This document summarizes 4 court cases related to qualifications for public office and legal practice: 1. Cayetano v. Monsod - The Supreme Court upheld the appointment of Christian Monsod as COMELEC chairman, finding that he met the 10-year law practice requirement despite not being in private practice. 2. Philippine Lawyer's Association v. Agrava - The Court found that representation before the Philippine Patent Office constitutes the practice of law, so members of the bar are qualified without further examination. 3. People of the Philippines v. Villanueva - The Court affirmed that a city attorney could represent a complainant in a single criminal case as a private prosecutor without violating rules against private

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1. Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, September3, 1991
Facts:
RespondentChristian Monsodwas nominatedby President Corazon C. Aquinoto the positionofChairman oftheCOMELEC ina letter received bytheSecretariat of
the Commission onAppointments onApril25, 1991. Petitioneropposedthenomination becauseallegedly Monsod does notpossess therequired qualificationof
having been engagedin the practiceoflaw for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991,theCommissionon Appointments confirmedthenomination ofMonsodas ChairmanoftheCOMELEC. On June18,19 91, hetookhis oathofoffice.
On the sameday, heassumed officeas Chairman oftheCOMELEC.
Challenging thevalidity of theconfirmation bytheCommission onAppointments ofMonsod's nomination, petitioneras a citizenand taxpayer, filedtheinstant
petitionfor certiorari and Prohibitionpraying thatsaid confirmationandtheconsequentappointmentofMonsod as Chairman oftheCommissionon Elections be
declared nulland void.
Issue: WhethertheappointmentofChairman Monsod ofComelecviolates Section 1(1), ArticleIX-C ofthe 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitutionprovides inSection 1 (1), ArticleIX-C,that there shall bea Commission on Elections composedofa Chairmanand six Commissioners whoshall
be natural-borncitizens of thePhilippines and,atthetime oftheir appointment, at least thirty-fiveyears ofage,holders ofa collegedegree, andmust not have been
candidates for any electiveposition intheimmediately preceding elections.However,a majority thereof, including theChairman, shallbemembers ofthePhilippine
Bar who havebeenengaged inthepracticeoflawfor atleasttenyears.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member ofthePhilippineBar,having passed thebarexaminations of1960with a grade of86-55%. Hehas been dues paying member of
the IntegratedBarof the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. Hehas alsobeen paying his professional licensefees as lawyer for morethan tenyears.
At this point, itmight behelpfulto define private practice.The term,as commonly understood, means "an individual ororganization engagedin the business of
delivering legal services."(Ibid.). Lawyers who practicealone areoften called "solepractitioners."Groups oflawyers arecalled"firms."Thefirm is usually a
partnershipandmembers ofthefirmarethepartners. Some firms may beorganizedas professional corporations andthemembers calledshareholders. In either
case, the members of thefirm aretheexperienced attorneys. Inmost firms, thereareyounger ormoreinexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."
Hence, theCommissionon the basis ofevidencesubmitteddoling thepublic hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined thathe possessedthe
necessary qualifications as required bylaw. Thejudgmentrendered by theCommission in theexerciseofsuch an acknowledged poweris beyondjudicial interference
except only upon a clear showing ofa grave abuse ofdiscretionamounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,only wheresuchgrave
abuse of discretion is clearlyshownshall the Courtinterferewith theCommission's judgment. In the instantcase,thereis no occasion for theexerciseoftheCourt's
corrective power, sinceno abuse, muchless a grave abuseofdiscretion,that would amountto lack or excess ofjurisdiction andwould warrant theissuanceofthe
writs prayed, for has beenclearly shown.
Besides intheleading case ofLuegov. Civil ServiceCommission, theCourt saidthat,Appointmentis anessentiallydiscretionarypower andmust beperformedby the
officer in which itis vestedaccording to his bestlights, the only condition being that the appointeeshould possess thequalifications requiredby law. Ifhedoes, then
the appointment cannot befaulted ontheground that thereare others betterqualified who shouldhave been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdomwhichonlytheappointing authority can decide.
2. Philippine Lawyer’sAssociation vs. Agrava
RespondentDirector of thePhilippine Patent Officeissued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys beforethe PhilippinePatentOffice,thesaid examinationto coverpatent law and jurisprudence and the rules ofpractice before said
office. According tosaidcircular,members ofthePhilippine Bar,engineers and other persons withsufficient scientific and technicaltraining are qualified. Petitioners
contend thatonewhohas passed thebar exams and licensed bytheSupreme Courtto practicelaw in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said
office.
On the other hand, respondentDirectormaintains that theprosecution ofpatentcases does notinvolve entirelythepractice oflaw but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training.
ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice oflaw
HELD: YES. The practiceof law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation ofapplicants, oppositor s, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement oftheir rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application ofother laws and legal principles.
Furthermore,theDirector of Patents,exercising as hedoes judicialor quasi-judicialfunctions, itis reasonable tohold thata memberofthebar, because ofhis legal
knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.
