Fiscal Term Paper v5

Controlling the Peak of the Wave:
Fiscal and Societal Effects of Gender Imbalances in Asia
and Strategies for Adaptation in the Medium Term
Term Paper
By Alexander Fleming, MA ‘09
“Confronting Long-Term Fiscal Challenges and Risks: A Policy Seminar”
2nd Semester – Spring 2009 – Professor Heller
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Washington, DC

Controlling the Peak of the Wave: Fiscal and Societal Effects of Gender Imbalances in
Asia and Strategies for Adaptation in the Medium Term
By Alexander Fleming
Executive Summary:
The ‘surplus males’ in Asia are now reaching reproductive and marriage age,
and world governments will have to deal with them for the next 20-30 years until
long term policy actions begin to affect the adult populations. Sex-selective
abortions and technological development allowed the culturally ingrained son
preference in Asian societies, notably India and China, to be expressed by all levels
of society. Initial studies in the 1990’s identified the problem, but at that time the
scope and duration was unclear. Follow-up research shows that half-hearted actions
by some governments may be taking hold, but for this generation of young adults
the problem is unsolvable; mitigation is not an option.
The 80-100 million surplus males in Asia, with numbers peaking in the next
20 years, will have severe demographic, economic, social, and security implications
that are not yet understood. Governments are faced with this wave, and the only
way to get over it is through clear focus on adaptation strategies. The consistent use
of social education, family planning, urban welfare support, pension systems, labor
force management, migration strategies, and military recruitment will allow the
wave to pass without the worst security risks of terrorism and political instability
being realized. Ignoring the problem, however, could have severe and far-reaching
consequences.
Term Definitions:
Sex Ratio at Birth (SRB) – number of ‘live births’ of males vs. females in any time
period, notably only available in countries with accurate primary statistic reporting
and with a consistent definition of ‘live birth’

Population Sex Ratio (PSR) – number of adult males for every 100 adult females
living in a society, generally based on census data (e.g. PSR = 105, would mean 105
men for every 100 women)
Expected Population Sex Ratio – projection of sex ratio based on historical birth
rates, life expectancy, mortality, and intrinsic growth rates for a country
Birth Deficit (Male or Female) – difference in male or female births, expressed as the
number ‘missing’ in one sex for the imbalance (raw number or percentage of all
births)
Missing Females – number of adult females not present in a country or region, based
on the difference between population sex ratio and expected population sex ratio
Bare Branches – the translation of a Chinese expression that describes young men
whose branch of the family tree will never grow leaves or bear fruit because they
will not find a marriage partner or produce offspring
1) Introduction
The creation of a cohort of surplus males in Asia began in the late 1980’s
based on technological innovations that allowed the expression of existing cultural
predispositions. The existence of this cohort was identified at the normal speed of
census, data analysis and demographic research, an caused an alarm call by
academics in the 1990’s, but by then the surplus males were well on their way to
adulthood.1 The quantification of this problem continues to this day, and in the
mean time the cohort has begun to reach marriageable age only to find no partners
available.2 The certainty of this situation means that governments and policy
makers must concern themselves with adaptation to this issue, combined with
1 Klasen, “A Turning Point in Gender Bias in Mortality,” 285.
2 Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace,” 9.

