Types of gas in steel and power plants

1. Gas Disaster in Steel
Industries
A talk by
Syed Najaf Ali

2. By-product Gases/Utilities
handled in Steel Industry
Blast furnace Gas Propane
Coke Oven Gas LPG
LD Gas CBM
Mixed Gas STEAM
Oxygen FURNACE OIL
Nitrogen LDO
Argon NATURAL GAS
Acetylene
Synthesis gas
Compressed air

3. Properties of By-product Gas
Properties B.F. Gas Coke Oven Gas Converter Gas
Explosive Range 35-70% 5-32% 15-70%
Density Kg/NM3 1.3-1.4 0.43-0.50 1.31-1.35
Calorific Value
KCAL/NM3
750-850 4200-4400 1800-2200
Physical
Properties
Poisonous Colorless
Odourless
Explosive
Blue Flame
Heavier than
Air
Poisonous
Colorless
Typical smell of
Hydrogen
Sulphide and
Napthalene.
Explosive Yellow
Flame
Lighter than Air
Poisonous
Colorless
Odourless
Explosive
Blue Flame
Heavier than Air

4. MSDS of different gases
Properties B.F. Gas Coke Oven Gas Converter Gas Synthesis Gas
Explosive Range 35-70% 5-32% 15-70% 5-56%
Density Kg/NM3 1.3-1.4 0.43-0.50 1.31-1.35 0.3-0.35
Calorific Value
KCAL/NM3
750-850 4200-4400 1800-2200 1800-1900
Physical
Properties
Poisonous Colorless
Odourless
Explosive
Blue Flame
Heavier than
Air
Poisonous
Colorless
Typical smell of
Hydrogen
Sulphide and
Napthalene.
Explosive Yellow
Flame
Lighter than Air
Poisonous
Colorless
Odourless
Explosive
Blue Flame
Heavier than Air
Colourless,Combi
nation of H2 & N2
in the ratio of 3:1.
Explosive, Blue
flame, lighter than
air

5. Hazards of By- product
Gases produced in Steel Plants
• Gas poisoning
• Short term exposure may cause suffocation,
headache, dizziness etc.
• Long term exposure may cause severe
injury to vital organs / death.
• May cause explosion and fire.

6. Gas Poisoning
• Caused by simple asphyxiation and chemical
asphyxiation.
• Simple asphyxiation is due to presence of CO2, CH4,
H2, N2 etc. in the gas, which replaces the oxygen,
making the atmosphere deficient of Oxygen (non-
breathable)
• Chemical asphyxiation is due to presence of carbon
monoxide in the gas which has nearly 240 times higher
affinity with haemoglobin than that of oxygen,
producing Carboxy haemoglobin .
• Severity of poisoning depends on concentration of
gas, duration of exposure and individuals susceptibility.

7. First Aid for Gas poisoning
• Remove the gas affected person from gaseous
atmosphere to fresh air.
• Loosen the clothing, shoes and belt. Take care
of false teeth, if any.
• Start artificial respiration if required. Artificial
respiration is to be given by respirator or mouth
to mouth method.
• If the heart is not beating, apply cardiac
massage.
• Administer oxygen and send the patient to
medical post giving oxygen on the way.
• Obtain medical assistance as quickly as
possible.

8. Safety Precautions in case of
Fire/Explosion due to Gas
• Use wet gunny bag, jet of steam or Nitrogen
in case of minor fire.
• In case of major fire, inform fire brigade.
• Arrange for cooling of adjacent pipes and
structures.
• Reduce gas pressure, inject Nitrogen /
steam to dilute the gas concentration.
• Use proper extinguishing media.

9. Safety rules for Gas Line jobs
• Don’t lit fire or smoke in gaseous area.
• No one should take rest or sleep under gas pipeline.
• Display danger / caution boards at gas line junctions.
• No welding/cutting job should be carried out without
proper analysis (CO & explosive) and clearance from
competent authority.
• Use gas mask while working in an area having unsafe level
of CO concentration.
• Minimum two persons should work in gas hazardous
areas.
• Never enter a furnace, tank, gas main or other closed
space where gas is suspected to be present without prior
gas analysis.

