This paper argues that this mainstream narrative of American motivations and intentions in earthquake-ridden Haiti is an incomplete stance that overlooks the role of US national interests, namely that of security and strategic allyships.

1. Aiding American Security:
A Case-Study in the Haitian Earthquake Response

2. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck near the Haitian capital of Port-
au-Prince, ultimately leading to the collapse of 100,000 and damage of 200,000 structures, the
injuring of over 300,000 and death of 316,000 people, and displacement of over 1.5 million
people throughout the nation (DesRoches, 1; Reilly; Margesson; Katz; UN News) . Right after it
happened, surviving Haitian government officials made an urgent request for American
assistance, to which President Barack Obama responded with a “whole-of-government” response
through organizations like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) featuring Joint Task Force-
Haiti (JTF-Haiti) under Operation Unified Response (Cecchine, 14; Ivers, 305; Margesso; Katz).
Since first addressing the disaster, the United States government has provided $1.4 billion and
committed over $3.6 billion in aid to Haiti, a nation then-already known as the “Republic of
NGOs” (USAID). The White House declared American intervention “officially humanitarian”,
it’s intentions and successes widely hailed as products of moral mandates and sentiments of
global citizenship (Ivers, 305). This paper argues that this mainstream narrative of American
motivations and intentions in earthquake-ridden Haiti is an incomplete stance that overlooks the
role of US national interests, namely that of security and strategic allyships.
When the United States, or any nation, engages in humanitarian efforts, they risk their
own troops, civilians, defense budgets, political support, and millions (in this case, billions) of
dollars. Despite much of literature on the US’s Haitian mediation structuring the situation in this
light, the practical realities and stakes tallied that lead to such a massive response should not and
are not produced out of empathy, but rather calculations of national interest. Until states place
humanitarian protections abroad as central to their own state interests, it will almost always be

3. the case that they will not step in until it does, or ends (Smith, 46). Built on a historic calibration
of desired regional influences, democratic nation-building benefits, and American domestic
coordination, US intervention after the Haitian earthquake was anything but a production of
benevolent aid with no strings attached.
When Haiti gained independence and became the second (and first Black) republic in the
Western Hemisphere in 1804, the United States, whose economy at the time was deeply based on
slave trade and feared a similarly-scaled slave revolt within its borders, did not only not
recognize Haiti’s autonomy from France for 60 years, but spent that time and past it imposing
trade embargos and demanding “reparations” payments to France. Reinforcing these
settlements, along with some other factors that included countering German interests in the
Caribbean, was also what brought the US Marines to occupy the nation over a century after, in
1915. American intervention served as the root of Haitian infrastructure and education, and
politics (Danner). Despite continuous waves of anti-American nationalism that lead to outcomes
such as Sténio Vincent’s Haitian presidency in 1930, once he (and officials like him) had power,
American directives were absorbed into the country’s political mechanisms (Multinational
Monitor, 9l). This was seen when Elie Lescot, who “epitomized the highest levels of American
control in Haiti”, later came into power in 1941, followed by Dumarsais Estimé, who despite
motions to renew Haitian national identity was unable to offer a permanent alternative to US
control, an issue that continued even as the Americans delved into the Cold War. Haitian
politicians vied for US endorsement, knowing that without it they had no chance of victory
(Smith).
And so, when Francois Duvalier’s regime, supposedly based on a Black nationalist and
populist platform, lead to the murder of tens of thousands of Haitians, it was America’s fear of

