Your 
systems. 
Working 
as 
one. 
Build 
Safe 
& 
Secure 
Distributed 
Systems 
Meet 
DoD 
Open 
Architecture 
Requirements 
and 
Cyber 
Security 
Guidance
Topics 
• IntroducFons 
• Open 
Architecture 
• Data 
DistribuFon 
Service 
• Examples 
of 
DDS 
in 
OA 
• DDS 
security 
• DDS 
safety 
• RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
• Q&A 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
2
Open 
Architecture
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
4
Reality 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
5
ImperaFve 
• Affordability 
• “Do 
more 
with 
less” 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
6
How 
• Improve 
reuse 
• Reduce 
maintenance 
and 
integraFon 
Fme 
– Incremental 
upgrades 
– New 
technology 
inserFon 
– System 
of 
Systems 
• Promote 
compeFFon 
– Reduce 
costs 
– Foster 
innovaFon 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
7
TradiFonal 
Approach 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
8
TradiFonal 
Approach 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
9
TradiFonal 
Approach 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
10
TradiFonal 
Approach 
• Hard 
coded 
connecFons 
• Up 
to 
O(n2) 
• Complex 
• Hard 
to 
maintain, 
evolve, 
re-­‐use 
E.g., 
sockets, 
RPC 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
11
Result 
Time 
& 
cost 
of 
integraFon, 
maintenance 
and 
upgrades 
System 
Scale 
and 
Age 
O(n2) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
12
SoluFon: 
Modularity 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
13
Key: 
Interoperability 
Well-­‐defined: 
• Interfaces 
• SemanFcs 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
14
Interoperability 
Level 
6 
Conceptual 
Interoperability 
Level 
5 
Dynamic 
Interoperability 
Level 
4 
Pragma<c 
Interoperability 
Level 
3 
Seman<c 
Interoperability 
Level 
2 
Syntac<c 
Interoperability 
Level 
1 
Technical 
Interoperability 
Level 
0 
No 
Interoperability 
Full 
assump<ons 
and 
constraints 
of 
meaningful 
abstrac<on 
of 
reality. 
Fully 
specified 
but 
independent 
model. 
Maintains 
state 
changes 
between 
systems 
during 
run 
<me. 
Includes 
assump<ons 
and 
constraints 
that 
effect 
data 
interchange. 
Systems 
are 
aware 
of 
methods 
& 
procedures 
of 
other 
systems. 
Context 
is 
understood 
by 
all 
par<cipa<ng 
systems. 
Meaning 
of 
data 
is 
exchanged 
through 
use 
of 
a 
common 
informa<on 
model. 
The 
meaning 
of 
informa<on 
is 
shared 
and 
unambiguously 
defined. 
Common 
structure 
or 
common 
data 
format 
for 
exchanging 
informa<on. 
The 
format 
of 
the 
informa<on 
exchange 
is 
unambiguously 
defined. 
Communica<on 
protocol 
for 
exchanging 
data. 
Bits 
& 
Bytes 
are 
exchanged 
in 
an 
unambiguous 
manner. 
Stand 
alone 
systems 
that 
have 
no 
interoperability 
Levels 
of 
Conceptual 
Interoperability 
Model 
(LCIM) 
for 
Systems 
Engineering 
VMASC 
(Virginia 
Modeling, 
Analysis 
and 
SimulaFon 
Center) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
15
ImplementaFon 
Challenges 
• Demanding 
technical 
requirements 
– Real-­‐Fme 
performance 
– Reliability, 
safety, 
survivability 
– Dynamic 
and 
ad 
hoc 
environments 
– Unreliable 
networks 
• MigraFng 
exisFng 
systems 
– OA 
versus 
other 
development 
and 
funding 
prioriFes 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
17
Data 
DistribuFon 
Service
For 
loose 
coupling, 
provides: 
• Discovery 
• RouFng 
• High-­‐availability 
• QoS 
enforcement 
• Well-­‐define 
interfaces 
• Standard 
interoperability 
Protocol 
Data 
DistribuFon 
Service 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
19
DDS 
Standard 
• Interoperability 
and 
portability 
– Data 
model 
specificaFon 
and 
discovery 
– Network 
protocol 
– Programming 
interface 
• Managed 
by 
Object 
Management 
Group 
(OMG) 
Cross-­‐vendor 
source 
portability! 
Standard 
API 
Data 
Model 
DDS 
Implementa<on 
Standard 
Protocol 
Cross-­‐vendor 
interoperability! 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
20
Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer 
CommunicaFon 
App 
or 
Component 
DDS 
Library 
• Completely 
App 
or 
Component 
DDS 
Library 
decentralized 
• No 
intermediate 
servers, 
message 
brokers 
or 
ESB 
• Low 
latency 
• High 
scalability 
• No 
single 
point 
of 
failure 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Interoperability 
Protocol 
DDS 
API 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
21
Easy 
IntegraFon 
of 
ExisFng 
Components 
Unmodified 
App 
Adapter 
DDS 
RouFng 
Service 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Interoperability 
Protocol 
Unmodified 
App 
Adapter 
DDS 
RouFng 
Service 
App 
or 
Component 
DDS 
Library 
App 
or 
Component 
DDS 
Library 
DDS 
or 
other 
protocol 
DDS 
API 
New 
and 
Updated 
Applica<ons 
Exis<ng, 
Unmodified 
Applica<ons 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
22
Seamless 
Enterprise-­‐Wide 
ConnecFvity 
Connect 
Everything, 
Everywhere 
Data 
DistribuFon 
Service 
Seamless 
data 
sharing 
regardless 
of: 
• Proximity 
• Plajorm 
• Language 
• Physical 
network 
• Transport 
protocol 
• Network 
topology 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
23
Example: 
RTI 
Connext 
Availability 
• Programming 
languages 
and 
environments 
– C, 
C++, 
C#/.NET, 
Java, 
Ada 
– Lua, 
Python 
– LabVIEW, 
MATLAB, 
Simulink, 
UML 
– REST/HTTP 
• OperaFng 
systems 
– Windows, 
Linux, 
Unix, 
Mac 
OS 
– Mobile 
– Embedded, 
real 
Fme 
– Safety 
criFcal, 
parFFoned 
• Processor 
families 
– x86, 
ARM, 
PowerPC… 
– 32-­‐ 
and 
64-­‐bit 
• Transport 
types 
– Shared 
memory 
– LAN 
(incl. 
mulFcast) 
– WAN 
/ 
Internet 
– Wireless 
– Low 
bandwidth 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
24
FoundaFon: 
Publish/Subscribe 
Data Distribution Service 
Data 
Sensor 
Commands 
Status 
Control 
App 
Sensor 
Data 
Sensor 
Commands 
Status 
Actuator 
Sensor 
Data 
Sensor 
Data 
Sensor 
Status 
Display 
App 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
25
Data-­‐Centric 
Publish 
As 
with 
a 
database: 
• Publishers 
Line Flight Dest Arv 
UA 567 SFO 7:32 
AA 432 LAX 9:15 Squawk Line Flight 
Squawk Long Lat Alt 
1234 37.4 -122.0 500.0 
7654 40.7 -74.0 250.0 
1234 UA 567 
7654 AA 432 
and 
subscribers 
are 
completely 
decoupled 
– Require 
no 
knowledge 
of 
each 
other 
– Adding 
clients 
does 
not 
affect 
exisFng 
applicaFons 
• DDS 
middleware 
maintains 
shared 
state 
for 
system 
robustness 
– ApplicaFons 
maintain 
consistent 
view 
– Late 
joining 
applicaFons 
get 
current 
snapshot 
– Not 
necessary 
to 
persist 
or 
reliably 
deliver 
all 
messages 
Subscribe 
Virtual 
Global 
Data 
Space 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
26
Completely 
Decentralized 
Component 
DDS 
Component 
DDS 
Unlike 
a 
database: 
• ApplicaFons 
Component 
DDS 
communicate 
peer-­‐to-­‐peer 
• No 
central 
database, 
server 
or 
message 
broker 
• MulFcast 
for 
efficient 
broad 
data 
distribuFon 
• Event 
driven 
• Data 
cached 
locally 
for 
instant 
access 
OpFonal 
Persistence 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
27
Support 
for 
Mission-­‐CriFcal 
Systems 
• Autonomous 
operaFon 
– AutomaFc 
discovery 
– No 
sys 
admin 
or 
centralized 
infrastructure 
• Non-­‐stop: 
no 
single 
point 
of 
failure 
• QoS 
control 
and 
visibility 
into 
real‑Fme 
behavior, 
system 
health 
• Embeddable 
• RTI 
Connext 
is 
TRL 
9 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
28
2014 
RPC 
over 
DDS 
2014 
DDS 
Security 
DDS: 
Family 
of 
SpecificaFons 
2013 
Web-­‐Enabled 
DDS 
DDS 
2008 
2009 
ImplementaFon 
Network 
/ 
TCP 
/ 
UDP 
/ 
IP 
App 
DDS 
ImplementaFon 
App 
DDS 
ImplementaFon 
2010 
DDS 
Spec 
2004 
DDS 
2006 
Interoperablity 
UML 
Profile 
for 
DDS 
DDS 
for 
Lw 
CCM 
DDS 
X-­‐Types 
2012 
DDS-­‐STD-­‐C++ 
DDS-­‐JAVA5 
App 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
29
RTI 
Role 
RTI 
Role 
Product 
Status 
Core 
DDS 
API 
DCPS 
author 
1st 
implementaFon 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Protocol 
Sole 
author 
1st 
implementaFon 
Based 
on 
IEC 
61148, 
which 
was 
authored 
by 
RTI 
and 
Schneider 
AutomaFon 
DDS-­‐XTypes 
Primary 
author 
1st 
implementaFon 
Based 
on 
prior 
RTI 
innovaFon 
DDS 
C++ 
PSM 
RFP 
author; 
specificaFon 
co-­‐author 
EAR 
available 
now 
DDS 
Java 
PSM 
Sole 
author 
Under 
development 
DDS 
Security 
Primary 
author 
EAR 
available 
now 
Web-­‐enabled 
DDS 
Primary 
author 
EAR 
available 
now 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
30
RTI 
Role 
RTI 
Role 
Product 
Status 
UML 
Profile 
for 
DDS 
Co-­‐ 
submiser 
1st 
implementaFon 
(3rd-­‐parFes) 
Standard 
being 
refined 
DDS 
for 
lwCCM 
Co-­‐ 
submiser 
1st 
implementaFon 
(3rd-­‐party) 
RPC 
over 
DDS 
Primary 
author 
Submission 
based 
on 
current 
capability 
Standard 
sFll 
under 
development 
InstrumentaFon 
RFP 
author 
Prototype 
now 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
31
Broad 
AdopFon 
and 
Support 
• RTI 
Connext 
alone 
used 
by 
1,000+ 
projects 
• ~14 
implementaFons 
• 9 
vendors 
have 
demonstrated 
interoperability 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
32
Interoperability 
DemonstraFon 
OCI 
ETRI 
PrismTech 
IBM 
RTI 
Twin 
Oaks 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
33
DDS 
in 
OA
Why 
DistribuFon 
Middleware? 
