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Authentication
Applications
1. Kerberos
2. Key Management and Distribution
3. X.509 Directory Authentication service
4. Public Key Infrastructure
5. Electronic Mail Security:
a. Pretty Good Privacy,
b.S/MIME.
Kerberos
.
Kerberos is a computer
network authentication protocol which
works on the basis of 'tickets' to allow
nodes communicating over a non-
secure network to prove their identity
to one another in a secure manner.
Key Management and
Distribution
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
PUBLICLY AVILABLE
DIRECTORY
Public key Authority
Public Key Certificates
One scheme has become universally accepted for
formatting public-key certificates
the X.509 standard.
X.5applications, including IP
security, transport layer security
(TLS), and S/MIME,X.509
certificates are used in most
network security
X.509 Authentication Service
 part of CCITT X.500 directory service
standards
◦ distributed servers maintaining some info
database
 defines framework for authentication
services
◦ directory may store public-key certificates
◦ with public key of user
◦ signed by certification authority
 also defines authentication protocols
 uses public-key crypto & digital signatures
◦ algorithms not standardised, but RSA
X.509 Certificates
 issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
◦ version (1, 2, or 3)
◦ serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
◦ signature algorithm identifier
◦ issuer X.500 name (CA)
◦ period of validity (from - to dates)
◦ subject X.500 name (name of owner)
◦ subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
◦ issuer unique identifier (v2+)
◦ subject unique identifier (v2+)
◦ extension fields (v3)
◦ signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
 notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed
by CA
X.509 Certificates
Obtaining a Certificate
 any user with access to CA can get
any certificate from it
 only the CA can modify a certificate
 because cannot be forged, certificates
can be placed in a public directory
CA Hierarchy
 if both users share a common CA then they
are assumed to know its public key
 otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy
 use certificates linking members of
hierarchy to validate other CA's
◦ each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and
parent (backward)
 each client trusts parents certificates
 enable verification of any certificate from
one CA by users of all other CAs in
hierarchy
CA Hierarchy Use
Certificate Revocation
 certificates have a period of validity
 may need to revoke before expiry,
eg:
1. user's private key is compromised
2. user is no longer certified by this CA
3. CA's certificate is compromised
 CA’s maintain list of revoked
certificates
◦ the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
 users should check certs with CA’s
Authentication Procedures
 X.509 includes three alternative
authentication procedures:
 One-Way Authentication
 Two-Way Authentication
 Three-Way Authentication
 all use public-key signatures
One-Way Authentication
 1 message ( A->B) used to establish
◦ the identity of A and that message is from
A
◦ message was intended for B
◦ integrity & originality of message
 message must include timestamp,
nonce, B's identity and is signed by A
Two-Way Authentication
 2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also
establishes in addition:
◦ the identity of B and that reply is from B
◦ that reply is intended for A
◦ integrity & originality of reply
 reply includes original nonce from A,
also timestamp and nonce from B
Three-Way Authentication
 3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which
enables above authentication without
synchronized clocks
 has reply from A back to B containing
signed copy of nonce from B
 means that timestamps need not be
checked or relied upon
Public Key Infrastructure
 RFC 2822 (Internet Security Glossary)
defines public-key infrastructure (PKI)
as the set of hardware, software,
people, policies, and procedures
needed to create, manage, store,
distribute, and revoke digital
certificates based on asymmetric
cryptography.
 The principal objective for developing
a PKI is to enable secure, convenient ,
and efficient acquisition of public keys
PKIX Management protocols
RFC 2510 defines the certificate management protocols (CMP)
RFC 2797 defines certificate management messages over CMS
(CMC), where CMS refers to RFC 2630, cryptographic
message syntax.
PGP
Phil Zimmermann
Philip R. "Phil" Zimmermann, is the creator of
Pretty Good Privacy,
the most widely used email encryption software
in the world.
He is also known for his work in VoIP encryption
protocols, notably ZRTP and Zfone.
