Lange Japan Aging

Intl – 401 GlobalStudies Capstone Project Winter, 2015
To What Extent are Social Factors Playing a
Role in the Rapid Aging of Japan?
Mitchel Lange
Instructor: Babafemi Akinrinade

Lange
2
Executive Summary
Due to constantly declining fertility rates in Japan over the last few decades, the
country’s population has aged at an abnormally rapid pace. To explore possible social factors
that could be playing an instrumental role in hastening the aging of Japan, demographics that
share similar views towards marriage are examined. The demographics are parasite singles,
hikikomori, and herbivore men. These three groups, encompassing different sections across the
young adult population of Japan, have each been noted to hold a disinterest in marriage and
relationships, instead preferring a lifestyle that emphasizes singleness. These demographics are
likely detrimental to Japanese fertility rates, but it turns out that the origin of the country’s
fertility decline dates back before any of these demographics were noted to exist. Examining
correlations between fertility declines in Japan with declines in marriage, factors affecting
marriage rates instead must be examined.
It is determined that the Japanese work culture, with long hours and strict ideologies
towards employees, provides a difficult environment for women to become mothers in. Working
women are forced to choose between a job and having children, with little opportunity for a
woman to have both a child and a stable career. This is labeled as an “either-or dilemma” and
this dilemma’s role in affecting marriage and fertility rates is examined. Policies established by
the government advocating fertility have also proven insufficient. It is concluded that significant
positive change in fertility will not take place unless changes in attitudes towards work take
place first and the situation for working mothers becomes more family friendly.

Lange
3
Introduction
In fall of 2013 an article describing the sex life (or lack thereof) of Japanese youngsters
began making waves on social media. The article throws out multiple statistics illustrating Japan
as a land of sex-deprived youth and claims that Japan’s serious issue of population decline is due
to a “flight from human intimacy”1. Following the path carved by a larger discourse, this article
highlighted a cultural phenomenon of Japan that contrasted with Western assumptions of sex and
the Internet ate it up. The article in question, The Guardian’s “Why have young people in Japan
stopped having sex?” by Abigail Haworth, currently stands at 200,000 shares and is the fourth
most read article the website has published this decade.2
This article is part of a larger discourse I’ve observed on the Internet where people tend
to pick at cultural idiosyncrasies of Japan for the value of humor. A Google search of “weird
Japan” brings up a multitude of sites established to collect examples of Japanese culture
foreigners find amusing or strange. If I type, “Why is Japan…” into Google, the site offers to
finish the queue with “…so weird”. A search of this term pulls up a throng of pages full of
foreigners racking their brains over kooky Japan and how it differs from the rest of the world.
Although all this is done in good humor, I worry peoples’ perspectives of Japan are being
influenced. Learning about a country from mere pictures on the Internet or articles meant to
emphasize cultural differences for humor can likely blur the reality of these idiosyncrasies. In the
case of this article, it purports the idea that changing levels of sexual desire is the reason the
Japanese population has shrunk so much. When speaking to classmates about my interest in
Japan and possible research topics one student explicitly asked me if I knew why Japanese
people weren’t having sex even though they were in the midst of a population crisis. Memories
1 Haworth, “Why Have Young People in Japan Stopped Having Sex?”
2 Sedghi, Arnett, and Moran, “The Guardian’s Top 100.”

Lange
4
of that viral article along with the wide range of “weird Japan” discourse I’ve read came to mind.
To become more educated on the issue and more readily prepared to dispel unrealistic notions
about Japan, specifically that low sexual desire is the cause of their population issue, I decided to
explore the issue of Japan’s rapidly aging society and what social factors were playing an
influential role.
Literature Review
A large portion of population research has centered its focus on investigating what factors
determine the age structure of a population. Out of factors suggested to be influential,
immigration, mortality, and fertility garner a considerable amount of attention. However, for
research specifically focused on the aging of populations, fertility is by far the factor that
receives the most attention. Rapid aging of a country can be economically detrimental. Aging
can cause stress on pension systems due to too many beneficiaries being supported by too few
taxpayers. Similarly, when a population is skewed towards the older generations, the ratio of
effective workers to effective consumers will be in favor of the consumers. This can lead to a
lower amount of resources and income available per capita.
Because it thins out the population of younger generations, fertility decline has the most
immediate hastening effect on the aging of a population, as opposed to mortality and
immigration. Also, in countries experiencing issues of population aging, governments are likely
to establish pro-fertility policies in order to advocate higher fertility while policies advocating a
decline in mortality are unrealistic. No country in the modern world would be able to advocate a
pro-mortality stance toward its population without taking severe backlash internationally.
Immigration can also help a nation offset population aging, but immigrants have been noted to