1.0 Common Services 
1.0 Common Services 
MUX 
MUX 
DWC 
l Grouping 
the 
modules 
into 
funcFonal 
clusters 
does 
nothing 
to 
change 
that 
reality 
and 
ease 
sovware 
integraFon 
UNCLASSIFIED 
l Hawkeye 
has 
funcFonally 
oriented 
sovware 
modules 
l Each 
module 
talks 
to 
many 
other 
modules 
RIP 
TRK 
MSI 
WAC 
TDA 
RDR 
IFF 
ESM 
SAFE 
L4 
L11 
L16 
SEN 
DSC 
HMI 
ACIS 
DIA 
NAV 
MCP 
IPCC 
FIL 
TDM 
l Adding 
new 
funcFonality 
cascades 
integraFon 
re-­‐work 
across 
many 
other 
modules 
CEC 
8.0 Training 
5.0 Communications 
2.0 Sensors 
3.0 Fusion 
4.0 BMC2 
7.0 Visualization 
6.0 Sensor Control 
RIP 
CEC 
TRK 
MSI 
WAC 
TDA 
RAIDER 
CHAT 
RDR 
IFF 
ESM 
SAFE 
SEN 
DSC 
Distributed 
Data 
Framework 
L4 
L11 
L16 
IPv6 
HMI 
ACIS 
T4O 
DIA 
NAV 
MCP 
IPCC 
FIL 
TDM 
aADNS 
TIS 
l Changing 
the 
communicaFon 
between 
the 
modules 
can 
ease 
integraFon, 
when 
the 
new 
‘Publish 
Subscribe’ 
approach 
is 
used 
– 
each 
module 
publishes 
its 
output 
w/o 
regard 
to 
who 
is 
receiving 
it, 
in 
contrast 
to 
the 
point-­‐to-­‐point 
approach 
of 
tradiFonal 
inter-­‐process 
communicaFon 
It’s 
about 
an 
architecture 
that 
can 
assimilate 
evolving 
funcFonality, 
rather 
than 
remaining 
set 
in 
Fme
UAS 
Control 
Segment 
(UCS) 
Architecture
UCS 
Technical 
Reference 
Model
DDS 
has 
a 
number 
of 
desirable 
technical 
characterisFcs 
for 
use 
in 
real-­‐ 
Fme 
systems 
and 
real-­‐Fme 
control 
problems. 
It 
has 
demonstrated 
very 
low 
latency 
or 
Fme 
delay 
and 
message 
delivery 
between 
DDS 
nodes. 
It 
can 
also 
be 
implemented 
without 
the 
use 
of 
intermediate-­‐level 
nodes 
or 
servers, 
which 
reduces 
system 
requirements 
and 
complexity. 
DDS 
has 
already 
been 
adopted 
and 
incorporated 
into 
the 
UAS 
I‑IPT 
common 
grounds 
control 
system 
standard.
FACE Approach 
The FACE approach is a government-industry software standard 
and business strategy to: 
• Acquire affordable software systems 
• Rapidly integrate portable capabilities across global defense 
programs 
• Attract innovation and deploy it quickly and affordably 
46 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088
Transitioning to Open 
Interface Architecture 
Closed/Proprietary Open 
© 2014 RTI 
* http://www.forbes.com/sites/darcytravlos/2012/08/22/five-reasons-why-google-android-versus-apple-ios-market-share-numbers-dont-matter/ 
2014-Sep-25 
47 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088 
47
FACE Architecture - Layered 
Architecture Example 
48 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088
DDS 
Benefits 
for 
FACE 
• Loose 
coupling 
of 
publish/subscribe 
• Flexible 
communicaFon: 
1à1, 
1àmany, 
manyà1, 
manyàmany 
• Proximity 
and 
physical 
transport 
independence 
• Easy 
integraFon 
with 
non-­‐FACE 
apps 
• FACE 
TSS 
is 
thin 
layer 
over 
DDS 
– Less 
than 
2,000 
SLOC 
– DDS 
already 
supports 
FACE 
data 
model 
(IDL), 
serializaFon 
and 
deserializaFon 
– ExpediFous 
path 
to 
DO-­‐178C 
cerFficaFon 
• Tooling 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
49
TSS 
ConnecFon 
Mechanism 
Comparison 
RTI 
DDS 
CORBA 
Sockets 
POSIX 
Queues 
Shared 
memory 
Queuing 
ports 
Sampling 
ports 
Proximity 
Intra-­‐parFFon 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
Inter-­‐parFFon 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
Inter-­‐node 
● 
● 
● 
MulFple 
concurrently 
● 
DistribuFon 
One-­‐to-­‐one 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
One-­‐to-­‐many 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
Many-­‐to-­‐one 
● 
● 
● 
Many-­‐to-­‐many 
● 
● 
● 
Unreliable 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
50
Airborne 
System 
Flexible 
IntegraFon 
Including 
TSS 
and 
Na9ve 
DDS 
Apps 
Airborne 
System 
FACE 
UoP 
FACE 
UoP 
TSS 
Library 
TSS 
Library 
Local 
CommunicaFon 
Rou<ng 
Service 
FACE 
UoP 
FACE 
UoP 
TSS 
Library 
TSS 
Library 
Local 
CommunicaFon 
Rou<ng 
Service 
DDS 
App 
DDS 
App 
DDS 
Library 
DDS 
Library 
Local 
CommunicaFon 
Rou<ng 
Service 
Ground 
System 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
51
DDS 
and 
FACE™ 
TSS 
Demo 
Android 
app 
using 
DDS 
to 
publish 
data 
from 
the 
tablet’s 
sensors 
Simulated 
cockpit 
display 
receiving 
data 
through 
FACE 
Transport 
Services 
Segment 
(TSS) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
52
Esterel 
SCADE 
Java 
App 
generated 
C 
App 
Demo 
Stack 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
Micro 
RTI 
implementa<on 
of 
FACE 
TSS 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
Professional 
Wind 
River 
VxWorks 
653 
OS 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Interoperability 
Protocol 
ARM 
CPU 
PowerPC 
CPU 
Android 
OS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
53
Esterel 
SCADE 
Java 
App 
generated 
C 
App 
Interoperability 
at 
MulFple 
Layers 
All 
Applica9on 
Transparent 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
Micro 
RTI 
implementa<on 
of 
FACE 
TSS 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
Professional 
Wind 
River 
VxWorks 
653 
OS 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Interoperability 
Protocol 
ARM 
CPU 
PowerPC 
CPU 
Android 
OS 
Java 
↔ 
C 
DDS 
API 
↔ 
FACE 
TSS 
API 
Android 
↔ 
VxWorks 
653 
ARM 
↔ 
PowerPC 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
54
UK 
MOD 
Generic 
Vehicle 
Architecture 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
55
GVA 
Key 
Principles 
1. Take 
account 
of 
previous 
MOD 
investment; 
2. Be 
applicable 
to 
current 
and 
future 
systems; 
3. Use 
open, 
modular 
and 
scaleable 
architectures 
and 
systems; 
4. Facilitate 
technology 
inserFon 
(upgrade, 
update, 
replace, 
repair, 
remove 
and 
addiFon); 
5. Not 
needlessly 
implement 
in 
hardware 
any 
funcFonality 
that 
can 
be 
implemented 
in 
sovware; 
6. Take 
a 
‘whole 
plajorm’ 
systems 
view, 
though 
life 
(including 
cost); 
7. Be 
done 
in 
conjuncFon 
with 
industry 
and 
all 
relevant 
MOD 
stakeholders; 
8. Be 
MOD 
owned 
and 
maintained; 
9. Specify 
the 
minimum 
necessary 
to 
achieve 
MOD's 
desired 
benefits 
avoiding 
unnecessary 
constraint 
in 
implementaFon. 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
56
Generic 
Vehicle 
Architecture 
(GVA) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
57
Future 
Interoperability 
of 
Camp 
ProtecFon 
Systems 
Project 
(FICAPS) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
58
FICAPS 
Enables: 
• Real-­‐Fme 
informaFon 
exchange 
between 
Camp 
ProtecFon 
Systems 
(CPS) 
of 
different 
naFons 
(also 
via 
SatCom) 
• Interoperability 
of 
CPS 
equipment 
to 
allow 
easy 
and 
quick 
replacement 
of 
equipment 
(plug-­‐and-­‐play) 
• MulFnaFonal 
use 
of 
a 
naFonal 
system 
due 
to 
a 
mulFlingual 
Human 
machine 
interface 
• Enhancement 
of 
CPS 
capabiliFes 
by 
adding 
new 
equipment 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
59
FICAPS 
Architecture 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
60
EUROCONTROL 
Flight 
Object 
Interoperability 
EUROCAE 
ED-­‐133 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
61
GE 
Healthcare 
RevoluFon® 
"GE 
Healthcare 
chose 
the 
DDS 
standard 
because 
it 
can 
handle 
many 
classes 
of 
intelligent 
machines. 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
saFsfies 
the 
demanding 
requirements 
of 
our 
devices, 
and 
RTI 
has 
the 
depth 
and 
experience 
necessary 
to 
partner 
with 
us 
in 
order 
to 
meet 
our 
stringent 
standards. 
