “secure”
• There is no such thing as “secure.”
•Dictate action instead of collaborative planning
•Mushy tier definition
• Tiers should be clearly defined and documented
•Incomplete execution
• Half measures can leave you in a poor state
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
26
Pitfalls 0x1
•“Fire and Forget”
• Review the infra and execution on a regular basis to ensure you’re meeting
your goals and to see if there is room for improvement
•Insufficient documentation
• Documentation should be considered “living” and be validated as complete,
then kept up to date over time as things evolve
•Insufficient training
• Along with documentation should come training. Admins’ processes will
change in potentially dramatic fashion
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
27
Pitfalls 0x2
•No/insufficient monitoring
• No news is good news, right? Right?
•All ‘permit’ and no ‘deny’
• Implicit/explicit deny. Saying something shouldn’t be done isn’t the same as
preventing it from being done.
•Bespoke ACLs
• ACLs should be clearly defined and should grant/deny based on groups, not
individual accounts. Customizing ACLs ad hoc can expose the org more than is
immediately clear.
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
28
Pitfalls 0x3
•Incomplete application of policy and/or technical
controls
•Restricted Groups vs. GPP for controlling local
group membership
•Not addressing existing sensitive group
memberships and permissions
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
29
Pitfalls 0x4
•Reusing existing management infra for bastion
hosts/workstations
• These should be managed separately. If nothing else, ensure
automation/management creds between tiers aren’t shared (SCOM “runas”
and service accounts for instance)
•Attempting “big bang” in existing environments
• Tiered access can and should be approached in phases/stages/milestones
• Go for the big ticket items first: Domain controllers/domain admins
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
30
Alternatives?
• “Air-gapped” administration model
• “Zero Trust”
• Temporal group membership
• Protected Users Group
• “Red Forest”
• Credential Guard
• Device Guard
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
31
Conclusion
Implementing the tiered access concept is challenging, cutting across a
number of different technologies, organizational elements, and
organizational concerns, but can result in greatly improved security for the
organization that implements the concept well
• Take the “Important Considerations” section in to account before you
implement, preferably in the design phase
• Even after implementation, the “Pitfalls” section can help you identify
areas where your implementation may have fallen short, so they can be
addressed in the future
• Sometimes, the completed implementation barely resembles the original
design. If it works and provides the desired functionality and security,
update your documentation and go with it!
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
32
Q&A
@joelmleo
https://www.linkedin.com/in/joelmleo
Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal
Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo
33

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Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Internal Resources Through Tiered Access

  • 1. Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access Joel M. Leo – 3/22/2018 Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 1
  • 2. Disclaimer This presentation represents my own experience, thoughts, and opinions and is not representative of Gap, Inc.’s opinions or positions. This presentation is not endorsed or approved by Gap, Inc., nor does Gap, Inc. assume any responsibility or liability for the content, accuracy or completeness of the information presented. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 2
  • 3. About me • Live and work in Honolulu, Hawaii • Principal Systems Engineer and Active Directory Architect for Gap, Inc. • Trainer for ADSecurity.org ( https://www.adsecurity.org ) • Principal Consultant for Hi Tech Hui ( https://www.hitechhui.com ) • Consultant for several other organizations, focusing primarily on Active Directory Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo @joelmleo https://www.linkedin.com/in/joelmleo 3
  • 4. Contents  Background  Addressing the Problem Through Tiered Access  Important Considerations  Pitfalls  Alternatives  Conclusion  Q&A  Resources for Further Research Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 4
  • 5. Background What’s the problem Earthman? Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 5
  • 6. Insider Threats are Real I’ll take “Things I Already Knew” for $1,000, Alex • 90% of organizations feel vulnerable to insider attacks [1] • Organizations surveyed indicate “users with excessive privileges” is the highest risk factor (37%) for insider threats [2] • Insider threats are cited as the second highest concern (after ransomware,) while “User credentials and privileged accounts represented the most common data types” exfil’d [3] • US CERT has an Insider Threat Center to “conduct empirical research and analysis to develop solutions that combat insider threats” [4] • Edward Snowden [no citation needed] [1],[2] – Insider Threat Report 2018, by Crowd Research Partners http://crowdresearchpartners.com/portfolio/insider-threat-report/ [3] – SANS 2017 Data Protection Survey – SANS https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/sensitive-data-risk-2017-data-protection-survey-37950 [4] – Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute - https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=91513 Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 6
  • 7. Problem Statement Network deployments often leave administrative resources and accounts exposed to abuse from inside the organization. Perimeter measures, such as firewalls, do not mitigate these risks. Other tools, including endpoint protection, alerting, etc., have varying levels of efficacy taken on their own. By segregating administrative accounts & resources away from standard accounts & resources, and separating administrative responsibilities and infrastructure in to “tiers,” we can greatly improve our organization’s security posture, helping to prevent internal misuse. However, there are numerous pitfalls that can result in the feels of security without actual improved security. I’ll try to help you avoid them. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 7