3. People ofthe Philippinesvs. Villanueva
On September 4,1959, theChiefofPoliceofAlaminos, Laguna, chargedSimplicio Villanueva with the Crime ofMalicious MischiefbeforetheJustice ofthePeace
Court ofsaidmunicipality. Said accusedwas representedby counsel de officiobutlater onreplaced bycounsel de parte.The complainant in thesamecasewas
representedby City Attorney Ariston FuleofSan PabloCity, having entered his appearanceas private prosecutor,after securing thepermissionofthe Secretary of
Justice. Thecondition of his appearanceas such, was thatevery timehewould appear at the trialofthe case, hewouldbe considered on officialleave ofabsence,
and that hewouldnotreceiveany paymentfor his services. TheappearanceofCity Attorney Fuleas privateprosecutor was questionedby thecounsel for the
accused,invoking thecase of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532,Nov. 28, 1947,whereinit was ruledthat "whenan attorney had beenappointedto the position
ofAssistantProvincialFiscalor City Fiscal andthereinqualified,by operationoflaw, heceased toengageinprivatelaw practice."Counselthen arguedthat theJP
Court in entertaining theappearance ofCity Attorney Fule in thecaseis a violationoftheaboveruling. On December 17,1960theJP issuedan order sustaining the
legality of theappearanceofCity Attorney Fule.

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Under dateof January 4, 1961,counselfor theaccusedpresented a "Motionto InhibitFiscalFulefromActing as Private Prosecutor in this Case,"this timeinvoking
Section 32, Rule27,now Sec.35,Rule138,Revised Rules ofCourt,which bars certainattorneys from practicing. Counselclaims thatCity Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. TheJPCourt ruledon the motionby upholding theright ofFuleto appearandfurtherstating that he(Fule) was not actually engagedin private law
practice.This Order was appealed to the CFIofLaguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961,thepertinent
portions of which read:
The present caseis onefor malicious mischief. There being no reservation bytheoffendedparty ofthe civil liability,the civilaction was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminalaction.The offended party had, therefore, theright tointervene in thecaseandberepresentedby a legalcounselbecauseofherinterestin the civil
liabilityof the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule127 of the Rules ofCourtprovides thatin the courtofa justice ofthepeacea party may conducthis litigation in person,with the aidofan agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, orwiththeaid ofan attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fuleappearedin the JusticeofthePeaceCourt as an agent orfriend
ofthe offended party. Itdoes not appear that hewas being paidfor his services orthat his appearancewas in a professional capacity.As Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablohe hadno control orinterventionwhatsoever intheprosecutionofcrimes committed inthemunicipality ofAlaminos,Laguna,becausetheprosecutionof
criminal cases coming fromAlaminos is handledby theOffice ofthe ProvincialFiscalandnotby theCity Attorney ofSanPablo. Therecouldbe nopossibleconflictin
the duties of AssistantCity Attorney Fuleas Assistant City Attorney ofSan Pablo and as privateprosecutor in this criminalcase.On theother hand, as a lready pointed
out, the offendedparty in this criminal casehad a rightto berepresented by an agent or a friendto protectherrights in the civil actionwhichwas impliedly instituted
together withthecriminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D.Fulemay appear beforetheJusticeofthePeace CourtofAlaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutorin this criminalcaseas an agent or a friendofthe offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal fromtheorderofthe JusticeofthePeaceCourt ofAlaminos,Laguna, allowing theappearance ofAriston D.Fuleas private prosecutoris
dismissed, without costs.
The above decisionis thesubject oftheinstant proceeding.
The appeal shouldbe dismissed, for patently being withoutmerits.Asidefrom theconsiderations advanced by the learnedtria ljudge, heretofore reproduced,and
which we consider plausible,thefallacyofthe theory ofdefensecounsel lies in his confused interpretationofSection 32ofRule127 (nowSec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules), whichprovides that"no judgeor other officialor employee ofthe superiorcourts or oftheoffice oftheSolicitor General, shallengagein private practiceas a
member of thebar or giveprofessionaladvice toclients."He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as privateprosecutor in thecasewas engaging inprivate
practice.We believethat the isolatedappearance ofCity Attorney Fuledid not constituteprivatepracticewithinthemeaning and contemplation ofthe Rules.
Practice is morethan an isolatedappearance, for it consists infrequent orcustomaryactions, a succession ofacts ofthe same kind. In other words, itis frequent
habitual exercise(Statevs. Cotner,127,p. 1, 87 Kan.864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practiceoflaw tofallwithin the prohibitionofstatutehas been interpreted as
customarily orhabitually holding one's selfout to thepublic,as customarily and demanding paymentfor suchservices (Statevs. Bryan, 4 S.E.522, 98N.C.644,647).
The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusiveas determinative ofengagement intheprivatepracticeoflaw. The following observationoftheSolicitor
Generalis noteworthy:
Essentially, theword privatepracticeoflaw implies that one must havepresented himselfto beintheactive andcontinued practice ofthelegal profession and that
his professional services areavailable to the publicfor compensation, as a source ofhis livelihoodor in considerationofhis said services.
For one thing, it has neverbeen refuted that City Attorney Fulehad beengiven permission by his immediate superior, theSecretary ofJustice, torepresent the
complainantin the caseatbar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THEFOREGOING, the decision appealedfrom shouldbe,as it is herebyaffirmed, inall respects, with costs against appellant.
