The document analyzes U.S.-Syrian political relations following the Iraq War. It discusses how the war impaired Syria politically and economically. Bashar al-Assad's leadership complicated Syria's response, as he opposed the U.S. but also cooperated at times to avoid conflict. The relationship remains complex, as Syria balances fears of U.S. influence in the region with the desire to participate in the international community. Future cooperation on Iraq may improve ties, if internal Syrian politics allow for more constructive engagement.

1. U.S. and Syrian Political Relations Post
Iraq War
Kristina Console
Politics 120-International Relations
Professor Hisham H. Ahmed
March 20, 2007

2. 1.)
It is a well-documented fact within the political sphere that United States and
Syrian relations, throughout history, have been unstable.1 The United States has had Syria
on its State Department list of terror-sponsoring nations since its’ drafting in 1979.2 Not
surprisingly, terror is only a fraction of the concerns the United States experiences with
regard to Syria. Syria’s blatant aversion for Israel, a nation whom receives strong support
from the United States, only furthers the strain between the United States and Syria. These
two nations, although objectionable toward one another, have remained relatively peaceful
over time. As to be expected, the United States’ recent war in Iraq has changed the
atmosphere between the two nations considerably. The specifics surrounding the war have
not only impaired Syria politically, but economically as well. Consequently, there have
been a multitude of emotions between the United States and Syria that stem from their
individual stakes in the war. Thus far, the Iraq war has heightened unfavorable
circumstances amongst the two nations, thereby elevating the possibility of devastating
future conflict.
Directly before the United States invasion of Iraq, Syria’s president passed and was
succeeded by his son, Bashar al Assad. Bashar is an example of an “individual influence”3
that shaped his country’s policies toward the war and the United States itself. Bashar, being
a new leader, and a young one at that, had to prove himself capable of fulfilling the duties
required of a formidable leader. Unfortunately he was

3. 2.)
viewed as “devoid of any experience, leadership skills, or charisma, and furthermore, he
lacked any vision of the direction in which he wanted to lead Syria.”4 In fact, his
personal confusion on these matters shaped the way in which Syria responded politically
within its own neighboring countries and abroad. For instance, when the United States was
preparing the attack on Saddam in 2002, Syria, under the direct control of Bashar, adopted
a “staunch anti-American stance.”5 Syria’s government was so opposed to this act that they
accused Washington of having a “hidden agenda” and a desire to create a “new American
order in the Middle East for itself and on behalf of Israel.”6 During this period, Syrian
leaders were unaware, if not in disbelief, of the possible defeat of Saddam’s regime.
Looking after their own national interests and neighboring states was appropriate during
this time. Not to mention, the differing political, religious, and economic groups that
makeup Syria were all demanding of Bashar’s attention. With this in mind, it’s no wonder
he had to adapt to the change that was inevitably taking place amongst the Middle East.
Strong pressure from the United States thereafter required Syria’s assistance in the “war on
terror”. The first example of this is Syria’s swift shift from anti-American rhetoric to
cooperation in capturing and revealing known terrorists within its borders. The once fierce
critic of the war was now aiding the United States; or was it?

4. 3.)
Obviously Syria realized the potential danger the United States posed after the
collapse of Saddam’s regime. Is it possible they were protecting themselves from a future
United States attack? This assumption seems sensible when Syria’s relationship with the
United States is examined after the events that brought down Saddam. Syria began to
cooperate with the United States just enough to prevent a hostile response within its own
borders and among Washington. Syria continued to play “cat and mouse”7 with the
Americans. On one hand, Syria avoided meeting basic United States demands on Iraq
issues; on the other, they announced they would increase forces along the border to prevent
terrorist movement between countries, thereby appeasing the United States.8 This was an
interesting development on Syria’s part. President Bush made a statement after the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September Eleventh stating, “You’re either with us, or
against us.” If that’s the case, then where does Syria stand? Their flip-flop behavior seems
questionable. Then again, upon further examination it becomes obvious why a complete
adoption of United States policy would prove extremely difficult for Syria. Syria’s
geographical location is one key to the problem. The geopolitics surrounding Syria are dire.
Syria borders Iraq and has its close ties within the Middle East, not the United States;
which would explain why they originally supported Iraq over the United States. However,
once Iraq was taken over, Syria recognized the new dilemma. Syria began to publicly
support the United States war against terror by denouncing the attacks on America and
offering assistance in United States efforts to