Born: February 12, 1954 (age 61), Camden,
New Jersey, United States
Education: Florida Atlantic University
Organizations founded: Silent Circle
Books: PGP source code and internals, High
tension, The official PGP user's guide
35
Email Security
 email is one of the most widely used
and regarded network services
 currently message contents are not
secure
◦ may be inspected either in transit
◦ or by suitably privileged users on
destination system
36
Email Security Enhancements
 confidentiality
◦ protection from disclosure
 authentication
◦ of sender of message
 message integrity
◦ protection from modification
 non-repudiation of origin
◦ protection from denial by sender
37
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
 Open source, freely available software
package for secure e-mail
 de facto standard for secure email
 developed by Phil Zimmermann
 selected best available crypto algs to
use
 Runs on a variety of platforms like
Unix, PC, Macintosh and other
systems
 originally free (now also have
commercial versions available)
38
PGP Operation –
Authentication
1. sender creates message
2. Generates a digital signature for the
message
3. use SHA-1 to generate 160-bit hash of
message
4. signed hash with RSA using sender's
private key, and is attached to message
5. receiver uses RSA with sender's public key
to decrypt and recover hash code
6. receiver verifies received message using
hash of it and compares with decrypted
hash code
39
PGP Operation –
Confidentiality
1. sender generates a message and encrypts
it.
2. Generates a128-bit random number as
session key
3. Encrypts the message using CAST-128 /
IDEA / 3DES in CBC mode with session
key
4. session key encrypted using RSA with
recipient's public key and attached to the
msg
5. receiver uses RSA with private key to
decrypt and recover session key
6. session key is used to decrypt message
40
PGP Operation – Confidentiality &
Authentication
 can use both services on the same
message
◦ create signature & attach it to the message
◦ encrypt both message & signature
◦ attach RSA/ElGamal encrypted session key
This sequence is preferred because
--one can store the plaintext message/file and its
signature
--no need to decrypt the message/file again and
again
42
PGP Operation –
Compression
 PGP compresses messages to save space
for e-mail transmission and storage
 by default PGP compresses message after
signing but before encrypting
◦ so can store uncompressed message &
signature for later verification
◦ Encryption after compression strengthens
security (because compression has less
redundancy)
 uses ZIP compression algorithm
43
PGP Operation – Email
Compatibility
 when using PGP will have binary data (8-bit
octets) to send (encrypted message, etc)
 however email was designed only for text
 hence PGP must encode raw binary data
into printable ASCII characters
 uses radix-64 algorithm
◦ maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars
◦ also appends a CRC
 PGP also segments messages if too big
(maximum length 50,000 octets)
44
PGP Operation – Summary
45
PGP Session Keys
 need a session key for each message
◦ of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit
CAST or IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES
 uses random inputs taken from
-actual keys hit
-keystroke timing of a user
46
PGP Public & Private Keys
 since many public/private keys may be in
use, need to identify which is actually used
to encrypt session key in a message
◦ could send full public-key with every message
◦ but this is inefficient
 rather use a key identifier based on key
◦ is least significant 64-bits of the key
◦ will very likely be unique
 also use key ID in signatures
47
PGP Message Format
48
PGP Key Rings
 each PGP user has a pair of keyrings:
◦ public-key ring contains all the public-keys
of other PGP users known to this user,
indexed by key ID
◦ private-key ring contains the public/private
key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID
& encrypted keyed from a hashed
passphrase
 security of private keys thus depends
on the pass-phrase security
51
PGP Message Generation
52
PGP Message Reception
S/MIME
 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
 A standard way for email encryption and
signing
 IETF effort (RFCs 2632, 2633 – for version
3.0; RFCs 3850, 3851 for version 3.1; 5750,
5751 for version 3.2)
 Industry support
 Not a standalone software, a system that is to
be supported by email clients
◦ such as MS Outlook and Thunderbird
 S/MIME handles digital signatures
◦ Also provides encryption
Quick E-mail History
 SMTP and RFC 822
◦ only ASCII messages (7-bit)
 MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
◦ content type
 Almost any type of information can appear in an email
message
◦ transfer encoding
 specifies how the message body is encoded into textual
form (radix64 is common)
 S/MIME: Secure MIME
◦ new content types, like signature, encrypted data
S/MIME Functions
 enveloped data
◦ encrypted content and associated keys
