This document provides background information on the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom. It summarizes that the Argentinian military junta, led by Leopoldo Galtieri, invaded the Falkland Islands in an attempt to resolve a longstanding territorial dispute with the UK. The invasion was likely an example of a diversionary war, where a government initiates an external conflict to distract from domestic unrest. Argentina's economy had collapsed, leading to widespread protests against the junta regime. Facing few viable policy options, the invasion was meant to rally nationalist sentiment and unite Argentines behind the government.

1. Jesse Shikiar
Political Science 407
Research Paper
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Argentina was responsible for a direct invasion of the Falkland Islands in an
effort to resolve a longstanding dispute with the United Kingdom over the territory’s ownership.
Thus, the Falklands War was born. The Falklands War was a ten-week war fought between
Argentina and the United Kingdom in which 649 Argentine and 255 British soldiers were killed.1
The main actors on the Argentinian side were the junta, a military dictatorship, and more
specifically, Leopoldo Galtieri, the dictator responsible for the deployment of Argentinian forces
into the sovereign islands. Argentina’s military junta claimed that it held sovereignty over the
islands since they inherited them from Spain in 1800. The United Kingdom however, had legally
ruled the islands since 1830 according to international treaty law. 2
Margaret Thatcher was the
Prime Minister of the UK in 1982, and vehemently condemned the Argentinian attack. She
claimed that the citizens of the islands were of British tradition and stock, and as a result, a
British naval force was sent to the South Atlantic to reclaim them. The century long battle over
the sovereignty of the islands is a good precursor to some of the questions surrounding how the
war began. Why, given the long period of time that the islands had been disputed, did Galtieri
decide to invade on the eve of his country’s economic collapse? Was it just a coincidence or did
Galtieri use the islands to save his image and gain reelection?
In most modern political science literature, the Falklands War represents the clearest
example of a diversionary war. Diversionary war theory is simply an explanation for the
outbreak of a war or conflict. It contends that a leader will start a conflict abroad in order to
1
Hickman, Kennedy. "The Falklands War: An Overview."
2
TAQUINI, ALBERTO C. "A History of the Falkland Islands." Nature. 297.5866 (1982): 450-450. Print.

2. instill a sense of nationalism in its constituency when there is domestic unrest. The foreign
policy maneuver will then distract the population away from the problems of the regime. In
essence, it will “divert” the public away from the problems at home because war tends to have
the ability to unite a country under a single cause. This is sometimes referred to as the “rally
around the flag effect”. It is theorized that Argentina’s invasion of these islands was the junta’s
(Argentinian military regime) way of addressing the problems underlying their regime’s poor
socio-economic status. In this essay, I will recount the history that underlies the Junta’s regime
and seek to explain why, when given a number of different possible solutions, states choose to
pursue a diversionary conflict. Not only will I discuss the correlation between domestic issues
and the use of an aggressive foreign policy abroad, but I will also explain why the Argentinian
government decided to forgo other options in exchange for a diversion. I will explore the ways in
which other countries made diversionary war the most likely option for the Junta and conclude
that based on the assumptions of diversionary war and the corresponding evidence; the Falklands
War is a well-tested example of this theory.
ASSUMPTIONS AND VARIABLES OF DIVERSIONARY WAR THEORY
There are a number of important assumptions about diversionary war theory. These
assumptions allow us to compare specific cases of war with theories about their cause. If
diversionary foreign policy is to be the true cause of a war, we must assume that political leaders
are intent on maintaining enough power to access resources that allow them to influence their
state with policy. Inevitably, leaders will pursue policies that put them in conflict with their
constituency. This creates a scenario in which internal opposition can force a leader out of
power. Therefore, leaders are assumed to enact policies that are popular and fair so that the
constituency remains happy. 3
Sensible leaders make choices that will keep them in power and
3
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson (1995). War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime

