M-SCORE A MISUSEABILITY 
WEIGHT MEASURE 
by 
MohmadAzar ( 12JJ1D4010 ) 
Guide: Ram Naresh Yadav 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Information Technology 
JNTUH College of Engineering, Nachupally
ABSTRACT 
 Users within the organization’s perimeter perform various actions on this 
data and may be exposed to sensitive information embodied within the 
data they access. 
 In an effort to determine the extent of damage to an organization that a 
user can cause using the information she has obtained, we introduce the 
concept of Misuseability Weight. 
 The M-score measure is tailored for tabular data sets and cannot be 
applied to nontabular data such as intellectual property, business plans, 
etc. 
 It is a domain independent measure that assigns a score, which 
represents the misuseability weight of each table exposed to the user, by 
using a sensitivity score function acquired from the domain expert.
CON.. 
 By assigning a score that represents the sensitivity level of the data that a 
user is exposed to, the misuseability weight can determine the extent of 
damage to the organization if the data is misused. 
 Using this information, the organization can then take appropriate steps to 
prevent or minimize the damage.
Introduction 
• To calculate the M-Score, A Misuseability weight measure, 
this calculates a score that represents the sensitivity level of 
the data exposed to the user and by that predicts the ability 
of the user to maliciously exploit the data.
Con.. 
Data stored in an organization’s computers is 
extremely important and expresses the core 
of the organization’s power. 
An organization undoubtedly wants to 
preserve and retain this power. On the other 
hand, this data is necessary for daily work 
processes.
Problem statement 
• There is no previously proposed method for 
estimating the potential harm that might be 
caused by leaked or misused data while 
considering important dimensions of the 
nature of the exposed data.
EXISTING SYSTEM 
 The existing methods usually check the table satisfies the k-anonymity, 
whether the table appears for atleast k-times. 
 The differential privacy ensure that statistical (or aggregation) 
queries can be executed on a database with high accuracy 
while preserving the privacy of the entities in the database. 
 The data-centric approach focuses on what the user is trying 
to access instead of how expresses it. with this approach, an 
action is modeled by extracting features from the obtained 
result-set.
DISADVANTAGES 
 A known disadvantage of k-anonymity is that it 
consider the diversity of the sensitive attribute 
value. 
 The differential privacy approach is relevant 
only when exposing statistical information 
rather than individual records. 
 In data-centric approach, it assume that 
analyzing what a user sees can provide a more 
direct indication of a possible data misuse.
PROPOSED SYSTEM 
 In proposed system, we present a new concept, Misuseability 
Weight, for estimating the risk emanating from data exposed 
to insiders. 
 This concept focuses on assigning a score that represents the 
sensitivity level of the data exposed to the user and by that 
predicts the ability of the user to maliciously exploit this data. 
 It assigns a misuseability weight to tabular data, discuss some 
of its properties, and demonstrate its usefulness in several 
leakage scenarios.
ADVANTAGES 
 Only our proposed one for calculating M-score, can solve the 
above problems. 
 Our proposed system have different approaches for efficiently 
acquiring the knowledge required for computing the M-score, 
and the M-score is both feasible and can fulfill the main goal 
for estimating the user. 
 This M-score method is very useful for protecting both 
individual data and statistical information.
BLOCK DIAGRAM
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS 
Language : JAVA 
Front End : JSP, Servlet 
Back End : My SQL 
Web server : Apache Tomcat 5.5
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS 
Processor : > 2GHZ 
Hard disc : 40 GB 
RAM : 1GB
Literature Survey
1. Database Security—Concepts, Approaches, And Challenges 
• Elisa Bertino, Fellow, Ieee, And Ravi Sandhu, Fellow, Ieee 
• As organizations increase their reliance on, possibly distributed, 
information systems for daily business, they become more vulnerable to 
security breaches even as they gain productivity and efficiency 
advantages. Though a number of techniques, such as encryption and 
electronic signatures, are currently available to protect data when 
transmitted across sites, a truly comprehensive approach for data 
protection must also include mechanisms for enforcing access control 
policies based on data contents, subject qualifications and characteristics, 
and other relevant contextual information, such as time. It is well 
understood today that these mantics of data must be taken into account 
in order to specify effective access control policies.
2. Knowledge Acquisition And Insider Threat Prediction In 
Relational Database Systems 
• QussaiYaseenAndBrajendra Panda 
• This paper investigates the problem of knowledge acquisition by an 
unauthorized insider using dependencies between objects in relational 
databases. It defines various types of knowledge. In addition, it introduces 
the Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG), which shows 
dependencies among objects and the amount of knowledge that can be 
inferred about them using dependency relationships. Moreover, it 
introduces an algorithm to determine the knowledgebase of an insider 
and explains how insiders can broaden their knowledge about various 
relational database objects to which they lack appropriate access 
privileges. In addition, it demonstrates how NDIGs and knowledge graphs 
help in assessment of insider threats and what security officers can do to 
avoid such threats.