 signed data
◦ encoded message + encoded signed message
digest
 clear-signed data
◦ cleartext message + encoded signed message
digest
 signed and enveloped data
◦ Nested signed and encrypted entities
S/MIME Cryptographic
Algorithms
 hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5
 digital signatures: DSS & RSA
 session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA
 message encryption: Triple-DES, AES and
others
 sender should know the capabilities of the
receiving entity (public announcement or
previously received messages from receiver)
◦ otherwise sender takes a risk
Scope of S/MIME Security
 S/MIME secures a MIME entity
◦ a MIME entity is entire message except the
headers
◦ so the header is not secured
 First MIME message is prepared
 This message and other security related data
(algorithm identifiers, certificates, etc.) are
processed by S/MIME
 and packed as one of the S/MIME content
type
S/MIME Content Types
EnvelopedData
 For message encryption
 Similar to PGP
◦ create a random session key, encrypt the message
with that key and a conventional crypto, encrypt the
session key with recipient’s public key
 Unlike PGP, recipient’s public key comes
from an X.509 certificate
◦ trust management is different
SignedData
 For signed message
◦ both message and signature are encoded so that
the recipient only sees some ASCII characters if he
does not use an email client with S/MIME support
 Similar to PGP
◦ first message is hashed, then the hash is encrypted
using sender’s private key
 Message, signature, identifiers of algorithms
and the sender’s certificate are packed
together
◦ again difference between S/MIME and PGP in trust
management
Clear Signing
 Another mechanism for signature
◦ but the message is not encoded, so an email
client with no S/MIME support could also
view the message
 of course the signature will not be verified and will
be seen as a meaningless attachment
 multipart/signed content type
◦ 2 parts
 Clear text message
 Signature
◦ Let’s see an example
S/MIME Certificate Processing
 S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates
◦ Certification Authorities (CAs) issue certificates
◦ unlike PGP, a user cannot be a CA
 each client has a list of trusted CA certificates
◦ actually that list comes with e-mail client software or
OS
 and own public/private key pairs and certs
 Our textbook says “S/MIME key management
is a hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy and
PGP’s web of trust”
◦ but I do not believe that this is the case, because it
is very hard for an average user to maintain the list
of trusted CAs
S/MIME Certificate Processing
and CAs
 One should obtain a certificate from a CA in order
to send signed messages
 Certificates classes (common practice by most
CAs)
◦ Class 1
◦ Class 2
◦ Class 3
 CA certification policies (Certificate Practice
Statement)
◦ ID-control practices
 Class 1: only email address check
 Class 2: class1 + against third party database / fax documents
 Class 3: class1 + apply in person and submit picture IDs and/or
paper documents
Stronger
identity
validation
Easier to
issue

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unit6.ppt

  • 1. Authentication Applications 1. Kerberos 2. Key Management and Distribution 3. X.509 Directory Authentication service 4. Public Key Infrastructure 5. Electronic Mail Security: a. Pretty Good Privacy, b.S/MIME.
  • 2. Kerberos . Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol which works on the basis of 'tickets' to allow nodes communicating over a non- secure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 19. One scheme has become universally accepted for formatting public-key certificates the X.509 standard. X.5applications, including IP security, transport layer security (TLS), and S/MIME,X.509 certificates are used in most network security
  • 20. X.509 Authentication Service  part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards ◦ distributed servers maintaining some info database  defines framework for authentication services ◦ directory may store public-key certificates ◦ with public key of user ◦ signed by certification authority  also defines authentication protocols  uses public-key crypto & digital signatures ◦ algorithms not standardised, but RSA
  • 21. X.509 Certificates  issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing: ◦ version (1, 2, or 3) ◦ serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate ◦ signature algorithm identifier ◦ issuer X.500 name (CA) ◦ period of validity (from - to dates) ◦ subject X.500 name (name of owner) ◦ subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key) ◦ issuer unique identifier (v2+) ◦ subject unique identifier (v2+) ◦ extension fields (v3) ◦ signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)  notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA
  • 23. Obtaining a Certificate  any user with access to CA can get any certificate from it  only the CA can modify a certificate  because cannot be forged, certificates can be placed in a public directory
