BVR combat was, for a long time, dream of both Western and Asian air forces. Today, it seems that the dream has been finally fulfilled; but is that really so?

1. BVR combat brief

2. Philosphy of BVR combat
● kill opponent beyond visual range
● USAF position
– first look
– first shot
– first kill
● visual range depends on size of aircraft
– generalized as anything beyond 37 kilometers

3. Comparision with infantry combat
● infantry combat readily moved towards close to
medium range combat since World War I
– sniper rifle: 1 000 - 2 000 meters range
– battle rifle: 500 - 1 000 meters range
– assault rifle: 300 - 500 meters range
● main weapon until Vietnam battle rifles; assault
rifles appear in World War II (StG-44)
● most combat happens at ranges no greater
than 100 meters

4. Comparision with infantry combat
● M-14 (top) was
replaced by M-16
(bottom) which was
initially sabotaged by
US generals so it
jammed in combat.
M-16 itself was
heavier version of
very successfull AR-
15

5. US concept of battle requirements
● stealth works, enemy doesn't have it
● BVR works, enemy's doesn't
● air bases and aircraft carriers safe from attack
● AWACS safe from attack, enemy doesn't have
it
● quality can compensate for quantitiy
● history shows that these necessities are
unlikely to hold true in case of conflict with
competent opponent

6. Stealth
● all US stealth fighters based on assumptions
that:
– combat will be solved at beyond visual range
– enemy will use active X-band radar as primary
combat sensor for both ground and air
installations
– enemy will not use anti-stealth measures

7. Anti-stealth measures
● fighters
– stay passive
– RWR
– IRST
– IR AAMs
● ground
– passive radar
– HF/VHF radar
– IR SAMs

8. Anti-stealth measures
● stay passive
– forces dilemma upon opponent
● use radar and risk early detection
● stay passive and loose advantage given by radar
stealth
– both courses of action render irrelevant
advantage provided by low RCS
● RWR
– modern radar warners can detect AESA LPI
radars at two times or more its own detection
distance vs typical fighter target
– SPECTRA and F-22s defense suite can use
opponent's radar to generate firing solutions

9. Anti-stealth measures
● IRST
– QWIP IRST
● PIRATE (Typhoon)
● OSF (Rafale)
● EO DAS (F-35)
● OLS-50M (PAK FA)
● possibly on J-20
– allows for head-on detection of subsonic fighters
at distances of 50-90 kilometers, and of
missile flares to 90-150 kilometers

10. Anti-stealth measures
● QWIP can operate in very longwave 15 micron
band to detect targets whose temperature is
only few degrees Celzius different from
temperature of their background/surroundings
● result: air combat switch from visual+radar
centric to visual+infrared centric
● IR missiles are not affected by radar stealth
– modern IR imaging missiles can lock on to
target from any aspect
– missile's IR sensor can be used in lieu of IRST if
latter is unavaliable

11. Anti-stealth measures
● HF/VHF radar
– radar stealth of aircraft dependant on
wavelength of threat radar
– all stealth fighters to date optimised for X band
stealth
– can be used along with IR SAM

12. Anti-stealth measures
● during Kosovo war,
Serbs used VHF
radar combined with
IR SAM to shoot
down one and cripple
another F-117
– F-117 suffered 2
losses out of
1300 sorties
– F-16 flew 4500
sorties with 1
being shot down

13. Anti-stealth measures
● passive radar
– multiple receivers on different locations
– uses environmental EM radiation to detect
stealth aircraft
● multistatic radar
– similar technique to passive radar, but uses its
own transmitters

14. BVR missile performance
● g forces in tracking turn are square of speed
● modern fighters highly maneuverable
– 12 g turn at Mach 0,5 (combat speed) - 0,9
(cruise speed)
– BVR missile speed: Mach 4
● missile needs to pull 237 to 768 g to defeat
maneuvering fighter

15. BVR missile performance
● modern BVR missiles can pull 30 g in their no-
escape zone
– missile Pk
● against target maneuvering at cruise speed: 13%
● against target maneuvering at corner speed: 4%
– this Pk does not account for any counter
measures
● BVRAAM Pk against maneuvering targets with
no ECM to date: 6-8%, compare to 15% for
WVRAAM; ECM can reduce Pk by 50% > 2-7%

