Secure Pork Supply Implementation - PORK Academy - Dr. Pam Zaabel, Iowa State University; Dr. Patrick Webb, National Pork Board, from the 2017 World Pork Expo, June 7 - 9, 2017, Des Moines, IA, USA. More presentations at http://www.swinecast.com/2017-world-pork-expo

1. Secure Pork Supply Plan:
Federal, State, Industry, and
Academic Partnership
Pam Zaabel, DVM
Center for Food Security and Public Health
College of Veterinary Medicine
Iowa State University

2. Secure Pork Supply Plan
• Changing Response Plans
• Secure Food Supply Plan Overview
• Secure Pork Supply Plan

3. Changing Response Plans

4. “US livestock industries have
changed dramatically since 1929”
We Must be Prepared to Respond
in New Ways

5. Factors Requiring a Change in FAD
Planned Responses
• Very large herd sizes
• Extensive movement of animals
• Public resistance to stamping out
• Environmental concerns with
carcass disposal
• Increased numbers of deer and
feral swine

6. USDA FAD PReP
Response Plans

7. Tools for Control of FADs
• Stop Movement
• Biosecurity
• Stamping Out
– Depopulate all clinically affected and in-contact
susceptible animals (within 24 hours or as
soon as possible)
• Trace-back/Trace-forward
– 28 days prior to outbreak
• Rapid Diagnostics
• Vaccination
– Vaccinate to kill/slaughter; Vaccinate to live

8. Phases and Types
of FMD Response
• Strategies for the
response to, and
management of,
an FMD outbreak
will change as the
outbreak
progresses and
will depend upon
the magnitude,
location and other
characteristics of
the outbreak.
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak

9. • FMD and CSF
– Vaccine will not be immediately
available, and will be in short
supply when available
• ASF
– No vaccine
Vaccination will not be a viable
option for initial rapid control
of these FADs in a large FAD
outbreak
Vaccine Availability
Ramirez

10. Secure Food Supply
Plans Overview

11. Control Area Established Around Each
Infected Premises
Secure Food Supply Plans work toward
enabling movement of animals or products
from flocks/herds with no evidence of
infection in a Control Area

12. Secure Food Supply Plans
Movement from Premises with No Evidence of Infection
• Secure Milk Supply (2009)
–Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
–Movement of milk, animals
• Secure Pork Supply* (2010)
–FMD, Classical Swine Fever,
African Swine Fever
–Movement of animals
• Secure Beef Supply (2014)
–FMD
–Movement of animals
All funded by USDA APHIS
*Some funding also provided by National Pork Board

13. Secure Food Supply Plans During an
FAD Outbreak
Overall goals include:
–Detect, control, and contain FAD as quickly
as possible;
–Avoid interruptions in animal/animal product
movement to commercial processing from farms
with no evidence of infection during a foreign
animal disease outbreak; and
–Maintain business continuity for producers,
transporters, and food processors through
response planning.
• www.aphis.usda.gov/ Select Emergency Response
• www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Secure-Food-Supply/index.php

14. Business Continuity Planning
• Minimize the unintended negative effects of
disease and disease response while
achieving response goals
• Provide risk-based solutions derived from
scientific data
• Control or eradicate disease without
“destroying” the industry

15. Common Components of
Secure Food Supply Plans
• Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness
• Biosecurity
• Surveillance
• Epidemiology questionnaires
• Movement permit guidance
• Risk assessments
–Completed and in process

16. Common Components of
Secure Food Supply Plans (cont’d)
• Plans based on current capabilities
and will evolve with science, risk
assessments and new capabilities
• Guidelines only
–Final decisions made by responsible officials
during outbreak
• Outreach and training pre- and
post-outbreak

17. Secure Pork Supply Plan

18. Secure Pork Supply Plan
(Funded by USDA APHIS VS and NPB)
Goal: Provide a workable business
continuity plan for pork premises with no
evidence of the FAD infection and associated
industries that is credible to Responsible
Regulatory Officials

19. Plan Development
• Industry-State-Federal-Academia
partnership
• Funded by USDA APHIS and NPB
• Voluntary participation
• Movements either to slaughter or to
the next stage of production
• Revise, pilot test, lessons learned

20. Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan
FADs addressed
• African Swine Fever
(ASF)
• Classical Swine
Fever (CSF)
• Foot and mouth
Disease (FMD)
Not a public health or
food safety concern
NPB