4. communism that lead to his acceptance, which would only be incrementally repealed through a
series of aid suspensions and embargoes much later (Danner). It is the end of the Duvalier
dynasty that ushered in the era Haiti found itself in, give or take a number of elections and coups,
when the earthquake struck. By 2008, foreign aid (not including private charities) made up over
13% of Haitian GNI, power and resources were nestled in the hands of pro-US elites, and the
chances of development seemed slow and slim (Adelman, 12).
Despite coming into 2010 already juggling the wars in Afghanistan and Iran, the Great
recession and a peaking unemployment rate, ongoing domestic conflicts over healthcare reform,
and a 6.5 magnitude earthquake in California just 3 days before the one in Haiti, the US put in
the call to have FEMA on the ground after the Haitian earthquake within 1.5 hours, the US Air
Force Special Operations Command dispatched personnel within a day, and had donations
amounting to over $774 million within the first five weeks (FEMA, 6; Margesson; Katz;
Adelman, 90). By mid-May, $1.1 billion dollars would have been donated to and by private and
voluntary organizations- a total that would eventually reach $1.4 billion. The US government’s
contributions alone would come to total $1.4 billion and are still expected to amount to over $3.6
billion, including the $50,000 authorized by the USAID for the initial emergency response
programs implementation (Adelman, 90; Margesson; USAID) .
It took two days for SOUTHCOM to establish and dispatch Joint Task Force-Haiti, whose
commander, Lieutenant General P. K. "Ken" Keen, was already in Haiti when the disaster
occurred and already held a “long-standing, positive professional relationship” with the
commander of the United Nations Sabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Hédi Annabi
(Margesson; Katz; Cecchine, xii) . With his communications equipment intact, L.t.-Gen Keen
oversaw the Department of Defense’s response, which included to the dispatch of 20,458

5. military personnel, 2.1 million bottled waters, and 1.79 million food rations by the end of the
month. Additional measures including 26 Navy and Coast Guard vessels, 68 helicopters, and
over 50 fixed-wing aircrafts were consequently integrated (Margesson; Katz). The height of
America’s military footprint came to reach 22,000 troops, American NGOs went on to fund 80%
of social services in the country, and national corporations had donated $148 million by March
(Margesson; Katz; Ivers, 304; Adelman, 91) . Even former presidents Bill Clinton and George
W. Bush established a fund that raised $54.5 million, which eventually dispersed throughout
over 50 organizations and had an additional positive impact on the conditions of more than
311,000 earthquake victims as of December 2012 (Pearce).
Given the disaster’s placement as one of “the most devastating events in recent history,
the swiftness of action and massiveness of resource mobilization following the earthquake was
and probably remains the single most intense humanitarian effort following a natural disaster to
date (DesRoches, 1). However, where there was Haiti’s 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 2010, there
has also been a 9.1 magnitude quake in 2011 Japan, an 8.3 in 2015 Chile, and a 7.1 in 2018 Peru
just two days after the 8th-year anniversary of that first shock a dozen miles south of Port-au-
Prince (The Telegraph; Bacon; Reilly). Although Haiti was certainly the one with the most to
gain in this situation, the disparity between American response in its case and that of other
nations’ earthquake-induced crises seems to hint at an aim set past reconstructions and
benevolence. National differences considered, the proportional exceptionalism of overall
intervention with Haitian case holds as a legacy of American humanitarian protections and
efforts but must be considered so within light of what the US sought to gain.
Perhaps the best mechanism to understand the American agenda in Haiti is the five
components of national interest: security, economic prosperity, social goals, humanitarian and

6. moral concerns, and the intangible. American cost-benefit analysis has throughout history been
deliberated within these terms, prioritizing securing US territory against hostile attack, retaining
domestic stability and social tranquility, prompting American prosperity, and advancing
“cherished American values” (Smith; Multinational Monitor). Although American intervention
in Haiti can tick off each of these boxes, and therefore be far more elaborated up, there is little
denial that power calculations and security with the aim of freedom from foreign domination,
development and possession of international allyship networks and defenses, and prevention of
having national “choke points” amongst enemy intelligence have been and are almost always (if
not always) at the forefront of national interest calculations.
Given the American government’s broad, global reach of intervention and the opposition
it induces- be it on behalf of state or non-state actors- the establishment of efficient, controllable
borders is essential to the nation’s protection. The internal displacements and subsequent exodus
precipitated by disasters such as Haiti’s have historically been followed by massive refugee and
migrant movements across borders and seas to perceived havens. The potential wave of Haitians
seeking refuge in the United States- additional to those already then integrated into migration
processes- would be a firm enough inducement not only for the US to reaffirm border
protections, but to seek to tackle the root of the problem, be it through establishing “legitimate
governments” or incentivizing nationals to remain within their state lines (Smith, 42, 37).
However, intervening in the earthquake did not merely signal potential to retain physical
boundaries amongst the two nations, but likewise an opportunity to establish and reaffirm
cooperation amongst the US and a Latin American country. After setbacks in US-Latin
American countries reflected in the Organization of the American State’s refusal of
Washington’s endorsement for Secretary General in 2005, receding hopes for a hemisphere-wide