16. BVR missile performance
● proximity fuze can trigger explosion if anything
flies nearby
● ranges given for BVR missiles only at high
altitude against aircraft in attack
– at low altitude range reduced to 25%
– against aircraft in flight range reduced to 25%
– AIM-120D range at low altitude against aircraft
in flight: 10 km

17. BVR missile performance
● pre-Vietnam AIM-7
claims: 0,7 Pk
● Vietnam performance:
0,08 Pk against less
advanced (but
competent) opponent
– most shots still from
visual range
● supports scepticism
about BVR missile
performance claims
Photo source: Air Power Australia

18. BVR missile performance
● BVR proponents' counter: Desert Storm, Allied
Force and Iraqi Freedom
– 5 BVR kills in Desert Storm; all other kills from
visual range
– F-15 AIM-7 Pk: 0,34; AIM-9 Pk: 0,67
– AIM-120: 6 BVR kills in Iraqi Freedom and
Desert Storm out of 13 shots

19. BVR missile performance
● these claims are misleading
– no targets had RWR or ECM
– no targets had support from stand-off jammers
– no targets had BVR weapon (radar, IR or anti-
radiation)
– majority of targets had no sensors to warn them
about incoming missiles and had bad cockpit
visibility: did not take evasive action
– Allied forces had large numerical and pilot
superiority

20. BVR technology penalties
● increased cost and complexity
– less aircraft
– less sorties per day per aircraft
● result
– training penalties
– numerical penalties
● personnel > numbers > technology

21. BVR technology penalties
● F-22 and F-15
designed for BVR
● F-16A designed for
WVR
● JAS-39C designed for
WVR with some BVR
capability

22. BVR technology penalties
● aircraft cost in 2013 USD
– F-22A: 262 million USD flyaway, 61 000 USD
per hour in the air; 13 300 USD per kg
– F-15C: 126 million USD flyaway, 30 000 USD
per hour in the air; 9 921 USD per kg
– F-16A: 30 million USD; 4 240 USD per kg
– JAS-39C: 40 million USD, 4 700 USD per hour
in the air; 6 040 USD per kg

23. BVR technology penalties
● missile cost in 2013 USD
– BVR missiles
● AIM-120D: 1 470 000 USD
– WVR missiles
● AIM-9X: 678 000 USD
● IRIS-T: 270 000 USD

24. BVR technology penalties
● cost per enemy aircraft shot down:
– AIM-120D
● Pk 3-8%
● 18 375 000 - 49 000 000 USD
– AIM-9X
● Pk 10-15%
● 4 520 000 - 6 780 000 USD
– IRIS-T
● Pk 10-15%
● 1 800 000 - 2 700 000 USD

25. BVR technology penalties
● Loadout cost and effectiveness
– 8 BVRAAM
● Pk 0,24-0,64
● 11 760 000 USD
– 8 WVRAAM
● Pk 0,8-1,2
● 2 160 000 - 5 424 000 USD
● number of missiles for Pk = 1
– BVRAAM: 12-33 = 17,64 - 48,51 million USD
– WVRAAM: 6-10 = 1,62 - 6,78 million USD

26. BVR technology penalties
● radar-based combat
– radar is active sensor
● gives away position of aircraft using it
● can be used for IFF
● radar signal can be used to target aircraft using
radar
– only countermeasure to turn radar off

27. BVR technology penalties
● longer range means larger radar
– larger aircraft
● heavier
● more expensive
● less maneuverable
– more complex systems
● more expensive per unit of weight
● harder to maintain
● less reliable

28. BVR technology penalties
● Result
– smaller force for $$$
– less sorties per number of aircraft
– less effective per sortie
– does not provide advantage in effective
engagement range

29. First look: electronically
● modern defense suites (SPECTRA) can target
aircraft through its radar emissions
● result: radars will be turned off in next major air
war

30. First look: visually
● the biggest target in the sky is the first one to
die

31. First look: visually
US F-15 jets intercepting MiG-29s at medium altitude

32. IFF
● as recently as 2003 Iraqi Freedom,
misidentified US aircraft were lost to allied
systems
● only reliable IFF visual one > optical systems

33. First look: visually
● result: biggest target is detected first
– reverses theoretical advantage of radar-based
BVR combat
Image source: F-22 fighter performance by James P Stevenson

