© Copyright Fortinet Inc. All rights reserved.© Copyright Fortinet Inc. All rights reserved.
Extending Fabric-Ready into ICS
Chet Namboodri
2
Convergence of IT and Traditional OT
What was air gapped and proprietary is now connected and general purpose
In the past, they were …
 Isolated from IT
 Run on proprietary control
protocols
 Run on specialized hardware
 Run on proprietary embedded
operating systems
 Connected by copper and twisted
pair
Now they are …
 Bridged into corporate networks
 Riding on common internet
protocols
 Running on general purpose
hardware with IT origins
 Running mainstream IT operating
systems
 Increasingly connected to wireless
technologies
3
Typical SCADA Components are Vulnerable
 Domain-specific technologies: Many technologies require specialized knowledge of industrial control
systems technology & communications. Enterprise IT security technologies are not ICS-aware
 Operational Technology deficiencies: PLCs and RTUs are low computational computers built for
controlling physical components such as valves, pumps, motors, etc.
 Lack of authentication
 Lack of encryption
 Backdoors
 Buffer overflow
 Tailored attacks on physical
control components
Market Realities
5
ICS Cybersecurity: Making the Headlines
A Worm in the Centrifuge- Stuxnet
30 Sept. 2010
An unusually sophisticated cyber-weapon is
mysterious but important. A new software
“worm” called Stuxnet …
A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed
Physical Damage
30 Sept. 2015
Massive damage by manipulating and
disrupting control systems at German steel mill
U.S. Finds Proof: Cyberattack on Ukraine
Power Grid
3 Feb. 2016
Almost immediately, investigators found
indications of a malware called BlackEnergy.
Industroyer; A Cyberweapon can disrupt Power Grids
12 June 2017
Hackers allied with the Russian government have devised a
cyberweapon that has the potential to be the most disruptive
yet against electric systems that Americans depend on for
daily life, according to U.S. researchers.
The Ukraine’s Power Outage Was a Cyber Attack
18 Jan. 2017
A power blackout in Ukraine's capital Kiev last month was
caused by a cyber attack and investigators are trying to
trace other potentially infected computers.
Hackers halt plant operations in watershed cyberattack
15 Dec. 2017
Schneider confirmed that the incident had occurred and that
it had issued a security alert to users of Triconex, which
cyber experts said is widely used in the energy industry,
including at nuclear facilities, and oil and gas plants.
Triton: hackers take out safety systems in
'watershed' attack on energy plant
15 Dec. 2017
Sophisticated malware halts operations at
power station in unprecedented attack which
experts believe was state-sponsored
6
Top Threat Vectors for OT - 2017 SANS Survey
What are the top three threat vectors you are most concerned with? Rank the top three, with
“First” being the threat of highest concern.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Other
Industrial espionage
Internal threat (intentional)
External threats (supply chain or partnerships)
Integration of IT into control system networks
Malware families spreading indiscriminately
Phishing scams
Extortion, ransomware or other financially…
External threats (hacktivism, nation states)
Internal threat (accidental)
Devices and “things” (that cannot protect…
First Second Third
Source: SANs: The 2017 State of Industrial Control System Security: July 2017
7
2017 SANS Survey: Security Technologies In Use
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Anti-malware/Antivirus
Access controls
Assessment and audit
User and application access controls
Monitoring and log analysis
Vulnerability scanning
Security awareness training for staff,…
Asset identification and management
Control system network security monitoring…
Industrial intrusion prevention systems (IPS)
Industrial intrusion detection systems (IDS)
In Use Planned
What security technologies or solutions do you currently have in use? What new technologies
or solutions would you most want to add for control system security in the next 18 months?
Source: SANs: The 2017 State of Industrial Control System Security: July 2017
8
Capabilities Required of an Integrated Solution
Rapidly Detect Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities, Threats
and Incidents
Reduce
Troubleshooting and
Remediation Efforts
Quickly Recognize and
Remediate Operational
Anomalies
Track Industrial Assets
and Corresponding
Cybersecurity Risks
Deploy at Enterprise
Scale with Proven
Performance
Centrally Supervise and
Monitor Distributed
Networks
Fabric-Ready ICS Cybersecurity
The Fortinet / Nozomi Networks Integrated Solution
10
Nozomi Networks’ Solution Architecture
11
SIEM SOC Corporate
Firewall
Remote
Access
Historian Firewall DNS
Local SCADA
& HMI
Local SCADA
& HMI
Local SCADA
& HMI
www
Site #1 Site #2 Site #N
PLCs RTUs PLCs RTUs PLCs RTUs
Comprehensive Security for ICS
Level 4
Production
Scheduling
Level 3
Production
Control
Level 2
Plant
Supervisory
Level 1
Direct Control
Level 0
Field Level
Selected threats
detected
• Monitoring of remote access connection to networks
• Connection to Internetcorporate network DMZ
• MITM & Scanning Attacks (Port, Network)
• Unauthorized cross level communication
• IP conflicts
• Weak passwords (FTP /
TFPTP / RDP / DCERPC)
• Traffic activity summaries
Bad configurations (NTP /
DNS / DHCP/ etc.)