3. A Security Punctuation Framework For Enforcing Access 
Control On Streaming Data 
• Rimma V. Nehme, Elke A. Rundensteiner, Elisa Bertino 
• The management of privacy and security in the context of data stream 
management systems (DSMS) remains largely an unaddressed problem to 
date. Unlike in traditional DBMSs where access control policies are 
persistently stored on the server and tend to remain stable, in streaming 
applications the contexts and with them the access control policies on the 
real-time data may rapidly change. A person entering a casino may want 
to immediately block others from knowing his current whereabouts. We 
thus propose a novel "stream-centric" approach, where security 
restrictions are not persistently stored on the DSMS server, but rather 
streamed together with the data. Here, the access control policies are 
expressed via security constraints (called security punctuations, or short, 
sps) and are embedded into data streams.
4. Evolution Of Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing 
• Yongbin Yuan, Jing Yang, Jianpei Zhang, Sheng Lan, Junwei Zhang 
• To achieve privacy protection better in data publishing, data must 
be sanitized before release. Research on protecting individual 
privacy and data confidentiality has received contributions from 
many fields. In order to grasp the development of privacy 
preserving data publishing, we discussed the evolution of this 
theme, focused on privacy mechanism, data utility and its metrics. 
The privacy mechanism, such as k anonymity-diversity and t-closeness, 
provides formal safety guarantees and data utility 
preserve useful information while publishing data. Meantime, we 
discussed social network privacy and location based service. Finally, 
we made a conclusion with respect to privacy preserving data 
publishing, and given further research directions.
Diagrams
Dataflow Diagram
Use case Diagram 
Distributor 
Work allocation 
Original Data 
Fake data 
Find Leakage 
Agent1 
Leak Data 
Agent2
Class Diagram
Sequence Diagram 
Agent Allocation 
Strategies 
Leaker Leakage 
analysis 
Distributor 
Requesting the datas 
Creating the fake datas using allocation Strategies 
Fake datas prepared 
Sending original datas with fake objects 
Some agents are leaking datas 
Check for the leakaged datas and finding out the gulit 
Report the gulit one
Activity Diagram 
Distributor 
Giving set of 
Original data 
Agent 
U1,U2,U3 
Is fake data 
found 
yes 
checks who's 
fake data 
Allocation 
Strategies 
No leakage 
of data 
Adding fake 
data ... 
no 
Report U!,U2,U3...Un 
leak data
Modules
Modules 
• 1. Data Allocation Module 
• 2. Fake Object Module 
• 3. Optimization Module 
• 4. Data Distributor
1. Data Allocation Module 
• The main focus of our project is the data allocation problem as how can 
the distributor “intelligently” give data to agents in order to improve the 
chances of detecting a guilty agent.
2. Fake Object Module 
• Fake objects are objects generated by the distributor in order to increase 
the chances of detecting agents that leak data. The distributor may be 
able to add fake objects to the distributed data in order to improve his 
effectiveness in detecting guilty agents. Our use of fake objects is inspired 
by the use of “trace” records in mailing lists.
3. Optimization Module 
• The Optimization Module is the distributor’s data allocation to agents has 
one constraint and one objective. The distributor’s constraint is to satisfy 
agents’ requests, by providing them with the number of objects they 
request or with all available objects that satisfy their conditions. His 
objective is to be able to detect an agent who leaks any portion of his 
data.
4. Data Distributor 
• A data distributor has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted 
agents (third parties). Some of the data is leaked and found in an 
unauthorized place (e.g., on the web or somebody’s laptop). The 
distributor must assess the likelihood that the leaked data came from one 
or more agents, as opposed to having been independently gathered by 
other means.
Screenshots
Conclusion 
• We introduced a new concept of 
misuseability weight and discussed the 
importance of measuring the sensitivity level 
of the data that an insider is exposed 
• Data acquisition that might be subjective and 
not consistent among different experts which, 
in turn, may lead to an inaccurate sensitivity 
function. In regards to the time factor
REFERENCES 
 2010 CyberSecurity Watch Survey, 
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ecrimesummary10.pdf, 2012. 
 A. Kamra, E. Terzi, and E. Bertino, “Detecting Anomalous Access Patterns in 
Relational Databases,” Int’l J. Very Large Databases,vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 1063-1077, 
2008. 