21. FMD: The MOST Contagious
Disease of Animals
• Hoof and Mouth
Disease
• Not a food safety or
public health concern
• Clinical signs
-Blisters on the feet and
the snout
-Lameness, fever, and
going off feed

22. Classical Swine Fever (CSF)
(Hog Cholera)
• Not a public health or
food safety concern
• Clinical signs
– Reddened and crusty eyes
– Skin discoloration
– Fever
– Constipation followed
by diarrhea
– Huddling
– Unsteadiness
– Going off-feed

23. African Swine Fever (ASF)
• Not a public health or
food safety concern
• Clinical signs
– Skin discoloration
– Diarrhea
– Piling
– Tiredness
– Abortion
– Going off feed
– Death
PIADC
PIADC

24. Day 1 of an FMD, CSF, or
ASF Outbreak
• Notification of OIE and member
countries
– FMD: All exports of cattle, swine, sheep,
goats and their uncooked products will
be STOPPED
– CSF or ASF: All exports of swine and their
uncooked products will be STOPPED
• Control Area(s) established to manage
movements
• Prices will drop
• Consumer confidence at risk

25. Controlled Movement
• Day 1 of an outbreak
– Stop movement
• No new movements initiated from FAD Control Area
– Animals already in transit need to land
somewhere
• Continue on to their destination
• Return to site of origin
• Handled somewhere in between
– Producers may need to manage their animals
without moving animals for several days to
weeks

26. USDA FAD PReP
Movement Guidelines
• Establish Control Area
– Infected and Buffer Zone
– Quarantine
– Movement by permit
only, based on risk
– Movement controls
in place until Control
Area released
– Secure Food Supply Plans
working on domestic movement

27. Controlled Movement
• Movement Resumes
– Enhanced Biosecurity
– Surveillance
– Movement Permits

28. Movement Permits
• Permits may be required for all movements
onto, off of premises during the outbreak
• Have a Premises Identification Number
(PIN) for each site

29. Decision to Issue Movement Permits for
Animals with No Evidence of Infection in a
Control Area
• For movement of live animals to another production site, the
premises of destination must agree to accept the risk of receiving
the animals and the owners of the production site of origin must
request a movement permit
• For movement to slaughter, the owners of the slaughter facility
must agree to accept the animals and the owners of the
production site of origin must request a movement permit
• Unified Incident Command Officials must be willing to let the
animals leave the premises (and Control Area)
• State Animal Health Officials in the state of origin and the state of
destination must agree to the movement

30. Decision to Approve Movement
May Be Influenced By
• Degree of confidence that animals are not infected
• Phase and Type of FMD, CSF, or ASF response
• FAD status of the states of transit, destination
• Final destination
– In a Control Area
– Slaughter
– Another production site
• Vaccination
• Animals recovered from infection
• Consequences of not allowing movement

31. SPS Plan Summary
• How producers
can prepare prior
to an outbreak
• Information which
may be needed to
request a
movement permit

32. SPS Plan Summary
• Links to documents
utilized for response
planning

33. Biosecurity to Control Introduction
of Novel Diseases
Biosecurity is expensive and inconvenient
• Producers implement the level of biosecurity needed to
protect from endemic diseases
– There is herd immunity to most endemic diseases
– Low levels of pathogen shedding and high levels
of resistance
• The routine level of biosecurity is not sufficient to protect
from a newly introduced highly contagious disease
(e.g., FMD, CSF, ASF)
– No herd immunity
– High levels of pathogen shedding and low levels
of resistance

34. Biosecurity
• Producers responsibility
– Protect their herds by keeping the
disease off the farm
• Responsible Regulatory Officials
responsibility
– Protect the US herd by keeping the
disease from spreading

35. Biosecurity Self-Assessment
Checklist
• Biosecurity Manager and
Written Plan
• Training
• Protecting the Pig Herd
• Vehicles and Equipment
• Personnel
• Animal and Semen Movement
• Carcass Disposal
• Manure Management
• Rodent, Wildlife, and Other
Animal Control
• Feed
In place In progress Not In place

36. Information Manual
Information Manual
For Enhanced
Biosecurity:
Swine Raised Indoors

37. Biosecurity
Four concepts emphasized
• A Biosecurity Manager
• A written site-specific biosecurity plan
• A defined Perimeter Buffer Area
• A defined Line of Separation