Lange
5
adapt to their host country’s fertility trends in the long run.3 Although a wave of immigrants can
help balance the age ratio in the short term, the fact they will eventually age as well as adapt to
local fertility trends means immigration is not an ideal solution to population aging.
Therefore, a large amount of literature on population aging focuses on analyzing fertility. Within
this context, fertility research has consisted of documentation and explanation of fertility decline
in efforts to aid the development of successful population policies to address changes in fertility.
This is achieved through multiple means, and is not limited to estimating factors impeding or
causing fertility decline, evaluating fertility trends, and carrying out surveys concerning various
attitudes around fertility and children. Topics of these surveys can concern opinions on
contraceptives and family planning, attitudes towards having children, fertility intentions, and
quantifying fertility histories, to name a few.
Fertility also plays a primary role in the demographic transition model. This is important
because a country’s economic development and progress through demographic transitions can
lead to fundamental changes of its age structure. Although the demographic transition was
originally created with only 4 stages, sequentially consisting of an equilibrium of high birth and
death rates, then a stage of falling death rates, a stage of falling birth rates, and then a final
equilibrium of low birth and death rates, an additional fifth stage has been proposed by scholars.
This proposed new stage involves birth rates falling below death rates and can help explain
declines in fertility developed countries around the world are experiencing. Although the ideal
rate for replacement is 2.1 births per woman, Japanese and South Korean 2012 total fertility rates
(TFR) were respectively 1.3 and 1.4.4 Europe has also experienced a significant wave of fertility
3 Lee and Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem?”
4 World Bank, Fertility Rate, Total (births per Woman).

Lange
6
decline, with the average TFR of the European Union being 1.58 in 2012.5 Even though TFR
varies considerably between countries in Europe, Eurostat shows us that average fertility in the
European Union has been below the replacement rate since at least 1990.6 This suggests that the
transition into a stage of low fertility is not temporary and could be signatory of a greater
demographic shift, the proposed fifth stage of the demographic transition model.
Methodology
This paper follows the lead of other literature on population aging by focusing on the role
of fertility as a determinant in shaping a society’s age structure. Specifically, I examine three
demographics that have emerged in contemporary Japan and question their role in the aging of
the Japanese population. A common trend among these demographics is a lack of interest in
fostering romantic relationships. Youth among these groups have also been infamous for
adopting a lifestyle of permanent singleness, with no drive to become married. These
demographics can be seen as the section of the Japanese population that inspired the Guardian
article mentioned in this paper’s introduction. To answer the research question, “To what extent
are social factors playing a role in the rapid aging of Japan?” I test the hypothesis that the
common disinterest in marriage and romantic relationships among these demographics is of
concern and these groups are playing an instrumental role in the aging of Japan.
Answering this research question is important because it can help shed light on the causes
of population aging in Japan as well as possible solutions. Understanding this issue is important
due to the economic threats that can be posed by imbalances in a society’s age structure. As the
most extreme case of population aging, Japan is no exception to these issues and Japanese
scholars are questioning how to deal with economic threats of a rapidly aging population. Thus
5 Eurostat, Total Fertility Rate 2012.
6 Ibid.