 S. Mathew, M. Petropoulos, H.Q. Ngo, and S. Upadhyaya, “Data-Centric Approach 
to Insider Attack Detection in Database Systems,” Proc. 13th Conf. Recent 
Advances in Intrusion Detection,2010. 
 L. Sweeney, “k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy,” Int’l J. Uncertainty, 
Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 5,pp. 571-588, 2002.

Final review m score

  • 1.
    M-SCORE A MISUSEABILITY WEIGHT MEASURE by MohmadAzar ( 12JJ1D4010 ) Guide: Ram Naresh Yadav Assistant Professor Department of Information Technology JNTUH College of Engineering, Nachupally
  • 2.
    ABSTRACT  Userswithin the organization’s perimeter perform various actions on this data and may be exposed to sensitive information embodied within the data they access.  In an effort to determine the extent of damage to an organization that a user can cause using the information she has obtained, we introduce the concept of Misuseability Weight.  The M-score measure is tailored for tabular data sets and cannot be applied to nontabular data such as intellectual property, business plans, etc.  It is a domain independent measure that assigns a score, which represents the misuseability weight of each table exposed to the user, by using a sensitivity score function acquired from the domain expert.
  • 3.
    CON..  Byassigning a score that represents the sensitivity level of the data that a user is exposed to, the misuseability weight can determine the extent of damage to the organization if the data is misused.  Using this information, the organization can then take appropriate steps to prevent or minimize the damage.
  • 4.
    Introduction • Tocalculate the M-Score, A Misuseability weight measure, this calculates a score that represents the sensitivity level of the data exposed to the user and by that predicts the ability of the user to maliciously exploit the data.
  • 5.
    Con.. Data storedin an organization’s computers is extremely important and expresses the core of the organization’s power. An organization undoubtedly wants to preserve and retain this power. On the other hand, this data is necessary for daily work processes.
  • 6.
    Problem statement •There is no previously proposed method for estimating the potential harm that might be caused by leaked or misused data while considering important dimensions of the nature of the exposed data.
  • 7.
    EXISTING SYSTEM The existing methods usually check the table satisfies the k-anonymity, whether the table appears for atleast k-times.  The differential privacy ensure that statistical (or aggregation) queries can be executed on a database with high accuracy while preserving the privacy of the entities in the database.  The data-centric approach focuses on what the user is trying to access instead of how expresses it. with this approach, an action is modeled by extracting features from the obtained result-set.
  • 8.
    DISADVANTAGES  Aknown disadvantage of k-anonymity is that it consider the diversity of the sensitive attribute value.  The differential privacy approach is relevant only when exposing statistical information rather than individual records.  In data-centric approach, it assume that analyzing what a user sees can provide a more direct indication of a possible data misuse.
  • 9.
    PROPOSED SYSTEM In proposed system, we present a new concept, Misuseability Weight, for estimating the risk emanating from data exposed to insiders.  This concept focuses on assigning a score that represents the sensitivity level of the data exposed to the user and by that predicts the ability of the user to maliciously exploit this data.  It assigns a misuseability weight to tabular data, discuss some of its properties, and demonstrate its usefulness in several leakage scenarios.
  • 10.
    ADVANTAGES  Onlyour proposed one for calculating M-score, can solve the above problems.  Our proposed system have different approaches for efficiently acquiring the knowledge required for computing the M-score, and the M-score is both feasible and can fulfill the main goal for estimating the user.  This M-score method is very useful for protecting both individual data and statistical information.
  • 11.
  • 12.
    SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS Language: JAVA Front End : JSP, Servlet Back End : My SQL Web server : Apache Tomcat 5.5
  • 13.
    HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS Processor: > 2GHZ Hard disc : 40 GB RAM : 1GB
  • 14.
  • 15.
    1. Database Security—Concepts,Approaches, And Challenges • Elisa Bertino, Fellow, Ieee, And Ravi Sandhu, Fellow, Ieee • As organizations increase their reliance on, possibly distributed, information systems for daily business, they become more vulnerable to security breaches even as they gain productivity and efficiency advantages. Though a number of techniques, such as encryption and electronic signatures, are currently available to protect data when transmitted across sites, a truly comprehensive approach for data protection must also include mechanisms for enforcing access control policies based on data contents, subject qualifications and characteristics, and other relevant contextual information, such as time. It is well understood today that these mantics of data must be taken into account in order to specify effective access control policies.
  • 16.