10. • Not less than three persons should work in boilers,
cellars and tunnels and must wear masks.
• Control rooms having Gas pipelines / impulse lines
should be properly ventilated.
• Low voltage spark proof electric lamps should be
used in enclosed gas areas.
• Use non sparking / grease coated tools for gas line
jobs.
• Blank plate must be placed after the valve for
isolation of a gas line / equipment.
• Gas line jobs should be undertaken as per written
safety protocol in day hours, except in emergency.
Safety rules for Gas Line jobs

11. CASES OF GAS DISASTERS
IN STEEL INDUSTRIES

12. • Due to gas exposure about 18 persons fell
down one after another and fear gripped
everyone.
• Gas had spread up to about 50-70 mtr.
from work site.
• EMD personnel wore gas masks and put
back the chain into wheel for subsequent
operation.
1.0 GAS LEAKAGE IN BF GCP - RSP

13. Incident.
GCP unit #4 was planned to be taken into line in `B`
shift.
Raw gas side goggle valve was opened.
For operating clean gas side goggle valve de-
clamping operation started. People were exposed to
gas leaking at a pr. of 300 mm WC.
The operation was being done in a haste. The chain
slipped out of wheel.
1.0 GAS LEAKAGE IN BF GCP - RSP

17. Change introduced in operating practice:
• The chain guard was put which was not existing earlier.
• During goggle valve operation, wearing of gas masks was
made compulsory.
• Line pr. was made mandatory to be brought down to about
150 mmWC.
• Presence of stand –by ambulance and a rescue team from
Fire services is being ensured .

18. • Hub-Zug being tied with a hook in goggle valve to facilitate
pulling in case it stucks half-way.
• Presence of mechanical and all other supporting agencies
being ensured.
• Persons required during goggle operation only were
allowed.

19. 2. Falling of RCOG Bleeder stack.
Incident.
• NB 1000 RCOG bleeder stack had got corroded and
developed a hole of about 150 mtr dia at about 10-12 mtr
from ground level. Incident for replacing the bleeder stack
was in process.
• In July 2000 around 2 pm, excess gas was being bleed
through this bleeder stack. A part of gas was leaking
through the hole.
• During lightening the leaking gas caught fire and before
anything could be done, the stack fell down, necessarily
escaping the charged gas lines to modernization units.
2.0 FALLING OF RCOG BLEEDER STACK -
RSP

21. 3.0 Explosion in LD Gas holder -
RSP
• Occurred in 1997
• Loss of property due to extensive
damage
• Cause was infiltration of air in to
holder (high Oxygen in LD Gas)
• Spark in ESP during export of LD Gas
caused fire
• Fire travelled back to holder leading to
explosion

23. ESP

24. Dust Catcher Platform
6th March 2007, 11.35 AM
4.0 BF GAS LEAKAGE FROM BF-IV DUST
CATCHER - BSP

25. Case Briefing
After filling the dust into four dump
cars, dust valve could not be closed
Heavy BF gas leakage at
the dust catcher platform
3 Casualties
1 Fatal

26. • Due to the absence of any level sensor, valve closing
is totally dependent on the skill & experience of the
operator. Slight delay in closing can cause heavy
leakage of BF gas.
• Dust valve motor was found out of foundation &
all coupling bolts except one were broken.
• Slight delay in reducing the Blast to 0.25-0.3 kg/cm2
from 1kg/cm2
• No gas detection & alarm system was installed.
• Insufficient escape routes.
• No system of checking of dust
valves before operation.
Observations