Lange
7
this paper, with its focus on the causes of declining fertility in Japan, can provide useful to the
developing literature. Also, given that other developed nations have been experiencing
population aging in recent years as well, Japan can act as an important lesson. With the most
rapidly aging society in the world, the way Japan deals with its aging crisis can provide insight
for other countries on how to address an aging population.
Although I casually spoke with Japanese nationals during my stay in Japan about the
issue of population aging, and these conversations have undoubtedly affected my position on and
interpretation of the phenomenon, I did not conduct any official, unbiased surveys to collect data
from the Japanese. I did however utilize research conducted by various international
organizations. My primary sources include studies carried out by the World Health Organization,
the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration, to name a few. I also pull data
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, an institution of the Japanese
government, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency in the US government. All of this data is
quantitative and involved statistical surveys of Japanese citizens, except in the case of
International Organization for Migration which surveyed immigrants in Japan.
The fields my secondary sources are affiliated with include population aging, the
Japanese labor markets, the Japanese work culture, the study of emerging demographics in
contemporary Japan (in particular the social phenomena of herbivore men, hikikomori, parasite
singles, and freeters), population policies, and family planning in Japan. Using context analysis I
analyze how these fields overlap and pull information relevant to the issue of Japan’s rapidly
aging population. Utilizing context analysis allowed me to create a greater foundation for my
research faster and cheaper than if I were to conduct interviews and collect data on site. A
limitation of content analysis however is the amount of bias that can be inherent in the utilized

Lange
8
sources. I used sources that covered many fields in an effort to alleviate such biases. While some
of these sources indeed pulled from international comparisons and were not limited to population
aging merely within the context of Japan, this paper is primarily emic in nature. I analyze
population aging and fertility decline in the context of Japan and my observations with little
focus on other countries.
I begin by describing population aging in the context of Japan. Using multiple figures I
will highlight the severity of the issue. Here is where I describe my hypothesis. With a focus
specifically on falling fertility rates, I introduce three different emerging demographics and how
I believe they are playing an instrumental role in hastening the aging of Japan. After that,
through data analysis, I will determine to what degree these demographics are truly influencing
the issue. Next, I will proceed to introduce the either-or dilemma plaguing women in Japan in
context of children and work and this dilemma’s effect on fertility. This will segue into a
criticism of policies created to aid Japanese parents and how they actually are enforcing the
either-or dilemma I presented earlier. I end by drawing conclusions from the material presented.
The Role of Social Factors in Japan’s Rapidly Aging Society
Japan’s rapid population aging has been recorded as the fastest in the world.7 In 1960
only 12.7% of adults in Japan were over 60, but by 1990 this number had nearly doubled to
21.5%.8 Continuing to increase, 31.2% of the Japanese population was over 60 years old in
2005.9 Various reports on the future of the Japanese population have been written, and the
general consensus is that the ratio of seniors to other age cohorts will continue to grow, straining
7 Ogawa, “JAPAN’S CHANGING FERTILITY MECHANISMS AND ITS POLICY RESPONSES.”
8 Clark et al., “Population Decline, Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese
Economy.”
9 Ibid.

Lange
9
the Japanese pension system and possibly creating a labor emergency. If the trend continues as it
has, the ratio of earners to consumers will be further imbalanced in favor of consumers,
overwhelming the available workers.
In the context of the three factors deemed to have the most influential effect on age
structures of a population (which are mortality, immigration, and total fertility rate or TFR)
Japan is a case of extremes. Japan has the highest average life expectancy of any country in the
world, at 81 years for men and 87 for women.10 In contrast, immigration is the on the opposite
end of extremity. Thanks to strict laws on citizenship and reported xenophobia amongst
nationals, Japan is described as a country unattractive to immigrants.11 It is not surprising then
that Japan’s immigration rates are quite low, with an average net migration rate of .06 per 1,000
people between 2010 and 2014.12 As of 2014, among countries with non-negative migration rates
(non-negative meaning more people were immigrating than emigrating) Japan was tied for last
place for lowest amount of immigrants entering the country.13 As for TFR Japan was recorded to
have an average rate of 1.41 births per woman in 2012, well below the global replacement rate of
2.1.14
Because fertility has been judged to be the factor of population aging easiest to advocate
for governments,15 as compared to mortality and immigration, this paper is primarily focused on
exploring the social factors playing a role in Japan’s falling fertility rates. When I set out to
research the role of social factors in the aging of Japan’s population I hypothesized that emerging
10 World Health Organization, Life Expectancy Data by Country.
11 Jung, “Can Japan Become “A Society Attractive for Immigrants?”
12 Internation Organization for Migration, Japan Facts and Figures.
13 Central Intelligence Agency, COUNTRY COMPARISON:: NET MIGRATION RATE.
14 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Standardized Vital
Rates and Reproduction Rates.