34. Numbers
● number of aircraft for 1 billion USD
– F-22: 3
– F-15C: 7
– F-16A: 33
– JAS-39C: 22
● Sortie rate:
– F-22: 0,5, F-15: 1
– JAS-39: 2, F-16: 1,2
● 3:1 ratio maximum where superior quality can
compensate for superior quantitiy

35. Numbers
● Sorties per day:
– F-22: 1,5
– F-15: 7
– F-16A: 39,6
– JAS-39C: 44

36. Numbers
● Missiles carried:
– F-22: 8 BVRAAM
– F-15: 4 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM
– F-16: 6 WVRAAM / 2 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM
– JAS-39: 6 WVRAAM / 2 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM

37. BVR technology penalties
Cost Cost per kg Operating cost Aircraft for 1 billion USD Sorties Missiles
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
F-22
JAS-39
F-15C
F-16A

38. Numbers
● Lanchester square
–
●
●
●
●
● critique not fully applicable to air combat

39. Numbers
● OODA loop
– observe
– orient
– decide
– act
● too large number of hostile fighters in the air
can significantly slow down, or even break, the
loop

40. USAF self-delusion
● assumption: technology neutralizes numbers
● assumption: long-range air-to-air combat gives
unparalleled advantage
● justification: F-22 BVR dominance in exercises
● exercises between F-22 and F-15/F-16 use
BVR missile Pk of 0,65
– justification based on combat in Iraq
– AIM-120 had Pk of 0,46 against non-
maneuvering fighters without ECM; AIM-7
achieved 0,34 in Iraq in same conditions

41. USAF self-delusion
● reality:
– WVR performance still important
– air bases under constant threat of attack - even
when one side has undisputed air superiority
● cruise missiles make this problem even worse
● rewriting history
– agility was always important
● von Richthofen („Red Baron“) opted for more
agile fighter at expense of speed
● agility continued to dominate air-to-air combat
through WW2, Korea, Vietnam

42. BVR fighter performance in WVR
● as shown above, BVR combat does not work
against competent opponent
● result: fighters forced to fight within visual range
– requirements: small size, light weight, low wing
loading, low thrust loading, low drag, high fuel
fraction, numerical superiority, ability to
achieve quick kills
● how do BVR fighters compare?
– BVR requirements: high speed, large missile
payload, large radar >> maneuvering and
numerical penalty

43. Size

44. Capability penalties
combat w eightcombat w eight w ing loadingw ing loading thrust loadingthrust loading flyaw ay costflyaw ay cost sorties per day per aircraftsorties per day per aircraft
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
GripenCGripenC
F-16CF-16C
F-22AF-22A
F-15CF-15C

45. Result
● excessive BVR requirements (radar and radar-
guided BVR missiles instead of RWR, IRST and
IR BVR missiles) mean that most BVR fighters
are (performance-wise) actually fighter-
bombers
– can't fight against dedicated fighters
– can't bomb as well as dedicated bombers
● but modern fighters operate at speeds too high
to attack tactical targets on ground, and are too
delicate to withstand AA fire

46. Secure air bases?
● BVR fighters, especially stealth ones, based
upon implicit assumption of safe air bases
– but how safe air bases really are?
● even when Allies had complete superiority in
the air, their bases were attacked

47. Secure air bases?
● US air bases use hardened shelters for fighters

48. Secure air bases?
● air base tendering: using fighters to shoot down
opponent's fighters when they try to take off
– Sidewinder-armed Fokker DR.1 can shoot down
F-22 by using that tactic, and several can
close down entire air base
● aircraft spend majority (over 2/3) of time on the
ground; consequently, problem of secure air
bases among most important
– possible solution: use fighters that don't need
concrete runways or any large, fixed facilities
– US super-carriers unable to keep CAP
overhead

49. Secure air bases - conclusion
● air bases are never secure
– small numbers of expensive, so-called „high-
performance“ fighters that have to operate
from highly visible concrete runways require
relatively small effort to destroy when
compared to large numbers of small, cheap,
rugged fighters that can operate from nearly
anywhere
– large numbers of fighters are required to defend
air bases

50. Aircraft carriers
● US carrier force
– 10 fleet carriers
● currently Nimitz class super-carriers
● to be replaced by very similar Gerald F Ford
class
– 9 amphibious assault ships
● can host V/STOVL fighters
● smaller, cheaper than „fleet“ carriers

51. Aircraft carriers
● very vulnerable to assymetric response
– cannot generate sorties as efficiently as land air
bases
– can be quickly sunk by cheaper weapons
● AIP/diesel submarines
● „carrier killer“ cruise missiles
● problem
– very complex BVR-based fighters
– tankers can be converted to flattops, but what
about fighters?