3. create a positive image for the regime. However, these choices do not always have a progressive
effect on the state. When poor social and economic policies are enacted, people begin to rebel
and oppose the rule of the current leadership. When domestic instability grows enough, leaders
are forced to act, and are subject to a number of constraints pertaining to which solution they
choose.
When faced with unavoidable domestic strife, a government is assumed as having a
couple of options to appease the public with. For my analysis, I assume that in order to address
domestic unrest a government must either repress the opposition, reform their internal structure,
launch a diversionary conflict, or rely on other states and institutions to aid in the process of
rebuilding. This is called a policy alternatives explanation, which will allow me draw on much of
the research that Amy Oakes has committed to diversionary war theory. 4
How a state determines
what solution to use entirely depends on which one is the most efficient and easily accessible.
For diversionary theory to be true, a state must not only launch a foreign policy endeavor, but
they must do so after all other options prove to be less efficient. In the Falklands War, I will
explain how the junta operated under this assumption and chose to pursue a diversion because it
was their most efficient and readily accessible plan.
Evaluating certain external variables within a nation can make theories dynamic and
applicable to a variety of circumstances. One causal variable that is important in comparing the
Falklands War with diversionary theory is what Amy Oakes refers to as “state extractive
capacity”. This is the idea that there is variation in how leaders can react to domestic problems
based on their ability to “extract” the necessary resources that can solve those problems. State
extractive capacity measures how easy it is for a government to use its country’s resources to
Types and Political Accountability. American Political Science Review, 89, pp 841-855.
4
Oakes, Amy. “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands.” Security Studies Number 3. (2006): 432-463. Print

4. solve crises. When domestic problems are abundant, the ability of a state to enact reformist
policies relies primarily on the resources that the state can “extract” from its own system. 5
Strong governments are able to extract resources that allow them to solve domestic instability,
while weak governments cannot. Weak governments are plagued by unrest. This means they
cannot access the necessary economic, civil, and military resources to solve their state’s
problems internally. Later on, I will discuss how the junta’s low capacity to gather economic
resources made diversionary foreign policy a very enticing political option.
One final variable that must be evaluated is a state’s image internationally. This is
important in determining whether or not a state decides to pursue foreign aid to solve their
internal issues. If the government of a state presents an image of immorality or corruptness, then
that state is less likely to receive foreign aid from rich democratized countries such as the United
States. In the face of domestic unrest, action must be taken. I assume that having a bad image
abroad constrains the decision making of states that seek to take such action when domestic
instability arises. Before the Falklands War, the image that the junta portrayed internationally
disallowed them from pursing foreign aid, which meant a greater focus on using foreign policy
as a solution.
EXPECTATION OF THE TEST
If the Falklands War provides evidence of diversionary foreign policy, then the
assumptions and variables must make it so. We must expect to see a society in which the
economic state is so critical that the government is forced to take action or forfeit to total
rebellion. If diversionary theory is applicable to the Falklands War, then we will have an
Argentinian government with four choices: reform, repress, approach allies for aid, or divert with
foreign policy. The weak ability of the government to access its resources will likely constrain
5
Oakes, Amy. "Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands." Security Studies Number.3 (2006): 437. Print.

5. the Argentinian junta’s decision making and eliminate reform and repression as viable solutions.
All other assumptions holding true, we will expect Galtieri to implement diversionary foreign
policy to rally the public’s support for the regime. We will also expect to observe that the
immoral image that the junta regime acquired due to their human rights atrocities, disallowed
external help from being a valid solution. We will expect to see that Galtieri perceived to gain a
quick and decisive victory with a target that was geographically close to Argentina, and far from
the UK. Diversionary war eliminates some of the pressure exerted on the government by the
people and distracts them from the shortcomings of their respective leadership.
THE EVIDENCE
Galtieri claimed power at a time when Argentina’s economy and citizens were
completely demoralized. By 1981, over 45 banks and other economic institutions had filed for
bankruptcy. The junta tried to implement numerous economic policies centered on devaluing the
currency but this only heightened inflation and plunged Argentina into a deeper crisis.6
Unions
publicly denounced the government and went on strike, while businesses detested the junta’s
economic plans that were ruining their ability to survive independently. The Catholic Church
revoked the rule of the junta in favor of democratic ideals, which established an even deeper
chasm between the people and its rulers. Families publicly protested about their missing children
and demanded better economic benefits. With the spread of media coverage and the ability of
information to travel quickly, foreign nations, other countries, and NGOs all began to expose the
junta regime. They were no longer insulated from domestic pressures. Soon enough, former
political parties gathered steam and reorganized their efforts into effective opposition that the
government could no longer ignore. They had to make a choice: force against the people,
6
Kaminsky, Graciela, Amine Mati, and Nada Choueiri. "Thirty Years of Currency Crises in Argentina: External Shocks or Domestic
Fragility?"Economia 10.1 (2009): 81-123.