  • 8. These concerns are OS agnostic, but I’ll be focusing on Microsoft-based problems and solutions, with a particular focus on Active Directory and administrators that have control over the domains. Other operating systems will have their own concerns and methodologies against which this conceptual framework can be leveraged Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 8
  • 9. Killchain Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo Image credit: Microsoft https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/ata-threats 9
  • 10. Null Tier, aka “The Swamp” Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 10
  • 11. Null Tier Admin Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo T3h intertubes 11
  • 12. Null Tier Admin Compromise Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 12
  • 13. Addressing the Problem Through Tiered Access Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 13
  • 14. What Is Tiered Access? “Tiered access” in this context means A system by which administrative access to applications and infrastructure is separated from normal user access through “tiers,” improving security by controlling the flow of administrative access to, within, and between tiers A “tier” is a logical collection of roles, responsibilities, resources and infrastructure that work together to deliver a service in a relatively secure fashion, separated from other tiers and non-admin users and computers through policy and technical controls Fundamental goal is to ensure different tiers and regular users cannot mix to help protect against PtH/PtT and to limit exposure in the case of a compromise Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 14
  • 15. Tiered Access High-Level Requirements • Defined tiers with all elements (servers, software, storage etc.) necessary to deliver a service • Based on org’s administrative responsibilities • AD • Storage • Workstations • Servers • Etc. • Clearly-defined administrative boundaries • Policy controls • Technical controls Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 15
  • 16. Security Slide Rule The more security you have the less usability you have, and vice versa. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo Usability Security You need to identify the best balance of security and usability for your organization 16
  • 17. Summary of Tiered Access Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo Yellow Tier Green Tier 17
  • 18. Admin Compromise, Interrupted Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 18
  • 19. Extended Tiering Model Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 19
  • 20. Important Considerations Successfully implementing tiered access requires coordination across multiple domains with orchestration between multiple technologies and concepts Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 20
  • 21. Important Considerations 0x0 • Security requirements of the org are key • Reference the security slide rule. Where do your org’s needs lie? • Requires ongoing executive support • Should be considered a tactic within a larger security strategy • Organizational security policies need to be considered and potentially modified • The first/highest tier should be your domain controllers/domain admins • Addressing these first nets the biggest bang for the buck (or CHF) from a security perspective • Scope needs to be reasoned and clearly defined • “Scope creep” is a real thing • Language and nomenclature used needs to be consistent and understood throughout the org • “Red/Yellow/Green tier” vs. “Tier 0/1/2” vs. “Tier 2/1/0” etc. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 21
  • 22. Important Considerations 0x1 • Trust needs to be established appropriately • And revoked! Full role lifecycle management all the way through is requisite • RBAC is a huge component of this concept • If a technology doesn’t support RBAC toss it in the bin! • There will be some bleed-through between tiers that may need to be addressed • Ie. virtualized domain controllers – how do you control access to the files that comprise the VM? Should it be your domain admins, virtualization admins or storage admins? Root (hint: No)? • Support stack needs to be clear • All should know which support group to talk to for issues at the different tiers Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 22
  • 23. Important Considerations 0x2 • Automate, automate, automate all the things, as much as possible • Self-service with structured approvals is handy • Bastion hosts/jump boxes • Hardened servers available only to members of the appropriate tier, which have access through technical controls to the appropriate admin interfaces and networks • Bastion workstations • Hardened workstations that only allow access to appropriate tier accounts and bastion hosts over appropriate networks • Credential Guard, Device Guard, endpoint protection, close monitoring etc. • Management (updates, config, etc.) should be separate from standard workstations • Yes, this means admins may need multiple workstations • SIEM/monitoring/alerting/defense is critical • Documentation is critical (design documents, role runbooks, etc.) Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 23
  • 24. Important Considerations 0x3 • Which environments are in-scope? • AD DFL/FFL, supported DC OS, physical sites, etc. • Available technical controls • GPO, startup/shutdown/logon/logoff scripts, SCOM/SCCM, IPSec, MFA etc. • Which technologies should be considered, utilized, & addressed • Compute, networking, storage, virtualization, cloud, automation, identity management, UEBA, SIEM, etc. • Security is never done. There is no “secured,” only more or less secure • This is not a panacea – still need to follow general best practices around automation, user management, patching, configuration management, endpoint protection etc. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 24
  • 25. Pitfalls Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 25