27. Recommendations
• Dust catcher winch drive should be shifted to safer
platform to prevent people from any gas exposure.
• A joint inspection of dust valve winch drive should
be done by Opr, Elect & Mech before every dust
valve operation.
• Automatic CO gas monitor with alarm system
should be installed on the dust valve platform.
• Before entering into gas prone area it should be
ensured that gas conc. is within the safe limits.
• Provision of wind indicator may be made

28. 5.0 CHIMNEY FAILURE IN SMS-I - BSP
27th March 2002, 7.30 P.M.
SMS-I Twin Hearth Furnace No. 4
Casualties Nil
Chimney collapsed on NB 1000 Coke
Oven gas line at the roof of SMS-I & sheared
the gas line into two pieces. Profuse gas
leakage started from one part and the other
part caught fire. Massive damage to the
structure occurred.

29. ACTIONS TAKEN
• EMD, Fire Brigade & CISF were called.
• L.D. Gas Export was stopped.
• Consumers were asked to cut down the gas
consumption.
• Network gas pressure was reduced to 300
mmwc from 600 mmwc
• Feeder I,II gate valves of SMS-I were closed
manually.
• Nitrogen purging started.
• Fire could be extinguished after 3.5 hours.
• Feeder I,II gate valves were blanked.

30. Recommendations
• All Chimney’s of the plant to be inspected
periodically.
• Chimney height to be reduced to 60 meters
• Chimney to be anchored properly.
• Gas line at SMS-I roof to be rerouted.
• Quick isolation mechanisms to be introduced in
gas network
• Emergency preparedness plan to be updated

31. 6.0 Rupture/Explosion of clean BF
Gas header - BSL(1994)
• On-line cladding done on BF Gas header to
arrest gas leakage
• Leakage persisted even after cladding
• Patch welding again carried out on the same
spot
• Following power failure, BF Gas grid pressure
shot up.
• Pipeline burst resulting in severe gas leakage
in the area leading to gas poisoning.
• Three executives succumbed to gas poisoning.

32. Conclusion
Hazards can be controlled, if we
follow the safe work procedure.
One error can cause extensive
damage to the plant & may toll
human lives

33. 7.0. EXPLOSION INSIDE
COOLING ZONE OF CA LINE
FURNACE
(IN 3RD AND 4TH STOREY) OF
CRM DURING SHUT DOWN
CONDITION ON 05.05.2012

34. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS
• CA LINE OF CRM WAS RUNNING SMOOTHLY TILL END
OF C-SHIFT OF 27.04.2012.
• CA LINE OF CRM WENT DOWN FOR NO MATERIAL ON
A-SHIFT OF 28.04.2012.
• MAIN DOOR, SLIDING DOOR, STAGE-II DOOR WAS
OPEN.
• INDIVIDUAL BURNER CLOSED AND SPOOL
DISCONNECTED ON 28.04.2012 A-SHIFT.
• ON 30.04.2012 A-SHIFT 10 NOS TR CHANGED
• GRINDING OF DEFLECTOR ROLL-I WAS DONE AND ROLL
WAS CHANGED.

35. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS
• ON 03.05.2012 A-SHIFT LINE WAS DOWN FOR NO
MATERIAL. STAGE-I THREADING AND WELDING
DONE NEAR THE MAIN DOOR.
• ON 03.05.2012 B-SHIFT LINE WAS DOWN FOR NO
MATERIAL. DOOR WAS CLOSED. NITROGEN
PURGING STARTED.
• ON 05.05.2012 A-SHIFT LINE WAS DOWN FOR NO
MATERIAL AND HOUSEKEEPING WAS DONE AT
FURNACE SIDE.
• ON 03.05.2012 B-SHIFT 09.15PM FURNACE
SUDDENLY EXPLODED.