• Network topologies
• Used ports of assets
• Unencrypted
communications (Telnet)
• Insecure Internet
connections
• Anomalous protocol behavior
• Online edits to PLC projects
• Communication changes
• Configuration downloads
• New assets in the network
• Non-responsive assets
• Corrupted OT packets
• Firmware downloads
• Logic changes
• Authentication to PLCs
• PLC actions (Start, Stop, Monitor, Run, Reboot,
Program, Test)
• Fieldbus I/O monitoring
12
SCADAguardian with FortiGate
Automatically learns ICS
behavior and detects
suspicious activities
Security Policy
Enforcement
Flexibility to enforce security policies
with different degree of granularity
Deep understanding of all
key SCADA protocols, open
and proprietary
Active Traffic
Control
Proactive filtering of malicious and
unauthorized network traffic
Real-time passive monitoring guarantees
no performance impact and permits
visibility at different layers of the Control
and Process Networks
In-line
Protection
In-line separation between IT
and OT environments
Turn–key Internal and
Perimeter Visibility
Fine Tuning, Control and
Monitoring of the Firewall Ruleset
Proactive SCADA
Security
Behavioral
Analysis
Deep SCADA
Understanding
Non-intrusive
Passive
Monitoring
13
Fortinet / Nozomi Networks Integrated Solution
Full Protection, Visibility and
Monitoring Thanks to Nozomi
Networks and Fortinet
The Nozomi Networks solution
passively monitors the network,
thus not affecting the performance
of the control system
The appliance is connected to the
system via a SPAN or mirror port
on a switch
Valve
Fan
Pump
14
Responding to Threats in Real Time
Monitor
A threat is detected by SCADAguardian
and an alert is generated
Detect
User-defined policies are examined
and the appropriate corresponding
action is triggered
Protect
FortiGate responds according to the user-
configured action (Node Blocking, Link
Blocking, or Kill Session) in order to
mitigate the issue
2
1
3
Valve
Fan
Pump
3
1
2
15
Three Use Case Scenarios: Blocking Attack Vectors
Blocking Reconnaissance
Activity
Blocking Unauthorized Activity
Blocking Advanced Malware or
Zero Day Attack
 New unknown node joins trusted
control network (or process
network)
 SCADAguardian detects it and
triggers alert to FortiGate
 FortiGate enforces policy and
blocks node from all access
 Node in trusted networks issues
a command to reprogram a PLC
 SCADAguardian detects anomaly
and triggers alert to FortiGate
 FortiGate enforces policy and
blocks communication
 SCADA Master changes process
in subtle way towards a critical
state
 SCADAguardian detects anomaly
and triggers alert for FortiGate
 FortiGate enforces policy and
blocks SCADA Master from all
access
1 2 3
16
Switch
HMI
Local
SCADA
PLC
PLC
PLC
RTU
RTU
RTU
Replicated
Historian
Corporate
Firewall
Remote
Access
Control Room
Central
Management
Console (CMC)
SIEM
Firewall
Firewall
Historian
DNS
Jump
Box
Patching
Server
Web
Firewall Switch
HMI
Local
SCADA
Real-time Visibility - IT/OT Convergence
17
Switch
HMI
Local
SCADA
PLC
PLC
PLC
RTU
RTU
RTU
Replicated
Historian
Corporate
Firewall
Remote
Access
Control Room
Central
Management
Console (CMC)
SIEM
Firewall
Firewall
Historian
DNS
Jump
Box
Patching
Server
Web
Firewall Switch
HMI
Local
SCADA
Real-time Visibility - Support Multi-tenant Deployments
Control Room
CMC
CMC
Area 1
Control Room
Onshore
Area 2
Control Room
Onshore
CMC
18
Nozomi Networks: Fortinet Fabric Ready for ICS
 Leverages Security Fabric APIs to deliver pre-
integrated, end-to-end security offerings
 Integrated products improve threat awareness
& intelligence, broaden & coordinate threat
response and policy enforcement
 Faster time-to-deployment & reduced costs
due to pre-validation of solutions
NETWORK
MULTI-CLOUDPARTNER API
EMAILUNIFIED ACCESS
IOT-ENDPOINT WEB APPS
ADVANCED THREAT PROTECTION
MANAGEMENT-ANALYTICS
Questions?