    2. Knowledge AcquisitionAnd Insider Threat Prediction In Relational Database Systems • QussaiYaseenAndBrajendra Panda • This paper investigates the problem of knowledge acquisition by an unauthorized insider using dependencies between objects in relational databases. It defines various types of knowledge. In addition, it introduces the Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG), which shows dependencies among objects and the amount of knowledge that can be inferred about them using dependency relationships. Moreover, it introduces an algorithm to determine the knowledgebase of an insider and explains how insiders can broaden their knowledge about various relational database objects to which they lack appropriate access privileges. In addition, it demonstrates how NDIGs and knowledge graphs help in assessment of insider threats and what security officers can do to avoid such threats.
  • 17.
    3. A SecurityPunctuation Framework For Enforcing Access Control On Streaming Data • Rimma V. Nehme, Elke A. Rundensteiner, Elisa Bertino • The management of privacy and security in the context of data stream management systems (DSMS) remains largely an unaddressed problem to date. Unlike in traditional DBMSs where access control policies are persistently stored on the server and tend to remain stable, in streaming applications the contexts and with them the access control policies on the real-time data may rapidly change. A person entering a casino may want to immediately block others from knowing his current whereabouts. We thus propose a novel "stream-centric" approach, where security restrictions are not persistently stored on the DSMS server, but rather streamed together with the data. Here, the access control policies are expressed via security constraints (called security punctuations, or short, sps) and are embedded into data streams.
  • 18.
    4. Evolution OfPrivacy-Preserving Data Publishing • Yongbin Yuan, Jing Yang, Jianpei Zhang, Sheng Lan, Junwei Zhang • To achieve privacy protection better in data publishing, data must be sanitized before release. Research on protecting individual privacy and data confidentiality has received contributions from many fields. In order to grasp the development of privacy preserving data publishing, we discussed the evolution of this theme, focused on privacy mechanism, data utility and its metrics. The privacy mechanism, such as k anonymity-diversity and t-closeness, provides formal safety guarantees and data utility preserve useful information while publishing data. Meantime, we discussed social network privacy and location based service. Finally, we made a conclusion with respect to privacy preserving data publishing, and given further research directions.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 23.
    Use case Diagram Distributor Work allocation Original Data Fake data Find Leakage Agent1 Leak Data Agent2
  • 24.
  • 25.
    Sequence Diagram AgentAllocation Strategies Leaker Leakage analysis Distributor Requesting the datas Creating the fake datas using allocation Strategies Fake datas prepared Sending original datas with fake objects Some agents are leaking datas Check for the leakaged datas and finding out the gulit Report the gulit one
  • 26.
    Activity Diagram Distributor Giving set of Original data Agent U1,U2,U3 Is fake data found yes checks who's fake data Allocation Strategies No leakage of data Adding fake data ... no Report U!,U2,U3...Un leak data
  • 27.
  • 28.
    Modules • 1.Data Allocation Module • 2. Fake Object Module • 3. Optimization Module • 4. Data Distributor
  • 29.
    1. Data AllocationModule • The main focus of our project is the data allocation problem as how can the distributor “intelligently” give data to agents in order to improve the chances of detecting a guilty agent.
  • 30.
    2. Fake ObjectModule • Fake objects are objects generated by the distributor in order to increase the chances of detecting agents that leak data. The distributor may be able to add fake objects to the distributed data in order to improve his effectiveness in detecting guilty agents. Our use of fake objects is inspired by the use of “trace” records in mailing lists.
  • 31.
    3. Optimization Module • The Optimization Module is the distributor’s data allocation to agents has one constraint and one objective. The distributor’s constraint is to satisfy agents’ requests, by providing them with the number of objects they request or with all available objects that satisfy their conditions. His objective is to be able to detect an agent who leaks any portion of his data.
  • 32.
    4. Data Distributor • A data distributor has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted agents (third parties). Some of the data is leaked and found in an unauthorized place (e.g., on the web or somebody’s laptop). The distributor must assess the likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more agents, as opposed to having been independently gathered by other means.
  • 33.
  • 38.
    Conclusion • Weintroduced a new concept of misuseability weight and discussed the importance of measuring the sensitivity level of the data that an insider is exposed • Data acquisition that might be subjective and not consistent among different experts which, in turn, may lead to an inaccurate sensitivity function. In regards to the time factor
  • 39.
    REFERENCES  2010CyberSecurity Watch Survey, http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ecrimesummary10.pdf, 2012.  A. Kamra, E. Terzi, and E. Bertino, “Detecting Anomalous Access Patterns in Relational Databases,” Int’l J. Very Large Databases,vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 1063-1077, 2008.  S. Mathew, M. Petropoulos, H.Q. Ngo, and S. Upadhyaya, “Data-Centric Approach to Insider Attack Detection in Database Systems,” Proc. 13th Conf. Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection,2010.  L. Sweeney, “k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy,” Int’l J. Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 5,pp. 571-588, 2002.