Lange
10
demographics of recent generations, specifically hikikomori, parasite singles, and herbivore men,
were the cause of Japan’s decreasing fertility rates. These groups have been noted for a lack of
interest in both fostering romantic relationships and marriage.16,17,18 Since falling fertility rates
are believed to be the most instrumental factor in hastening population aging,19 I supposed these
young peoples’ apathy towards relationships was playing a direct role in the aging of Japan.
Demographic #1: Parasite Singles
“Parasite single” is a term used to describe a demographic of young adults in Japan who
continue to live with their parents well into their adult lives without attempting to branch out and
start an independent life. Estimated to number around 14 million in 2006, 20 parasite singles
encompass quite a large demographic and therefore can be difficult to generalize. Many different
sub-groups exist which may have various reasons for choosing to stay with their parents over
living on their own. However, mutual qualities that have been observed among a large proportion
of these young adults include financial dependence on their parents and a disinterest in marriage.
Because of the financial stability they enjoy living with their parents, parasite singles are
reportedly less inclined to seek out permanent, well paying jobs.21 Instead, they will often float
between different part time jobs and contract labor. A survey carried out by Japan’s Mainichi
Daily News determined that among parasite singles employed as office ladies, a position
overwhelmingly consisting of parasite singles, 20% did not pay for any household expenses and
16 Furlong, “The Japanese Hikikomori Phenomenon.”
17 Tran, “Unable or Unwilling to Leave the Nest?”
18 Charlebois, “Herbivore Masculinity as an Oppositional Form of Masculinity.”
21 Ibid.

Lange
11
approximately 30% contributed only around $250 USD a month.22 This is of concern to Japan’s
low fertility issue because of the observed relation between income and marriage. In 2011 only
9% of Japanese men in their 20’s/30’s were married among those with a yearly income under
$36,000 USD while 25%-40% of men with incomes above that income threshold were married.23
Demographic #2: Hikikomori
Similar to parasite singles, hikikomori live with their parents well into their adult years
and are financially dependent. Although hikikomori can be viewed as a subgroup under the wide
parasite single umbrella, what makes hikikomori unique is their characteristic acute social
withdrawal. Defined by extreme social anxiety, hikikomori cut off contact from the outside
world and reportedly to do little besides activities involving personal electronics, such as
watching television, playing video games, and accessing the Internet.24
Despite their existence as part of the larger parasite single phenomenon, hikikomori have
attracted a huge amount of media attention. Characters suffering from acute social withdrawal
have become plot devices in contemporary comics, cartoons, and television shows in Japan.
Although media portrayals tend to exaggerate and depict hikikomori as never leaving their
bedroom, this is not entirely accurate. Many hikikomori reportedly venture outside at night or the
early hours of the morning when they are less likely to run into people they know.25 Among the
many cases of surveyed hikikomori in his book, Zielenziger describes Jun, a 28 year old
hikikomori, as a man who utilizes midnight hours to escape the confinement of his bedroom.
22 Ibid.
23 Osawa, Kim, and Kingston, “Precarious Work in Japan.”
25 Zielenziger, “Retreating Youth Become Japan’s ‘Lost Generation.’”

