The document critically analyzes the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, highlighting its failure to meet critical air combat requirements, including air superiority and maneuverability, compared to other fighters like the F-16 and Rafale. It describes significant cost issues and operational limitations, questioning the F-35's effectiveness in various missions, particularly in fleet defense and tactical bombing. The analysis concludes that the F-35 is inadequate for modern combat scenarios, posing risks in terms of force presence and operational capability.

1. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

2. Requirements jungle
● air superiority ● CTOL
● fleet defense ● STOL
● tactical bombing ● CATOBAR
● ground attack / strike
● CAS ● replaces F-16, AV-8, F-
● reconnaissance 18, A-10, F-117, F-111,
A-6, Tornado
● air control ● closest foreign
● intelligence gathering counterpart Dassault
Rafale

3. Conflicting requirements
● air superiority ● low-level strike
– low wing loading – high wing loading
– high thrust to weight ● tactical bombing
ratio
– high payload
– small size
● stealth
– ability to achieve
quick kills – internal missile
carriage
– gun doors

4. Programme mismanagement
● LRIP
● no competetive prototyping
● 30% parts commonality between different versions
● cost increases
– 197 million USD F-35A, 237,7 million USD F-35B,
236,8 million USD F-35B >> flyaway costs

5. Is it really the best multirole aircraft?
● Establish important requirements
● Compare it with most similar US and foreign
aircraft
– F-16
– Saab Gripen
– Dassault Rafale
– Eurofighter Typhoon

6. F-35 air combat philosophy
● maneuverability is irrelevant = depends on radar
missile BVR shots to shoot down opponent
– AIM-7
● promised Pk: 0,7
● actual Pk: 0,08
– AIM-120
● combat Pk: 0,46
● ten recorded kills; 4 kills from WVR
● targets:
– no sensors
– no ECM
– not maneuvering
● US had numerical superiority

7. BVR vs WVR
● Vietnam Pk (vs maneuvering targets):
– gun: 28%
– IR missile: 15%
– BVR missile: 8%
● Deset Storm PK (vs non-maneuvering targets):
– gun: 100% (A-10 vs helicopters)
– IR missile: 67%
– BVR missile: 34%

8. BVR vs WVR
● Pk ratios have stayed the same: radar missile
lethality 1/2 of IR missile lethality; IR missile
lethality 1/2 of gun lethality
● Even LPI radars vulnerable to detection and
countermeasures
● Result: WVR combat between capable opponents as
important as ever

9. BVR vs WVR
● BVR requirements add:
– size
– weight
– cost
– maintenance downtime
● result:
– smaller numbers
– more vulnerable
– less time for pilot training

10. LPI - frequency hopping

11. Combat requirements
● first look
● first shot
● first kill
● avoid getting bounced
● outmaneuver opponent to fire
● high cruise speed
● outnumber enemy in the air

12. First look
● F-117 VLO
● 1 shot down, 1 irrepareably damaged from 1 300
sorties in Kosovo war
● flew only at night
● F-16 "legacy" aircraft
● 1 shot down from 4 500 sorties in Kosovo war
● flew both at day and at night
● IRST can detect stealth aircraft completely
passively, and at long range; radar gives away
position

14. First look
● F-35 assumptions:
– LPI radar cannot be detected
– F-35s IRST better than opponent's
– F-35s IR signature lower than opponent's
● Reality:
– Russians and Europeans have advantage in IRST
technology
– F-35s visual and IR signature larger than that of F-
16, Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon
– LPI radar can be detected and jammed by modern
EW suites

15. First look

17. First shot
● stealth requires internal weapons carriage
– gun bay doors cause 0,5 seconds to time between
pressing the button and first bullet leaving the gun
– F-35s gun has 0,4 s spin-up time; F-16s 0,5 s,
revolver guns 0,05 s
● result: F-35s gun needs almost full second to reach
full rate of fire after pilot has pressed the trigger
– IR missile has to be lowered by mechanism before
being fired: at least 1 second delay

18. First shot
● radar-guided missiles require 10 - 15 s acquisition
for cooperative target
● radar warns enemy and allows it to track and ID
radar-using fighter
● radar still has to penetrate any possible jamming
● enemy can cue in BVR IR missile or use anti-
radiation missile
● unlike F-22, F-35 can use IRST: renders opponent's
radar LO measures meaningless

19. F-35: bounce
● rearward visibility: angle obscured

20. Maneuverability
● Operational/ultimate g limits:
– F-35A: 9 g / 13,5 g
– F-35B: 7 g / 10,5 g
– F-35C: 7,5 g / 11,3 g
● G limits for 4,5th generation aircraft: 9 g
operational, 13,5 g ultimate
– Rafale 9 g / 16,7 g, Gripen 9 g / 13,5 g, F-16 9 g /
13,5 g, Typhoon 9 g / 12,6 g
● Instanteneous g limits for 3rd generation aircraft: 7-
8 g operational, 10,5-12 g ultimate

