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from SCADA to IoT
Cyber Security
Bogdan Matache - Romania 2015
 About ME, Bogdan Matache
 Cyber Security Specialist – Military Technical Academy
 SCADA Security Specialist – InfoSec Institute
 Auditor – ISO 27001
Specializations: Cryptography, Social Engineering, SCADA Pen testing
 IT&C – over 15 y
 Energy @ OIL Sectors – 10 y
 SCADA for Renewable Power Plants – 5 y
 Pen testing – OIL Sectors systems – 3 y
 Pen testing – Electrical Systems – 3 y
What I hacked ?
 Fuel Pump ( I changed densitometers values )
What I hacked ?
 Asphalt Station
( I Changed the percentage of bitumen)
What I Pen Tested ?
 VoIP Networks
 WiMAX BTS
 Cars (doors open system, tachometer, gps)
 Intelligent House System, Smart Buildings
 6 companies in 8 months ( Social Engineering )
 PLC’s (programmable logic Controller)
 Smart Electricity Meters
 Smart Gas Meters
 Magnetic & RFID Access Cards
 Drones Control System
 Etc.
What I do ?
 I work as a security auditor at EnerSec, a company specialized in
Cyber Security for Energy Sector
Definitions
 What is SCADA
 What is IoT
 What is Security
ICS and SCADA
 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is an umbrella term
covering many historically different types of control system
such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
and DCS (Distributed Control Systems). Also known as IACS
(Industrial Automation and Control Systems), they are a
form of Operational Technology. In practice, media
publications often use “SCADA” interchangeably with “ICS”.
SCADA
system
Cars
 OBD 2 (On-Board Diagnostics)
Airplanes
 ADS-B ( Automatic
Dependent
Surveillance
Broadcast )
Ships
 AIS ( Automatic
Identification
System )
Other hackable SCADA systems
 Power Plants (Nuclear Plants)
 Transportation System
( Train Switch Crossing and Beacons )
 Robots in factories
 Etc.
ics-cert.us-cert.gov
What is IoT ?
 The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical
objects or "things" embedded with electronics, software,
sensors, and network connectivity, which enables these
objects to collect and exchange data.
IoT Growth
SCADA vs IoT
 More devices
 More Systems
 More data
 More connectivity / access points
 More ‘home’ users
 Equals - More opportunities
Attacks Types for SCADA
 Power System or Water System ( most likely terrorism )
 Attacks upon the power system.
target – power system itself
 Attacks by the power system.
target – population ( make dark or rise lever of chlorine )
 Attacks through the power system
target - ex high voltage for a specific company
Attacks types for IoT
 Open doors ( Bluetooth Lockers, hotel rooms)
 Unwanted Surveillance (baby monitors or smart TV’s)
 Damage things ( Sprinklers, cooling systems )
 Pace Maker
 GPS ( fleet monitoring )
 Burglars ( profile from smart meters, energy consumption)
CIA vs AIC
 IT Security
confidentiality, integrity, availability
 SCADA and IoT
availability, integrity, confidentiality
Protocols
 For SCADA ( PLC’s)
ModBus, DNP3, IEC 60870,
IEC61850, Embedded Proprietary,
ICCP, UCA 2.0
 For IoT
Bluetooth low-e, Wi-Fi low-e,
NFC, RFID, ANT, Z-Wave,
Neul, SigFox, Thread,
6LowPAN, ZigBee, Cellular,
LoRA WAN
Software for Hacking SCADA / IoT
 Black Arch Linux
 Hack Ports
 Helix, Kali Linux
 Samurai STFU
 Security Onion
 OSINT
 Dedicated software exploits for PLC’s
for Siemens, Allen Bradley, Schneider, ABB, etc.
Hardware tools for Pentest
 WiFi Pineapple
 Rubber Ducky
Hardware tools
for Pentesting
 Hack RF
 Prox Mark 3
clone RFID Mifare cards
Hardware tools for Pentest
Malware example for SCADA / IoT
 Stuxnet, Havex, Flame, DragonFly
 APT is most dangerous
Critical risk scenarios
 RS 01 - disrupting the operation of control systems by delaying or
blocking the flow of information through control networks, thereby
denying availability of the networks to control system operators;
 RS 02 - unauthorized changes to programmed instructions in PLCs,
RTUs, or DCS controllers, change alarm thresholds, or issue
unauthorized commands to control equipment, which could
potentially result in damage to equipment (if tolerances are
exceeded), premature shutdown of processes (such as prematurely
shutting down transmission lines), or even disabling control
equipment;
Critical risk scenarios
 RS 03 - send false information to control system operators
either to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate
inappropriate actions by system operators;
 RS 04 - modify the control system software, producing
unpredictable results;
 RS 05 - interfere with the operation of safety systems.