Lange
12
Although unable to function in social settings, going outside at night was the only way he was
able to offset the detrimental health effects of continuously staying in his room.26
Whereas parasite singles often choose to stay with parents, the case of hikikomori is
direr. They usually are forced to rely on parents or other family members for financial support
due to their inability to function in society. Because of such acute social anxiety, sustaining a job
is near impossible for hikikomori. Similarly, rejection of peers in the workplace and the
classroom by hikikomori has been shown to support a trend of extreme shyness towards the
opposite sex along with ambivalent views towards romantic relationships.27
Demographic #3: Herbivore men
Herbivore masculinity is an emerging lifestyle among young males that deprioritizes sex
and emphasizes soft masculinity. While the main pillar of salaryman masculinity, the hegemonic
form of masculinity in post-war Japan, was based on the notion of married male breadwinners
(salarymen) having a stable job and being able to support their families, this new form of
masculinity takes focus away from job security and economic factors and instead places
importance in personal appearance and cultivating platonic friendships with the opposite sex.
This is theorized to be a societal response to the economic crash of the 1990’s, when the job
market was restructured and companies began closing regular positions in favor of contract labor
and part-time positions. 28 The deregulation of the labor market on top of increased global
competition and Japanese economic stagnation pushed companies to cut permanent positions and
26 Zielenziger, Shutting out the Sun.
27 Krieg and Dickie, “Attachment and Hikikomori.”

Lange
13
shift focus to hiring temporary workers.29 With the availability of stable work now scarcer than
generations before, herbivore masculinity can be seen as a method for males to maintain
masculinity in an era where previous standards of job stability, and therefore masculinity, are not
applicable.
These herbivore men fit into Japan’s aging issue because of their apathy towards sex and
romantic relationships. As described by Charlebois, Ushikubo’s research on this demographic
shows us how their lifestyle choices could be further hastening the falling of the country’s
reproduction rates.30 Ushikubo tells us how these men often see sex as mendokusai, a word used
in Japanese to describe something tiresome that one would rather not do but is often forced to.
The way these men describe sex shows it as duty, not something to be enjoyed. Some of the men
who partook in the study, despite being in committed romantic relationships, were not sexually
involved with their partners. Not admitting that these men have no sexual desire, Ushikubo
describes that many of these men overwhelmingly choose to rely on pornographic media instead
of girlfriends to fulfill sexual desires.
These Demographics as the Source for Japan’s Rapid Population Aging
As young people choosing not to start families are growing in number, it was only natural
to suppose that these young people were the vanguards of a new generation of decreased fertility.
Parasite singles, hikikomori, and herbivore men are making lifestyle choices that do not
prioritize marriage and having children. However, there lies a conspicuous flaw in assuming they
were the catalysts in jumpstarting the rapid aging of Japan. Although these demographics are
bringing about changing views on relationships, if you look at the data in table 1, you can see
29 Osawa, Kim, and Kingston, “Precarious Work in Japan.”

Lange
14
that the largest drops in TFR were taking place up until the 1980’s. Also, as table 2 shows, the
TFR has not been above the replacement rate (2.1 births per mother) in Japan since 1974. The
first medically documented case of hikikomori was in 1986.31 Theories suppose that herbivore
men and the rise of parasite singles are results of the 1990’s economic crash.32,33 The problem of
sub-replacement fertility rates in Japan and subsequent population aging began before these
phenomena even existed, so therefore something else is at play.
Table 1, Data taken from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication
Table 2, Data taken from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication
31 Furlong, “The Japanese Hikikomori Phenomenon.”
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Total Fertility Rates in Japan by Year
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Changes in JapaneseTFR Compared to Previous Year

Lange
15
In post-war Japan, sudden drops in fertility were not only large in proportion to other first
world countries at the time but happened much earlier as well.34 Ogawa, looking at the rates of
mothers having subsequent children, describes that these early falls were due to sudden drops in
the rates of women having a third and fourth child.35 Mothers began to restrict themselves to one
or two children, a trend that has continued up through contemporary times. However, when
fertility began to drastically dip again in the 1970’s, it lines up with dips in marriage rates among
women, a factor Ogawa claims is instrumental in falling reproductive rates. To analyze falling
fertility, we must examine factors affecting marriage in Japan.
Nosaka describes a correlation in Japan between the age of mothers and falling
reproduction rates. As a dependent variable, Japanese reproduction rates for women tend to fall
as the age when she has her first child increases.36 Therefore there is a notable trend of younger
mothers being more likely to have more children than older mothers. Because a minimal amount
of births are out of wedlock in Japan (1.9% as of 2003)37, reproduction is extremely dependent
on marriage. Given the fact that the mean age of marriage for women and men in Japan has
increased over the years, falling fertility rates make sense. The mean age of marriage for women
was 24.5 in 1975, but as of 2005 that age has increased to 29.4.38
But why are women delaying marriage or, in extreme cases, rejecting it altogether?
Running parallel with demographical research in other countries, much of the literature on
Japanese women support the notion that increased educational opportunities has increased their
34 Ogawa, “JAPAN’S CHANGING FERTILITY MECHANISMS AND ITS POLICY RESPONSES.”
35 Ibid.
36 Nosaka, “THE M-SHAPED DILEMMA.”
37 Boling, “Demography, Culture and Policy.”
38 Clark et al., “Population Decline, Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese
Economy.”