6. immense structural reform, attempts at foreign aid or diversionary foreign policy to reignite
support for the government.
ASK FOR HELP?
In the decade leading up the Falklands War, the Argentinian government failed to create
an economic and social structure that was trusted by the international community. The lack of
structured leadership for so many years fragmented the political system. In 1976, the military
began to formally exercise power through a “junta” (military dictatorship), up through the
Falklands War. The junta referred to their agenda as the “National Reorganization Process”. It
marked the beginning of a period of Argentinian history known as the “Dirty War” in which the
junta oppressed political opponents through force and violence. They closed the National
Congress, imposed censorship on all aspects of society, and banned trade unions. Throughout the
country, military style detention camps were set up for opponents of the regime, where hundreds
of people were persecuted, killed, or just “disappeared”. With growing evidence of civil rights
violations and humanitarian crimes (estimates say about 30,000 people died during this time
period),7
the junta’s image deteriorated internationally. This damaged their ability to pursue
foreign resources for help. Not even the United States, with whom Galtieri had built an anti-
communist relationship with, would prove to offer the Argentines any help before they pursued
the Falkland Islands. This shows how much image matters in international politics, an idea that
is still evident in today’s world. For example, the Obama Administration has made it their goal to
avoid supplying resources to immoral regimes like North Korea and Russia. However, Congress
recently signed off on a one billion dollar deal that will provide Ukraine with resources to defend
its sovereignty. Their positive image and promotion of non-authoritarian ideals incentivized the
7
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. "Dirty War." Britannica. N.p., 27 Feb. 2013. Web. 30 May 2014.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/165129/Dirty-War>.

7. US to outfit them with a steady supply of resources. To the contrary, Argentina’s well-known
human rights crimes did not dictate that same response because no powerful country wants to
appease a state that is killing its own people. Thus, the image of the Argentinian government
ended up eliminating the foreign resources available to the junta.
REFORM OR REPRESS?
In evaluating why diversionary foreign policy was the best option for the junta, it is
necessary to analyze the potential for the junta to reform or repress in 1982. As stated above, the
use of diversionary policy hinges upon the ability or inability of a state to access its resources to
solve domestic problems (state extractive capacity). The Argentinian economy was devastated by
years of economic neglect. When Galtieri took power, he needed money for the government so
he borrowed relentlessly by selling publicly owned businesses and taking out loans. Galtieri
thought privatization would save the economy in the short run and restore the public’s trust in his
regime. However, the junta’s aggressive spending plunged the country into a 40 billion dollar
debt, half of which was to be owed by 1983, the year after the Falklands War. With money
losing value daily, the government lost its access to resources that were important in restoring
higher wages and better working conditions. A lack of economic resources also meant that
Galtieri couldn’t establish institutional tools such as a temporary army or political surveillance
that would allow further repression of public discontent. In “A History of Argentina in the
Twentieth Century, Luis Romero describes the government as being unable to adequately
distribute its resources to things like education and the public health sector. A lack of enough
resources, whether financial or material, eliminated the possibility for Galtieri to engage in
reform or repression, both of which required immense amounts of money and material capital to
achieve. 8
He also couldn’t campaign for new policy or promise the people structural economic
8
Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2002. 256-57. Print.