AddiFonally, 
RTI's 
Connext 
DDS 
allows 
us 
to 
standardize 
on 
a 
single 
communicaFons 
plajorm 
across 
product 
lines." 
-­‐-­‐ 
J 
Gustavo 
Perez, 
General 
Manager 
for 
MI&CT 
Engineering 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
62
Audi: 
Modular 
HIL 
Bus 
DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP 
Hardware-in-the-Loop 
A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR AUTOMOTIVE 
HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP TEST 
As automotive electronic system design evolves, so must the HiL testbench and automotive test platforms. The 
fundamental functional design approach has been modular and ECU-centric, but the ECU count has steadily 
increased. The next big shift is to achieve functionality through the integration of multiple ECUs. Audi is responding 
to these challenges by radically re-thinking the architecture of the HiL test platform and defi ning a next generation 
approach. The new approach introduces the concept of a HiL-Bus to integrate the functionality of multiple existing 
HiL sub-systems and meet the needs of a modular best-in-class test ecosystem. By using a data orientedapproach 
the complexity of the testbench is reduced making it easier to integrate hardware and software products from 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
63
Medical 
Device 
Interoperability 
• 100,000 
to 
200,000 
annual 
preventable 
deaths 
in 
US 
hospitals 
– Hospital 
error 
is 
6th 
leading 
cause 
of 
preventable 
death 
• $30b 
in 
wasted 
cost 
• Lack 
of 
clinical 
decision 
support 
– No 
“smart 
alarms” 
• CorrelaFon/fusion 
of 
data 
from 
mulFple 
devices 
– Alarm 
faFgue 
• OR: 
70% 
of 
anesthesiologists 
disable 
clinical 
alarms 
• ICU: 
86% 
false 
alarms 
– Unsynchronized 
clocks 
• Manually 
device 
configuraFon 
is 
error 
prone 
(e.g., 
ORàICU) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
71
Integrated 
Clinical 
Environment 
(ICE) 
Standard 
(ASTM 
F2761) 
• Developed 
by 
Medical 
Device 
"Plug-­‐and-­‐Play" 
Interoperability 
Program 
(MPnP) 
• Specifies 
interoperability 
for 
medical 
devices 
• Encompasses 
all 
ICU 
& 
operaFng 
room 
devices 
– From 
blood 
pressure 
cuffs 
to 
intravenous 
pumps 
to 
venFlators 
– Complete 
logging 
– AutomaFc 
error 
detecFon 
– Beser 
care 
• OpenICE 
reference 
implementaFon 
built 
on 
RTI 
Connext 
DDS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
72
DDS 
Security
Q4 
2013 
Reported 
Cyber 
Incidents 
to 
U.S. 
CriFcal 
Infrastructure 
hsp://ics-­‐cert.us-­‐cert.gov/monitors/ICS-­‐MM201312 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
75
Threats 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
76
Threats 
Alice: 
Allowed 
to 
publish 
topic 
T 
Bob: 
Allowed 
to 
subscribe 
to 
topic 
T 
Eve: 
Non-­‐authorized 
eavesdropper 
Trudy: 
Intruder 
Trent: 
Trusted 
infrastructure 
service 
Mallory: 
Malicious 
insider 
1. Unauthorized 
subscripFon 
2. Unauthorized 
publicaFon 
3. Tampering 
and 
replay 
4. Unauthorized 
access 
to 
data 
by 
infrastructure 
services 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
77
Security 
Terms: 
a 
Safe-­‐Deposit 
Box 
• AuthenFcaFon: 
The 
bank 
knows 
who 
you 
are. 
You 
must 
show 
ID. 
• Access 
Control: 
The 
bank 
only 
lets 
those 
on 
an 
access 
list 
into 
your 
box. 
• ConfidenFality: 
You 
are 
alone 
in 
the 
room. 
Nobody 
can 
see 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
box. 
• Integrity: 
The 
box 
is 
sealed. 
If 
anybody 
touches 
it 
you 
will 
know. 
• Non 
repudiaFon: 
You 
sign 
when 
you 
come 
in 
and 
out 
so 
you 
can’t 
claim 
that 
you 
weren’t 
there. 
• Availability: 
The 
bank 
is 
always 
open. 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
78
Security 
Boundaries 
System 
Boundary 
Transport 
Data 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
79
System 
Boundary 
• Across 
security 
domains 
• Independent 
of 
how 
data 
is 
secured 
within 
a 
system 
System 
1 
• Diode 
• Filter 
• Downgrade 
System 
2 
Cross-­‐ 
Domain 
Guard 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
80
Transport 
Layer 
ExisFng 
App 
Adapter 
DDS 
RouFng 
Service 
TCP/IP 
Capable 
Network 
ExisFng 
App 
Adapter 
DDS 
RouFng 
Service 
NaFve 
DDS 
App 
DDS 
Library 
NaFve 
DDS 
APP 
DDS 
Library 
Secure 
Transport 
Secure 
Transport 
Secure 
Transport 
Secure 
Transport 
Typically 
SSL, 
TLS 
or 
DTLS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
81
Secure 
Data 
Transfer 
1. AuthenFcate 
– Verify 
idenFty 
2. Securely 
exchange 
cryptographic 
keys 
3. Use 
keys 
to: 
– Encrypt 
data 
– Add 
a 
message 
authenFcaFon 
code 
App 
1 
App 
2 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
82
Secure 
Channel 
for 
Cross-­‐Network 
Bridging 
System 
1 
LAN 
RouFng 
Service 
System 
2 
LAN 
RouFng 
Service 
TLS 
WAN/ 
Internet 
Can 
be 
used 
with 
or 
without 
a 
firewall 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
83
ConnecFng 
Clients 
Across 
a 
WAN 
• Remote 
access 
to 
cloud 
or 
data 
center 
– Clients 
communicate 
with 
parFcipants 
in 
data 
center 
or 
cloud 
LAN, 
not 
with 
each 
other 
– Clients 
behind 
firewalls 
– Only 
one 
public 
address 
required 
• Example: 
Exposing 
a 
service 
to 
end-­‐user 
clients 
Remote 
App 
RouFng 
Service 
Remote 
App 
Remote 
App 
TLS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
84
LimitaFons 
of 
Transport 
Security: 
No 
Inherent 
Access 
Control 
• You’re 
authenFcated 
or 
you’re 
not 
• Less 
an 
issue 
for 
centralized 
systems 
– E.g.: 
non-­‐real-­‐Fme 
IT 
and 
consumer 
IoT 
systems 
– Broker 
centrally 
manages 
access 
control 
App 
Device 
App 
App 
Message 
Broker 
Device 
Device 
• Poor 
performance 
and 
scalability 
• Single 
point 
of 
failure/failover 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
85
LimitaFons 
of 
Transport 
Security: 
Overall 
Poor 
Performance 
and 
Scalability 
• No 
mulFcast 
support 
(even 
with 
DTLS 
over 
UDP) 
– Broad 
data 
distribuFon 
is 
very 
inefficient 
• Usually 
runs 
over 
TCP: 
poor 
latency 
and 
jiser 
• Requires 
a 
network 
robust 
enough 
to 
support 
IP 
and 
TCP 
• All 
data 
treated 
as 
reliable 
– Even 
fast 
changing 
data 
that 
could 
be 
“best 
effort” 
• Always 
encrypts 
all 
data, 
metadata 
and 
protocol 
headers 
– Even 
if 
some 
data 
does 
not 
have 
to 
be 
private 
• Security 
is 
at 
a 
very 
gross 
level 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
86
Introducing 
DDS 
Security 
First 
security 
standard 
to 
address 
performance, 
safety 
and 
security 
requirements 
of 
mission‑criFcal 
and 
real-­‐Fme 
systems 
HMI/UI 
Secure 
DDS 
Streaming 
AnalyFcs 
& 
Control 
IT, 
Cloud 
& 
SoS 
ConnecFvity 
Sensors 
Actuators 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
87
DDS 
Security 
• Security 
extensions 
to 
DDS 
standard 
• Requires 
trivial 
or 
no 
change 
to 
exisFng 
DDS 
apps 
and 
adapters 
• Runs 
over 
any 
transport 
– Including 
low 
bandwidth, 
unreliable 
– Does 
not 
require 
TCP 
or 
IP 
– MulFcast 
for 
scalability, 
low 
latency 
• Plugin 
architecture 
– Built-­‐in 
defaults 
– Customizable 
via 
standard 
API 
• Completely 
decentralized 
– High 
performance 
and 
scalability 
– No 
single 
point 
of 
failure 
Secure 
DDS 
library 
AuthenFcaFon 
Access 
Control 
EncrypFon 
Data 
Tagging 
Logging 
ApplicaFon 
Any 
Transport 
(e.g., 
TCP, 
UDP, 
mulFcast, 
shared 
memory, 
) 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
88
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
89
Service Plugin Purpose Interactions 
Authentication Authenticate the principal that is 
joining a DDS Domain. 
