The document discusses challenges in increasing biosecurity in the nursery industry. It summarizes existing industry certification schemes in the UK and overseas aimed at improving plant health and reducing biosecurity risks. It identifies issues like asymmetric information and public good characteristics that can lead to underprovision of biosecurity. The document also outlines themes discussed with industry, including the need for clear benefits to encourage participation in voluntary schemes, government support through policies, and ensuring schemes are designed to maximize coverage. Market impacts and future areas of research are also addressed.

1. Challenges in increasing biosecurity in the
nursery industry'
Glyn Jones, Fera Science Ltd

2. Overview
• FPPH Cost and Responsibility project
• Biosecurity as a public good
• Industry schemes
• Feedback from industry on scheme development
• RAPID Trade
• Modelling industry schemes

3. The “market” for plant
health/biosecurity
“Buyers”
• Plant producers
• Importers
• Consumers (food,
ornamentals,
ecosystem services)
“Suppliers”
Plant production supply
chain, i.e.
• Producers
• Traders
• Transporters
Market for
Plant Health
Characteristics of plant trade and biosecurity
• Asymmetric information
• Public good characteristics (non-rival / non-excludable)
= Market failure: plant health/biosecurity will be underprovided
by the market

4. Sector complexity and impact of poor
biosecurity

5. UK CRS Schemes
UK Agriculture Horticulture:
food
Horticulture:
ornamental plants
Forestry, parks and
gardens
Risk
reduction
Save Haven
certification1
LEAF Marque2 (Chain
of Custody)
Plant Health
Propagation
Scheme
(PHPS)2
BOPP certification
(grower standards)
1
Home Grown2
Forest Reproductive
Material (FRM) 2
Grown in Britain2
UK Sourced and
Grown (UKSG)
HTA Scheme
Phytosanitary certificates2
Plant passports2 (EU; certain species)
Control Rhizomania mutual
fund1
1 See Waage et al. (2007) 2 See ADAS (2014)

6. Overseas CRS schemes
World Agriculture: field crops Horticulture:
food
Horticulture:
ornamental plants
Forestry, parks
and gardens
Risk
reduction
All-risk farm insurance (only
losses) (US) 1
Voluntary insurance (private):
Potatopol (NL) 1
Compulsory levy (private):
Kartoffelafgaftsfonden
(Denmark) 1
BioSecure (Australia)2
Voluntary levy
(Israel) (citrus)
1
Revolving loan
fund (US) 1
Interstate pest
control compact
(US) 1
GIA (PPP) (NZ) 1
Swedish Horticultural Elite-plant-
station: testing of propagation
material2
Nursery registration (US)2
Phytosanitary certificates2
GlobalGAP
Control EPPRD (Aus) 1
1 See Waage et al. (2007) 2 See ADAS (2014)

7. Changing times
Traditional government activities
• Risk assessment /exclusion (import inspections,…)
• Monitoring and surveillance
• Quarantine measures
• Research funding
Budgetary pressure, increasing and changing risks
Therefore
• Supports trend towards private sector self-regulation
• Accommodate self-regulation in policies

8. Instruments for Intervention
Cost Sharing: Outbreak Control
• Insurance (independent provider or mutual)
• “Environmental” bond
• Retrospective levy (of total or a share of the costs)
Cost Sharing: Risk Reduction
• Chain of custody certification / assurance
• “Environmental” bond?
Addressing information asymmetry
Addressing public good
problem

9. Industry makes it’s move: Why?
• Chalara
 Woodland Trust – aspirations
and concerns on sourcing
• Xylella
 HTA etc – concerns on
regulatory response
DE
X
X X

10. Woodland Trust & HTA schemes
• Dynamic situation
• HTA:
• Pilot phase
• Roll out – want large scale
• Woodland Trust: UK Sourced and Grown:
• Problem regarding “S”!
• GiB?