21
Nozomi Networks: Leading ICS Cybersecurity
Since Oct 2013 ~$24m invested
+200,000 Monitored
+200 Global Installations
FOUNDED
DEVICES
CUSTOMERS
SERVING VERTICALS

Nozomi Fortinet Accelerate18

  • 1.
    © Copyright FortinetInc. All rights reserved.© Copyright Fortinet Inc. All rights reserved. Extending Fabric-Ready into ICS Chet Namboodri
  • 2.
    2 Convergence of ITand Traditional OT What was air gapped and proprietary is now connected and general purpose In the past, they were …  Isolated from IT  Run on proprietary control protocols  Run on specialized hardware  Run on proprietary embedded operating systems  Connected by copper and twisted pair Now they are …  Bridged into corporate networks  Riding on common internet protocols  Running on general purpose hardware with IT origins  Running mainstream IT operating systems  Increasingly connected to wireless technologies
  • 3.
    3 Typical SCADA Componentsare Vulnerable  Domain-specific technologies: Many technologies require specialized knowledge of industrial control systems technology & communications. Enterprise IT security technologies are not ICS-aware  Operational Technology deficiencies: PLCs and RTUs are low computational computers built for controlling physical components such as valves, pumps, motors, etc.  Lack of authentication  Lack of encryption  Backdoors  Buffer overflow  Tailored attacks on physical control components
  • 4.
  • 5.
    5 ICS Cybersecurity: Makingthe Headlines A Worm in the Centrifuge- Stuxnet 30 Sept. 2010 An unusually sophisticated cyber-weapon is mysterious but important. A new software “worm” called Stuxnet … A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage 30 Sept. 2015 Massive damage by manipulating and disrupting control systems at German steel mill U.S. Finds Proof: Cyberattack on Ukraine Power Grid 3 Feb. 2016 Almost immediately, investigators found indications of a malware called BlackEnergy. Industroyer; A Cyberweapon can disrupt Power Grids 12 June 2017 Hackers allied with the Russian government have devised a cyberweapon that has the potential to be the most disruptive yet against electric systems that Americans depend on for daily life, according to U.S. researchers. The Ukraine’s Power Outage Was a Cyber Attack 18 Jan. 2017 A power blackout in Ukraine's capital Kiev last month was caused by a cyber attack and investigators are trying to trace other potentially infected computers. Hackers halt plant operations in watershed cyberattack 15 Dec. 2017 Schneider confirmed that the incident had occurred and that it had issued a security alert to users of Triconex, which cyber experts said is widely used in the energy industry, including at nuclear facilities, and oil and gas plants. Triton: hackers take out safety systems in 'watershed' attack on energy plant 15 Dec. 2017 Sophisticated malware halts operations at power station in unprecedented attack which experts believe was state-sponsored
  • 6.
    6 Top Threat Vectorsfor OT - 2017 SANS Survey What are the top three threat vectors you are most concerned with? Rank the top three, with “First” being the threat of highest concern. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Other Industrial espionage Internal threat (intentional) External threats (supply chain or partnerships) Integration of IT into control system networks Malware families spreading indiscriminately Phishing scams Extortion, ransomware or other financially… External threats (hacktivism, nation states) Internal threat (accidental) Devices and “things” (that cannot protect… First Second Third Source: SANs: The 2017 State of Industrial Control System Security: July 2017
  • 7.
    7 2017 SANS Survey:Security Technologies In Use 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Anti-malware/Antivirus Access controls Assessment and audit User and application access controls Monitoring and log analysis Vulnerability scanning Security awareness training for staff,… Asset identification and management Control system network security monitoring… Industrial intrusion prevention systems (IPS) Industrial intrusion detection systems (IDS) In Use Planned What security technologies or solutions do you currently have in use? What new technologies or solutions would you most want to add for control system security in the next 18 months? Source: SANs: The 2017 State of Industrial Control System Security: July 2017
  • 8.
    8 Capabilities Required ofan Integrated Solution Rapidly Detect Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, Threats and Incidents Reduce Troubleshooting and Remediation Efforts Quickly Recognize and Remediate Operational Anomalies Track Industrial Assets and Corresponding Cybersecurity Risks Deploy at Enterprise Scale with Proven Performance Centrally Supervise and Monitor Distributed Networks
  • 9.
    Fabric-Ready ICS Cybersecurity TheFortinet / Nozomi Networks Integrated Solution
  • 10.
  • 11.