Handshake and establish 
shared secret between 
participants 
The principal may be an 
application/process or the user 
associated with that application 
or process. 
Participants may messages to 
do mutual authentication and 
establish shared secret 
Access Control Decide whether a principal is allowed 
to perform a protected operation. 
Protected operations include 
joining a specific DDS domain, 
creating a Topic, reading a 
Topic, writing a Topic, etc. 
Cryptography Perform the encryption and 
decryption operations. Create & 
Exchange Keys. Compute digests, 
compute and verify Message 
Authentication Codes. Sign and verify 
signatures of messages. 
Invoked by DDS middleware to 
encrypt data, compute and verify 
MAC, compute & verify Digital 
Signatures 
Logging Log all security relevant events Invoked by middleware to log 
Data Tagging Add a data tag for each data sample
Standard 
CapabiliFes 
AuthenFcaFon 
• X.509 
Public 
Key 
Infrastructure 
(PKI) 
with 
a 
pre-­‐configured 
shared 
CerFficate 
Authority 
(CA) 
• Digital 
Signature 
Algorithm 
(DSA) 
with 
Diffie-­‐Hellman 
and 
RSA 
for 
authenFcaFon 
and 
key 
exchange 
Access 
Control 
• Specified 
via 
permissions 
file 
signed 
by 
shared 
CA 
• Control 
over 
ability 
to 
join 
systems, 
read 
or 
write 
data 
topics 
Cryptography 
• Protected 
key 
distribuFon 
• AES128 
and 
AES256 
for 
encrypFon 
• HMAC-­‐SHA1 
and 
HMAC-­‐SHA256 
for 
message 
authenFcaFon 
and 
integrity 
Data 
Tagging 
• Tags 
specify 
security 
metadata, 
such 
as 
classificaFon 
level 
• Can 
be 
used 
to 
determine 
access 
privileges 
(via 
plugin) 
Logging 
• Log 
security 
events 
to 
a 
file 
or 
distribute 
securely 
over 
Connext 
DDS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
91
Security 
Flow 
Domain 
ParFcipant 
Create 
Fails 
AuthenFcate 
AuthenFcate 
Yes 
DP? 
DP? 
No 
Ignore 
Remote 
DP 
AuthenFcate 
Remote 
DP? 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Access 
OK? 
Ignore 
remote 
endpoint 
Message 
security 
Endpoint 
Create 
Fails 
Yes 
Access 
OK? 
No 
Create 
Domain 
ParFcipant 
Create 
Endpoints 
Discover 
remote 
DP 
Discover 
remote 
Endpoints 
Send/ 
Receive 
data 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
92
ProtecFons 
Protected 
Objects 
Domain 
(by 
domain_id) 
Topic 
(by 
Topic 
name) 
DataObjects 
(by 
Instance/Key) 
Protected 
OperaFons 
Domain.join 
Topic.create 
Topic.read 
(includes 
QoS) 
Topic.write 
(includes 
QoS) 
Data.createInstance 
Data.writeInstance 
Data.deleteInstance 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
93
Control 
over 
EncrypFon 
• Scope 
– Discovery 
data 
– Metadata 
– Data 
• For 
each: 
– Encrypt 
– Sign 
• OpFmizes 
performance 
by 
only 
encrypFng 
data 
that 
must 
be 
private 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
94
Example 
Domain 
Governance 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
95
Example 
Permissions 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
96
DDS 
Security 
Status 
• SpecificaFon 
adopted 
March 
2014 
– Considered 
“Beta” 
for 
1 
year 
– RTI 
chairing 
FinalizaFon 
Task 
Force 
• SpecificaFon 
provides 
a 
framework 
for 
securing 
DDS 
systems 
– Built-­‐in 
plugins 
provide 
a 
common 
approach 
for 
applicaFons 
without 
specialized 
requirements 
– Custom 
plugins 
can 
be 
developed 
to 
match 
more 
specialized 
deployments 
and 
integrate 
with 
exisFng 
infrastructure 
and 
hardware 
• Early 
Access 
Release 
available 
now 
from 
RTI 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
97
SpecificaFon 
Reviewers 
Include: 
• GE 
• Intel 
• Siemens 
• Technicolor 
• NSWC 
• General 
Dynamics 
• THALES 
• SAAB 
• Cassidian 
• QineFQ 
& 
UK 
MOD 
• Lockheed 
• Raytheon 
• None 
found 
any 
show 
stoppers 
• Several 
contacted 
OMG 
to 
urge 
adopFon 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
98
Security 
Example: 
Power 
Grid 
In 
Partnership 
with 
PNNL 
© 
2014 
RTI
Data 
Security 
Requirements 
Data 
Item 
Authen<ca-­‐ 
<on 
Access 
Control 
Integrity 
Non-­‐ 
repudia<on 
Confiden<ality 
Control 
traffic 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Data 
Telemetry 
X 
X 
traffic 
Physical 
Security 
Data 
X 
X 
X 
Engineering 
maintenance 
X 
Source: www.sxc.hu 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
100
Test 
Environment 
• Real 
World 
Environment 
– Transmission 
switching 
substaFon 
– Real 
substaFon 
equipment 
• PNNL 
powerNET 
Testbed 
– Remote 
connecFvity 
– Local 
control 
room 
demonstraFon 
environment 
– Dynamically 
reconfigurable 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
101
SCADA 
Equipment 
Setup 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
102
RTI 
and 
PNNL 
Grid 
Security 
Retrofit 
Control 
StaFon 
DNP3 
Master 
Device 
Transmission 
SubstaFon 
DNP3 
Slave 
Device 
RTI 
RouFng 
Service 
Gateway 
RTI 
RouFng 
Service 
ComProcessor 
DNP3 
Slave 
Device 
DNP3 
over 
RS232/485 
DNP3 
over 
Ethernet 
DNP3 
over 
DDS 
RTI 
RouFng 
Service 
Gateway 
DDS 
LAN 
DDS 
LAN 
RTI 
RouFng 
Service 
ComProcessor 
IP 
Router 
IP 
Router 
DDS 
over 
WAN 
Asack 
Detector 
Scada 
Converter 
Anomaly 
Detector 
Display 
Secure 
DDS 
over 
UDP 
EffecFve 
DNP3 
connecFon 
Details 
at 
hsp://blogs.rF.com 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
103
Support 
for 
Safety 
CriFcal 
Systems
DDS 
Inherently 
Well-­‐Suited 
to 
Safety 
CriFcal 
Systems 
• Non-­‐stop 
availability 
– No 
single 
point 
of 
failure 
– …including 
run-­‐Fme 
services 
– Support 
for 
redundant 
networks 
– AutomaFc 
failover 
between 
redundant 
publishers 
– Dynamic 
upgrades 
• Visibility 
into 
missed 
deadlines 
and 
presence 
• Proven 
in 
hundreds 
of 
mission 
criFcal 
systems 
• Used 
in 
US 
DoD 
TRL 
9 
systems 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
105
High-­‐Assurance 
Security: 
DO-­‐178C 
• Guideline 
• Used 
by 
FAA 
as 
basis 
for 
cerFficaFon 
– Aircrav 
are 
“cerFfied” 
– Sovware 
code 
developed 
under 
DO-­‐178 
provides 
“cerFficaFon 
evidence” 
• Increasingly 
adopted 
for 
military 
aircrav 
• Likely 
required 
for 
UAS 
integraFon 
into 
NAS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
106
DO-­‐178 
Safety 
Levels 
Level 
Failure 
Condi<on 
Typical 
% 
of 
avionics 
code 
A 
Catastrophic 
(may 
be 
total 
loss 
of 
aircrav) 
15% 
B 
Hazardous/Severe 
(serious 
injuries) 
35% 
C 
Major 
(minor 
injuries) 
30% 
D 
Minor 
(inconvenience) 
15% 
E 
No 
effect 
5% 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
107
CerFficaFon 
Costs 
• GeneraFon 
of 
DO-­‐178C 
evidence 
typically 
costs 
$50-­‐$100 
per 
ELOC 
• Process 
objecFves 
must 
be 
met 
• All 
must 
be 
documented 
• Code 
must 
be 
clean 
– Testable 
– No 
dead 
code 
– DeterminisFc 
Level 
Process 
Objec<ves 
Code 
Coverage 
A 
71 
Level 
B 
and 
100% 
of 
MCDC 
B 
69 
Level 
C 
plus 
100% 
of 
DC 
C 
62 
Level 
D 
plus 
100% 
of 
SC 
D 
26 
100% 
of 
Requirements 
E 
0 
None 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
108
Tenets 
Of 
Safety-­‐CriFcal 
Sovware 
• Reduce 
code 
size 
• Consider 
testability 
in 
design 
• Design 
code 