mitigation policies to reduce future occurrence. Policies along these lines have come
in various forms, and with unclear levels of effectiveness.
This paper examines the root causes of gender imbalances in human
populations, including the topic of son preference, cultural aspects of the problem,
and technological change effects. Key countries are identified and a few will be used
as case studies for the seriousness of the problem. Historical and current
measurement issues are discussed, along with the bibliographic history of relevant
examinations. The current status of populations is compared with previous
assessments, and the effects of this surplus male cohort are examined in several
areas. No quantitative modeling has been done, but this paper speculates on the
fiscal implications of the cohort based on the data and analysis of cited research
efforts. Finally, I propose several policy actions for adaptation and discuss the
effectiveness of current mitigation efforts.
It will become clear that some countries are aware of this problem and taking
action to affect birthrates.3 The effectiveness of these measures is up for debate, but
the importance of taking them is implicitly acknowledged by large nations such as
India and China.4 The key uncertainty in this debate is what to do about nations,
such as Afghanistan or Pakistan, that have significant male surpluses, coupled with
regime instability and insufficient social structures to mitigate the imbalance.
Andrea Den Boer asserts that one of the most fundamental strategic principles is
‘unequal access to resources leads to conflict.’5 These issues, along with potential
problems, are discussed in the conclusion.
The natural population sex ratio (PSR) for human populations is
approximately 1 to 1, but it does not start out this way at birth.6 Historical
observations over 300 years have confirmed a sex ratio at birth of approximately
3 Hesketh, “Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations,” 13274.
4 Den Boer, 11.
5 Den Boer, Bare Branches, 3.
6 Wikipedia, Human Sex Ratio, 1.

105 (males to 100 females), which slowly approaches 100 throughout adulthood,
and eventually leads to a surplus of females in old age.7 This reference scenario is
acknowledged by demographers and is compared with statistics of live births, which
are sometimes unevenly reported,8 and census reports in order to study the
development of populations. When researchers begin to see higher birth ratios from
116 to 120, such as the ones observed in China, India, and South Korea in the 1980s,
it is clear that either something unnatural is occurring or there are massive
reporting problems.9 There is also evidence that whole continents have skewed
PSRs away from normal, since the overall ratio of 104.2 in Asia as of 2001 suggests
almost 80 million more adult men than women.10
2) Historical Imbalances, Root Causes, and Manifestations
There are documented historical cases and legitimate reasons for distorted
sex ratios. Den Boer and Hudson speculate that these are generally due to military
invasion, and the resulting physical losses of men and social losses of women, or
they happen as a result of chronically fragile subsistence systems that drive changes
in the priorities of family labor and planning.11 The Soviet Union experienced a
massive deficit of men in the World War II era, and even today the life expectancy
difference between men and women in Russia was almost 14 years.12 These issues
only affect the adult population, and only secondarily change overall birth rates, but
will eventually correct themselves. Paraguay gave an even more intense example
after the 1864-1870 war, when the post-war census revealed a male population of
approximately 34,000 as opposed to a female population of 71,000.13 This PSR of 41
is extreme, but corrected to normal in the years that followed. A dramatic example
of a surplus of males occurred in medieval Portugal among young nobles seeking
glory and titles. These bands apparently led wars and territorial expansion that
7 Hesketh, 13271.
8 Attane, “Impact of a Female Deficit in China,” 757.
9 Hesketh, 13272.
12 Curtis ed., “Demographics,” 5.
13 Whigham, “Paraguayan Rosetta Stone,” 185.

resulted in significant political instability for the government.14 These issues,
however, are not the ones driving the distorted ratios in Asia.
East Asian, South Asian, Middle Eastern and North African populations
possess a deep cultural tradition of ‘son preference’ in families.15 The historical
value of women is constantly questioned in these cultures, which is typified in a
Chinese proverb that states: ‘raising a daughter is like watering a plant in another
man’s garden.’16 This strong desire for a male child possibly began as an economic
and labor reality,17 but since then has drawn several other justifications. These
include: higher wage earning potential of male children, and the support of elderly
parents; the tradition of continuing the ‘family line’; rules of inheritance; and
burdens of traditional dowry systems.18 Societies with large families experience this
problem to a lesser degree, because the sheer number of children increases the odds
of having a son, but the severe effects are noted in ‘small family’ situations.19
Sex preference is manifested in several different ways including sex-selective
abortion, abandonment of female children, and infanticide. Any social or public
policy issue that makes it more difficult for small families to have daughters
exacerbates these issues.20 Additionally, changes in population fertility combined
with any family planning laws makes the pressure even more intense on couples.21
The 1980’s also brought the first widely available ultrasounds and pre-natal sex
determination, causing an explosion in sex-selective abortion and immediately
rasing the SRB in affected countries.22 Parents were able to apply a lethal
combination to express son preference earlier in the process, reducing the ‘financial
15 Hesketh, 13272.
17 Ibid., 64.
18 Hesketh, 13272.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Attane, 757.
22 Hesketh, 13272.