  • 24. CA Hierarchy  if both users share a common CA then they are assumed to know its public key  otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy  use certificates linking members of hierarchy to validate other CA's ◦ each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent (backward)  each client trusts parents certificates  enable verification of any certificate from one CA by users of all other CAs in hierarchy
  • 26. Certificate Revocation  certificates have a period of validity  may need to revoke before expiry, eg: 1. user's private key is compromised 2. user is no longer certified by this CA 3. CA's certificate is compromised  CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates ◦ the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)  users should check certs with CA’s
  • 27. Authentication Procedures  X.509 includes three alternative authentication procedures:  One-Way Authentication  Two-Way Authentication  Three-Way Authentication  all use public-key signatures
  • 28. One-Way Authentication  1 message ( A->B) used to establish ◦ the identity of A and that message is from A ◦ message was intended for B ◦ integrity & originality of message  message must include timestamp, nonce, B's identity and is signed by A
  • 29. Two-Way Authentication  2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also establishes in addition: ◦ the identity of B and that reply is from B ◦ that reply is intended for A ◦ integrity & originality of reply  reply includes original nonce from A, also timestamp and nonce from B
  • 30. Three-Way Authentication  3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which enables above authentication without synchronized clocks  has reply from A back to B containing signed copy of nonce from B  means that timestamps need not be checked or relied upon
  • 31. Public Key Infrastructure  RFC 2822 (Internet Security Glossary) defines public-key infrastructure (PKI) as the set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography.  The principal objective for developing a PKI is to enable secure, convenient , and efficient acquisition of public keys
  • 32.
  • 33. PKIX Management protocols RFC 2510 defines the certificate management protocols (CMP) RFC 2797 defines certificate management messages over CMS (CMC), where CMS refers to RFC 2630, cryptographic message syntax.
  • 34. PGP Phil Zimmermann Philip R. "Phil" Zimmermann, is the creator of Pretty Good Privacy, the most widely used email encryption software in the world. He is also known for his work in VoIP encryption protocols, notably ZRTP and Zfone. Born: February 12, 1954 (age 61), Camden, New Jersey, United States Education: Florida Atlantic University Organizations founded: Silent Circle Books: PGP source code and internals, High tension, The official PGP user's guide
  • 35. 35 Email Security  email is one of the most widely used and regarded network services  currently message contents are not secure ◦ may be inspected either in transit ◦ or by suitably privileged users on destination system
  • 36. 36 Email Security Enhancements  confidentiality ◦ protection from disclosure  authentication ◦ of sender of message  message integrity ◦ protection from modification  non-repudiation of origin ◦ protection from denial by sender
  • 37. 37 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)  Open source, freely available software package for secure e-mail  de facto standard for secure email  developed by Phil Zimmermann  selected best available crypto algs to use  Runs on a variety of platforms like Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems  originally free (now also have commercial versions available)
  • 38. 38 PGP Operation – Authentication 1. sender creates message 2. Generates a digital signature for the message 3. use SHA-1 to generate 160-bit hash of message 4. signed hash with RSA using sender's private key, and is attached to message 5. receiver uses RSA with sender's public key to decrypt and recover hash code 6. receiver verifies received message using hash of it and compares with decrypted hash code
  • 39. 39 PGP Operation – Confidentiality 1. sender generates a message and encrypts it. 2. Generates a128-bit random number as session key 3. Encrypts the message using CAST-128 / IDEA / 3DES in CBC mode with session key 4. session key encrypted using RSA with recipient's public key and attached to the msg 5. receiver uses RSA with private key to decrypt and recover session key 6. session key is used to decrypt message
  • 40. 40 PGP Operation – Confidentiality & Authentication  can use both services on the same message ◦ create signature & attach it to the message ◦ encrypt both message & signature ◦ attach RSA/ElGamal encrypted session key This sequence is preferred because --one can store the plaintext message/file and its signature --no need to decrypt the message/file again and again
  • 41.