4. Cui vs. Cui
This is a proving in quo warrantooriginally filed in theCourtofFirst Instance ofCebu.The office in contention is thatofAdministratorofthe Hospiciode San Jose de
Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 infavor oftheplaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui,andappealed tous by thedefendant,AntonioMa. Cui, andby theintervenor,
Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitableinstitutionestablished by the spouses Don PedroCuiand Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for thecareand support, freeofcharge,of
indigent invalids,andincapacitated and helpless persons."It acquired corporateexistenceby legislation (Act No.3239ofthe PhilippineLegislature passed27
November 1925) and endowed with extensiveproperties by thesaidspouses througha series ofdonations,principally the deed ofdonation executed on 2January
1926.
Section 2 of Act No.3239gavetheinitial management tothefounders jointly and,in caseoftheir incapacity or death, to "suchpersons as they may nominateor
designate, intheorder prescribed to them."Section2 ofthedeed ofdonation provides as follows:
Que en casode nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitimesobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo denuestra muerte
o incapacidad se hallare residiendo enla caudadde Cebu, y nuestrosobrinopoliticoDionisio Jakosalem.Si nuestro dichosobrinoMariano Cui noestuviese residiendo
entonces en la caudad deCebu, designamos en sulugara nuestro otro sobrinolegitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSEDE BARILI. Ala muerteo incapacidad deestos dos administradores,la administraciondelHOSPICIO DESAN JOSEDEBARILIpasara a una sola persona que
sera elvaron,mayor deedad, que descienda legitimainentedecualquiera denuestros sobrinos legitimos MarianoCui, Mauricio Cui, VicenteCuiy Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo deabogado, o medico, o ingenierocivil, o farmaceutico, o a falta deestos titulos, elquepaguealEstado mayorimpuesto o contribution. En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferida elvaronde mas edad descendiente dequientenia ultimamentela administracion. Cuandoabsolutamentefaltarepersona deestas
cualificaciones, la administracion delHOSPICIO DESAN JOSEDEBARILI pasara alsenor Obispo deCebu o quien sea elmayordignatario dela Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviereasientoenla cabecera deesta Provincia de Cebu, y ensu defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cuidied in 1926, andhis widowcontinued toadministerthe Hospiciountilherdeath in1929.Thereupontheadministrationpassed to MauricioCuiand
Dionisio Jakosalem. Thefirst diedon 8 May 1931and the second on 1July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son ofMauricio Cui, became the administrator.

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Thereafter, beginning in1932, a series ofcontroversies andcourt litigations ensued concerning thepositionofadministrator, to which, in sofar as they are pertinent
to the present case, referencewill bemadelater inthis decision.
PlaintiffJesus Ma. Cuiand defendantAntonioMa. Cuiare brothers, being thesons ofMariano Cui, oneofthe nephews ofthe spouses Don Pedro Cuiand Doña
Benigna Cui. On 27February 1960thethen incumbent administrator,Dr. Teodoro Cui, resignedin favor ofAntonio Ma.Cui pursuant to a "convenio"entered into
betweenthem and embodied ina notarialdocument. Thenext day,28February,AntonioMa. Cui took his oath ofoffice. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had noprior notice
ofeither the"convenio"or ofhis brother's assumption ofthe position.
Dr. Teodoro Cuidied on27 August1960; on 5September 1960 the plaintiffwrotea letter to the defendant demanding that the officebe turnedoverto him; andon
13 September 1960, the demand nothaving beencomplied with theplaintifffiledthecomplaint inthis case. Romulo Cuilater onintervened, claiming a rightto the
same office, being a grandsonofVicenteCui, another one ofthenephews mentioned bythefounders ofthe Hospicio intheirdeed ofdonation.
As betweenJesus and Antonio themain issueturns upon their respectivequalifications totheposition ofadministrator.Jesus is theolder ofthetwo and therefore
under equalcircumstances would bepreferredpursuant tosection 2 ofthedeedofdonation. However, beforethetes tofagemay be, applied the deed gives
preference totheone, among thelegitimatedescendants ofthenephews therein named,"que posea titulode abogado, o medico, o ingenierocivil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta deestos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific pointin disputeis themealing oftheterm "titulo deabogado."Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degreeofBachelor ofLaws from the University ofSantoTomas
(Class 1926) butis not a member ofthe Bar,not having passed theexaminations toqualify him as one.AntonioMa. Cui,on theotherhand,is a memberoftheBar
and althoughdisbarred by this Court on29 March1957(administrativecaseNo.141), was reinstatedby resolution promulgated on 10February 1960, about two
weeks before heassumed the positionofadministrator ofthe Hospiciode Barili.