38. Biosecurity Manager
• Understand infectious diseases and
production animal agriculture, familiar
with facility
• Use the Self-Assessment Checklist and
Information Manual for Enhanced
Biosecurity
• Write site-specific biosecurity plan (with
the assistance of the herd veterinarian)
• Responsible for employee training
• Ensure compliance on the site

39. SPS Plan Biosecurity
Create a Site-Specific
Biosecurity plan
• explain how the
site meets all
the biosecurity
measures listed
in the checklist

40. Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
• Established around all
animal buildings serving
as an outer control
boundary to minimize
contamination near
the buildings
• Enter the PBA only
through a clearly
marked and controlled
PBA Access Point(s)
following appropriate
biosecurity measures

41. PBA Access Point(s)
• Designated areas where vehicles,
people, equipment or supplies cross
into the PBA
• Movement of equipment and
supplies into the PBA requires
cleaning and disinfection
• Movement of people through the
PBA Access Point(s) requires
following biosecurity measures

42. Line of Separation (LOS)
• Walls of the building
housing the pigs
• People and items
only cross the LOS
through a clearly
marked and
controlled LOS
Access Point(s)
following appropriate
biosecurity measures

43. LOS Access Point(s)
• Designated areas where people,
equipment or supplies cross LOS
• Movement of equipment and
supplies across the LOS requires
cleaning and disinfection
• Movement of people through LOS
access point(s) requires following
specific biosecurity measures

44. LOS Access Point(s)

45. Line of Separation (LOS)
Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)

46. Line of Separation (LOS)
Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)

47. Vehicles and Equipment

48. Carcass Disposal

49. Manure Management

50. Rodent, Wildlife, and Other
Animal Control

51. Feed
• Transport
• Storage
• Spills

52. Contingency Plans
• Inclement Weather
– Sheltered C&D area
– Off-site location
– Alternate delivery options
• Stop Movement
– Welfare concerns
– Carcass disposal
• Manure Storage
– If not permitted to
move off-site for a
period of time

53. Employee Biosecurity Training
‘Do Not Bring
Disease to the Site’
Each module
includes a quiz

54. Animal Movement

55. Biosecurity Posters
• Farm activities
• Producers and
Employees
• Visitors
• English and
Spanish

56. Surveillance Guidelines
• Tests currently
available
• Sample options
• Visual inspection
• Not a review of
sample sizes or
frequencies

57. SPS Plan Surveillance
Sample Collection and Testing
• PCR
• Sample type?
• blood
• oral fluids
• nasal swabs
• tonsils
Ramirez
Ramirez

58. SPS Plan Surveillance
www.securepork.org/training-materials.php

59. SPS Plan Surveillance

60. FMD Pocket Guide: Swine
www.securepork.org

61. FMD, CSF, and ASF
Lesion Posters

62. SPS Plan Epidemiology
Record Keeping Questionnaire

63. Challenges for
Implementation of the
Secure Pork Supply Plan

64. Challenges from a Producer/Production
System Perspective
• Implementation of biosecurity
• Management of animals if
movement is not allowed for
several days or weeks
• Willingness to accept animals
from a Control Area

65. Challenges from a Producer/Production
System Perspective
• The following likely sequelae from an FMD or CSF outbreak
must be considered:
– Increased death loss
– Poor rate of gain, feed efficiency in recovered animals
– If there is no mandated depopulation, there will be no
indemnity
– Increased treatment costs and other expenses
associated with managing the outbreak
– A dramatic drop in price for pork due to loss of export
markets and potential decrease in domestic consumption
– Flexibility in contract arrangements will be needed
• Contract feeding
• Delivery to packers
• Feed purchases

66. Challenges from State Animal
Health Officials’ Perspective
• Resources to manage outbreak
• Information needed to approve
movement permit
– To processing
– To another stage of production
– Within Control Area?
– Out of Control Area?
– Into their state
• Into a Control Area?
• Into a Free Area?

67. Challenges from USDA Perspective
• Access to sufficient responders and
resources
• Size of Control Area
• Trace-back and trace-forward
• Information management
• Control cost of responding
to outbreak

68. Challenges from a
Packers/Processors’ Perspective
• Protect their “Brand”
• Market for processed product
• Biosecurity
– Trucks and drivers
– Employees
• Flexibility in Contracts
– Receiving hogs
– Delivery of products
– Employee contracts

69. Secure Milk, Pork, Beef Plans
www.securemilksupply.org www.securebeef.org
www.securepork.org

70. www.securepork.org

71. Questions and Comments:
zaabelp@iastate.edu
Thanks for
giving a hoot!