and emotional’ cost. This ‘rational family planning strategy’ took hold and
apparently had excellent returns. 23
3) Current Status and Literature
Sex Ratios measured in the 1980s and 1990s by the UN and other
international agencies confirmed the situation, despite arguments that the SRB
numbers were a result of underreporting of female births in the rural areas.24
Comparisons of expected sex ratios with no gender bias in UN stable population
models yielded clear results for key countries. For the year 1990 in selected
countries:
Country Actual PSR Expected PSR Missing Women
(in millions)
China 106.0 99.7 34.6
India 107.9 98.6 38.4
Pakistan 110.5 99.8 4.3
Afghanistan 105.9 96.5 0.6
Total for Comparable High Deficit Countries = 86.8
(Table adapted from: Klasen, 292-293)
This situation obviously caused some note, and articles published by Amartya Sen in
1989 and 1990 first called these women ‘missing.’25 Different estimates and models
put the deficit at different levels, but it was clear that birth ratios were not helping
immediately. Measurements in the late 1990s lead to more significant conclusions
with our selected countries, which were chosen to fit into our later discussion.26
The summary statistics for 2000 are:
23 Attane, 757.
24 Ibid.
25 Klasen, 285.
26 By no means are these countries the only ones that have deficits, just the ones with notably high
percentages, changes in the decade of the 1990s, or particular strategic importance for future
political instability. Klasen (292-293) contains the complete list of deficit countries.

Country Actual PSR Expected PSR Missing Women
(in millions)
China 106.7 100.1 40.9
India 107.2 99.3 39.1
Pakistan 108.1 100.3 4.9
Afghanistan 105.4 96.4 1.0
Total for Comparable High Deficit Countries = 93.8
(Table adapted from: Klasen, 292-293)
The assumptions involved in the construction of these tables suggest an absolute
number of missing women in 2000 of between 65-110 million, but the exact number
cannot be given because of mortality and fertility assumptions. One thing that
Klasen concludes is that some countries, such as Bangladesh, have improved their
situation in the decade, but India and China’s deficits have become more
pronounced.27
India’s PSR of 107.2 has several characteristics that are unique to the South
Asian society, though the principle of son preference is highly similar. Both Chinese
and Indian parents expect their sons to grow up and care for them in old age.28
There are also notes of shame and pressure put on Indian women for bearing
daughters, and attempts to educate young Indian men on the status of women.29 Den
Boer and Hudson theorize that the unique social boundaries in Indian society,30 in
the form of the solidly stratified caste system, intensify the normal sex selection that
occurs. The intense marriage restrictions placed on Indian women to marry equally
or up mean that the men in lower castes have even fewer chances to find a partner.
Indian PSR also has notable regional variations that focus the problem in one area.
The breakdowns show that most of India’s imbalances are focused in the north and
northwestern states and in higher caste families. The presence of so many surplus
males in these areas has shown statistically significant relationships to high crime
27 Klasen, 286.
28 Hesketh, 13272.
29 O’Rourke, “China/India,” 4.