The Court a quo,in deciding this pointin favor ofthe plaintiff, saidthat the phrase"titulode abogado,"taken alone, means thatofa full-fledgedlawyer,butthathas
used in thedeedof donationand considering thefunction or purposeoftheadministrator,it shouldnot begivena strictinterpretation buta liberalone,"and
thereforemeans a law degreeor diploma ofBachelor ofLaws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous bothby thedefendantand by theintervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken aloneor in context theterm"titulode abogado"means notmere possession ofthea cademic degreeofBachelorofLaws
but membership in theBarafter due admission thereto, qualifying onefor thepractice oflaw.In Spanish the word "titulo"is defined as "testimonies o instrumento
dado para ejercer unempleo,dignidado profesion"(Diccionario dela Lengua Española,RealAcademia Espanola, 1947 ed.,p. 1224) andtheword "abogado,"as
follows: "Perito enelderecho positivoquesededica a defender enjuicio,por escrito o depalabra, los derechos o interese s delos litigantes, y tambiena dar dictmen
sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales queseleconsultan (Id., p.5) ABachelor's degreealone, conferred by a law schooluponcompletion ofcertain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercisethelegalprofession. TheEnglishequivalentof"abogado"is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and
general signification, and has referenceto thatclass ofpersons whoareby licenseofficers ofthecourts,empoweredto appear,prosecuteand defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties,responsibilities and liabilities aredevolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdictionadmissionto theBar and tothepracticeoflawis under the authority oftheSupreme Court. According toRule 138such admission requires passing
the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificatefrom the Clerk ofCourt, this certificatebeing his licenseto practicetheprofession. The
academicdegreeof Bachelor ofLaws initselfhas littleto do withadmissionto theBar, except as evidenceofcompliance withtherequirements that an applicant to
the examinations has "successfully completed alltheprescribed courses, ina law schoolor university,officially approved by the Secretary ofEducation."For this
purpose,however,possession ofthedegree itselfis not indispensable: completion oftheprescribed courses may beshownin someother way. Indeedthereare
instances,particularly under theformerCodeofCivil Procedure, where persons who hadnot gone through any formal legal educationin collegewereallowed totake
the Bar examinations and toqualify as lawyers.(Section 14ofthat coderequired possessionof"the necessary qualifications oflearning ability.") Yet certainly it would
be incorrectto say that such persons donot possess the"titulodeabogado"becausethey lack theacademicdegreeof Bachelor ofLaws from some lawschoolor
university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili musthave establishedtheforegoing testadvisely,and providedin the deed ofdonation that ifnota lawyer, the
administratorshould bea doctor ora civilengineer or a pharmacist, in thatorder; orfailing all these, should betheonewho pays the highest taxes among those
otherwisequalified.Alawyer, first ofall, becauseunderAct No. 3239 the managers ortrustees ofthe Hospicioshall "makeregulations for thegovernment ofsaid
institution (Sec. 3,b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated anddestitutepersons ma ybe admitted to theinstitute"(Sec. 3, d);
shall seeto it thattherules and conditions promulgated for admission are not inconflict withtheprovisions oftheAct; andshall administer properties of
considerablevalue -for allofwhich work, itis to bepresumed, a working knowledge ofthelaw anda licenseto practicethe profession would be a distinctasset.
Under this particular criterion wehold thattheplaintiffis not entitled, as against the defendant, totheofficeofadministrator. Butit is arguedthat although thelatter
is a member of the Bar heis nevertheless disqualifiedby virtueofparagraph 3ofthe deed ofdonation,which provides that theadministrator may beremovedon the
ground, among others,of ineptitudein thedischargeofhis officeor lack ofevident sound moralcharacter. Referenceis madeto thefact that thedefendantwas
disbarredby this Court on 29 March1957for immorality and unprofessional conduct. Itis alsoa fact,however,that hewas reinstatedon 10February 1960, beforehe
assumed theofficeof administrator. His reinstatement is recognition ofhis moral rehabilitation,uponproofno less than thatrequired for his admission totheBar in
the first place.
Wherefore, theparties respectfullypray thattheforegoing stipulation offacts be admitted and approvedby this Honorable Court, withoutprejudice totheparties
adducing other evidenceto provetheircasenot coveredby this stipulation offacts.
Whether ornot the applicant shallbereinstatedrests toa great extentin the sound discretionofthecourt. Thecourt action willdepend,generally speaking, on
whether or not itdecides that the publicinterest in theorderly andimpartial administration ofjustice willbeconservedby theapplicant's participation therein in the
capacity of anattorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, likea candidatefor admissionto thebar, satisfy thecourt thatheis a personofgood moral
character - a fit and proper personto practicelaw.The courtwill takeinto considerationtheapplicant's character and standing prior tothedisbarment, thenature
and character of thecharge for which hewas disbarred, his conductsubsequentto the disbarment,andthetimethat has elapsed between the disbarment andthe
application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur.,Sec.301, p.443)
Evidence of reformation is required beforeapplicant is entitled toreinstatement,notwithstanding theattorney has receiveda pardon following his conviction,a nd
the requirements for reinstatementhavebeen held to bethesameas for original admission to the bar, exceptthat the court may requirea greater degree ofproof
than in an originaladmission. (7 C.J.S.,Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

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The decisivequestions onanapplication for reinstatementarewhether applicantis "ofgood moralcharacter"in thesensein whichthatphraseis usedwhen applied
to attorneys-at-law andis a fit andproperperson tobe entrusted withtheprivileges oftheofficeofanattorney, and whether his mentalqualifications aresuchas to
enablehimto dischargeefficientlyhis duty to the public, and themoralattributes areto beregarded as a separateand distinctfrom his mental qualifications.(7
C.J.S., Attorney &Client,Sec.41, p. 816).
