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The Power of the
OT Security Playbook
Chris Sistrunk, PE
Technical Manager, ICS/OT
Mandiant
Chris Sistrunk, PE
Mandiant (8+ years)
▪ Technical Manager
▪ Mandiant ICS/OT ConsultingTeam
Entergy (11+ years)
▪ Power Engineer
▪ SCADA & SubstationAutomation
▪ Substation SecurityTeam
BSidesJackson, BEER-ISAC, #NAPCON, #DJaaS
Wisdom
“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
MikeTyson
“It's how you react to that adversity that defines you, not the
adversity itself.”
Mike Berardino, South Florida Sun-Sentinel
“Safety rules are written in blood.”
R.L. Grubbs, Senior Safety Specialist, Entergy
Response Plans & Playbooks Aren’t New
Where there’s an incident…
There should be a plan….right?
▪ Incident Response Plans & Playbooks
– NIST SP800-61 Revision 2 Computer Security
Incident HandlingGuide
– CISA Federal Gov. Cybersecurity Incident &
Vulnerability Response Playbooks
▪ Incident Command System structure
– https://www.fema.gov/incident-command-
system-resources
Hurricane Ian
(Image
credit:
RAMMB/CIRA/CSU)
Hurricane Ian
https://www.facebook.com/Linejunk/photos/a.254076281414434/2378855028936538/
ICS4ICS
Adding control system cybersecurity
incident response to the FEMA / NIMS ICS
framework
▪ https://gca.isa.org/ics4ics
Know your role
Know your role
Who do we call and when?
Engineers
Network Admins
PR, Safety
Legal, HR,Vendors
IR Retainer
OT Incident Response
IT/OT Differences
• When/Where/How is the ICS affected?
Assess the situation
• Return the ICS to normal quickly and safely
Define objectives
• ICS devices have RTOS and ICS protocols
Collect evidence
• Analysis must be done to verify anomalies
Perform analysis
• Regularly report status to management
Communicate
• How/When to regain control of the ICS
Develop remediation plan
• Write a report of what exactly happened
Document findings
Similar
Physical Processes
Must be collected
manually
No ICS-specific
DFIR tools
Similar
ICS devices have
constraints
Similar
!
!
!
!
IR Plan Objectives
Determine a course of action (triage then act)
– Return the system to normal quickly and safely
– Safety is #1, Availability is #2
– There’s no best way
Incident Response Plan
– Playbooks / Use Cases
13
Use Cases & Playbooks
Breaks down the Incident Response Plan
▪ Use Cases
– Scenarios that drive the development of playbooks
▪ Playbook / Runbook
– Step-by-step instructions that the IRTeam uses to remediate the incident
– Manual
– Automatic
– Hybrid
Example Use Cases
1. Commodity Malware
– Conficker, Ramnit, Kegotip
2. Credential Compromise
– Ukraine 2015 attack, PLC ladder logic change (INLAurora)
3. Destructive Attack
– KillDisk, overwriting firmware (Ukraine 2015)
– “Wiper malware (NotPetya) or ransomware spreading
4. ICS ProtocolAttack
– Stuxnet, Industroyer1 (Ukraine 2016),Triton, Industroyer2 (Ukraine 2022)
– Incontroller (no victims but worth studying)
Remediations
Remediation for each play
Examples:
▪ Restore backups
▪ Reset passwords
▪ Sever/Isolate the OT network
▪ Utilize critical spares
“RUN IT!”
Practice & Review the Tape
Tabletop exercises
Lessons Learned / Past AAR
Threat modeling
Reviewing threat intelligence
Use / design real-world scenarios
to drive preparation & response
Resource: Public Power Playbook
This FREE playbook fromAPPA helps small
power utilities
▪ prepare a cyber incident response plan
▪ prioritize actions and engage the right
people during cyber incident response
▪ coordinate messaging
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/
documents/Public-Power-Cyber-Incident-
Response-Playbook.pdf
Alright Stop
Collaborate with ICS vendors
They may already have steps
documented that you can use in
response playbooks
They will likely need to be involved
if the incident directly impacts their
equipment > they know it best
Don’t over-complicate things
More wisdom from football:
▪ https://joedanielfootball.com/overcomplicate-defensive-playbook/
“The best defense against any offense, is your defensive playbook. No
one else’s. What do you do best?”
“You don’t need every coverage… Every coverage has a weakness so
choose a complimentary coverage that takes away that weakness.”