areas.31 Power in the northern provinces is controlled by organized criminal gangs
that are at a level of near legitimacy and presence in government.32 This situation
has high potential to contribute to sectarian and ethnic violence along with social
instability. If you couple this with the male surplus in Pakistan, and the situation in
Kashmir takes on a whole new dimension.33
The current trend of 40.9 million (2000) surplus Chinese males is made more
intense by several factors unique to China. Chinese society took coupled
demographic, technological and social policies in such a way that pushed the SRB to
change incredibly fast with a growing population. This sped the creation of
imbalances. First, Chinese population growth and total population are imposing as a
result of the rapid industrialization and economic development of the last 20 years.
This intrinsic growth coupled with significant drops in fertility since 1970 are signs
of a changing society, but have also been observed in other countries undergoing
industrialization and rural-to-urban transitions.34 This fertility drop created a
perfect storm for sex preference pressure when the one-child policy was
implemented in 1979. Dropping fertility thus combined with state policy and local
reproductive norms to put overwhelming pressure on parents.35 The lack of male
children has even fueled an extensive human trafficking system based on abduction
and transfer of infant males to different rural areas.36 Finally, the sheer volume of
missing females in China, if not corrected, will begin to have a significant effect on
Chinese population decline based on projection modeling by Isabelle Attane.37 The
assumptions here are strong, but the thought experiment shows just how long-term
the effects of this imbalance could be.
32 Ibid.
34 Shen, “China’s Future Population and Development Challenges,” 32.
35 Murphy, “Fertility and Distorted Sex Ratios in Rural China,” 619.
36 Jacobs, “Chinese Hunger for Sons Fuels Boys’ Abductions,” 1.
37 Attane, 759.

The sex ratio in female deficit regions may already be declining, according to
UN Population Division projections.38 The peak, based on a report in 1999, occurred
in the 1990s, and after that the female deficit regions will begin dropping back down
towards the world average, though they will remain higher for decades. This is good
news, since Den Boer and Hudson link excess males to violence and political
instability, however for the next 20 years the problem is already in place. These
surplus males generally occupy the lowest class of society. They are generally
transients who are under or un-employed, and they live in colonies of bachelor
subcultures that have disturbingly intense tendencies for vice and violence. The 94
million of this class in China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan will have to be
managed through the peak of their wave, or they could cause unprecedented and
unforeseen problems on a regional or global scale.
4) Fiscal Effects
The effects of these surplus males fall into 4 general categories, with several
specific manifestations. These general categories have several associated fiscal
expenditure categories, which I will explore in the ‘worst case scenario’ mindset for
the government from a non-numerical point of view. The four (author-created)
effects categories are:
a. Demographic (population, fertility, etc…)
b. Economic (workforce, GDP, productivity, migration)
c. Social (crime, education, health care, pension)
d. Security (military, terrorism, political instability, illicit business)
Each of these categories carries specific medium-term implications, if this surplus
male cohort is to be managed as it slowly resolves itself.
38 Klasen, 286.

a. Demographic: It was noted earlier that these imbalances could have
significant effects on populations in the long term. The most extreme scenarios
could see birth rates dropping or some kind of mass migration solution. The fiscal
costs in this category will be related to continued family planning efforts,
enforcement of mitigation efforts, and incentive systems to encourage non-gender
biased selection. The use of ultrasounds in pre-natal sex determination is a key part
of this system, and this will have to be regulated as cultural limitations are
overcome. The government may be able to save money as the number of legal
abortions for murky reasons goes down, and public health expenditures will also go
down if the medical problems associated with illegal abortions can be reduced.
Fertility should have a neutral effect, since fertility changes in both India and China
appear to be in line with other industrialized and growing society’s. If the sex ratios
in femal deficit countries continue to get worse, then demographic issues that are
truly unpredictable will begin to come into play. The use of migration on a massive
scale to correct imbalances could result in overwhelming expenditures.39 The
unique aspects of a mostly female aging population could also have unexpected
costs.40
b. Economic: The presence of surplus males could be good for a country’s
workforce if they are effectively utilized. However, most of the men in question
possess minimal education and occupy migrant worker roles on the outskirts of
society. The training and externalities of housing this sheer volume of workers may
outweigh the positive value of their labor. The productivity of the economy as a
whole is probably not increased by the presence of surplus males, except with
regard to military operations (considered later). Migration could be a huge cost
drain, whether the answer is out-migration of males or in-migration of females.
Unfortunately most of these female deficit countries sit in the same part of the
world, and the only nearby countries with a surplus of females (Russia and former
Soviet Union) have enough culturally ingrained racism that mass pairings with low-
39 Storesletten, “Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration,” 300.
40 Rossi, “Sex and Gender in an Aging Society,” 142.