52. Aircraft carriers

53. Aircraft carriers
● solution
– small fighter that can take off in relatively short
distance, and is cheap and simple enough to
be produced in very large numbers
– dedicated strike aircraft
– navalized A-10
– island bases and „island hopping“
● same solutions applicable for land-based
aviation
– completely contrary to BVR combat „logic“

54. What about AWACS?
● AWACS is one of corner stones of USAF BVR
doctrine
– large aircraft with huge, long-range radar

55. AWACS killer missiles
● K-100
– range of 200 kilometers
● Vympel R-37
– range of 400 kilometers against AWACS; work
still in progress
KS-100

56. Scenario: PLAAF invasion of Taiwan

57. Combat assumptions
● All scenarios
– all F-22s (183) on Taiwan > 90 sorties per day
– use low and high end to estimate both
possibilities
– stealth fighters invulnerable to BVR shots
● Scenarios 2 and 4
– 450 F-35s, 225 sorties per day
● 300 F-35s on Taiwan > 150 sorties per day
● 3 carrier battle groups near Taiwan > 150 F-35s,
75 sorties per day

58. Combat assumptions
● 1 200 Chinese fighters in range of Taiwan
– by 2030 PLAAF likely to have 20 J-20, 800 Su-
30/J-11B, 800 J-10
– assume 1 200 J-10 and J-11/Su-30 with 1 sortie
per fighter per day
● 15 J-20: 5 sorties per day
● 600 J-11: 600 sorties per day
● 600 J-10: 600 sorties per day

59. Combat assumptions (Sc 1&2)
● BVR missile Pk
– 0% against F-22, F-35, J-20
– 4% against Su-27, 30, 33, 35
● WVR missile Pk
– 15% against F-22, Sukhoi, J-20
– 22% against F-35A, 29% against F-35B, 27%
against F-35C
● gun Pk
– 30% against F-22, J-20, Sukhoi
– 50% against F-35

60. Combat assumptions (Sc 3&4)
● US missile Pk: 100%
● PLAAF missile Pk: 0%

61. Missile loadout
● F-22: 6 BVR, 2 WVR
● F-35: 4 BVR
– unsurvivable in visual range combat
● J-10: 6 BVR, 2 WVR
● J-11: 6 BVR, 2 WVR
● Su-30: 6 BVR, 4 WVR
● J-20: 6 BVR, 2 WVR

62. Combat assumptions
● radar detection range
– against F-22: 45 km
– against F-35: 80 km
– against J-20: 60 km
– against legacy: 100 km
● WVR missile range
– USAF (AIM-9X): 26 km
– PLAAF (PL-8): 20 km

63. Combat assumptions
● Closure rate
– scenario 1: 850 m/s
– scenario 2: 650 m/s
– range in time:
● 100 km = t
● 80 km = t+23s (Sc1), t+31s (Sc2)
● 60 km = t+47s (Sc1), t+67s (Sc2)
● 45 km = t+65s (Sc1), t+85s (Sc2)
● 26 km = t+87s (Sc1), t+114s (Sc2)
● 20 km = t+94s (Sc1), t+123s (Sc2)
– does not account for time required to evade
missiles

64. Combat assumptions
● SAMs have been taken out by cruise missiles
and don't participate
● Taiwanese air forces do not participate
● all sorties avaliable launched at once
– Scenario 1
● USAF: 90 F-22
● PLAAF: 5 J-20, 600 J-11, 600 J-10
– Scenario 2
● USAF/USN: 90 F-22, 225 F-35
● PLAAF: 5 J-20, 600 J-11, 600 J-10