to 
be 
determinisFc 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
109
Connext 
DDS 
Cert 
• Small 
footprint, 
cerFfiable 
DDS 
– ~25K 
ELOC 
– No 
dynamic 
memory 
allocaFon 
– StaFc 
endpoint 
discovery 
only 
• Follows 
OMG 
DDS 
specificaFon 
– C 
and 
C++ 
APIs 
– Subset 
of 
minimum 
profile 
• ApplicaFon 
portability 
and 
interoperability 
with 
full 
DDS 
– Including 
RouFng 
Service 
• CompaFble 
with 
RTI’s 
FACE 
interface 
• DO-­‐178C 
Level 
A 
cerFficaFon 
available 
1H 
2015 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
110
DO-­‐178C 
Level 
A 
CerFficaFon 
Evidence 
• Plan 
for 
Sovware 
Aspects 
of 
CerFficaFon 
(PSAC) 
• Sovware 
Development 
Plan 
(SDP) 
– Requirements 
standards 
– Design 
standards 
– Code 
standards 
• Sovware 
VerificaFon 
Plan 
(SVP) 
• Sovware 
ConfiguraFon 
Management 
Plan 
(SCM) 
• Sovware 
Quality 
Assurance 
Plan 
• Sovware 
Requirements 
Data 
• Design 
DescripFon 
• Traceability 
• SQA 
Records 
• SCM 
Records 
• Sovware 
ConfiguraFon 
Index 
• Sovware 
VerificaFon 
Cases 
and 
Procedures 
• Sovware 
VerificaFon 
Results 
• Sovware 
Accomplishment 
Summary 
CerFficaFon 
evidence 
can 
be 
re-­‐used 
across 
programs 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
111
Savings 
from 
DDS 
CerFficaFon 
Evidence 
30,000 
ELOC 
20,000 
ELOC 
10,000 
ELOC 
Level 
A 
$3,000,000 
$2,000,000 
$1,000,000 
Level 
B 
$2,550,000 
$1,700,000 
$850,000 
Level 
C 
$1,800,000 
$1,200,000 
$600,000 
• DDS 
cerFficaFon 
evidence 
available 
at 
fracFon 
of 
cost 
• Availability 
at 
start 
of 
project 
also 
reduces 
risk 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
112
Summary 
• CerFfiable 
DDS 
designed 
for 
safety-­‐criFcal 
applicaFons 
now 
available 
– Connext 
DDS 
Cert 
– Standards 
compliant 
– Small 
footprint 
• Code 
is 
cerFfiable 
to 
DO-­‐178 
Level 
A 
– Minimal 
lines 
of 
code 
– DeterminisFc 
• CerFficaFon 
evidence 
is 
reusable 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
113
RTI 
Connext 
DDS
DDS 
DifferenFaFon 
DDS 
Standard 
Interoperability 
Portability 
Real-­‐Fme 
QoS 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
115
Secure 
Professional 
Micro 
Cert 
Connext 
DDS 
Product 
Family 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Interoperability 
Protocol 
Full 
DDS 
Libraries 
RouFng 
Service 
Database 
IntegraFon 
DDS 
Subset 
DDS 
Subset 
DO-­‐178C 
CerFfiable 
Admin 
Console 
Monitoring 
Microsov 
Excel 
Recording 
Replay 
Wireshark 
Persistence 
Logging 
Prototyper 
General 
Purpose 
& 
Real-­‐Time 
Apps 
Remote 
Apps 
ExisFng 
Apps 
and 
Devices 
Adapter 
Small 
Footprint 
Apps 
High 
Assurance 
Apps 
JMS 
API 
Security 
Plugins 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
116
ApplicaFon 
Code 
Data 
Types 
Dynamically 
defined 
(API) 
Custom 
Pre-­‐defined 
DDS: 
C, 
C++, 
C#, 
Java, 
Ada 
JMS 
Data-­‐Centric 
Publish/Subscribe 
AutomaFc 
Discovery 
History 
Cache 
Monitoring 
Local 
API 
& 
remote 
Quality 
of 
Svc 
API 
& 
file-­‐based 
OperaFng 
System 
and 
Network 
Stack 
Windows, 
Linux, 
Unix, 
embedded, 
RTOS 
Interface 
Compiler 
Interface 
DefiniFons 
• 
IDL 
• 
XML 
/ 
XSD 
• 
WSDL 
Shared 
Memory 
UDPv4 
ucast 
& 
mcast 
TCP 
TLS 
& 
DTLS 
(SSL) 
UDPv6 
ucast 
& 
mcast 
Custom 
Pluggable 
Transport 
Interface 
Generated 
APIs 
– 
event-­‐driven, 
polled 
& 
SQL 
query 
Reliability 
• 
DDS-­‐RTPS 
Wire 
Protocol 
<XML> 
Pluggable 
Discovery 
Peer-­‐to-­‐peer 
File-­‐based 
Custom 
WAN 
<XML> 
Request/reply, 
Guaranteed 
Messaging 
Security 
Security 
AuthenFcaFon 
EncrypFon 
Access 
Control 
Tagging 
Logging 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
117
Q&A 
and 
Discussion
Next 
Steps 
– 
Learn 
More 
• Contact 
RTI 
– Demo, 
Q&A 
• Download 
sovware 
– www.rF.com/downloads 
– Free 
trial 
with 
comprehensive 
tutorial 
– RTI 
Shapes 
Demo 
• Watch 
videos 
& 
webinars, 
read 
whitepapers 
– www.rF.com/resources 
– www.youtube.com/ 
realFmeinnovaFons 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
119
Summary 
• AdopFon 
of 
OA 
is 
essenFal 
– Affordability 
– CompeFFveness 
• DDS 
is 
well-­‐suited 
for 
OA 
– Loose 
coupling 
– Meets 
real-­‐Fme, 
mission-­‐criFcal 
requirements 
– Leading-­‐edge 
security 
and 
safety 
– Proven 
foundaFon 
– Eases 
exisFng 
system 
migraFon/modernizaFon 
• RTI 
Connext 
provides 
a 
robust 
DDS 
soluFon 
2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 
© 
2014 
RTI 
120

Build Safe & Secure Distributed Systems - RTI Huntsville Roadshow- 2014 09 25

  • 1.
    Your systems. Working as one. Build Safe & Secure Distributed Systems Meet DoD Open Architecture Requirements and Cyber Security Guidance
  • 2.
    Topics • IntroducFons • Open Architecture • Data DistribuFon Service • Examples of DDS in OA • DDS security • DDS safety • RTI Connext DDS • Q&A 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 2
  • 3.
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  • 6.
    ImperaFve • Affordability • “Do more with less” 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 6
  • 7.
    How • Improve reuse • Reduce maintenance and integraFon Fme – Incremental upgrades – New technology inserFon – System of Systems • Promote compeFFon – Reduce costs – Foster innovaFon 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 7
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  • 11.
    TradiFonal Approach •Hard coded connecFons • Up to O(n2) • Complex • Hard to maintain, evolve, re-­‐use E.g., sockets, RPC 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 11
  • 12.
    Result Time & cost of integraFon, maintenance and upgrades System Scale and Age O(n2) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 12
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  • 14.
    Key: Interoperability Well-­‐defined: • Interfaces • SemanFcs 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 14
  • 15.
    Interoperability Level 6 Conceptual Interoperability Level 5 Dynamic Interoperability Level 4 Pragma<c Interoperability Level 3 Seman<c Interoperability Level 2 Syntac<c Interoperability Level 1 Technical Interoperability Level 0 No Interoperability Full assump<ons and constraints of meaningful abstrac<on of reality. Fully specified but independent model. Maintains state changes between systems during run <me. Includes assump<ons and constraints that effect data interchange. Systems are aware of methods & procedures of other systems. Context is understood by all par<cipa<ng systems. Meaning of data is exchanged through use of a common informa<on model. The meaning of informa<on is shared and unambiguously defined. Common structure or common data format for exchanging informa<on. The format of the informa<on exchange is unambiguously defined. Communica<on protocol for exchanging data. Bits & Bytes are exchanged in an unambiguous manner. Stand alone systems that have no interoperability Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model (LCIM) for Systems Engineering VMASC (Virginia Modeling, Analysis and SimulaFon Center) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 15
  • 17.