class Chinese and Indian men are not yet feasible.41 The overall fiscal cost in this
area is mixed.
c. Social: This is the one area where there will be significant short and
medium term costs that must be borne by the deficit countries. Den Boer and
Hudson make a convincing case that the surplus males create higher crime rates and
violence wherever they go.42 The only way to overcome this natural tendency is to
pour money intro structured living environments, primary and secondary
education, social safety nets, and work projects for these males to make them
productive members of society. The government will not be able to conjure women
out of nowhere, but there are possible revenue sources from a legal and well
regulated sex-industry and sanctioned ‘vice sprees’ to use a phrase from Den Boer.
Health care will need to be provided for these bachelor groups, or they could risk
spreading infectious and sexually transmitted diseases. Depending on the length of
time that the problem exists, then some kind of pension system maybe required to
support these people, but this may be lumped into the expenditures of a social
safety net if the government chooses to purse that path.
d. Security: This area could go one of three ways. These surplus males are
ideal for recruitment into national military and military-type structures. They would
provide ample supply of conscripts for then next 20 years, and this would give them
some legitimacy, control, and a useful occupation in society. The alternate case is
that they provide an ideal recruiting population for terrorist and extreme religious
groups, who would use their influx of numbers to destabilize society. The cases of
Afghanistan and Pakistan are used to illustrate this, since several mountainous areas
hold campus for these disaffected young men. The middle case is the criminal path,
where the cohort is a supply for street gangs and mafia enforcement, and conducts
illegal drug trades, human trafficking, and other illicit activities. Neither of the last
two options are good for the stability of society, and could result in extreme fiscal
41 Based on author’s personal research and observations in mating trends in the former Soviet Union.

costs to suppress or control. There is a political problem because the military cannot
expand indefinitely without attracting the interest of nearby neighbors. The push to
find glory for this huge force may push the government security strategy in a war-
like direction, even if it was never intended that way.
5) Policy Actions for Adaptation
This surplus male population exists now all over Asia, and the situation will
evolve whether governments chose to deal with it or not. China and India have both
begun legal efforts to correct sex ratios at birth, but cultural leanings remain strong.
Laws against all manifestations of son preference exist, but they are not uniformly
or strictly enforced, so the problem may not be over as soon as the most optimistic
projections.43 Governments must simultaneously spend on mitigation and support
adaptation efforts to control the peak of this surplus cohort in the next 20 years.
First, efforts must be directed at shifting social and cultural tendencies to
change son preference. There are several ways to attack this, including the already
existing legal restrictions on pre-natal sex identification, but these must be strictly
enforced.44 The government could make efforts to reduce son preference by
increasing social support and welfare for the elderly, reducing the need for children
to be responsible. There could also be a legal effort to reduce the use of dowries,
which add a burden for daughters on a family. Efforts to increase the education and
training of women will increase their value in society, and this coupled with their
scarcity could force serious social change. Governments can support this change
with marketing and public education campaigns to reduce son preference.
Second, governments must find useful and supported occupations for these
disaffected cohorts of men. Military recruitment can be used up to a certain point,
but education may need to fill the rest of the gap. The country must not allow these
cohorts to fall into the hands of terrorist ideologies, or risk political upheaval and
43 Hesketh, 13274.
44 Ibid.