5. 4.)
apprehend those responsible for terror.9 The American officials, at this time, were quoted as
saying that the information provided by Syria had helped prevent attacks on American
targets in the Gulf, thereby saving American lives.10 Yet Syria’s assistance wavered when
they “turned a blind eye”11 towards the presence of Bin Laden activists within its borders,
among others. Furthermore, Syria continued to strengthen its relationship with North
Korea, Iran, and Hezbollah; nations and groups that President Bush described as the “Axis
of Evil”. In maintaining their continued wish-washy behavior toward the United States,
Syria’s Vice President Abd-Halim Khaddam, warned that:
“The American attack on Iraq is designed to bring about the partition of that country,
which is a strategic objective of Israel’s. In fact, it is part of the long-standing Zionist aim
of breaking up the national fabric of the countries of the region……we are defending Iraq,
which is an Arab country, and the fate of all the Arabs is bound up with its fate.”12
The Syrian government, through many contexts including this one, continually mentions
their national identity as Arabs. This is a key to understanding the difficulty, as previously
mentioned, in identifying with the United States. Bashar himself stated that the United
States ‘is interested only in gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the map of the
region in keeping with its worldview……Bush does not understand that for the Arabs
honor is more important than anything else, even food.”13 It’s apparent that one level of
analysis that springs from Syrian statements is that of an “internal” influence.14 The cultural
perspective of the Syrian people means a great deal to them, which might facilitate an
explanation regarding Syria’s diffident attitude toward the United States involvement in the
Middle East.

6. 5.)
An important dynamic within the examination of Syria’s approach toward the
United States is the deep-rooted belief in American imperialism abroad. In general, the
Superpower status the United States holds, both economically and militarily, throughout
the Middle East is massive. This is not a new phenomenon; United States involvement in
foreign affairs have been rampant throughout time. This has been so much the case in
history that many nations are hesitant in dealing with the United States, if not fearful of a
backlash. As evidence of this fear abroad, Syria stood alone against the United States
when Iraq was invaded. In effect, this stance heightened tensions between Syria and its
neighboring states. Syria was seeking out support within the inter-Arab arena to counteract
Washington. Damascus was clearly infuriated with the “pro-American stand that Arab
states, including Egypt, had adopted, or more correctly with the position of passive
bystander that many had adopted.”15 This, in effect, caused a negative ripple among these
nations. At the March 2003 Arab Summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Bashar’s potent speech was
“notable for the accusing finger he pointed at those Arab states that were not lending Iraq
their support but preferred to remain as uninvolved onlookers.”16 This fear by Syria, as
previously noted, comes from the possibility of the United States stripping them of their
devout Arab culture, not to mention the imperialistic undertones of United States actions.
At one point, Syria’s minister of information, ‘Adnan ‘Umran proclaimed, “Involvement of
Americans in the domestic

7. 6.)
affairs of the Arab countries are reminiscent of the colonial period, and if Washington
could, it would bring us all back to that period.”17 Syrian political leaders are constantly
making sharp contrasts between American and Arab ideologies, as witnessed in the
previous exchange. They see America as the shallow, self-righteous, power hungry country
with the aim of conquering and occupying the Middle East; both physically and politically.
This is a commonsensical fear given the track record of the United States; it also plays into
the imperialism of the United States as a whole. In the current state it’s in, the United
States has hegemonic dominance over a large part of these smaller countries. From a
rational perspective, Syria knows where their boundaries lie with regard to the United
States. Syria may desire to be rid of the United States ideologically and for the preservation
of their culture, but for their national security, they must arrive at a middle ground.
The United States must also oversee its own welfare. Since the attacks on
September Eleventh, the United States underwent a change of massive proportions to
secure itself from further terrorist attacks. This obviously includes keeping a sharp eye on
the Middle East as a whole, in particular those nations who support terrorist activities and
organizations. Fortunately for the United States, its hegemony over parts of the world make
it better equipped to do so. Accordingly, there is bound to be uproar within these countries
being monitored; especially if the United States is an unfavorable bedfellow to
7.)