21. Maneuverability
● Sustained g limits:
– F-35A: 4,95 g @ M 0,8 and 4 600 m
– F-4E: 5,5 g @ M 0,8 and 3 100 m with 40% fuel
● Wing loading @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM and 2
Sidewinder:
– F-35A: 428 kg/m2, F-35B: 434,2 kg/m2, F-35C: 338
kg/m2
– Rafale C: 276 kg/m2
– Gripen C: 287 kg/m2
– F-16 C: 392 kg/m2

22. Maneuverability
● Thrust-to-weight ratio @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM
and 2 Sidewinder:
– F-35A: 1,07
– F-35B: 1,05
– F-35C: 0,93
– Rafale C: 1,22
– Gripen C: 0,95
– F-16C: 1,186

23. Maneuverability
● Combat weight:
– 18 270 kg F-35A
– 18 541 kg F-35B
– 21 009 kg F-35C
– 12 629 kg Rafale C
– 8 605 kg Gripen C
– 10 936 kg F-16C

24. Speed
● internal carriage means that speed is same in combat
and in clean configuration
– M 1,6 maximum
● maximum speed in combat configuration:
– Rafale M 1,8, Typhoon M 1,8, Gripen M 1,8, F-16 M
1,6
● maximum speed in clean configuration:
– Rafale M 2, Typhoon M 2, Gripen M 2, F-16 M 1,8

25. Combat persistence
● measured by fuel fraction
– F-35A: 0,38
– F-35B: 0,29
– F-35C: 0,36
– Rafale C: 0,31
– Typhoon: 0,29
– Gripen C: 0,27
– F-16C: 0,26

26. Numbers
● F-35A: 197 million USD flyaway cost
● F-35B: 237,7 million USD flyaway cost
● F-35C: 236,8 million USD flyaway cost
● likely 36 hours of maintenance per hour in the air (80% of F-22s
maintenance downtime)
● force presence: aircraft for equal cost x sortie rate
● Rafale C: 88,43 million USD flyaway cost, 8 hours of maint.
● Typhoon T3: 130 million USD flyaway cost, 9 hours of maint.
● Gripen C: 42,98 million USD flyaway cost, 19 hours of maint.
● F-16 C: 68,8 million USD flyaway cost; 19 hours of maint.
● all values in FY 2012 USD

27. Numbers
● Aircraft for 1 billion USD:
– F-35 A: 5
– F-35 B: 4
– F-35 C: 4
– F-16 C: 14
– Gripen C: 23
– Rafale C: 11
– Typhoon T3: 7

28. Numbers
● 1 bln USD force sorties per week:
– F-35A: 22
– F-35B: 18
– F-35C: 18
– F-16C: 117
– Gripen C: 351
– Rafale C: 205
– Typhoon T3: 117

29. Comparision: weapons effectiveness
vs non-maneuvering targets
gun
IR missile
radar missile
vs maneuvering targets
0 20 40 60 80 100 120

30. Comparision: bounce

31. Comparision: gun firing delay
Gun F-35
F-16
Rafale/Gripen
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

32. Comparision: maneuverability
Combat w eight
Thrust-to-w eight
F-35 A
F-35 B
F-35 C
Wing loading Rafale C
Gripen C
F-16 C
T3 Typhoon
Operational g limit
Ultimate g limit

33. Comparision: force presence
Aircraft
Rafale C
Gripen C
T3 Typhoon
F-16C
F-35A
F-35B
F-35C
Sorties per day
0 10 20 30 40 50 60

34. Conclusion: air combat
● F-35 is failure on all fronts
– unlikely to achieve first look or first shot
– unable to outmaneuver modern fighter aircraft in
order to gain firing solution
– unable to escape if detected
– unable to provide required force presence
– unable to withstand attrition

35. Fleet defense
● F-35 incapable of fighting modern fighter aircraft or
performing most missions other than ground attack
● low sortie rate especially problematic due to limited
number of aircraft carrier can carry
● single engine: more vulnerable to corrosion

36. Tactical bombing
● requirements
– ability to attack tactical targets on the ground
● only mission F-35 can actually do
● still requires cooperation with slower aircraft if there
is danger of unwanted collateral damage

37. CAS
● definition: usage of aircraft against hostile targets
representing possible threat to friendly forces
– result: targets attacked are often in close proximity to
friendly forces
● F-35 too delicate to survive ground fire and too fact
to find and attack ground targets

38. Reconnaissance
● sensory suite is suitable for scout missions, but it
cannot escape if attacked
● low sortie rate and high cost - both per-aircraft and
per-sortie - will make such missions rare and high
risk

39. Forward air control
● too fast and high flying for pilot to recognise tactical
targets or telltale signs of hidden enemy forces, and
to distinguish between friendly troops, enemy troops
and civillians
● same problems cause it to be incapable of assessing
the damage done to enemy troops precisely

40. Written by
● Picard578
● http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/
● 13. 3. 2013.