instability. The overarching priority here must be legitimizing these men in society
and bringing them off the edges to give them value and a place in the social order.
This is an extreme challenge, given the cultural mores in place, however it is the
only way to ensure they will do more good than harm. The attitude change this will
require from the rest of society to adjust may be more traumatic for cultures.
Third, international bodies must support innovative migration arrangements
to find stable situations where these ‘Bare Branches’ can have a chance for fulfilling
lives, whether or not it involves families and children. This is especially important,
and could gain international attention, if the terrorism problems intensify in Asia. It
is clear that terrorist training camps draw from these cohorts and use exactly then
same techniques to give young men priorities and a place in the world. World
governments must fight a counter-indoctrination war with the surplus males, and
show them that they have a place in our world.
6) Conclusion
Surplus males are a legitimate security, economic and social concern in Asia.
Mitigation efforts must be pursued along with adaptation spending in order to
maintain stability through the peak of this wave. Chinese and Indian governments
are minimally aware of the problem, and are beginning to take action. The real
concern for the world lies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where surplus males are
funneled directly into violent extremist organizations or tribal conflict. If these
issues are not handled on a regional level, they will become problems of global scale.

Bibliography:
Attane, Isabelle. “The Demographic Impact of a Female Deficit in China, 2000-2050.”
Population and Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec. 2006); 755-770.
Clark, Shelley. “Son Preference and Sex Composition of Children: Evidence from
India.” Demography, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb., 2000); 95-108.
Curtis, Glenn E. editor. “Demographics” and “The Role of Women.”Russia: A Country
Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996.
Den Boer, Andrea M. and Valerie M. Hudson. Bare Branches: Security Implications of
Asia’s Surplus Male Population. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.
_____. “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest
States.” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002); 5-38.
Fargues, Philippe, Bryce Giddens and Joe Stork. “From Demographic Explosion to
Social Rupture.” Middle East Report, No. 190, Gender, Population, Environment (Sp. –
Oct., 1994); 6-10.
Hesketh, Therese and Zhu Wei Xing. “Abnormal Sex Rations in Human Populations:
Causes and Consequences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in the
United States of America, Vol. 103, No. 36 (Sep., 2006); 13271-13275.
Jacobs, Andrew. “Chinese Hunger for Sons Fuels Boys’ Abductions.” New York Times,
April 5th, 2009, national edition.
Klasen, Stephan and Claudia Wink. “A Turning Point in Gender Bias in Mortality? An
Update on the Number of Missing Women.” Population and Development Review, Vol.
28, No. 2 (June 2002); 285-312.
McNicoll, Geoffrey. “Policy Lessons of the East Asian Demographic Transition.”
Population and Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 2006); 1-25.
Murphy, Rachel. “Fertility and Distorted Sex Ratios in a Rural Chinese County:
Culture, State and Policy.” Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec.,
2003); 595-626.
O’Rourke, Breffni. “China/India: Demand For Male Children Creates Gender
Imbalance.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 17th, 2006.
Rossi, Alice S. “Sex and Gender in an Aging Society.” Daedalus, Vol. 115, No. 1, The
Aging Society (Winter, 1986); 141-169.

Shen, Jianfa. “China’s Future Population and Development Challenges.” The
Geographical Journal, Vol. 164, No. 1 (Mar., 1998); 32-40.
Storesletten, Kjetil. “Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration.” The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Apr., 2000); 300-323.
United Nations Population Division. Online database. Accessed April 2009.
http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm
University of Chicago Press. The Chicago Manual of Style. 15th ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Whigham, Thomas L. and Barbara Potthast. “The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New
Insights into the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870.” Latin American
Research Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999); 174-186.
Wikipedia (Online Encyclopedia). Human Sex Ratio. Accessed April 3rd, 2009.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_sex_ratio
Worobec, Christine D. Review of Women in Russia and Ukraine, by Rosalind Marsh.
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1997); 730-732.

Fiscal Term Paper v5

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (20)

Similar to Fiscal Term Paper v5

Similar to Fiscal Term Paper v5 (20)

Fiscal Term Paper v5