As far as moralcharacter is concerned, thestandard requiredofone seeking reinstatementto the office ofattorney cannot beless exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3of the deed of donation as a requisite for the officewhich is disputed inthis case. Whenthedefendant was restoredto theroll oflawyers therestrictions
and disabilities resulting fromhis previous disbarment werewipedout.
This action must fail ononeother ground: itis already barred bylapseoftimeamounting theprescriptionor laches.Under Section16ofRule66(formerly sec.16,
Rule 68, taken fromsection216 ofAct 190), this kindofaction mustbe filedwithin one (1) yearafter the right ofplaintiffto holdtheofficearose.
PlaintiffJesus Ma. Cuibelieved himselfentitled to the officein questionas long agoas 1932. On January 26 ofthatyear hefiled a complaint inquowarrantoagainst
Dr. Teodoro Cui, whoassumedtheadministration ofthe Hospicioon 2 July1931. MarianoCui, theplaintiff's father andAntonio Ma. Cuicameinas intervenors. The
case was dismissedby theCourt ofFirstInstanceupon a demurrer bythedefendant there tothecomplaint and complaint inintervention. Upon appeal tothe
Supreme Court fromtheorderofdismissal, thecasewas remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecutethe
case as indicatedin thedecision ofthis Court, but accededto anarrangementwhereby Teodoro Cui continuedas administrator;Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser"andplaintiff Jesus Ma. Cuiaccepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently theplaintiff tried toget the position by a series ofextra-judicialmaneuvers.First heinformedtheSocial WelfareCommissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January hehad"madeclear"his intention ofoccupying theofficeofa dministrator ofthe Hospicio."He followedthatup with
another letter dated 4February,announcing that hehad taken over theadministrationas of1 January 1950. Actually, however, hetook his oath ofofficebeforea
notary publiconly on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply ofacknowledgment, dated2 March,from the SocialWelfareCommissioner,whothought that hehad
already assumed thepositionas stated inhis communicationof4 February 1950.The rathermuddledsituation was referred by theCommissioner totheSecretary of
Justice, who, in anopinion dated3 April 1950(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting anotheropinion previously given, in effect ruledthat theplaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitledto theadministration ofthe Hospicio.
Meanwhile,thequestion againbecamethesubject ofa court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action againstthePhilippine National Bank
in the Court of FirstInstanceofCebu (Civ.No. R-1216) becausetheBank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. TheBank then fileda third-party complaint
against hereinplaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, whohad, as statedabove, taken oath as administrator. On 19October 1950, having been deprived ofrecognition by
the opinion of theSecretaryofJusticehe moved todismiss thethird-party complaint ontheground thathewas relinquishing "temporarily"his claimto the
administration of the Hospicio.The motion was deniedin an orderdated 2 October 1953.On 6 February 1954 hewas ableto takeanother oathofoffice as
administratorbeforePresidentMagsaysay, andsoon afterwardfiled a second motionto dismiss in Civil caseNo. R-1216. PresidentMagsaysay, beit said, upon
learning that a case was pending in Court,stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that"as far as (he) was concerned the courtmay disregardtheoath"thus
taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless andtheotherparties inthecase filedtheirnotice ofappeal fromthe order ofdismissal. The plaintiffthen filed
an ex-parte motionto beexcluded as party in theappeal andthetrial Court againgranted the motion. This was on 24November1954. Appellants thereupon
instituted a mandamus proceeding in theSupremeCourt (G.R.No. L-8540), which was decidedon 28 May 1956,to the effectthat Jesus Ma. Cuishould beincludedin
the appeal. That appeal, however, afterit reachedthis Courtwas dismiss uponmotionofthe parties, who agreedthat "the office ofadministrator andtrusteeof
the Hospicio... shouldbe ventilated inquowarrantoproceedings tobe initiated against theincumbent bywhomsoeveris not occupying the officebut believes hehas
a right to it"(G.R. No.L-9103). The resolutionofdismissalwas issued31July 1956. At thattime theincumbent administratorwas Dr. TeodoroCui, butno action
in quo warranto was filed against himby plaintiffJesus Ma. Cui as indicated intheaforesaidmotion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendantAntonioMa. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member ofthe Bar, andon thefollowing 27 February Dr.Teodoro Cui resigned as
administratorin his favor, pursuantto the"convenio"betweenthem executed on thesamedate. Thenext day Antonio Ma. Cuitookhis oathofoffice.