“A complicated playbook won’t win football games for you if the
players can’t execute.You should strive to keep your playbook as simple
as you can”
Run it!
You have designed plays for each phase
▪ Use your players’ strengths
▪ Exploit attacker weaknesses
Remember what you practiced, and react
to that adversity
Finish strong!
Knowledge & preparation are powerful
Create an OT Incident Response Plan
 Review what you already have
 Reference IT IRP and OT DRP
 Leverage your security and engineering pros
Define use cases for different scenarios
 Start small & don’t overcomplicate (4 OT use cases)
 Use them to create simple, solid playbooks
Practice!
 UseTTX to hone the IR team skills
 Provide feedback to IRP and Playbooks to improve
REDEFINE THE WIN!
Minimize incident impact with
preparation, early detection, &
response.
Halting the attacker anywhere in
the cycle stops them from
achieving their objective!
Transparency and information
sharing will help other targeted
orgs or potential victims.
E T N T E
C W C
M S
FS
WR WR
w w
Q
RB
Questions?
Thank you!
@chrissistrunk
chris.Sistrunk@mandiant.com

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BSidesAugusta 2022 - The Power of the OT Security Playbook

  • 1. The Power of the OT Security Playbook Chris Sistrunk, PE Technical Manager, ICS/OT Mandiant
  • 2. Chris Sistrunk, PE Mandiant (8+ years) ▪ Technical Manager ▪ Mandiant ICS/OT ConsultingTeam Entergy (11+ years) ▪ Power Engineer ▪ SCADA & SubstationAutomation ▪ Substation SecurityTeam BSidesJackson, BEER-ISAC, #NAPCON, #DJaaS
  • 3. Wisdom “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” MikeTyson “It's how you react to that adversity that defines you, not the adversity itself.” Mike Berardino, South Florida Sun-Sentinel “Safety rules are written in blood.” R.L. Grubbs, Senior Safety Specialist, Entergy
  • 4. Response Plans & Playbooks Aren’t New
  • 5. Where there’s an incident… There should be a plan….right? ▪ Incident Response Plans & Playbooks – NIST SP800-61 Revision 2 Computer Security Incident HandlingGuide – CISA Federal Gov. Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks ▪ Incident Command System structure – https://www.fema.gov/incident-command- system-resources
  • 8.
  • 9. ICS4ICS Adding control system cybersecurity incident response to the FEMA / NIMS ICS framework ▪ https://gca.isa.org/ics4ics
  • 11. Know your role Who do we call and when? Engineers Network Admins PR, Safety Legal, HR,Vendors IR Retainer
  • 12. OT Incident Response IT/OT Differences • When/Where/How is the ICS affected? Assess the situation • Return the ICS to normal quickly and safely Define objectives • ICS devices have RTOS and ICS protocols Collect evidence • Analysis must be done to verify anomalies Perform analysis • Regularly report status to management Communicate • How/When to regain control of the ICS Develop remediation plan • Write a report of what exactly happened Document findings Similar Physical Processes Must be collected manually No ICS-specific DFIR tools Similar ICS devices have constraints Similar ! ! ! !
  • 13. IR Plan Objectives Determine a course of action (triage then act) – Return the system to normal quickly and safely – Safety is #1, Availability is #2 – There’s no best way Incident Response Plan – Playbooks / Use Cases 13
  • 14.
  • 15. Use Cases & Playbooks Breaks down the Incident Response Plan ▪ Use Cases – Scenarios that drive the development of playbooks ▪ Playbook / Runbook – Step-by-step instructions that the IRTeam uses to remediate the incident – Manual – Automatic – Hybrid
  • 16. Example Use Cases 1. Commodity Malware – Conficker, Ramnit, Kegotip 2. Credential Compromise – Ukraine 2015 attack, PLC ladder logic change (INLAurora) 3. Destructive Attack – KillDisk, overwriting firmware (Ukraine 2015) – “Wiper malware (NotPetya) or ransomware spreading 4. ICS ProtocolAttack – Stuxnet, Industroyer1 (Ukraine 2016),Triton, Industroyer2 (Ukraine 2022) – Incontroller (no victims but worth studying)
  • 17. Remediations Remediation for each play Examples: ▪ Restore backups ▪ Reset passwords ▪ Sever/Isolate the OT network ▪ Utilize critical spares “RUN IT!”