7. free trade area, undiminished drug flows and drug violence between the two regions, the US’s
seeming endorsement of a military coup against the Venezuelan President-Elect, et al., American
regional power- once bolstered by democracy promotion efforts- something had to be done
(O’Neil, 9). The number of Latin Americans approving of US democratic values had dropped
from 45% in 2002 to 29% by 2007 (PEW, 100). Between this, the legacy of the Monroe
Doctrine’s and the Washington Consensus slowing to a halt (seen in Latin American states’ shift
away from a foreign policy established relative to the US), and esteem for US global and
hemispheric leadership in the region reaching a historical low, Haiti not only stood as an exercise
in humanitarian interests, but as a well-needed precipitator to assert American presence and
influence in the Caribbean and South America (O’Neil, 5-6) .
American interest in the region wasn’t just about continuing a past of positive relations.
Latin America was and remains the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States and a
strong partner in the development of alternative fuel, accounting for nearly 30% of oil imports
(in comparison with 20% from the Middle East) (O’Neil 5-6) . Bolstered by the rising economic
powers of Mexico and Brazil, it came as no surprise that Latin America also served as the US’s
fastest-growing trade partner, with $223 billion worth of goods being exported to Latin America
in 2006 alone- a massive number at the time when compared to the $55 billion’s worth China
had imported the same year (US Census Bureau Foreign Trade; Hornbeck). US merchandise
trade with Latin America overall had grown by 139% throughout the decade leading up to 2006,
compared to 96% with Asia and 95% with the EU. Countries in the South were not only growing
stronger, but then-recent US focus on Middle Eastern relations had created space for them to
expand interactions with global economies like China and India (Horbeck; O’Neil, xi).

8. Despite being one of the “more important open market regions in the world and a crucial
provider of energy, minerals, and food”, Latin America’s ties to the United States were also
characterized by channels of black-market drug trade and immigration (O’Neil, 5, xi, 9). Latin
America was not only the US’s biggest supplier of oil, but was also first in exporting illegal
drugs and as the physical and cultural homeland of millions of Hispanic and Lusophone
immigrants and American citizens. Latin America’s proximity to and “remarkable
interconnectedness” with the United States was and continues to be a major determinant of the
US racial makeup, with Latinx people accounting for 50% of recent US population growth and
15% of the present-day US population (O’Neil, 6; ). As a source of a growing portion of the
American electorate, Latin America is not solely something that should remain within its
diaspora’s daily lives and concerns, but as a priority of American policy and foreign relations-
something that the US government understood well even during the initial reaction to the Haitian
crisis.
Haiti’s position amongst this is also notable, given the US’s historic view on it as a
“counterbalance to Communist Cuba”, as well as its potential as a trading partner and actor in the drug
trade (Easterly, 330-331). As a smaller, nonnuclear nation lacking deep-seated democratic values, it
posed a far more minimal potential of counterbalancing American interests than, say, India, Israel, or
Russia (Rotberg, 137). Despite this lack, the potential of democratic development in Haiti was also a
well-needed and accessible piece in the puzzle of positive hemispheric relations. President Clinton’s
statement under the Duvalier regime that “no national security issue is more urgent than securing
democracy’s triumph around the world” echoes the sentiments of democratic peace theorists, who assert
that democracies are not only less militaristic than otherwise authoritarian states, but also hold especially
pacific and friendly relations amongst each other (Smith, 39-40); . The promise of long-term democratic