Lange
16
agency and independence, allowing them to be less dependent on marriage for survival.39,40,41
With higher education, women are better able to land career jobs and can become economically
self-sufficient. However, with higher education also comes a higher opportunity cost for leaving
work. This notion is important in the scope of Japan due to the “either-or” dilemma, where
Japanese women are forced to choose between having a career and having children.
Children or a career? An either-or dilemma
Boling uses the term “either-or dilemma” to refer to the strictness of the Japanese work
culture and the amount of loyalty that is expected of company employees which leaves little
room for family matters. 42 The culture of work in post-war Japan is very demanding.
Establishing the image of the salaryman, Japanese companies determined married males were
expected to give unyielding loyalty to a company in exchange for lifetime employment and age-
based promotions and pay raises. In carrying out this unyielding loyalty employees were
expected to commit most of their time to their job. Due to excessive overtime and socially
obligated after hours socializing, many men had little time to offer their families. By the phrase
“socially obligated after hours socializing”, I am referring to the tradition of companies
expecting their workers to partake in drinking parties, which often take place several times a
week, as well as playing on company sports teams and attending company outings. Failure to
take part in these activities means an employee is not conforming to the cultural expectation of
an employee, which can reportedly lead to tensions with supervisors and being ostracized by
40 Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura, “Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan.”
41 Family Planning Perspectives, “Japan’s Fertility Trends Linked to Late Marriage, Unique
Social Factors, Heavy Reliance on Abortion.”

Lange
17
peers.43 This commitment undoubtedly creates a sense of community among employees, making
it easier for them to prioritize life at work over life at home. This further strengthens the ideology
of an employee devoting their life to a company. A study by the ZACAT International Social
Survey Program tells just how demanding these jobs can be. In response to the question, “How
many hours a week on average does your spouse work?” Japanese women answered with a mean
of 56 hours, not including the after hours socializing or commute times.44 In contrast with the
image of a 9am to 5pm, 40 hours workweek that is common in many western countries, the
culture of work in Japan is comparatively much more demanding.
Exacerbating the divide between working and having children, childrearing in Japan is
noted to be both uniquely demanding on time as well as difficult. The ZACAT survey mentioned
previously details the struggles of Japanese mothers well. Japanese housewives are quoted to
spend a mean of 27.5 hours a week on household work and this is described by Boling to be
considerably higher than European countries.45,46 The existence of words like “childcare stress”
and “childrearing neurosis” in the Japanese vernacular as well as the fact centers and programs
have been established to help mothers deal with such disorders paints childrearing in Japan as a
daunting task.47 75% of Japanese women believe being a stay at home mother is just as fulfilling
as working for pay.48 In context, the fact falling fertility rates over the years run parallel with
rising rates of female employment rates makes sense. If having children is seen to be equivalent
43 Kojima, “Fertility in Japan and France.”
44 ZACAT, International Social Survey Programme 2002: Family and Changing Gender Roles
III.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 ZACAT, International Social Survey Programme 2002: Family and Changing Gender Roles
III.