The failureof the plaintiff to prosecutehis claimjudicially after this Court decided the firstcaseof Cuiv. Cui in1934(60 Phil. 3769), remanding it tothetrialcourtfor
further proceedings; his acceptanceinsteadofthe positionofassistant administrator,allowing Dr.TeodoroCui tocontinueas administratorand his failureto filean
action inquowarrantoagainst saidDr. Cui after31July 1956, whentheappealinCivil CaseNo. R-1216oftheCebu Court was dismissed upon motionofthe parties
preciselyso that the conflicting claims oftheparties could beventilatedin such anaction -all thesecircumstances militateagainsttheplaintiff's present claiminview
ofthe rule that an action inquowarrantomustbe filedwithin oneyearafter the rightofthe plaintiffto hold theofficearose. Theexcusethat the plaintiffdid not file
an action againstDr. Teodoro Cuiafter 31 July1956 because ofthe latter's illness did not interrupttherunning ofthe statutory period. And thefact that this action
was filedwithinoneyearofthe defendant's assumptionofoffice in September1960does not maketheplaintiff's position any better,for thebasis of theactionis his
own right to theofficeand itis from the timesuchright arosethat the one-year limitation mustbe counted, not fromthedatetheincumbentbeganto discharge the
duties of said office.Bautista v. Fajardo, 38Phil. 624; Limvs. Yulo, 62Phil.161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,grandsonofVicenteCui, one ofthenephews ofthe founders of
the Hospiciomentioned bythem inthedeedofdonation. Heis further,in the lineofsuccession,than defendantAntonioMa. Cui,who is a son ofMariano Cui,
another one of the saidnephews. Thedeed ofdonation provides: "a la muerteo incapacidadde estos administradores (thoseappointedin thedeed itself) pasara a
una sola persona que sera el varon,mayor deedad, que descienda legitimamentede cualquiera denuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,Vicente
Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo deabogado... En igualdadde circumstancias, sera preferidoel varon demas edad descendientede quien tenia ultimamentela
administration."Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.Cui is older than heand thereforeis preferred whenthecircumstances are
otherwiseequal. Theintervenorcontends that theintentionofthefounders was to confer theadministration by lineand successivelyto thedescendants ofthe
nephews named inthedeed, in theorder they arenamed.Thus, heargues,sincethe last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, whobelonged to the Mauricio Cuiline,
the next administrator must comefrom thelineofVicente Cui,to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is notjustified by theterms ofthe
deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealedfrom is reversedand setaside, and the complaints as well as thecomplaintin intervention
are dismissed, withcosts equally againstplaintiff-appellee andintervenor-appellant.

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5. IN RE: ALMACEN [1970]
Facts:
 In the civilcaseVirginia Y. Yaptinchayvs. Antonio H.Calero,in w/cAtty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant, the TC rendered judgment
against Almacen’s client.
 After Atty. Almacenreceived a copyofthe decision,he moved for its reconsideration. He served on theadversecounsel a copy ofthemotion, but did not
notify the latterof the time& placeofhearing on said motion.
 Meanwhile,plaintiffmoved for execution ofthejudgment. TC denied bothmotions.
 To prove that hedid serve ontheadverse party a copy ofhis 1st MFR, hefiled a 2ndMFR to w/che attached therequiredregistryreturncard.This 2nd
MFR, however, was orderedwithdrawn bytheTC uponverbal motion ofAtty.Almacenhimself, who earlier had already perfected theappeal. TC elevated
the caseto the CA.
 CA, on the authority ofthis Court's decisionin Manila Surety &Fidelity Co.,Inc. vs.BatuConstruction & Co. dismissed theappealfor having failed to
indicate notice oftime andplaceofhearing.
Atty. Almacen movedto reconsiderthis resolution hefiled pleading entitled "Latest decision oftheSupremeCourtin Support ofMotionfor
Reconsideration,"citing RPvs. GregorioA. Venturanza as the applicablecasebut theCAagain deniedMFR, stating thatRP vs. Venturanza is noauthority
on the matterin issue.
 He then appealed to SC w/cwas denied by a minute resolution. Likewise, his MFR andleave tofilea 2ndMFR & for extension oftime were denied. Entry
of judgment was then made.
 Then, Atty. Almacen gaveventto his disappointment by filing his "Petition toSurrender Lawyer'sCertificate ofTitle"— a pleading that is interspersed
from beginning to end withtheinsolent,contemptuous, grossly disrespectfuland derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced,against this Court as well
as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional(check the case for what’s written)
 He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents ofthe petition and some parts were published in some newspapers.
 The SC decided by resolutionto withhold actionon his petitionuntilhe shall have actually surrenderedhis certificate. But no word came from him. So he
was reminded to turn over his certificate, w/c he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. But he
manifested “that he has no pending petition in connection w/ Calero vs. Yaptinchay Case.”
 SC require Atty. Almacen to showcause"why no disciplinary actionshould betaken against him."He deniedthecharges and askedfor permission"to give
reasons &causewhy nodisciplinary action should be taken against him...in an open & public hearing"& later also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person"w/c the court granted.
 But his written answer, as undignified &cynicalas itis unchastened,offers no apology but instead unremittingly repeats his jeremiad oflamentations, this
time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
Issue:
WON Atty. Almacen’sgrievancesare with merit
 NO. He chafes at theminuteresolutiondenialofhis petition for review.But truths to tell, mostpetitions rejected by the SC are utterly frivolous & ought
never to have been lodged at all. Besides, weretheSC to accept everycaseor write a fullopinion for every petition they reject, they’d be unable to carry
out effectively the burden placed upon them by the Constitution
 The Court underscores thefactthat cases takento this Court onpetitions for certiorari fromtheCAhave hadthebenefit ofappellate review. Hence, the
need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions ifthis Court is tobe moved into accepting them. For itis axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction
vested upon this Court over the CAis not intended to give every losing party another hearing, as implied in sec. 4 ofRule 46 ROC.