    ImplementaFon Challenges •Demanding technical requirements – Real-­‐Fme performance – Reliability, safety, survivability – Dynamic and ad hoc environments – Unreliable networks • MigraFng exisFng systems – OA versus other development and funding prioriFes 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 17
  • 18.
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    For loose coupling, provides: • Discovery • RouFng • High-­‐availability • QoS enforcement • Well-­‐define interfaces • Standard interoperability Protocol Data DistribuFon Service 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 19
  • 20.
    DDS Standard •Interoperability and portability – Data model specificaFon and discovery – Network protocol – Programming interface • Managed by Object Management Group (OMG) Cross-­‐vendor source portability! Standard API Data Model DDS Implementa<on Standard Protocol Cross-­‐vendor interoperability! 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 20
  • 21.
    Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer CommunicaFon App or Component DDS Library • Completely App or Component DDS Library decentralized • No intermediate servers, message brokers or ESB • Low latency • High scalability • No single point of failure DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Interoperability Protocol DDS API 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 21
  • 22.
    Easy IntegraFon of ExisFng Components Unmodified App Adapter DDS RouFng Service DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Interoperability Protocol Unmodified App Adapter DDS RouFng Service App or Component DDS Library App or Component DDS Library DDS or other protocol DDS API New and Updated Applica<ons Exis<ng, Unmodified Applica<ons 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 22
  • 23.
    Seamless Enterprise-­‐Wide ConnecFvity Connect Everything, Everywhere Data DistribuFon Service Seamless data sharing regardless of: • Proximity • Plajorm • Language • Physical network • Transport protocol • Network topology 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 23
  • 24.
    Example: RTI Connext Availability • Programming languages and environments – C, C++, C#/.NET, Java, Ada – Lua, Python – LabVIEW, MATLAB, Simulink, UML – REST/HTTP • OperaFng systems – Windows, Linux, Unix, Mac OS – Mobile – Embedded, real Fme – Safety criFcal, parFFoned • Processor families – x86, ARM, PowerPC… – 32-­‐ and 64-­‐bit • Transport types – Shared memory – LAN (incl. mulFcast) – WAN / Internet – Wireless – Low bandwidth 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 24
  • 25.
    FoundaFon: Publish/Subscribe DataDistribution Service Data Sensor Commands Status Control App Sensor Data Sensor Commands Status Actuator Sensor Data Sensor Data Sensor Status Display App 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 25
  • 26.
    Data-­‐Centric Publish As with a database: • Publishers Line Flight Dest Arv UA 567 SFO 7:32 AA 432 LAX 9:15 Squawk Line Flight Squawk Long Lat Alt 1234 37.4 -122.0 500.0 7654 40.7 -74.0 250.0 1234 UA 567 7654 AA 432 and subscribers are completely decoupled – Require no knowledge of each other – Adding clients does not affect exisFng applicaFons • DDS middleware maintains shared state for system robustness – ApplicaFons maintain consistent view – Late joining applicaFons get current snapshot – Not necessary to persist or reliably deliver all messages Subscribe Virtual Global Data Space 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 26
  • 27.
    Completely Decentralized Component DDS Component DDS Unlike a database: • ApplicaFons Component DDS communicate peer-­‐to-­‐peer • No central database, server or message broker • MulFcast for efficient broad data distribuFon • Event driven • Data cached locally for instant access OpFonal Persistence 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 27
  • 28.
    Support for Mission-­‐CriFcal Systems • Autonomous operaFon – AutomaFc discovery – No sys admin or centralized infrastructure • Non-­‐stop: no single point of failure • QoS control and visibility into real‑Fme behavior, system health • Embeddable • RTI Connext is TRL 9 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 28
  • 29.
    2014 RPC over DDS 2014 DDS Security DDS: Family of SpecificaFons 2013 Web-­‐Enabled DDS DDS 2008 2009 ImplementaFon Network / TCP / UDP / IP App DDS ImplementaFon App DDS ImplementaFon 2010 DDS Spec 2004 DDS 2006 Interoperablity UML Profile for DDS DDS for Lw CCM DDS X-­‐Types 2012 DDS-­‐STD-­‐C++ DDS-­‐JAVA5 App 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 29
  • 30.
    RTI Role RTI Role Product Status Core DDS API DCPS author 1st implementaFon DDS-­‐RTPS Protocol Sole author 1st implementaFon Based on IEC 61148, which was authored by RTI and Schneider AutomaFon DDS-­‐XTypes Primary author 1st implementaFon Based on prior RTI innovaFon DDS C++ PSM RFP author; specificaFon co-­‐author EAR available now DDS Java PSM Sole author Under development DDS Security Primary author EAR available now Web-­‐enabled DDS Primary author EAR available now 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 30
  • 31.
    RTI Role RTI Role Product Status UML Profile for DDS Co-­‐ submiser 1st implementaFon (3rd-­‐parFes) Standard being refined DDS for lwCCM Co-­‐ submiser 1st implementaFon (3rd-­‐party) RPC over DDS Primary author Submission based on current capability Standard sFll under development InstrumentaFon RFP author Prototype now 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 31
  • 32.
    Broad AdopFon and Support • RTI Connext alone used by 1,000+ projects • ~14 implementaFons • 9 vendors have demonstrated interoperability 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 32
  • 33.
    Interoperability DemonstraFon OCI ETRI PrismTech IBM RTI Twin Oaks 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 33
  • 34.
  • 36.
    Why DistribuFon Middleware? 1.0 Common Services 1.0 Common Services MUX MUX DWC l Grouping the modules into funcFonal clusters does nothing to change that reality and ease sovware integraFon UNCLASSIFIED l Hawkeye has funcFonally oriented sovware modules l Each module talks to many other modules RIP TRK MSI WAC TDA RDR IFF ESM SAFE L4 L11 L16 SEN DSC HMI ACIS DIA NAV MCP IPCC FIL TDM l Adding new funcFonality cascades integraFon re-­‐work across many other modules CEC 8.0 Training 5.0 Communications 2.0 Sensors 3.0 Fusion 4.0 BMC2 7.0 Visualization 6.0 Sensor Control RIP CEC TRK MSI WAC TDA RAIDER CHAT RDR IFF ESM SAFE SEN DSC Distributed Data Framework L4 L11 L16 IPv6 HMI ACIS T4O DIA NAV MCP IPCC FIL TDM aADNS TIS l Changing the communicaFon between the modules can ease integraFon, when the new ‘Publish Subscribe’ approach is used – each module publishes its output w/o regard to who is receiving it, in contrast to the point-­‐to-­‐point approach of tradiFonal inter-­‐process communicaFon It’s about an architecture that can assimilate evolving funcFonality, rather than remaining set in Fme
  • 42.
    UAS Control Segment (UCS) Architecture
  • 43.
  • 44.
    DDS has a number of desirable technical characterisFcs for use in real-­‐ Fme systems and real-­‐Fme control problems. It has demonstrated very low latency or Fme delay and message delivery between DDS nodes. It can also be implemented without the use of intermediate-­‐level nodes or servers, which reduces system requirements and complexity. DDS has already been adopted and incorporated into the UAS I‑IPT common grounds control system standard.
  • 46.
    FACE Approach TheFACE approach is a government-industry software standard and business strategy to: • Acquire affordable software systems • Rapidly integrate portable capabilities across global defense programs • Attract innovation and deploy it quickly and affordably 46 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088
  • 47.
    Transitioning to Open Interface Architecture Closed/Proprietary Open © 2014 RTI * http://www.forbes.com/sites/darcytravlos/2012/08/22/five-reasons-why-google-android-versus-apple-ios-market-share-numbers-dont-matter/ 2014-Sep-25 47 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088 47
  • 48.
    FACE Architecture -Layered Architecture Example 48 http://www.opengroup.org/face Distro A, Approved for Public Release NAVAIR 2014-088
  • 49.
    DDS Benefits for FACE • Loose coupling of publish/subscribe • Flexible communicaFon: 1à1, 1àmany, manyà1, manyàmany • Proximity and physical transport independence • Easy integraFon with non-­‐FACE apps • FACE TSS is thin layer over DDS – Less than 2,000 SLOC – DDS already supports FACE data model (IDL), serializaFon and deserializaFon – ExpediFous path to DO-­‐178C cerFficaFon • Tooling 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 49
  • 50.
    TSS ConnecFon Mechanism Comparison RTI DDS CORBA Sockets POSIX Queues Shared memory Queuing ports Sampling ports Proximity Intra-­‐parFFon ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Inter-­‐parFFon ● ● ● ● ● Inter-­‐node ● ● ● MulFple concurrently ● DistribuFon One-­‐to-­‐one ● ● ● ● ● ● ● One-­‐to-­‐many ● ● ● ● ● Many-­‐to-­‐one ● ● ● Many-­‐to-­‐many ● ● ● Unreliable 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 50
  • 51.
    Airborne System Flexible IntegraFon Including TSS and Na9ve DDS Apps Airborne System FACE UoP FACE UoP TSS Library TSS Library Local CommunicaFon Rou<ng Service FACE UoP FACE UoP TSS Library TSS Library Local CommunicaFon Rou<ng Service DDS App DDS App DDS Library DDS Library Local CommunicaFon Rou<ng Service Ground System 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 51
  • 52.