65. Scenario 1
● t = 90 F-22 launch 540 BVR missiles against
1200 PLAAF legacy fighters; Pk = 0,04; 22
targets destroyed
● t+65 = 1183 PLAAF fighters launch 7230 BVR
missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed
● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk =
0,14, 25 targets destroyed
● t+94 = 1158 PLAAF fighters launch 2316 WVR
missiles; Pk = 17%; could destroy 394 F-22s
but only 90 present; 90 targets destroyed

66. Scenario 1
● End result
– USAF aircraft lost: 90
– PLAAF aircraft lost: 47
– USAF aircraft remaining: 0
– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 1158
– USAF kill/loss ratio: 0,52

67. Scenario 2
● t = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 840 BVR
missiles against 1200 Chinese legacy fighters;
Pk = 0,04, 33 targets destroyed
● t+65 = 1172 PLAAF fighters launch 7032 BVR
missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed
● t+87 = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 480 WVR
missiles; Pk = 0,14, 67 targets destroyed
● t+94 = 1105 PLAAF fighters launch 2210 WVR
missiles; average Pk = 24%; could destroy 530
targets but only 240 present; 240 targets
destroyed

68. Scenario 2
● End result
– USAF aircraft lost: 240
– PLAAF aircraft lost: 100
– USAF aircraft remaining: 0
– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 1105
– USAF kill/loss ratio: 0,42

69. Scenario 3
● t = 90 F-22 launch 540 BVR missiles against
1200 Chinese legacy fighters; Pk = 1, 540
targets destroyed
● t+65 = 665 PLAAF fighters launch 7230 BVR
missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed
● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk =
1, 180 targets destroyed
● t+94 = 485 PLAAF fighters launch 970 WVR
missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed

70. Scenario 3
● End result
– USAF aircraft lost: 0
– PLAAF aircraft lost: 720
– USAF aircraft remaining: 90
– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 485

71. Scenario 4
● t = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 1140 BVR
missiles against 1200 PLAAF legacy fighters;
Pk = 1, 1140 targets destroyed
● t+65 = 65 PLAAF fighters launch 390 BVR
missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed
● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk =
1, 65 targets destroyed
● t+94 = 0 PLAAF fighter aircraft remaining

72. Scenario 4
● End result
– USAF aircraft lost: 0
– PLAAF aircraft lost: 1205
– USAF aircraft remaining: 240
– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 0

73. PLAAF Taiwan invasion summary
● numbers matter
– in 3 out of 4 scenarios US defenders defeated
● it is unwise to rely solely on a „silver bullet“
solutions
● even with perfect missile Pk and invulnerable
aircraft, defenders were unable to win if PLAAF
sent more fighters than they had missiles
– with more realistic assumptions, maximum
break even force ratio is 3 PLAAF aircraft for
every US one - assuming USAF superiority in
every aspect

74. Scenarios critique
● do not take into account PLA area denial
systems
– cruise missiles
– diesel electric and AIP submarines
● these systems are designed for assymetric
warfare against US Navy; likely to prevent US
carrier operations near Chinese coast
● do not take into account Republic of China's
(Taiwan) air forces
● excessively optimistic

75. Scenarios critique
● many PLAAF air bases significantly harder than
typical US air base
– underground hangars
– no visible fuel storage
– result: US bases vulnerable to attack; US force
sizes portrayed are too optimistic
● IRST not taken into account
– OLS-35 can detect subsonic stealth fighter
head-on at 50 kilometers; 10% more if
supersonic
– QWIP IRST allows for detection range of 90 km
head on vs subsonic fighter; possibly used on
J-20

76. PLAAF air bases
Fuzhou air base - clearly visible entrances to
underground facility
Source: 2008 RAND brief

77. USAF Kadena air base
Source: 2008 RAND brief

78. Scenarios critique
● IR BVR missiles not taken into account
– unlikely to achieve significantly better Pk than
radar-guided BVR missiles for reasons of
physics, but negate US advantage in radar
stealth
● VHF SAMs used by
China - can detect
stealth aircraft

79. Scenarios critique
● PLA SAMs more likely to survive initial missile
exchange than US/Taiwanese SAMs
● many PLAAF fighters - being copies of Russian
Su-27 and MiG-29 - can operate from dirt strips
or any sufficiently flat and hard surface; US
fighters cannot
● stealth aircraft are not invulnerable to radar-
guided missiles

80. Written by
● Picard578
● http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/