  • 26. Pitfalls 0x0 Or: oh, the things I’ve seen 0.o •Thinking this makes you “secure” • There is no such thing as “secure.” •Dictate action instead of collaborative planning •Mushy tier definition • Tiers should be clearly defined and documented •Incomplete execution • Half measures can leave you in a poor state Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 26
  • 27. Pitfalls 0x1 •“Fire and Forget” • Review the infra and execution on a regular basis to ensure you’re meeting your goals and to see if there is room for improvement •Insufficient documentation • Documentation should be considered “living” and be validated as complete, then kept up to date over time as things evolve •Insufficient training • Along with documentation should come training. Admins’ processes will change in potentially dramatic fashion Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 27
  • 28. Pitfalls 0x2 •No/insufficient monitoring • No news is good news, right? Right? •All ‘permit’ and no ‘deny’ • Implicit/explicit deny. Saying something shouldn’t be done isn’t the same as preventing it from being done. •Bespoke ACLs • ACLs should be clearly defined and should grant/deny based on groups, not individual accounts. Customizing ACLs ad hoc can expose the org more than is immediately clear. Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 28
  • 29. Pitfalls 0x3 •Incomplete application of policy and/or technical controls •Restricted Groups vs. GPP for controlling local group membership •Not addressing existing sensitive group memberships and permissions Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 29
  • 30. Pitfalls 0x4 •Reusing existing management infra for bastion hosts/workstations • These should be managed separately. If nothing else, ensure automation/management creds between tiers aren’t shared (SCOM “runas” and service accounts for instance) •Attempting “big bang” in existing environments • Tiered access can and should be approached in phases/stages/milestones • Go for the big ticket items first: Domain controllers/domain admins Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 30
  • 31. Alternatives? • “Air-gapped” administration model • “Zero Trust” • Temporal group membership • Protected Users Group • “Red Forest” • Credential Guard • Device Guard Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 31
  • 32. Conclusion Implementing the tiered access concept is challenging, cutting across a number of different technologies, organizational elements, and organizational concerns, but can result in greatly improved security for the organization that implements the concept well • Take the “Important Considerations” section in to account before you implement, preferably in the design phase • Even after implementation, the “Pitfalls” section can help you identify areas where your implementation may have fallen short, so they can be addressed in the future • Sometimes, the completed implementation barely resembles the original design. If it works and provides the desired functionality and security, update your documentation and go with it! Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 32
  • 33. Q&A @joelmleo https://www.linkedin.com/in/joelmleo Insomnihack 2018 - Securing Assets Against Malicious Internal Users Through Tiered Access -© 2018 Joel M. Leo 33

Editor's Notes

  1. Side benefit of helping to prevent external compromise Bill Cheswick from Bell Labs famously described years ago as “a crunchy shell around a soft, chewy center.”
  2. Spend some time discussing the killchain Attempt to break the chain by ensuring highly privileged accounts have access to a limited subset of apps and infra
  3. Environment is fairly default User A logs in to his workstation with his domain user account Local administrator but not a domain admin Workstation has a number of productivity applications User A goes about his daily business for his employer
  4. Admin A is on the admin team and as such is granted admin privileges across a broad swath of the org Admin A grabs her coffee in the morning Logs in to her workstation Her account is a local admin and is also a domain admin Workstation has a number of applications she uses for her daily work; email, productivity apps as well as administrative tools, etc. Admin A goes about her daily business accessing applications and servers, fixing broken things and watching the occasional funny cat video on t3h intertubes
  5. Multiple insider threat compromise scenarios (illustrated) User A is actually Mr. Hackerman Installs malicious software (he’s already a local admin per the previous slide) – keylogger, mimikatz, powershell empire, WSL running Kali etc. Requests assistance from Admin A, who being the helpful person she is, obliges by logging on with her account, which is a domain admin Mr. Hackerman now has domain admin hash or creds, even if she rdp’d in Mr. Hackerman can now reuse those creds maliciously 2) – Mr. Hackerman installs mitm llmnr (responder) etc. to catch creds on the network 3)
  6. Tiered access helps secure access through restricting access to like-tiered accounts and resources Role accounts Bastion workstations Defined tiers Nomenclature varies No access to lower tiers No access from lower to higher tiers Some possible exceptions on a temporary and very limited basis Regular user accounts are unable to access either tier, and tiered accounts are unable to access regular resources etc. Privsep/least privilege Key point – regular users should not be greatly impacted by implementing tiered admin access
  7. Bastion hosts If there’s time, expand a bit on the concept Resources in-tier Red = domain controllers Yellow = member servers Green = workstations, tablets etc.
  8. All can be pieces of a functional structure, but are not solutions on their own Air gapped – very onerous, but nearly unimpeachable security Zero trust – “internal networks are not inherently more trustworthy than external” - good start Temporal groups – triggers can be set on compromised endpoints that wait for an identity to auth that has the desired access. Trigger kicks off, executing script that persists access either on a different account or via some other mechanism Protected user groups– keylogger will still happily grab the creds Red forest – on its own is insufficient Credential/device guard – good protection locally, but no protection against creds being captured on the network or privileges being misused