    DDS and FACE™ TSS Demo Android app using DDS to publish data from the tablet’s sensors Simulated cockpit display receiving data through FACE Transport Services Segment (TSS) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 52
  • 53.
    Esterel SCADE Java App generated C App Demo Stack RTI Connext DDS Micro RTI implementa<on of FACE TSS RTI Connext DDS Professional Wind River VxWorks 653 OS DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Interoperability Protocol ARM CPU PowerPC CPU Android OS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 53
  • 54.
    Esterel SCADE Java App generated C App Interoperability at MulFple Layers All Applica9on Transparent RTI Connext DDS Micro RTI implementa<on of FACE TSS RTI Connext DDS Professional Wind River VxWorks 653 OS DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Interoperability Protocol ARM CPU PowerPC CPU Android OS Java ↔ C DDS API ↔ FACE TSS API Android ↔ VxWorks 653 ARM ↔ PowerPC 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 54
  • 55.
    UK MOD Generic Vehicle Architecture 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 55
  • 56.
    GVA Key Principles 1. Take account of previous MOD investment; 2. Be applicable to current and future systems; 3. Use open, modular and scaleable architectures and systems; 4. Facilitate technology inserFon (upgrade, update, replace, repair, remove and addiFon); 5. Not needlessly implement in hardware any funcFonality that can be implemented in sovware; 6. Take a ‘whole plajorm’ systems view, though life (including cost); 7. Be done in conjuncFon with industry and all relevant MOD stakeholders; 8. Be MOD owned and maintained; 9. Specify the minimum necessary to achieve MOD's desired benefits avoiding unnecessary constraint in implementaFon. 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 56
  • 57.
    Generic Vehicle Architecture (GVA) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 57
  • 58.
    Future Interoperability of Camp ProtecFon Systems Project (FICAPS) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 58
  • 59.
    FICAPS Enables: •Real-­‐Fme informaFon exchange between Camp ProtecFon Systems (CPS) of different naFons (also via SatCom) • Interoperability of CPS equipment to allow easy and quick replacement of equipment (plug-­‐and-­‐play) • MulFnaFonal use of a naFonal system due to a mulFlingual Human machine interface • Enhancement of CPS capabiliFes by adding new equipment 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 59
  • 60.
  • 61.
    EUROCONTROL Flight Object Interoperability EUROCAE ED-­‐133 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 61
  • 62.
    GE Healthcare RevoluFon® "GE Healthcare chose the DDS standard because it can handle many classes of intelligent machines. RTI Connext DDS saFsfies the demanding requirements of our devices, and RTI has the depth and experience necessary to partner with us in order to meet our stringent standards. AddiFonally, RTI's Connext DDS allows us to standardize on a single communicaFons plajorm across product lines." -­‐-­‐ J Gustavo Perez, General Manager for MI&CT Engineering 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 62
  • 63.
    Audi: Modular HIL Bus DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP Hardware-in-the-Loop A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR AUTOMOTIVE HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP TEST As automotive electronic system design evolves, so must the HiL testbench and automotive test platforms. The fundamental functional design approach has been modular and ECU-centric, but the ECU count has steadily increased. The next big shift is to achieve functionality through the integration of multiple ECUs. Audi is responding to these challenges by radically re-thinking the architecture of the HiL test platform and defi ning a next generation approach. The new approach introduces the concept of a HiL-Bus to integrate the functionality of multiple existing HiL sub-systems and meet the needs of a modular best-in-class test ecosystem. By using a data orientedapproach the complexity of the testbench is reduced making it easier to integrate hardware and software products from 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 63
  • 71.
    Medical Device Interoperability • 100,000 to 200,000 annual preventable deaths in US hospitals – Hospital error is 6th leading cause of preventable death • $30b in wasted cost • Lack of clinical decision support – No “smart alarms” • CorrelaFon/fusion of data from mulFple devices – Alarm faFgue • OR: 70% of anesthesiologists disable clinical alarms • ICU: 86% false alarms – Unsynchronized clocks • Manually device configuraFon is error prone (e.g., ORàICU) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 71
  • 72.
    Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) Standard (ASTM F2761) • Developed by Medical Device "Plug-­‐and-­‐Play" Interoperability Program (MPnP) • Specifies interoperability for medical devices • Encompasses all ICU & operaFng room devices – From blood pressure cuffs to intravenous pumps to venFlators – Complete logging – AutomaFc error detecFon – Beser care • OpenICE reference implementaFon built on RTI Connext DDS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 72
  • 73.
  • 75.
    Q4 2013 Reported Cyber Incidents to U.S. CriFcal Infrastructure hsp://ics-­‐cert.us-­‐cert.gov/monitors/ICS-­‐MM201312 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 75
  • 76.
  • 77.
    Threats Alice: Allowed to publish topic T Bob: Allowed to subscribe to topic T Eve: Non-­‐authorized eavesdropper Trudy: Intruder Trent: Trusted infrastructure service Mallory: Malicious insider 1. Unauthorized subscripFon 2. Unauthorized publicaFon 3. Tampering and replay 4. Unauthorized access to data by infrastructure services 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 77
  • 78.
    Security Terms: a Safe-­‐Deposit Box • AuthenFcaFon: The bank knows who you are. You must show ID. • Access Control: The bank only lets those on an access list into your box. • ConfidenFality: You are alone in the room. Nobody can see the contents of the box. • Integrity: The box is sealed. If anybody touches it you will know. • Non repudiaFon: You sign when you come in and out so you can’t claim that you weren’t there. • Availability: The bank is always open. 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 78
  • 79.
    Security Boundaries System Boundary Transport Data 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 79
  • 80.
    System Boundary •Across security domains • Independent of how data is secured within a system System 1 • Diode • Filter • Downgrade System 2 Cross-­‐ Domain Guard 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 80
  • 81.
    Transport Layer ExisFng App Adapter DDS RouFng Service TCP/IP Capable Network ExisFng App Adapter DDS RouFng Service NaFve DDS App DDS Library NaFve DDS APP DDS Library Secure Transport Secure Transport Secure Transport Secure Transport Typically SSL, TLS or DTLS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 81
  • 82.
    Secure Data Transfer 1. AuthenFcate – Verify idenFty 2. Securely exchange cryptographic keys 3. Use keys to: – Encrypt data – Add a message authenFcaFon code App 1 App 2 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 82
  • 83.
    Secure Channel for Cross-­‐Network Bridging System 1 LAN RouFng Service System 2 LAN RouFng Service TLS WAN/ Internet Can be used with or without a firewall 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 83
  • 84.
    ConnecFng Clients Across a WAN • Remote access to cloud or data center – Clients communicate with parFcipants in data center or cloud LAN, not with each other – Clients behind firewalls – Only one public address required • Example: Exposing a service to end-­‐user clients Remote App RouFng Service Remote App Remote App TLS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 84
  • 85.
    LimitaFons of Transport Security: No Inherent Access Control • You’re authenFcated or you’re not • Less an issue for centralized systems – E.g.: non-­‐real-­‐Fme IT and consumer IoT systems – Broker centrally manages access control App Device App App Message Broker Device Device • Poor performance and scalability • Single point of failure/failover 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 85
  • 86.
    LimitaFons of Transport Security: Overall Poor Performance and Scalability • No mulFcast support (even with DTLS over UDP) – Broad data distribuFon is very inefficient • Usually runs over TCP: poor latency and jiser • Requires a network robust enough to support IP and TCP • All data treated as reliable – Even fast changing data that could be “best effort” • Always encrypts all data, metadata and protocol headers – Even if some data does not have to be private • Security is at a very gross level 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 86
  • 87.
    Introducing DDS Security First security standard to address performance, safety and security requirements of mission‑criFcal and real-­‐Fme systems HMI/UI Secure DDS Streaming AnalyFcs & Control IT, Cloud & SoS ConnecFvity Sensors Actuators 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 87
  • 88.
    DDS Security •Security extensions to DDS standard • Requires trivial or no change to exisFng DDS apps and adapters • Runs over any transport – Including low bandwidth, unreliable – Does not require TCP or IP – MulFcast for scalability, low latency • Plugin architecture – Built-­‐in defaults – Customizable via standard API • Completely decentralized – High performance and scalability – No single point of failure Secure DDS library AuthenFcaFon Access Control EncrypFon Data Tagging Logging ApplicaFon Any Transport (e.g., TCP, UDP, mulFcast, shared memory, ) 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 88
  • 89.
  • 90.
    Service Plugin PurposeInteractions Authentication Authenticate the principal that is joining a DDS Domain. Handshake and establish shared secret between participants The principal may be an application/process or the user associated with that application or process. Participants may messages to do mutual authentication and establish shared secret Access Control Decide whether a principal is allowed to perform a protected operation. Protected operations include joining a specific DDS domain, creating a Topic, reading a Topic, writing a Topic, etc. Cryptography Perform the encryption and decryption operations. Create & Exchange Keys. Compute digests, compute and verify Message Authentication Codes. Sign and verify signatures of messages. Invoked by DDS middleware to encrypt data, compute and verify MAC, compute & verify Digital Signatures Logging Log all security relevant events Invoked by middleware to log Data Tagging Add a data tag for each data sample
  • 91.
