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SMU CSE 5349/49
Email Security
SMU CSE 5349/7349
Threats
• Threats to the security of e-mail itself
– Loss of confidentiality
• E-mails are sent in clear over open networks
• E-mails stored on potentially insecure clients and mail
servers
– Loss of integrity
• No integrity protection on e-mails; body can be
altered in transit or on mail server
– Lack of data origin authentication
– Lack of non-repudiation
– Lack of notification of receipt
SMU CSE 5349/7349
Threats Enabled by E-mail
• Disclosure of sensitive information
• Exposure of systems to malicious code
• Denial-of-Service (DoS)
• Unauthorized accesses etc.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
What are the Options
• Secure the server to client connections (easy
thing first)
– POP, IMAP over ssh, SSL
– https access to webmail
– Very easy to configure
– Protection against insecure wireless access
• Secure the end-to-end email delivery
– The PGPs of the world
– Still need to get the other party to be PGP aware
– Practical in an enterprise intra-network environment
SMU CSE 5349/7349
Email based Attacks
• Active content attack
– Clean up at the server (AV, Defang)
• Buffer over-flow attack
– Fix the code
• Shell script attack
– Scan before send to the shell
• Trojan Horse Attack
– Use “do not automatically use the macro” option
• Web bugs (for tracking)
– Mangle the image at the mail server
SMU CSE 5349/7349
Email SPAM
• Cost to exceed $10 billion
• SPAM filtering
– Content based – required hits
– White list
– Black list
– Defang MIME
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP
• PGP=“Pretty Good Privacy”
• First released in 1991, developed by Phil Zimmerman
• Freeware: OpenPGP and variants:
• OpenPGP specified in RFC 2440 and defined by IETF
OpenPGP working group.
– www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html
• Available as plug-in for popular e-mail clients, can also be
used as stand-alone software.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP
• Functionality
– Encryption for confidentiality.
– Signature for non-repudiation/authenticity.
• Sign before encrypt, so signatures on unencrypted
data - can be detached and stored separately.
• PGP-processed data is base64 encoded
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Algorithms
Broad range of algorithms supported:
• Symmetric encryption:
– DES, 3DES, AES and others.
• Public key encryption of session keys:
– RSA or ElGamal.
• Hashing:
– SHA-1, MD-5 and others.
• Signature:
– RSA, DSS, ECDSA and others.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Services
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Message
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Key Rings
• PGP supports multiple public/private keys
pairs per sender/recipient.
• Keys stored locally in a PGP Key Ring –
essentially a database of keys.
• Private keys stored in encrypted form;
decryption key determined by user-
entered pass-phrase.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
Key Management for PGP
• Public keys for encrypting session keys /
verifying signatures.
• Private keys for decrypting session keys /
creating signatures.
• Where do these keys come from and on
what basis can they be trusted?
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Key Management
• PGP adopts a trust model called the web of trust.
• No centralised authority
• Individuals sign one another’s public keys, these
“certificates” are stored along with keys in key
rings.
• PGP computes a trust level for each public key in
key ring.
• Users interpret trust level for themselves.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Trust Levels
• Trust levels for public keys dependent on:
– Number of signatures on the key;
– Trust level assigned to each of those
signatures.
• Trust levels recomputed from time to time.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Key Mgmt Issues
• Original intention was that all e-mail users would
contribute to web of trust.
• Reality is that this web is sparsely populated.
• How should security-unaware users assign and
interpret trust levels?
• Later versions of PGP support X.509 certs.
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Message Generation
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Message Generation (cont’d)
• The sending PGP entity performs the following steps:
– Signs the message:
• PGP gets sender’s private key from key ring using its user id as an
index.
• PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key.
• PGP constructs the signature component of the message.
– Encrypts the message:
• PGP generates a session key and encrypts the message.
• PGP retrieves the receiver public key from the key ring using its
user id as an index.
• PGP constructs session component of message
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Message Reception
SMU CSE 5349/7349
PGP Message Reception
• The receiving PGP entity performs the following steps:
– Decrypting the message:
• PGP get private key from private-key ring using Key ID field in
session key component of message as an index.
• PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key.
• PGP recovers the session key and decrypts the message.
– Authenticating the message:
• PGP retrieves the sender’s public key from the public-key ring using
the Key ID field in the signature key component as index.
• PGP recovers the transmitted message digest.
• PGP computes the message for the received message and compares
it to the transmitted version for authentication.