9. growth based on post-earthquake stability brought on by the US holds the potential to not only serve
American commercial and security interests through increased multilateral cooperation, but also the
development of a community of feeling that could rival the EU (Smith, 42). With the added element of a
Haitian diaspora tying the two, this seems especially prospective (Dewan). An additional statement by
President Clinton expands on this idea furthermore:
"Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and stabilize our
region, and more likely to create free markets and economic opportunity to become
strong, reliable trading partners, and they’re more likely to provide their own people
with the opportunities that will encourage them to stay in their nations and to build
their own futures.” (Smith, 42)
In closing, the clarity of Haiti’s strategic importance is certainly not something that
should be overlooked in favor of narratives of altruism. The United States’s attempt to restore
legacies of diplomatic cooperation and balance cultural merging brought on by the history of its
relations with Latin America, with Haiti as a nonhostile vehicle, is not only indicative of the need
to reinvent humanitarian considerations within academia, but of political capacity to exploit
opportunistic disasters to manifest broader economic and international benefits. By no means is
this to invalidate the potential of a humanitarian agenda- be it one in 2010 or presently- but
rather to offer broader considerations of security in cases not broadly characterized under that
umbrella; it must be understood that both interact throughout the processing of the interests of
the American state. To reiterate, humanitarian engagement is rarely ever a production of mere
emotion, but rather the amassment and application of capital ad resources that, in cases such as
that in Haiti, remain in circulation and greatly expand throughout the years. The fact that the
United States managed to retain this social agenda sector within the context of a history of

10. acceptance of and cooperation with influencing a separate state provides potential for strategic
option-building during a period of declining US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
The development of Donald Trump’s “America First” policy reflects the bare setting of
this consideration, voiding the narrative of international benevolence and obligation the Obama
administration based its intervention on (Ferrarelo). Through the removal of niceties and
enforcement of self-interest as the driving force in US foreign policy, the current president
exemplifies (or, to the very least, publicly idealizes) a more precautionary approach to aid and
development abroad. Perhaps the best mechanism in comparison between the present and past
executives can be quantified in dollars, whether through the 13.9% decrease in the foreign aid
budget between 2016 and 2017 alone or in Trump’s push for reducing it further by 37% (Bearak,
Brookings, Reuters). More specifically to Haiti, whereas the year of the earthquake saw a 259%
increase in American governmental assistance to the nation than was provided in 2009, every
year since 2010 (2011-2017) has seen an average drop of ~24.76% in contributions, with a
yearly average of $416.14 million (236% less than the immediate post-earthquake budget)
(USAID, Index Mundi). With the present Haitian aid budget at $251 million dollars we now have
($1.149 billion dollars less than in 2010) being administered to a nation that, despite the recent 8-
year anniversary of the earthquake, remains the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere
(USAID). With Hurricane Sandy in 2012, a three-year drought, the UN-induced cholera crisis,
and the deaths of over a thousand people after the 2016 Hurricane Matthew, post-earthquake
Haiti remains in a consistent state of crisis and rebuilding (Cook).
With the “worldwide weakening of US influence” of the 21st century, reflected in the rise
of the Chinese economy (and recent improvement of Sino-Latin America relations), and the
“securitization of important aspects of US foreign policy which distorted and burdened” its

11. relationship with its Southern counterparts, the United States seems to have become less
important in the world economy and therefore earning lesser deference, “generally and in
bilateral relations” (Domínguez, 10, 14). Humanitarian storytelling or not, what is certain is that,
in the end, Haiti’s role as a fortifier of US-Latin American relations- ad therefore American
calculations of its potentiality for US interests- did not prove successful.
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