  • 42. 42 PGP Operation – Compression  PGP compresses messages to save space for e-mail transmission and storage  by default PGP compresses message after signing but before encrypting ◦ so can store uncompressed message & signature for later verification ◦ Encryption after compression strengthens security (because compression has less redundancy)  uses ZIP compression algorithm
  • 43. 43 PGP Operation – Email Compatibility  when using PGP will have binary data (8-bit octets) to send (encrypted message, etc)  however email was designed only for text  hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters  uses radix-64 algorithm ◦ maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars ◦ also appends a CRC  PGP also segments messages if too big (maximum length 50,000 octets)
  • 45. 45 PGP Session Keys  need a session key for each message ◦ of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES  uses random inputs taken from -actual keys hit -keystroke timing of a user
  • 46. 46 PGP Public & Private Keys  since many public/private keys may be in use, need to identify which is actually used to encrypt session key in a message ◦ could send full public-key with every message ◦ but this is inefficient  rather use a key identifier based on key ◦ is least significant 64-bits of the key ◦ will very likely be unique  also use key ID in signatures
  • 48. 48 PGP Key Rings  each PGP user has a pair of keyrings: ◦ public-key ring contains all the public-keys of other PGP users known to this user, indexed by key ID ◦ private-key ring contains the public/private key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID & encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase  security of private keys thus depends on the pass-phrase security
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 53. S/MIME  Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions  A standard way for email encryption and signing  IETF effort (RFCs 2632, 2633 – for version 3.0; RFCs 3850, 3851 for version 3.1; 5750, 5751 for version 3.2)  Industry support  Not a standalone software, a system that is to be supported by email clients ◦ such as MS Outlook and Thunderbird  S/MIME handles digital signatures ◦ Also provides encryption
  • 54. Quick E-mail History  SMTP and RFC 822 ◦ only ASCII messages (7-bit)  MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) ◦ content type  Almost any type of information can appear in an email message ◦ transfer encoding  specifies how the message body is encoded into textual form (radix64 is common)  S/MIME: Secure MIME ◦ new content types, like signature, encrypted data
  • 55. S/MIME Functions  enveloped data ◦ encrypted content and associated keys  signed data ◦ encoded message + encoded signed message digest  clear-signed data ◦ cleartext message + encoded signed message digest  signed and enveloped data ◦ Nested signed and encrypted entities
  • 56. S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms  hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5  digital signatures: DSS & RSA  session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA  message encryption: Triple-DES, AES and others  sender should know the capabilities of the receiving entity (public announcement or previously received messages from receiver) ◦ otherwise sender takes a risk
  • 57. Scope of S/MIME Security  S/MIME secures a MIME entity ◦ a MIME entity is entire message except the headers ◦ so the header is not secured  First MIME message is prepared  This message and other security related data (algorithm identifiers, certificates, etc.) are processed by S/MIME  and packed as one of the S/MIME content type
  • 59. EnvelopedData  For message encryption  Similar to PGP ◦ create a random session key, encrypt the message with that key and a conventional crypto, encrypt the session key with recipient’s public key  Unlike PGP, recipient’s public key comes from an X.509 certificate ◦ trust management is different
  • 60. SignedData  For signed message ◦ both message and signature are encoded so that the recipient only sees some ASCII characters if he does not use an email client with S/MIME support  Similar to PGP ◦ first message is hashed, then the hash is encrypted using sender’s private key  Message, signature, identifiers of algorithms and the sender’s certificate are packed together ◦ again difference between S/MIME and PGP in trust management
  • 61. Clear Signing  Another mechanism for signature ◦ but the message is not encoded, so an email client with no S/MIME support could also view the message  of course the signature will not be verified and will be seen as a meaningless attachment  multipart/signed content type ◦ 2 parts  Clear text message  Signature ◦ Let’s see an example
  • 62. S/MIME Certificate Processing  S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates ◦ Certification Authorities (CAs) issue certificates ◦ unlike PGP, a user cannot be a CA  each client has a list of trusted CA certificates ◦ actually that list comes with e-mail client software or OS  and own public/private key pairs and certs  Our textbook says “S/MIME key management is a hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy and PGP’s web of trust” ◦ but I do not believe that this is the case, because it is very hard for an average user to maintain the list of trusted CAs
  • 63. S/MIME Certificate Processing and CAs  One should obtain a certificate from a CA in order to send signed messages  Certificates classes (common practice by most CAs) ◦ Class 1 ◦ Class 2 ◦ Class 3  CA certification policies (Certificate Practice Statement) ◦ ID-control practices  Class 1: only email address check  Class 2: class1 + against third party database / fax documents  Class 3: class1 + apply in person and submit picture IDs and/or paper documents Stronger identity validation Easier to issue