  • 18. Practice & Review the Tape Tabletop exercises Lessons Learned / Past AAR Threat modeling Reviewing threat intelligence Use / design real-world scenarios to drive preparation & response
  • 19. Resource: Public Power Playbook This FREE playbook fromAPPA helps small power utilities ▪ prepare a cyber incident response plan ▪ prioritize actions and engage the right people during cyber incident response ▪ coordinate messaging https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/ documents/Public-Power-Cyber-Incident- Response-Playbook.pdf
  • 20. Alright Stop Collaborate with ICS vendors They may already have steps documented that you can use in response playbooks They will likely need to be involved if the incident directly impacts their equipment > they know it best
  • 21. Don’t over-complicate things More wisdom from football: ▪ https://joedanielfootball.com/overcomplicate-defensive-playbook/ “The best defense against any offense, is your defensive playbook. No one else’s. What do you do best?” “You don’t need every coverage… Every coverage has a weakness so choose a complimentary coverage that takes away that weakness.” “A complicated playbook won’t win football games for you if the players can’t execute.You should strive to keep your playbook as simple as you can”
  • 22. Run it! You have designed plays for each phase ▪ Use your players’ strengths ▪ Exploit attacker weaknesses Remember what you practiced, and react to that adversity Finish strong!
  • 23. Knowledge & preparation are powerful Create an OT Incident Response Plan  Review what you already have  Reference IT IRP and OT DRP  Leverage your security and engineering pros Define use cases for different scenarios  Start small & don’t overcomplicate (4 OT use cases)  Use them to create simple, solid playbooks Practice!  UseTTX to hone the IR team skills  Provide feedback to IRP and Playbooks to improve
  • 24. REDEFINE THE WIN! Minimize incident impact with preparation, early detection, & response. Halting the attacker anywhere in the cycle stops them from achieving their objective! Transparency and information sharing will help other targeted orgs or potential victims.
  • 25. E T N T E C W C M S FS WR WR w w Q RB Questions?

Editor's Notes

  1. Sports teams have been using playbooks to win games with great success. Government entities have been using structured incident response FEMA 1970s from wildfires > https://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt CDC and UN Covid-19 IT incident response playbooks are already an invaluable tool to “win” (prevent or minimize impact) in the case of a cybersecurity incident or foe. Your industrial processes ALREADY have incident response playbooks to guide actions to minimize impact for their plant, their employees, and even the public. I will show you the power of adding OT security response plays in your playbook to help your team redefine the game to win. NASA – need I say more…they are known for some of the most rigorous procedures Critical Infrastructure / Manufacturing have been using them from the lessons learned from disasters to help prevent damage and protect lives After BASF Oppau explosion in 1921 Three Mile Island Piper Alpha BP Deepwater Horizon https://www.breakthroughbasketball.com/offense/destroy-playbook.html https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf https://info.publicintelligence.net/BPGoMspillresponseplan.pdf https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-61r2.pdf https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus
  2. The ICS4ICS approach guides companies, organizations, and municipalities in identifying an incident, assessing damage, addressing immediate challenges, communicating with the right agencies and stakeholders, and resuming day to day operations.
  3. https://assets.usafootball.com/documents/fdpb/FDPB-DEFENSE-PLAYBOOK_final.pdf
  4. Let’s take the 7 steps from Mandiant’s IR process and apply / compare it to OT
  5. Normally every industrial owner has a well defined disaster incident response plan. Safety is #1. Keeping the control system/plant running to make money is #2 (availability). Each plant is different and therefore the priorities may be completely different. They will usually align with the business risk for each plant. Risk = probability*impact.   For example: after a hurricane, the power company wants to get as many lights on the fastest. So they focus on the big lines and substations. They also want to get priority power lines on, like hospitals and other essential services. Then work their way out from there.
  6. https://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/10/the-saints-spelled-out-their-playbook-against-the-falcons-on-national-tv Each one of these plays are designed for a certain part of the game, using the strengths of his players, and taking advantages of opponents' weaknesses.
  7. Use cases are scenarios that drive the development of the playbook, which is a set of step-by-step instructions the incident response team uses to remediate the incident Playbooks can be manual or automatic, or a combination of both.
  8. https://www.perfect-performancenova.com/blog/how-to-properly-analyze-your-opponents-game-film
  9. Small and medium public power utilities generally don’t have to meet NERC CIP requirements...especially for requiring an IRP. So this free resource was made to help.
  10. Each one of these plays are designed for a certain part of the game, using the strengths of his players, and taking advantages of opponents weaknesses.