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Email2

  • 2. SMU CSE 5349/7349 Threats • Threats to the security of e-mail itself – Loss of confidentiality • E-mails are sent in clear over open networks • E-mails stored on potentially insecure clients and mail servers – Loss of integrity • No integrity protection on e-mails; body can be altered in transit or on mail server – Lack of data origin authentication – Lack of non-repudiation – Lack of notification of receipt
  • 3. SMU CSE 5349/7349 Threats Enabled by E-mail • Disclosure of sensitive information • Exposure of systems to malicious code • Denial-of-Service (DoS) • Unauthorized accesses etc.
  • 4. SMU CSE 5349/7349 What are the Options • Secure the server to client connections (easy thing first) – POP, IMAP over ssh, SSL – https access to webmail – Very easy to configure – Protection against insecure wireless access • Secure the end-to-end email delivery – The PGPs of the world – Still need to get the other party to be PGP aware – Practical in an enterprise intra-network environment
  • 5. SMU CSE 5349/7349 Email based Attacks • Active content attack – Clean up at the server (AV, Defang) • Buffer over-flow attack – Fix the code • Shell script attack – Scan before send to the shell • Trojan Horse Attack – Use “do not automatically use the macro” option • Web bugs (for tracking) – Mangle the image at the mail server
  • 6. SMU CSE 5349/7349 Email SPAM • Cost to exceed $10 billion • SPAM filtering – Content based – required hits – White list – Black list – Defang MIME
  • 7. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP • PGP=“Pretty Good Privacy” • First released in 1991, developed by Phil Zimmerman • Freeware: OpenPGP and variants: • OpenPGP specified in RFC 2440 and defined by IETF OpenPGP working group. – www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html • Available as plug-in for popular e-mail clients, can also be used as stand-alone software.
  • 8. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP • Functionality – Encryption for confidentiality. – Signature for non-repudiation/authenticity. • Sign before encrypt, so signatures on unencrypted data - can be detached and stored separately. • PGP-processed data is base64 encoded
  • 9. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Algorithms Broad range of algorithms supported: • Symmetric encryption: – DES, 3DES, AES and others. • Public key encryption of session keys: – RSA or ElGamal. • Hashing: – SHA-1, MD-5 and others. • Signature: – RSA, DSS, ECDSA and others.
  • 12. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Key Rings • PGP supports multiple public/private keys pairs per sender/recipient. • Keys stored locally in a PGP Key Ring – essentially a database of keys. • Private keys stored in encrypted form; decryption key determined by user- entered pass-phrase.
  • 13. SMU CSE 5349/7349 Key Management for PGP • Public keys for encrypting session keys / verifying signatures. • Private keys for decrypting session keys / creating signatures. • Where do these keys come from and on what basis can they be trusted?
  • 14. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Key Management • PGP adopts a trust model called the web of trust. • No centralised authority • Individuals sign one another’s public keys, these “certificates” are stored along with keys in key rings. • PGP computes a trust level for each public key in key ring. • Users interpret trust level for themselves.
  • 15. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Trust Levels • Trust levels for public keys dependent on: – Number of signatures on the key; – Trust level assigned to each of those signatures. • Trust levels recomputed from time to time.
  • 16. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Key Mgmt Issues • Original intention was that all e-mail users would contribute to web of trust. • Reality is that this web is sparsely populated. • How should security-unaware users assign and interpret trust levels? • Later versions of PGP support X.509 certs.
  • 17. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Message Generation
  • 18. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Message Generation (cont’d) • The sending PGP entity performs the following steps: – Signs the message: • PGP gets sender’s private key from key ring using its user id as an index. • PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key. • PGP constructs the signature component of the message. – Encrypts the message: • PGP generates a session key and encrypts the message. • PGP retrieves the receiver public key from the key ring using its user id as an index. • PGP constructs session component of message
  • 19. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Message Reception
  • 20. SMU CSE 5349/7349 PGP Message Reception • The receiving PGP entity performs the following steps: – Decrypting the message: • PGP get private key from private-key ring using Key ID field in session key component of message as an index. • PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key. • PGP recovers the session key and decrypts the message. – Authenticating the message: • PGP retrieves the sender’s public key from the public-key ring using the Key ID field in the signature key component as index. • PGP recovers the transmitted message digest. • PGP computes the message for the received message and compares it to the transmitted version for authentication.

Editor's Notes

  1. Story: mailing of patent list to academic mailing list.
  2. In fact PGP-processed data can be used with any transport protocol. PGP-processed message is simply placed Into e-mail client edit window.
  3. S/MIME and PGP address these questions in quite different ways. What goes wrong if you use the wrong public key to encrypt or verify?
  4. Another HP story here: academic and HP employee using PGP as guerrilla secure e-mail solution.