Lange
18
to having a job in the eyes of Japanese women, it is no surprise women choosing to do both
would be few in number given the commitment and effort both activities demand.
The high standards of the Japanese work culture are not specific to males. Although the
salaryman image was established in an era when males dominated the work force, social
developments in Japan have led to a higher ratio of women working and they also must adhere to
cultural expectations surrounding labor. However, what makes the either-or dilemma facing
Japanese woman so detrimental to fertility is the fact that women must deal with expectations as
both ideal workers and ideal mothers. While the burden of adhering to expectations of an ideal
worker applies to men and women, the daunting task of childrearing is still strictly viewed as a
job for females. Because the modern Japanese economy was built upon the concept of the
salaryman, Japan has developed as a country where males are viewed as breadwinners and
females are expected to stay at home and raise the children.
Issues with Policies
Not only does the Japanese work culture leave little room for working women to become
mothers, but policies and institutions established by the government to support parents are
inadequate in their current state. For example, the Japanese government has established childcare
centers around the country to watch kids while parents are at work, but Boling describes how the
operating hours for these centers do not account for time parents must spend doing unregulated
overtime and social obligations.49 Most of these parents are leaving work in the late evening,
well past the closing time of these centers. To make matters worse, these centers are not
universal and are insufficiently distributed. While there are too many in less populated areas,

Lange
19
dense areas like Tokyo and Kyoto are lacking enough of these centers, leading to extremely long
waiting lists. In many cases parents are forced to rely on other family members to pick up
children at these centers. In an interesting study, Nosaka observes that women who live close to
their own mothers and enjoy positive a relationship with each other tend to experience higher
levels of fertility.50 Nosaka explicitly references the ability of grandmothers to watch over their
daughter’s child while the daughter is at work as the primary reasons this trend exists.
Similarly, policies regarding work leave have been noted to be ineffective. Official
nation-wide policies protect parents for a year off at 40% pay but the standard of an “ideal
worker” pressures parents into prioritizing work over taking leave. Many employees have
reported experiencing ostracism after they return from parental leave.51 Government statistics
show that these policies are severely underutilized and women in management track jobs often
quit when they reach their late 20’s and early 30’s in order to have a child.52 It is not surprising,
given the ideals of Japanese work culture, that rates of women quitting doubles after they
become pregnant with their first child.53 The fact that these leave policies are running parallel
with rising rates of women quitting shows that reform is necessary. Although established to
allow parents to balance work and children, these policies are instead enforcing the detrimental
either-or choice.
Concluding Remarks
The hypothesis regarding specific demographics among Japanese youth disinterested in
relationships as the cause of fertility decline in Japan is misguided. The issue of low fertility
52 Fackler, “Career Women in Japan Find a Blocked Path.”
53 Ibid.

Lange
20
started decades ago, much earlier before any of these groups emerged. Japan has been
experiencing sub-replacement levels of fertility since 1974. Instead of the lifestyle choices of
parasite singles, hikikomori, and herbivore men, I believe the blame for the country’s low
fertility can be placed on the strict ideologies surrounding work in Japan. The way it forces
women to choose between a career and having children with little opportunity for both is
detrimental to fertility. The ineffectiveness of policies established to aid working parents can also
be blamed, with little success in making the childrearing process easier.
One could suggest more effective policies can be enacted in order to advocate higher
fertility. A higher number of day care centers, leave policies that allow higher pay, and
government allowances or stipends to help parents pay for childrearing costs are a few simple
examples for policies that could possibly raise total fertility rates in the country. However, I
believe the most effective changes that can take place in regards to Japan’s low fertility would be
changes in the ideologies wrapped up in Japanese work culture. I believe if employment wasn’t
equivalent to the complete devotion of an employee’s time to a company, then Japanese fertility
rates could possibly rise once again. Unless such a change takes place then I doubt any policies
advocating fertility will make much progress.