11. Questions posed
• What are the benefits – sufficiently tangible to make it worthwhile?
• Lower probability of regulatory response, market access, lower regulatory burden,
public sector procurement
• What’s missing?
• Weakest link: what do you do about those who don’t join?
• Biosecurity economies - risk management tools/shared detection/surveillance
• Shared industry impacts? Self insurance …… bonds …..
• Natural environment impacts ….. deed system
• Training?
• How can they be included? Barriers/enablers
• The role of Defra

12. Themes: Defra leadership and policy interactions
• Scheme support
• Government endorsement - clear message
• Want a stronger strategic direction from government
• Has industry considered how the schemes might interact with the wider
policy landscape and market demand factors?
• Challenge to the participants: Why would a business want to join the
scheme?
• Some suggestions that reduced inspections = benefit - rejected by
participants
• Can Defra increase the benefits of membership – what policy levers can help?

13. • Biosecurity policy
• Pro-active temporary import bans of high risk
• Responses to malpractice need to be seen to have teeth.
• Expansion of nursery licencing and compulsory inspections to other importers of
plants like landscapers/architects, plant traders, garden designers, developers and
the public.
• Basing border inspections on the rating of exporting nurseries.
• Communication strategy
• Increased communication from Defra. Common perception that plant health
awareness within the industry is often severely lacking.
• Includes clarity of message from Defra - objectives
• NB – interpretation of the flow of information - Tim Edwards
Themes: Defra leadership and policy interactions

14. Themes: Scheme design
Number of schemes
• Less is more - avoid confusing the industry and buyers,
• Extend to include other sectors;
Scheme benefits
• Policy to increase membership – earned recognition.
• Include an element of mitigation funding through matching industry contributions
Demand pull
• Stimulate demand from retailers , raising end user awareness through campaigns, (public
sector) procurement, and encouraging earlier specification of products in grants
Scheme coverage
• How many need to join to raise the biosecurity bar?
• Concern re dynamic nature of the sector, the new pathways available, and the less
formal/fringe suppliers that can affect the whole sector. Some suggested had to be 100%

15. Theme: Market distortions
• Market distortions and subsequent difficulties in demand prediction –
match long lead-times with grants
• Increasing distinction of UK grown material - lead to a two tier system?
• Confidence in domestic market to reduce imports
• Transition to a higher level of home grown material need government
support
• Need for nurseries to cooperate/data share to enable them to meet large
orders

16. Future FPPH work
•Integrate with LWEC Phyto-threats
• WP2: Feasibility analyses and development of ‘best practice’ criteria
• Socio-economics analysis to assess applicability of best practice criteria
• Cost-benefit analysis of introducing ‘best practice’
• Developing ‘best practice’ criteria to underpin guidelines for an accreditation
scheme
•Further interviews and exploration of above themes
•Analysis of demand pull
•Modelling – scheme design and required uptake

17. RAPID Trade
• BBSRC and US National Science Foundation funding
• Aims: develop risk management methodologies based on calibrated
and validated economic models of trade-related disease transmission
• US: Arizona/California/Michigan/Yale etc UK: York, Stirling, Fera
• Extension and Ecological Modelling paper
• Assurance scheme: Two class of agent: Members and Freeriders
• No disease dynamics, no membership fee, just an agreed level of biosecurity
• What is the coalition size? What are the global benefits? Do they improve
biosecurity?

18. Assurance scheme model: payoffs
• Damages – own infection, neighbour infected
• Additional biosecurity costs of membership

19. Very early results
• Population of 50, 9 join the scheme
• Reduction in regulatory impacts for members – all
50 join
• Future …. potential ESRC bid
• Earned recognition – similar to Better Regulation work
• Membership fees, demand pull
• Participation level and “global” effect on probability of
infection – measure of scheme effectiveness
• Introduce pest/disease dynamics

20. Thankyou
FPPH and RAPID Trade
Fera: Glyn Jones, Barbara Agstner
RAPID Trade
University of York: Andrew Bate, Julia Touza, Piran White
University Stirling, Adam Kleckzowski