 Recalling Atty. Almacen's petitionfor review, theCourtheldthat the CAhad fully andcorrectly consideredthedismissal ofhis appealin the lightofthelaw
and applicable decisions ofthis Court. Farfrom straying away fromthe"acceptedandusual course ofjudicialproceedings,"it tracedtheprocedural lines
etched by this Court in a number ofdecisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
 Regarding the MFR,Atty. Almacen knew,or ought to have known, that for MFR to stay the running ofthe period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of themotion upon the adverseparty(which hedid), butalso notify the adverseparty ofthe timeand placeofhearing (which admittedly he
did not) as articulatedin Manila Surety& Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co. IfAtty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower
court's judgment, he has only himselfto blame.
 It would thus appear thatthereis no justificationfor his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
WON Atty. Almacen’s actuationsmerit penalty
 YES. Every citizen has theright tocomment uponandcriticize the actuations ofpublic officers. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism
concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.
 Courts thus treatwithforbearanceandrestraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. As citizen and officer ofthe court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions ofcourts and judges.
 To curtail the rightofa lawyer tobe critical ofthefoibles ofcourts & judges is to seal the lips ofthose in the best position to give advice & who might
consider it their duty, to speak disparagingly.
 But it is thecardinalcondition ofall such criticism that itshall bebona fide, and shall notspill over thewalls ofdecency and propriety. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violationofthe duty ofrespect to courts.It is sucha misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. Alawyer vows
solemnly to conduct himself"withall good fidelity...to thecourts (Sec. 3, Rule 138) and the ROC constantly remind him “to observe and maintain the
respectdueto courts of justiceand judicialofficers."(Sec. 20(b),Rule138) Thefirst canon oflegalethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake ofthe temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance ofits supreme importance."
 In his relations with thecourts,a lawyermay notdividehis personality so as to beanattorney atonetime anda merecitizen at another.Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations orcommunications orin the course ofa political campaign, ifcouched ininsulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration ofjustice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
 An examinationofrelevant parallelprecedents [State v. Calhoon,In Re Glenn,In Re Humphrey,People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, InRe Troy, InRe
Rockmore ,InRe Mitchell, State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, Bar Ass'n ofSan Francisco v.Philbrook,State Board ofExaminers v. Hart, Cobbv. United
States, In Re Graves, InRe Doss, State v. Grimes]imparts the lessonthat post-litigation utterances orpublications,madeby lawyers,critical ofthe courts
and theirjudicial actuations, whether amounting toa crime or not,which transcendthepermissiblebounds offair commentand legitimatecriticismand
thereby tendto bring theminto disrepute or tosubvertpublicconfidencein their integrity andin theorderly administration ofjustice, constitutegrave
professionalmisconduct which may bevisited with disbarment orother lesserappropriatedisciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in theexercise of
the prerogatives inherent init as thedulyconstitutedguardian' ofthe morals &ethics ofthe legalfraternity.
 The cases Salcedovs. Hernandez, In re Sotto, Rheemofthe Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings againstAlfonsoPonce Enrile, et al., Medinavs. Rivera, In
the matter of the Intestate Estate ofRosario Olba,Contemptproceedings against AntonioFranco, People vs. Carillo, People vs. Venturanza, et al.,De Joya,
et al. vs.CFI of Rizal, Sisonvs. Sandejas, Parangas vs. Cruz, andCornejo vs. Tan allinvolvedcontumacious statements made inpleadings filedpending

6. Page6
litigation. However, althoughthedoctrinalrule is that protectivemantleofcontempt may ordinarily beinvoked only againstscurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes whilea court mulls over a pending caseand notafter theconclusion thereof, that rulecannot be availedof by Atty. Almacen (who
made thecomments after this Court had written finis to his appeal) becausesuch rulehas lost muchofits vitality.
 Although for some time, this was theprevailing view inthis jurisdiction, the first stir for a modificationthereof, however, camewhen, in People vs. Alarcon,
the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented withthemajority holding ofthemajority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule
above-adverted to. Thena completedisengagementfrom the settled rule was laterto bemadein Inre Brillantes. Thus, Atty. Almacen could as much be
liable for contempt therefor as ifit had been perpetrated during the pendency ofthe said appeal.
 Besides,pendancy or non-pendancy is hereimmaterial.The sole objectiveof this proceeding is topreserve the purity ofthelegal profession, by removing
or suspending a member whose misconducthas proved himselfunfit tocontinueto beentrusted with duties &responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do.