8. many of them. The United States “rare confluence of military, economic, and cultural
power gives it what might appear to be an extraordinary ability to shape the
global future to its will.18 This is precisely why America’s position of power is resented by
many and is seen as an empire.19 In turn, it is difficult to acquire support on issues; global
terrorism specifically, under this opinion. Consequently, this “naked exercise of power
infuriates the rest of the world.”20 Unfortunately in Syria’s case, the United States has a
real, relevant stake in seeing them make peace with Israel, combat terrorism, and assist in
the future stability of Iraq. There are two sides to the issue, and it is an intricate, complex
relationship that must work to better both nations. The events that unfold in Iraq are the key
to building a sustainable rapport between the United States and Syria. Optimistically, we
will see a shift in relations once the two nations begin to cooperate vis-à-vis the future of
Iraq.
The United States overthrow of Baghdad shocked Syria. Syrian television, in
rejection, refused to cover the vivid images of Saddam’s statue toppling to the ground. Yet,
despite Syria’s defiance and announcement that it would not “cooperate with any pro-
Western regime established in Baghdad,”21 it also had to take into account the significance
this act would have on their own interests.22 Many believe that there are three reasons for
Bashar’s anti-American stance: First, he was in the mind-set that Syria was the next target
of the United States, Second, Bashar was desperate to position himself in a positive light in
front of his public and Arabs in general, and Third, he did not expect
8.)

9. such a swift American victory in Iraq.23 In any event, Syria is still back and forth on United
States requests and communications. As one Middle East expert put
it, “Syrians have a history of playing both ends of the fence, being constructive in one area
and being the furthest from constructive in another area.”24 Just recently, Syria and Iran’s
ministers of defense signed an agreement that represented military cooperation regarding
“common threats presented by Israel and the United States.”25 It seems as though Syria
feels, once again, that the United States poses a real threat to them and is desperately trying
to build relations within its region. At some point, hopefully Syria will work with the
United States in a constructive way toward the stabilization of Iraq. Syria has taken steps to
gain ground in Iraq by maintaining dialogue with the Iraqi political scene.26 On this end, the
White House National Security Council spokesman pushed that “Syria needs to now
demonstrate that it is committed to constructive engagement and fostering an Iraq that can
govern, sustain and defend itself.”27 Besides, Syria recognizes the need to maintain a
relationship and have an opinion on the new Iraqi government. This may indeed be the
connection Syria can use to foster relationships within the Middle East, as opposed to the
isolationist status it’s had for quite some time. Likewise, the United States is in no rush to
battle Syria. Syria is extremely important to the United States because “it can be a force for
either stability or instability in an extremely volatile region.”28 Syria and the Unites States’
conflicting worldviews make it increasingly difficult to see eye to eye. Furthermore, Syrian
policy continues to fluctuate between fear
9.)

10. of the United States and “the desire to integrate into the world order which the United
States leads.”29 Overall, the internal dynamics of the current Syrian regime remains a vital
aspect in United States policy toward Syria.30 Only time will tell how the relations between
the two nations will evolve; It’s my hope that some kind of understanding and/or mutual
benefit is reached.

11. 1
ENDNOTES
E
Eyal Zisser, Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard, The Middle East Quarterly, 2003
[Journal on-line]; Available from http://www.meforum.org/article/555
Mary Crane, “Middle East- U.S. Syrian Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, [Article
2
on-line]; Available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/7852/middle_east.html
3
3
Charles W. Kegley Jr., World Politics: Trends and Transformation (Belmont: Thomson
Wadsworth, 2007), 57
4
Eyal Zisser, “Syria, the United States, and Iraq-Two Years After the Downfall of Saddam
Hussein,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2005. [Article on-line];Available from http://
meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a2.html
5
Eyal Zisser, “Syria and the War in Iraq,” Middle East review of International Affairs, 2003
[Article on-line]; Available from http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue2/jv7n2a4.html
Eyal Zisser, Syria & War in Iraq
6
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
7
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
8
Eyal Zisser, Syria & War in Iraq
9
Eyal Zisser, Syria & War in Iraq
10
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
11
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
12
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
13
Charles W. Kegley Jr., World Politics, 57
14
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
15
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
16
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., Bad Habits
17
1
18
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 118

12. Charles Kegley, World Politics, 118
19
Charles Kegley, World Politics, 118
20
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
21
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
22
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
23
Steven A. Cook, “Cook: Decision to Meet With Syria, Iran ‘Positive’,” Council on Foreign
24
Relations, 28 February, 2000 [Interview on-line]; available from
http://www.cfr.org/region/414/syria.html
25
“Iraq and Syria Restore Relations,” BBC, 2006 [Article on-line]; Available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6167968.stm
Eyal Zisser, Syria & War in Iraq
26
Iraq & Syria restore Relations
27
28
Robert Rabil, “Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East,” On-line
description of book, available from http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9015
Eyal Zisser, Syria & U.S., 2 years after
29
30
Tom Raum, “Bush Presses Iran, Syria on Iraq Weapons,” The Associated Press, 2007 [Article
on-line]; Available from http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2942352&CMP=OTC-
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