    Standard CapabiliFes AuthenFcaFon • X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with a pre-­‐configured shared CerFficate Authority (CA) • Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with Diffie-­‐Hellman and RSA for authenFcaFon and key exchange Access Control • Specified via permissions file signed by shared CA • Control over ability to join systems, read or write data topics Cryptography • Protected key distribuFon • AES128 and AES256 for encrypFon • HMAC-­‐SHA1 and HMAC-­‐SHA256 for message authenFcaFon and integrity Data Tagging • Tags specify security metadata, such as classificaFon level • Can be used to determine access privileges (via plugin) Logging • Log security events to a file or distribute securely over Connext DDS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 91
  • 92.
    Security Flow Domain ParFcipant Create Fails AuthenFcate AuthenFcate Yes DP? DP? No Ignore Remote DP AuthenFcate Remote DP? No Yes No Yes Access OK? Ignore remote endpoint Message security Endpoint Create Fails Yes Access OK? No Create Domain ParFcipant Create Endpoints Discover remote DP Discover remote Endpoints Send/ Receive data 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 92
  • 93.
    ProtecFons Protected Objects Domain (by domain_id) Topic (by Topic name) DataObjects (by Instance/Key) Protected OperaFons Domain.join Topic.create Topic.read (includes QoS) Topic.write (includes QoS) Data.createInstance Data.writeInstance Data.deleteInstance 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 93
  • 94.
    Control over EncrypFon • Scope – Discovery data – Metadata – Data • For each: – Encrypt – Sign • OpFmizes performance by only encrypFng data that must be private 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 94
  • 95.
    Example Domain Governance 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 95
  • 96.
  • 97.
    DDS Security Status • SpecificaFon adopted March 2014 – Considered “Beta” for 1 year – RTI chairing FinalizaFon Task Force • SpecificaFon provides a framework for securing DDS systems – Built-­‐in plugins provide a common approach for applicaFons without specialized requirements – Custom plugins can be developed to match more specialized deployments and integrate with exisFng infrastructure and hardware • Early Access Release available now from RTI 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 97
  • 98.
    SpecificaFon Reviewers Include: • GE • Intel • Siemens • Technicolor • NSWC • General Dynamics • THALES • SAAB • Cassidian • QineFQ & UK MOD • Lockheed • Raytheon • None found any show stoppers • Several contacted OMG to urge adopFon 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 98
  • 99.
    Security Example: Power Grid In Partnership with PNNL © 2014 RTI
  • 100.
    Data Security Requirements Data Item Authen<ca-­‐ <on Access Control Integrity Non-­‐ repudia<on Confiden<ality Control traffic X X X X X Data Telemetry X X traffic Physical Security Data X X X Engineering maintenance X Source: www.sxc.hu 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 100
  • 101.
    Test Environment •Real World Environment – Transmission switching substaFon – Real substaFon equipment • PNNL powerNET Testbed – Remote connecFvity – Local control room demonstraFon environment – Dynamically reconfigurable 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 101
  • 102.
    SCADA Equipment Setup 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 102
  • 103.
    RTI and PNNL Grid Security Retrofit Control StaFon DNP3 Master Device Transmission SubstaFon DNP3 Slave Device RTI RouFng Service Gateway RTI RouFng Service ComProcessor DNP3 Slave Device DNP3 over RS232/485 DNP3 over Ethernet DNP3 over DDS RTI RouFng Service Gateway DDS LAN DDS LAN RTI RouFng Service ComProcessor IP Router IP Router DDS over WAN Asack Detector Scada Converter Anomaly Detector Display Secure DDS over UDP EffecFve DNP3 connecFon Details at hsp://blogs.rF.com 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 103
  • 104.
    Support for Safety CriFcal Systems
  • 105.
    DDS Inherently Well-­‐Suited to Safety CriFcal Systems • Non-­‐stop availability – No single point of failure – …including run-­‐Fme services – Support for redundant networks – AutomaFc failover between redundant publishers – Dynamic upgrades • Visibility into missed deadlines and presence • Proven in hundreds of mission criFcal systems • Used in US DoD TRL 9 systems 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 105
  • 106.
    High-­‐Assurance Security: DO-­‐178C • Guideline • Used by FAA as basis for cerFficaFon – Aircrav are “cerFfied” – Sovware code developed under DO-­‐178 provides “cerFficaFon evidence” • Increasingly adopted for military aircrav • Likely required for UAS integraFon into NAS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 106
  • 107.
    DO-­‐178 Safety Levels Level Failure Condi<on Typical % of avionics code A Catastrophic (may be total loss of aircrav) 15% B Hazardous/Severe (serious injuries) 35% C Major (minor injuries) 30% D Minor (inconvenience) 15% E No effect 5% 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 107
  • 108.
    CerFficaFon Costs •GeneraFon of DO-­‐178C evidence typically costs $50-­‐$100 per ELOC • Process objecFves must be met • All must be documented • Code must be clean – Testable – No dead code – DeterminisFc Level Process Objec<ves Code Coverage A 71 Level B and 100% of MCDC B 69 Level C plus 100% of DC C 62 Level D plus 100% of SC D 26 100% of Requirements E 0 None 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 108
  • 109.
    Tenets Of Safety-­‐CriFcal Sovware • Reduce code size • Consider testability in design • Design code to be determinisFc 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 109
  • 110.
    Connext DDS Cert • Small footprint, cerFfiable DDS – ~25K ELOC – No dynamic memory allocaFon – StaFc endpoint discovery only • Follows OMG DDS specificaFon – C and C++ APIs – Subset of minimum profile • ApplicaFon portability and interoperability with full DDS – Including RouFng Service • CompaFble with RTI’s FACE interface • DO-­‐178C Level A cerFficaFon available 1H 2015 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 110
  • 111.
    DO-­‐178C Level A CerFficaFon Evidence • Plan for Sovware Aspects of CerFficaFon (PSAC) • Sovware Development Plan (SDP) – Requirements standards – Design standards – Code standards • Sovware VerificaFon Plan (SVP) • Sovware ConfiguraFon Management Plan (SCM) • Sovware Quality Assurance Plan • Sovware Requirements Data • Design DescripFon • Traceability • SQA Records • SCM Records • Sovware ConfiguraFon Index • Sovware VerificaFon Cases and Procedures • Sovware VerificaFon Results • Sovware Accomplishment Summary CerFficaFon evidence can be re-­‐used across programs 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 111
  • 112.
    Savings from DDS CerFficaFon Evidence 30,000 ELOC 20,000 ELOC 10,000 ELOC Level A $3,000,000 $2,000,000 $1,000,000 Level B $2,550,000 $1,700,000 $850,000 Level C $1,800,000 $1,200,000 $600,000 • DDS cerFficaFon evidence available at fracFon of cost • Availability at start of project also reduces risk 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 112
  • 113.
    Summary • CerFfiable DDS designed for safety-­‐criFcal applicaFons now available – Connext DDS Cert – Standards compliant – Small footprint • Code is cerFfiable to DO-­‐178 Level A – Minimal lines of code – DeterminisFc • CerFficaFon evidence is reusable 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 113
  • 114.
  • 115.
    DDS DifferenFaFon DDS Standard Interoperability Portability Real-­‐Fme QoS 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 115
  • 116.
    Secure Professional Micro Cert Connext DDS Product Family DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Interoperability Protocol Full DDS Libraries RouFng Service Database IntegraFon DDS Subset DDS Subset DO-­‐178C CerFfiable Admin Console Monitoring Microsov Excel Recording Replay Wireshark Persistence Logging Prototyper General Purpose & Real-­‐Time Apps Remote Apps ExisFng Apps and Devices Adapter Small Footprint Apps High Assurance Apps JMS API Security Plugins 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 116
  • 117.
    ApplicaFon Code Data Types Dynamically defined (API) Custom Pre-­‐defined DDS: C, C++, C#, Java, Ada JMS Data-­‐Centric Publish/Subscribe AutomaFc Discovery History Cache Monitoring Local API & remote Quality of Svc API & file-­‐based OperaFng System and Network Stack Windows, Linux, Unix, embedded, RTOS Interface Compiler Interface DefiniFons • IDL • XML / XSD • WSDL Shared Memory UDPv4 ucast & mcast TCP TLS & DTLS (SSL) UDPv6 ucast & mcast Custom Pluggable Transport Interface Generated APIs – event-­‐driven, polled & SQL query Reliability • DDS-­‐RTPS Wire Protocol <XML> Pluggable Discovery Peer-­‐to-­‐peer File-­‐based Custom WAN <XML> Request/reply, Guaranteed Messaging Security Security AuthenFcaFon EncrypFon Access Control Tagging Logging 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 117
  • 118.
  • 119.
    Next Steps – Learn More • Contact RTI – Demo, Q&A • Download sovware – www.rF.com/downloads – Free trial with comprehensive tutorial – RTI Shapes Demo • Watch videos & webinars, read whitepapers – www.rF.com/resources – www.youtube.com/ realFmeinnovaFons 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 119
  • 120.
    Summary • AdopFon of OA is essenFal – Affordability – CompeFFveness • DDS is well-­‐suited for OA – Loose coupling – Meets real-­‐Fme, mission-­‐criFcal requirements – Leading-­‐edge security and safety – Proven foundaFon – Eases exisFng system migraFon/modernizaFon • RTI Connext provides a robust DDS soluFon 2014-­‐Sep-­‐25 © 2014 RTI 120