36. OBSERVATIONS
• AFTER EXPLOSION AT 09.15PM THE SPOOL
PIECE INTERCONNECTING SYNTHESIS GAS
AND NITROGEN TO MAKE PROTECTIVE GAS
WAS FOUND TO BE IN POSITION WITH BOTH
END FLANGES CONNECTED.
• ONE NO OF HAND GLOVEIN BURNING
CONDITION WAS REMOVED BY THE FIRE
PERSONNEL AT ABOUT 09.50PM FROM 3RD
AND 4TH STOREY ENTRY SIDE DOOR OF CA
LINE.

37. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
• SIREN FOR ALARM DURING NITROGEN FAILURE WAS FOUND
NOT WORKING.
• NO NITROGEN WAS COMING IN THE MIXING STATION OF CA
LINE NEAR FURNACE.
• SPOOL PIECE WAS FOUND DISCONNECTED FROM SYNTHESIS
GAS FLANGE
• SYNTHESIS GAS WAS LEAKING FROM LINE THROUGH
SYNTHESIS GASSAFETY VALVE AND SHUT OFF VALVE WERE
CLOSED.
• ON TEST LEAKING SYNTHESIS GAS WAS FOUND TO CONTAIN
100% EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE.
• NB 150 NITROGEN PIPELINE NEAR COL.J-10 NEAR HSM AT THE
END OF THE BAY WAS FOUND TO BE RUPTURED TO A LENGTH
OF 3.0 METERS.

38. ANALYSIS
CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCES OF HAPPENING
• SPOOL PIECE CONNECTING NITROGEN LINE TO
SYNTHESIS GAS WAS LYING CONNECTED.
• POWER FAILURE OCCURRED AT AROUND 06.50 PM
LEADING TO NITROGEN FAILURE SUDDENLY.
• LEAKING SYNTHESIS GAS FROM VALVES GOT FILLED
UP IN PLACE OF NITROGEN IN THE CA LINE FURNACE
AND IN PIPELINES OF SIZE NB150/NB60/NB40/NB20
IN DIFFERENT STAGES OF CA LINE FURNACE.
• AFTER RESUMPTION OF NITROGEN AT 09.15PM
PRESSURIZED NITROGEN AT 1500 MM OF WG FROM
NB150 NITROGEN LINE PUSHED THE SYNTHESIS GAS
CONTAINING 75% HYDROGEN AND 25% NITROGEN.

39. CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCES OF HAPPENING
• VELOCITY OF SYNTHESIS GAS INCREASED BY
NITROGEN PUSHING INSIDE THE PIPELINE WITH
DIRECTION CHANGES.
• AS DOOR OF STAGE-I WAS LYING OPEN SINCE
03.05.2012 A-SHIFT, EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WAS
ALREADYLYING FORMED INSIDE AT ALL STAGES
DURING NITROGEN FAILURE.
• THIS EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE LEAD TO EXPLOSION
INSIDE CA LINE FURNACE AT DIFFERENT STORIES.
ANALYSIS

40. RECOMMENDATIONS
SHORT TERM:
• SPOOL PIECE BETWEEN SYNTHESIS GAS AND NITROGEN LINE TO BE
TATALLY TAKEN OUT FROMPOSITION BY OPENING BOTH SIDE
FLANGES. BOTH SIDE OPEN FLANGES OF PIPELINE TO BE BLANKED.
• NITROGEN OPERATED SAFETY SHUT OFF VALVE SYNTHESIS GAS
SHOULD BE REPLACED.
• SYNTHESIS GAS SHUT OFF VALVE AFTER SAFETY VALVE SHOULD BE
REPLACED.
• SIRENBLOWING DURING NITROGEN FAILURE SHOULD BE
RESTORED.
• MANUAL FLOW METER IN THE SYNTHESIS GAS LINE TO BE
RESTORED.
• DURING NITROGEN FAILURE SERIES OF RED LIGHT SHOULD
GLOWIN THE ENTRY SIDEAND DELIVERY SIDE OF CA LINE.