Lange
21
References
Boling, Patricia. “Demography, Culture and Policy: Understanding Japan’s Low
fertility.(Statistical Data).” Population and Development Review 34, no. 2 (2008):
307–26.
Central Intelligence Agency. COUNTRY COMPARISON:: NET MIGRATION RATE, n.d.
Charlebois, Justin. “Herbivore Masculinity as an Oppositional Form of Masculinity.” Culture,
Society and Masculinities 5, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 89–104.
Clark, Robert, Naohiro Ogawa, Makoto Kondo, and Rikiya Matsukura. “Population Decline,
Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese Economy.” European Journal of
Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie 26, no. 2 (2010): 207–27.
doi:10.1007/s10680-009-9179-9.
Eurostat. Total Fertility Rate 2012, n.d.
Fackler, Martin. “Career Women in Japan Find a Blocked Path.” The New York Times, August
6, 2007, sec. International / Asia Pacific.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/world/asia/06equal.html.
Family Planning Perspectives. “Japan’s Fertility Trends Linked to Late Marriage, Unique
Social Factors, Heavy Reliance on Abortion” 19, no. 4 (July 1, 1987): 166–67.
doi:10.2307/2135164.
Furlong, Andy. “The Japanese Hikikomori Phenomenon: Acute Social Withdrawal among
Young People.” The Sociological Review 56, no. 2 (May 1, 2008): 309–25.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.2008.00790.x.
Haworth, Abigail. “Why Have Young People in Japan Stopped Having Sex?” The Guardian.
Accessed March 3, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/20/young-people-japan-stopped-
having-sex.
Internation Organization for Migration. Japan Facts and Figures, n.d.
Jung, Yeong-hae. “Can Japan Become ‘A Society Attractive for Immigrants?’ Identity, Gender
and Nation‐States under Globalization in East Asia.” International Journal of
Japanese Sociology 13, no. 1 (2004): 53–68. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6781.2004.00053.x.
Kojima, H. “Fertility in Japan and France.” Population 52, no. 5 (1997): 1143–72.
Krieg, Alexander, and Jane R. Dickie. “Attachment and Hikikomori: A Psychosocial
Developmental Model.” International Journal of Social Psychiatry 59, no. 1 (February
1, 2013): 61–72. doi:10.1177/0020764011423182.
Lee, Ronald, and Andrew Mason. “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging,
Dependency, and consumption.(ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHY)(Author Abstract).”
Science 346, no. 6206 (2014): 229.
Nosaka, Akiko. “THE M-SHAPED DILEMMA: LIFE STRATEGIES AND FERTILITY TRENDS
AMONG WORKING WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN.” Ethnology 48, no. 1
(January 1, 2009): 21–38.
Ogawa, Naohiro. “JAPAN’S CHANGING FERTILITY MECHANISMS AND ITS POLICY
RESPONSES.” Journal of Population Research 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 89–106.
Osawa, Machiko, Myoung Jung Kim, and Jeff Kingston. “Precarious Work in Japan.”
American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 3 (March 1, 2013): 309–34.
doi:10.1177/0002764212466240.

Lange
22
Retherford, Robert D., Naohiro Ogawa, and Rikiya Matsukura. “Late Marriage and Less
Marriage in Japan.” Population and Development Review 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2001):
65–102.
Sedghi, Ami, George Arnett, and Chris Moran. “The Guardian’s Top 100: Which Articles
Have Been Most Popular?” The Guardian. Accessed March 3, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/apr/17/the-guardians-top-
100-which-articles-have-been-most-popular.
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Standardized Vital Rates
and Reproduction Rates, n.d.
Tran, Mariko. “Unable or Unwilling to Leave the Nest? An Analysis and Evaluation of
Japanese Parasite Single Theories.” Text, July 3, 2006.
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2006/Tran.html.
World Bank. Fertility Rate, Total (births per Woman), n.d.
World Health Organization. Life Expectancy Data by Country, n.d.
ZACAT. International Social Survey Programme 2002: Family and Changing Gender Roles III,
2002.
Zielenziger, Michael. “Retreating Youth Become Japan’s ‘Lost Generation.’” NPR.org.
Accessed February 22, 2015.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6535284.
———. Shutting out the Sun : How Japan Created Its Own Lost Generation. 1st ed.. New York:
Nan ATalese, 2006.

Lange Japan Aging

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (13)

Similar to Lange Japan Aging

Similar to Lange Japan Aging (19)

Lange Japan Aging