8. change because the junta didn’t have the means to do it. Galtieri was quoted as saying in his
inaugural speech that “the time for words and promises is gone… I also know that words have
lost their force and power to persuade.” When a government has resources to work with, they can
provide the public with credible promises of change. With no money left, and no time to institute
change, reform and repression became inadequate options.
THE ROLE OF BRITAIN AND NATIONALISM
Outside nations also played a role in creating an environment in which Galtieri could
successfully use a diversionary foreign policy. The junta was entirely convinced that an unstable
British regime under the rule of Margaret Thatcher would provide a swift and decisive victory.
Diversionary foreign policy is only resorted to after cost benefit analysis is used to predict a
successful outcome of the provoked conflict. In 1981, Britain confirmed a plan to withdraw one
of its military patrol vessels, HMS Endurance from the waters near the Falkland Islands and
announced that budget cuts would force the closure of a key military sea base near the coast of
Argentina. A decreased British presence in the South Atlantic made an attack on the Falkland
Islands a much more enticing option to the junta.9
It also gave them a window of opportunity to
save their status as a government and so they launched a diversionary attack that they assumed to
be an easy victory. “As a representative of the Argentine navy said a few days prior to the
invasion, “We can’t stand more than 15 days of combat, let alone think of war”. 10
The
Argentines simply did not have the resources to fight anything more then a quick easy takeover
of the islands. At the same time, Galtieri told US Secretary of State Alexander Haig that “[the
junta] cannot sacrifice [their] honor… you will understand that the Argentinian government has
9
Bratton, Patrick, and Wallace Thies. "When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the
Falkland War."Comparative Strategy 30.1 (2011): 1-27. Taylor and Francis Online. Web. 1 June 2014.
10
Cardoso, Oscar R., R. Kirschbaum, and E. Van Der Kooy. Falklands, the Secret Plot. East Molesey, Surrey, UK: Preston Editions, 1987. 97.
Print.

9. to look good too.”11
Galtieri is referring to his war efforts as being propagated by the need for the
government to look good both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, after the war Galtieri
was quoted in an interview as stating: “Why should a country situated in the heart of Europe care
so much for some islands located far away in the Atlantic Ocean; in addition, islands which do
not serve any national interest? It seems senseless to me.” This hints at the fact that Galtieri is
downplaying the threat of a British response, hoping to arouse a sense of confidence and
nationalist sentiment in his own country over something he thinks historically belongs to
Argentina.
Convincing the Argentine citizens that the Falklands War would be an easy victory was a
way of increasing support for the military. If the military looked good, so too would the
militaristic dictatorship that the Galtieri led. The distinct point here is the relationship between
Galtieri’s military and Galtieri’s regime. The interconnectivity between the two is evidence that
diversionary war theory can be applied because both would benefit in the event of an easy
victory in the Falkland Islands. Galtieri himself admits to encouraging nationalism by promising
that Argentina would wage a battle if Britain retaliated, even though Argentina did not have the
necessary resources to do so. 12
His inflation of Argentinian military prowess displays the
intentions of enhancing nationalism throughout the country, a key assumption of diversionary
war theory. He wanted to glorify the military because it would make him and his administration
look stronger and more apt to handle the domestic internal problems at home.
COUNTEREVIDENCE
A number of different political scientists have proposed evidence that the Falklands War
11
Payne, Keith B. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: U of Kentucky, 2001. 56. Print.
12
Oakes, Amy. "Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands." Security Studies Number.3 (2006): 445-
446. Print.