41. LONG TERM
• ADEQUATE SIZE PRESSURIZED NITROGEN
TANK SHOULD BE PROVIDED AS BUFFER AND
CONNECTED TO THE SYSTEM FOR SUCH
NITROGEN FAILURE AS IS PROVIDED IN SSM
DECARB LINE.
• MANUAL FLOW METER SHOULD BE PROVIDED
IN SYNTHESIS GAS LINEAND PROTECTIVE GAS
LINE.
RECOMMENDATIONS

42. Nitrogen
Syn. gas
CA LINE FURNACE
MIX
STN
PG
SPOOL PIECE

43. 8.0. EXPLOSION IN CCD RSP
(SPRAY SATURATOR AREA)
CASUALITIES: 4 PERSONS SUSTAINED BURN
INJURY.

44. GAS SECTION OF AMMONIA SULPHATE PLANT
FC-A FC-B
AC-A AC-B
Spray
Saturators
A B
ETP-4
Drain
N2

45. 1.
 Explosion in CCD site-C , Spray saturator area.
 Four persons sustained burnt injury.
 No fatal.
2.
 Saturator , Acid Catcher & Final Cooler was
down.
 Line depressurised.
 Blanking done.
 N2 purging done.
 CO/Explosive mixture test done & found nil.

46.  Resulted in Explosion on lighting up of the cutting
torch for surface preparation.
3. Reasons :
 No sufficient purging.
4. Change in practice:
 Additional purging facility by steam provided.
 Purging ensured physically.
 Testing done exactly at the location where hot work
has to be done.
 Ensure inert media during cutting/welding.

47. 9.0. OXYGEN DISASTER IN RINL
ON 13.06.2012

48. HUGE EXPLOSION IN SMS-II COMPLEX OXYGEN
UNIT
CASUALITIES: 16 PERSONS BURNT ALIVE. MANY
SERIOUSLY INJURED.
WORST EVER ACCIDENT IN STEEL INDUSTRY.

49. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS
• NEWLY BUILT OXYGEN COMPLEX WAS ON
TRIAL RUN.
• DURING BLOWING OXYGEN PRESSURE WAS
GETTING FLUCTUATED AND PRESSURE WAS
INADEQUATE.
• RESISTANCE FELT IN FILTER INSTALLED ON
OXYGEN PRS UNIT.
• HEAVY EXPLOSION AT 20.30 HRS CAUSING
SERIOUS CASUALITIES.

50. POSSIBLE REASONS
• RESISTANCE IN FILTER.
• FILTER ELEMENT SINTERED BRONZE CAN
WITHSTAND A P OF 3-5 KGS.
• MORE P CAUSED RUPTURE OF FILTER
ELEMENT
• HEAT GENERATED DUE TO FRICTION OF
OXYGEN WITH FILTER ELEMENT.
• RESULTED IN HUGE EXPLOSION.

51. REMEDIAL MEASURES

52. PRV
FILTER
CONVERTER
PG
PRS

53. Recent Industrial Disasters in India
Although there has been no tragedy on the scale of
Bhopal in the last two decades, there have been
innumerable gas leaks, explosions and accidents.
Despite the setting up of pollution control boards
and monitoring agencies, the lake of will to impose
punitive measures on industry means that industry
continues to violate safety norms. There is also a
vast unorganized sector that continues to endanger
not just the lives and health of its workers but also
the community at large. Exploitation and violation of
safety norms often go hand in hand, with poor and
vulnerable sections of society bearing the brunt.

54. June 13,2012
The worst –ever accident in the history of
Visakhapatnam steel plant (VSP), happened at 8.45
PM on 13 June 2012 .Nineteen persons including senior
officers were burnt alive following a huge explosion in
the recently commissioned oxygen plant in the steel
melting in unit 3. About 20 workers injured seriously
.The explosion occurred when the officials were
conducting a trial run of oxygen plant.

55. 2010
June 14: Nearly 103 persons fell sick after
inhaling chlorine gas leaking from a cylinder
stored in Bombay Port Trust (BPT) premises at
Sewri .