    11 SIEM SOC Corporate Firewall Remote Access HistorianFirewall DNS Local SCADA & HMI Local SCADA & HMI Local SCADA & HMI www Site #1 Site #2 Site #N PLCs RTUs PLCs RTUs PLCs RTUs Comprehensive Security for ICS Level 4 Production Scheduling Level 3 Production Control Level 2 Plant Supervisory Level 1 Direct Control Level 0 Field Level Selected threats detected • Monitoring of remote access connection to networks • Connection to Internetcorporate network DMZ • MITM & Scanning Attacks (Port, Network) • Unauthorized cross level communication • IP conflicts • Weak passwords (FTP / TFPTP / RDP / DCERPC) • Traffic activity summaries Bad configurations (NTP / DNS / DHCP/ etc.) • Network topologies • Used ports of assets • Unencrypted communications (Telnet) • Insecure Internet connections • Anomalous protocol behavior • Online edits to PLC projects • Communication changes • Configuration downloads • New assets in the network • Non-responsive assets • Corrupted OT packets • Firmware downloads • Logic changes • Authentication to PLCs • PLC actions (Start, Stop, Monitor, Run, Reboot, Program, Test) • Fieldbus I/O monitoring
  • 12.
    12 SCADAguardian with FortiGate Automaticallylearns ICS behavior and detects suspicious activities Security Policy Enforcement Flexibility to enforce security policies with different degree of granularity Deep understanding of all key SCADA protocols, open and proprietary Active Traffic Control Proactive filtering of malicious and unauthorized network traffic Real-time passive monitoring guarantees no performance impact and permits visibility at different layers of the Control and Process Networks In-line Protection In-line separation between IT and OT environments Turn–key Internal and Perimeter Visibility Fine Tuning, Control and Monitoring of the Firewall Ruleset Proactive SCADA Security Behavioral Analysis Deep SCADA Understanding Non-intrusive Passive Monitoring
  • 13.
    13 Fortinet / NozomiNetworks Integrated Solution Full Protection, Visibility and Monitoring Thanks to Nozomi Networks and Fortinet The Nozomi Networks solution passively monitors the network, thus not affecting the performance of the control system The appliance is connected to the system via a SPAN or mirror port on a switch Valve Fan Pump
  • 14.
    14 Responding to Threatsin Real Time Monitor A threat is detected by SCADAguardian and an alert is generated Detect User-defined policies are examined and the appropriate corresponding action is triggered Protect FortiGate responds according to the user- configured action (Node Blocking, Link Blocking, or Kill Session) in order to mitigate the issue 2 1 3 Valve Fan Pump 3 1 2
  • 15.
    15 Three Use CaseScenarios: Blocking Attack Vectors Blocking Reconnaissance Activity Blocking Unauthorized Activity Blocking Advanced Malware or Zero Day Attack  New unknown node joins trusted control network (or process network)  SCADAguardian detects it and triggers alert to FortiGate  FortiGate enforces policy and blocks node from all access  Node in trusted networks issues a command to reprogram a PLC  SCADAguardian detects anomaly and triggers alert to FortiGate  FortiGate enforces policy and blocks communication  SCADA Master changes process in subtle way towards a critical state  SCADAguardian detects anomaly and triggers alert for FortiGate  FortiGate enforces policy and blocks SCADA Master from all access 1 2 3
  • 16.
  • 17.
    17 Switch HMI Local SCADA PLC PLC PLC RTU RTU RTU Replicated Historian Corporate Firewall Remote Access Control Room Central Management Console (CMC) SIEM Firewall Firewall Historian DNS Jump Box Patching Server Web FirewallSwitch HMI Local SCADA Real-time Visibility - Support Multi-tenant Deployments Control Room CMC CMC Area 1 Control Room Onshore Area 2 Control Room Onshore CMC
  • 18.
    18 Nozomi Networks: FortinetFabric Ready for ICS  Leverages Security Fabric APIs to deliver pre- integrated, end-to-end security offerings  Integrated products improve threat awareness & intelligence, broaden & coordinate threat response and policy enforcement  Faster time-to-deployment & reduced costs due to pre-validation of solutions NETWORK MULTI-CLOUDPARTNER API EMAILUNIFIED ACCESS IOT-ENDPOINT WEB APPS ADVANCED THREAT PROTECTION MANAGEMENT-ANALYTICS
  • 19.
  • 21.
    21 Nozomi Networks: LeadingICS Cybersecurity Since Oct 2013 ~$24m invested +200,000 Monitored +200 Global Installations FOUNDED DEVICES CUSTOMERS SERVING VERTICALS

Editor's Notes

  • #7 SCRIPT: …”BUT DON’T TAKE OUR WORD FOR IT. LISTEN TO ICS STAKEHOLDERS ACROSS THE GLOBE”