10. was nothing more then a play out of realist assumptions about power. They argue that Galtieri’s
decision to invade the islands was motivated out of his desire to achieve dominance in the
region. Evidence for this is centered on what historians refer to as the Beagle Dispute. This
conflict revolved around the possession of a couple of islands that are key in maintaining power
in the South Atlantic. The islands are key in controlling the Beagle Channel, one of only three
waterways between the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. Given the devastated Argentinian
economy, an invasion of the Falklands could provide an increase in trade and subsequent socio-
economic growth. The threat of losing control of the islands theoretically would have motivated
an invasion of the Falklands because that would maintain the balance of power in the region.
Although this is a compelling argument, there is less then adequate empirical evidence to
support this theory. The Vatican monitored the conflict over the islands off of the coast of Chile,
and if this argument holds true, they would have had to be okay with an unprovoked attack on
sovereign territory without any repercussions. Furthermore, the argument holds that if the junta
did not invade the Falkland Islands then they wouldn’t be able to quell a possible British-Chilean
alliance over shipping routes in the South Atlantic. However, this is somewhat untrue because
prior to the Falklands War, the British significantly reduced their naval presence in the South
Atlantic, which shows that they were not pursuing an aggressive alliance with any South
American state. Their removal from the South Atlantic actually prompted an attack on the
Falkland Islands. Britain became increasingly disinterested in matters south of the equator,
which contradicts the argument that Argentina was attempting to balance against future alliances.
CONCLUSION
In 1982, Argentina launched an attack on a group of islands that was perceived to be an

11. easy military victory in the South Atlantic. They did so as hundreds of thousands of Argentinian
citizens protested the oppressive, often violent rule of the military dictatorship known as the
junta. In order to avoid complete, utter rebellion by the state of Argentina, the junta had to make
a choice to maintain their reelection and credibility as state leaders. The poor economic state of
Argentina eliminated important resource that the junta would have been able to use if they chose
to restructure under a different set of policies. The brink of complete economic failure and
violent rebellion hindered Galtieri’s to repress his people further. He did not have an army to do
so, nor was it feasible that he had the resources to physically stop such a massive opposition. The
weakening of a British presence in the South Atlantic was the last piece of the puzzle that
Galtieri analyzed before could finalize his plan to attack the Falkland Islands purely out of the
interests of his regime.
When testing if diversionary war is applicable to the Falklands War it is necessary to
theorize about the choices that a government faces when dealing with the domestic unrest that
triggers the decision in the first place. Specifying the key assumptions of diversionary theory and
evaluating the variables that affect a state’s decision making allow us to build a case Argentina’s
invasion of the Falkland Islands was a result of diversionary foreign policy. The lack of
economic resources, a flawed international reputation, and the environment created by other
states, forced the junta to launch a diversionary attack to assert its strength in foreign policy. An
array of supportive evidence and of a lack of proof for key counterevidence allows one to
rationally theorize that the Falklands War is an example of diversionary foreign policy.
Works Cited

12. 1. Hickman, Kennedy. "The Falklands War: An Overview." Militaryhistory.about. About.com, n.d. Web. 01 June 2014.
<http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/falklands.htm>.
2. TAQUINI, ALBERTO C. "A History of the Falkland Islands." Nature. 297.5866 (1982): 450-450. Print.
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson (1995). War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A
Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. American Political Science Review, 89,
pp 841-855.
4. Oakes, Amy. “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands.” Security Studies Number
3. (2006): 432-463. Print
5. Oakes, Amy. "Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands." Security
Studies Number.3 (2006): 437. Print.
6. Kaminsky, Graciela, Amine Mati, and Nada Choueiri. "Thirty Years of Currency Crises in Argentina:
External Shocks or Domestic Fragility?"Economia 10.1 (2009): 81-123.
7. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. "Dirty War." Britannica. N.p., 27 Feb. 2013. Web. 30 May 2014.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/165129/Dirty-War>.
8. Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State UP, 2002. 256-57. Print.
9. Bratton, Patrick, and Wallace Thies. "When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces
Argentina during the Falkland War."Comparative Strategy 30.1 (2011): 1-27. Taylor and Francis Online.
Web. 1 June 2014.
10. Cardoso, Oscar R., R. Kirschbaum, and E. Van Der Kooy. Falklands, the Secret Plot. East Molesey, Surrey,
UK: Preston Editions, 1987. 97. Print.
11. Payne, Keith B. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: U of Kentucky,
2001. 56. Print.
12. Oakes, Amy. "Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands." Security
Studies Number.3 (2006): 445-446. Print.