56. October 29 : The Jaipur oil depot fire broke out on
October 29 ,2009 at 7:30PM( IST) at the Indian oil
corporation (IOC) oil depot’s giant tank holding 8,000
Kiloliters of oil, in Sitapura Industrial Area on the
outskirts of Jaipur, Rajasthan killing 12 people and
injuring over 200. The blaze continued to rage out of
control for over a week after it started and during the
period half a million people were evacuated from the
area. The incident occurred when petrol was being
transferred from the India Oil Corporation’s oil depot
to pipe line .There were at least 40 IOC employees at
the terminal , situated close to the Sanganer air port
(Jaipur air port) when it caught fire with an
explosion. Crude oil worth 500 crore (1 corer = 10
million) was burned. Beside huge damaged to

57. 2008
June 6: Explosion in the Indian petrochemicals
Corporation limited (IPCL, Nagothane
Maharashtra), four died and 46 injured. The
explosion occurred due to a fire in the plant where
around 205 maintenance workers were present.
Contact of Hydrocarbon and welding gas in the
plant caused the accident.

58. 2007
5 March: A measured fire broke out in the Indian oil
corporation’s Guwahati refinery’s crude distilling unit
.The fire, caused due to leakage unit 1 of the
refinery.

59. 2006
25 October: Reliance Industries refinery,
Jamnagar, Gujarat, Leaked hot vacuum gas oil
catches fire in air , 2 died .
19 September: Ravi organic Ltd., Muzzaffarnager,
UP, Gas release 1 died.
18 July: Anjana Explosives Ltd. Peddakaparthi
Nalgonda District, Andhra Pradesh, Spillage of haz
chem., 5 died.
29 March: Kanoria chemicals and Industries Ltd.
Renukoot, Sonebhadra, Utter Pradesh, Chlorine
release, 6 died 23 injured.

60. December: Mathura Refinery, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh,
fire, 1 died.
28 November: Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Unit-V IDA
Pashamylaram Medak Dist., Andhra Pradesh, Indian Oil
Corporation, Explosion while drying cloxaciline sodium 1
died 4 injured.
October 4: Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd., Sanathnagarn,
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh Explosion / fire, 2 died, 2
injured.
November 3: Orchid chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. , Alathur Kancheepuram dist. ,Tamil Nadu explosion
with fire , 2 died 4 injured.
15 June: Gujarat Refinery, fire
5 March: Matrix Laboratory Ltd., Unit – I, Kazipally,

61. 2004
October 30: Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Mohali,
Punjab fire in dryer room, 1 died, 2 injured.
October 29: Gujarat Refinery, Vadodara, Gujarat,
Explosion in slurry settler, 2 died 13 injured.
September 30: Explosion kills 10 people at Bhushan
Steel’s factory in Sahibabad, Uttar Pradesh, when
bombs contained in scrap originating in Iraq
exploded .Indian law prohibits the import of scrap
from war –zones .

62. July 29: Two matador trucks carrying cartons of date –
expired drugs and pesticides were dumped and set
ablaze by officials of Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd in
Sankheri village, near Bhopal. Villagers residing within
20 meters of the site complained of breathing
problems, stomach ache, diarrhea, nausea and
vomiting. Four people belonging to the family of a
farm labourer living nearby fell unconscious were
hospitalised.

63. July 18: A chlorine leak at 6 pm chemplast
Sanmar’s chlorine plants in Mettur
Dam,Tamilnadu , sent 23 people ,including a 22-
day – old child, to hospital. More than 50 people
are reported to have fainted after inhaling the
chlorine fumes. The state regulatory authorities,
police and district officials cooperated with the
company to hush the matter .No criminal
proceedings have been initiated against
chemplast.