Defence / Alerts
 ics-cert.us-cert.gov
 CERT-ICS.eu
Defence / Intelligence
Security
Operation
Center
[Bucharest] From SCADA to IoT Cyber Security

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[Bucharest] From SCADA to IoT Cyber Security

  • 1.
  • 2. from SCADA to IoT Cyber Security Bogdan Matache - Romania 2015
  • 3.  About ME, Bogdan Matache  Cyber Security Specialist – Military Technical Academy  SCADA Security Specialist – InfoSec Institute  Auditor – ISO 27001 Specializations: Cryptography, Social Engineering, SCADA Pen testing  IT&C – over 15 y  Energy @ OIL Sectors – 10 y  SCADA for Renewable Power Plants – 5 y  Pen testing – OIL Sectors systems – 3 y  Pen testing – Electrical Systems – 3 y
  • 4. What I hacked ?  Fuel Pump ( I changed densitometers values )
  • 5. What I hacked ?  Asphalt Station ( I Changed the percentage of bitumen)
  • 6. What I Pen Tested ?  VoIP Networks  WiMAX BTS  Cars (doors open system, tachometer, gps)  Intelligent House System, Smart Buildings  6 companies in 8 months ( Social Engineering )  PLC’s (programmable logic Controller)  Smart Electricity Meters  Smart Gas Meters  Magnetic & RFID Access Cards  Drones Control System  Etc.
  • 7. What I do ?  I work as a security auditor at EnerSec, a company specialized in Cyber Security for Energy Sector
  • 8. Definitions  What is SCADA  What is IoT  What is Security
  • 9. ICS and SCADA  Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is an umbrella term covering many historically different types of control system such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and DCS (Distributed Control Systems). Also known as IACS (Industrial Automation and Control Systems), they are a form of Operational Technology. In practice, media publications often use “SCADA” interchangeably with “ICS”.
  • 11. Cars  OBD 2 (On-Board Diagnostics)
  • 12. Airplanes  ADS-B ( Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast )
  • 13. Ships  AIS ( Automatic Identification System )
  • 14. Other hackable SCADA systems  Power Plants (Nuclear Plants)  Transportation System ( Train Switch Crossing and Beacons )  Robots in factories  Etc.
  • 16.
  • 17. What is IoT ?  The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects or "things" embedded with electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity, which enables these objects to collect and exchange data.
  • 19. SCADA vs IoT  More devices  More Systems  More data  More connectivity / access points  More ‘home’ users  Equals - More opportunities
  • 20. Attacks Types for SCADA  Power System or Water System ( most likely terrorism )  Attacks upon the power system. target – power system itself  Attacks by the power system. target – population ( make dark or rise lever of chlorine )  Attacks through the power system target - ex high voltage for a specific company
  • 21. Attacks types for IoT  Open doors ( Bluetooth Lockers, hotel rooms)  Unwanted Surveillance (baby monitors or smart TV’s)  Damage things ( Sprinklers, cooling systems )  Pace Maker  GPS ( fleet monitoring )  Burglars ( profile from smart meters, energy consumption)
  • 22. CIA vs AIC  IT Security confidentiality, integrity, availability  SCADA and IoT availability, integrity, confidentiality
  • 23. Protocols  For SCADA ( PLC’s) ModBus, DNP3, IEC 60870, IEC61850, Embedded Proprietary, ICCP, UCA 2.0  For IoT Bluetooth low-e, Wi-Fi low-e, NFC, RFID, ANT, Z-Wave, Neul, SigFox, Thread, 6LowPAN, ZigBee, Cellular, LoRA WAN
  • 24. Software for Hacking SCADA / IoT  Black Arch Linux  Hack Ports  Helix, Kali Linux  Samurai STFU  Security Onion  OSINT  Dedicated software exploits for PLC’s for Siemens, Allen Bradley, Schneider, ABB, etc.
  • 25. Hardware tools for Pentest  WiFi Pineapple  Rubber Ducky
  • 27.  Prox Mark 3 clone RFID Mifare cards Hardware tools for Pentest
  • 28. Malware example for SCADA / IoT  Stuxnet, Havex, Flame, DragonFly  APT is most dangerous
  • 29. Critical risk scenarios  RS 01 - disrupting the operation of control systems by delaying or blocking the flow of information through control networks, thereby denying availability of the networks to control system operators;  RS 02 - unauthorized changes to programmed instructions in PLCs, RTUs, or DCS controllers, change alarm thresholds, or issue unauthorized commands to control equipment, which could potentially result in damage to equipment (if tolerances are exceeded), premature shutdown of processes (such as prematurely shutting down transmission lines), or even disabling control equipment;
  • 30. Critical risk scenarios  RS 03 - send false information to control system operators either to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions by system operators;  RS 04 - modify the control system software, producing unpredictable results;  RS 05 - interfere with the operation of safety systems.
  • 31. Defence / Alerts  ics-cert.us-cert.gov  CERT-ICS.eu