64. July 13: Bombay High Court appoints retired
judge Dr. Dhanuka commissioner to
investigate possible toxic exposure among
employees working or having worked for
Monsanto India Ltd.at its Lonavla and
Silvassa plant.
July 6: A fire at Hindustan insecticides Ltd’s
Toluene fire, endosulfan plant in Eloor,
Kerala, guts the plant. More than 250 people
exposed to toxic fumes from the fire. The
company had no onsite or offsite emergency
plan, and the fire hydrant was not working.
The company dismissed the fire as a major
accident averted. No systematic medical
monitoring or aid was offered for victims.

65. May 31: Chemical factory, Dombivilli, Maharashtra,
Hexane release –fire, 1 died and 8 injured.
April 28: Anil Enterprises, Zakhira, Rohtak, Haryana
Fire in LPG fired oven, 6 died and 2 injures.
April 17: Three employees at the waste
Immunization Plant in Tarapur, Maharashtra,
exposed to radiation from small bottle of diluted but
highly radioactive waste.

66. April 6: One person killed and 29 affected following a
toxic gas leak at the Jaipur Golden Transport
Company’s go down on Roshanara Road, north Delhi
.Toxic gas is released after water was used to douse a
fire mixes with aluminum phosphide stored inside the
go down. The police find that the firm does not have a
valid license to handle toxic chemicals .There
managers arrested.
February 24: Explosion at ammonium per chlorate
facility in the SHAR complex, Sriharikota , kills 36
people .SHER is India’s premier space research
station.

67. January 5: Residents of Gawanpada township in
Chembur, a Mumbai suburb, complain of
breathlessness after a whitish power is emitted from
the Hindustan petro chemicals Ltd plant . HPCL’s
general manager visits the township and sends
sweepers in to clean up the power. A representative
from the public relations company hired by HPCL claims
the silica power is harmless.

68. 2002
December 20: IPCL, Gandhar, Gujarat, 18 workers &
300 villagers, in Jageshwar affected.
December 24: Three workers at a distillery at the
Chittur Cooperative sugar Mills in Palakkad, Kerala,
die after inhaling carbon dioxide while repairing a
pipeline .Workers allege absence of safety measures
and medical facilities at the factory premises.
November 8: Three killed, two hurt in an explosion at
Parakh Food Products at Kurkumbh Industrial Estate
near Daund in Maharashtra. The fire starts when
welders, repairing a pipeline connecting edible oil
tanka, cause the oil to overheat .Workers are flung
high in to the air with the impact of the explosion.
September 5: GACL, Vadodara, Gujarat, Chlorine
gas explosion,4 died and 20 injured

69. September 22: Six young women, aged between 17
and 20, and 54 suffer serious burns when a fire breaks
out at a match factory in Mudukkumeidanpatti, near
Kovilpatti in Tamil Nadu.
July 30: one person killed and 12 hospitalised following
a gas leak at RPG life Sciences Ltd’s Pimpri facility
located in the premises of Hindustan Antibiotics Limited
,Pimpri, Maharashtra . The company claims the gas,
emitted during manufacture of the drug Spirunolactons,
is not poisonous.

70. 2001
August 26: Five women employed at the Gujarat Clay
Mills in Kurla, Mumbai, hospitalised after inhaling
fumes caused by grinding a ‘blackish’ material. The
dean of Sion Hospital, where the women were
admitted, said they were suffering from
methhaemoglobinia. Workers say there was no
proper ventilation at the mill.

71. August 17: Twenty –two killed in a blast at the Tamil
Nadu Industrial Explosive Ltd plant near Katpadi in
Vellore. The accident occurred during the crimping
process for making detonators used in qurries.
35,000 detonators were stored in the building at the
time of the explosion. Two people had earlier died at
the unit.
May 31: Twenty –two young labourers, mainly from
Bengal, die after a gas cylinder bursts at a gold-
processing unit in Mumbai’s crowded Bhuleshwar
area. The gas cylinder had been illegally procured
and was fake. The laborers’ were unable to escape
the raging fire as the owner had locked them in the
room at night

72. THANK YOU