 The proffered surrender ofhis lawyer's certificateis, ofcourse,purely protestative on Atty. Almacen's part. But then, he went farther. In haughty and
coarselanguage, heactually availedofthe saidmoveas a vehiclefor his vicious tiradeagainst this Court. The integrated entirety ofhis petition bristles
with vile insults all calculatedto drivehome his contempt for and disrespect totheCourt and its members.Although,like any other Gov’t.entity in a viable
democracy,theCourt is notabovecriticism, a critique oftheCourt must beintelligentanddiscriminating, fitting to its high function as the court oflast
resort. And morethan this,validand healthy criticism is by nomeans synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constantstriving to attain them. Any criticism ofthe Court must possess the quality ofjudiciousness and must be
informed by perspective and infused by philosophy.
 It is not accurateto say that,as Atty.Almacen would haveappear, the members oftheCourt are the"complainants,prosecutors and judges"all rolled up
into one in this instance. Disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generic. There is neither a plaintiffnor a prosecutor therein.
 The nature& extent ofthe sanctions thatmay be visiteduponAtty. Almacen for his transgressions may rangefrom meresuspension to total removal or
disbarment(Sec.27,Rule 138, ROC) and thediscretionto assess under the circumstances theimposablesanctionis, ofcourse,primarily addressed to the
sound discretion of theCourt which, being neither arbitraryanddespoticnor motivated by personal animosityor prejudice, should ever be controlled by
the imperative need thatthepurityandindependenceofthe Bar bescrupulously guardedand the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
 The Court thus held that Atty. Almacenbesuspended fromthepractice oflawuntil further orders, themerit ofthis choice being best shown by the fact
that it will thenbe left toAtty.Almacen todeterminefor himselfhowlong orhow short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice oflaw.
Holding: Suspendedfrom the practiceoflaw untilfurther orders,thesuspension to take effect immediately.
6. IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDOM. DEGUZMAN, Petitioner
This is an administrativecaseinvolving a member oftheBar, Atty.FelizardoM. de Guzman.
In Civil CaseNo. 71648of the CourtofFirst Instance ofManila, entitled: "Lagrimas Lapatha, et al. versus VicenteFloro, etal.", the Hon. Jesus deVeyra rendered on
July 23, 1968, a decision thedispositiveportion ofwhichreads: 1
Judgment is,therefore, renderedsetting aside the judgment oftheCity Court in CivilCaseNo. 165187 entitled Floro v.Lapatha as wellas thewrit ofexecutionissued
pursuant thereto, and remanding this case totheCity Court ofManila in order to givePetitionerherdayin Court. Defendant Floroshallpaythecosts. Let copyofthis
decision be furnished the Supreme Courtto take whateverdisciplinary action itmaydeem fit against Atty.Felizardode Guzmanfor his manner ofbehavior inthe
proceedings before the City CourtofManila. (Emphasis Ours)
Upon receipt of copy of theabove-mentioned decision, this Court in its ResolutionofAugust16, 1968, requiredAtty. Felizardo deGuzman to answer, 2 and thelatter
complied on August30,1968.3 On September 10, 1968thematterwas referred to theSolicitor General for investigate report andrecommendation. 4 On November
20, 1973,we received theReport and RecommendationoftheSolicitor General. 5
At the hearing conductedby theOfficeoftheSolicitor General during which noneoftheparties,with theexception ofrespondent,Atty. Felizardode Guzman,
appeareddespitedue notice, thefollowing incidents werebrought out:
Sometimeon October 12, 1967,a complaint for ejectmentwas filedwith the City CourtofManila by VicenteFloro againstLagrimas Lapatha whichwas docketedas
Civil Case No. 165187of said court.6 On November2, 1967, a decisionwas renderedby theCity Court,Branch VIII,presidedby Judge Roman Cansino, Jr., to this
effect: 7
BY CONFESSION, judgment is herebyrendered ordering thedefendant andall persons claiming underherto vacatepremises describedin the complaint
and surrender thepossession thereofto theplaintiff; to pay unto theplaintiffthe unpaid rentals in the sumofP795.00, with interest thereon at thelegal
rate from October 12, 1967untilfully paid; thesum ofP150.00 as attorney's fees plus thecosts ofthesuit.
On December 29, 1967, Lagrimas Lapatha filed with the CourtofFirst InstanceofManila a "Petition for Relieffrom Judgment, Orders & other Proceedings in the
Inferior Court with a Writ ofPreliminary Injunction", naming thereinVicenteFloroand the SheriffofManila as party-respondents.8 In thePetition it was alleged by
petitionerLagrimas Lapatha that at the initialhearing ofCivil Case No. 165187in theCityCourt ofManila held at 8:30 o'clock inthemorning ofNovember 2,1967,
she appeared withoutcounsel; sheapproach Atty. Felizardo deGuzman, thelawyerofVicenteFloro,and beggedfor a five-day postponement ofthe trialto which
Atty. de Guzmanverbally agreed;Atty. deGuzmanthen askedherto affix her signatureon the court's "expediente"whichshedid, andafter signing sheleft the
courtroom;on November16, 1967, shegaveto Atty. Felizardo deGuzmana check for P350.00 inpartial payment ofher arrears in the rentals; onNovember 20,1967,
she was surprisedto receive copy ofa decision fromtheCity Court datedNovember 2, 1967, wherein itappeared thatshe confessed judgment when in truthand in
fact she askedfor postponement ofthat initialhearing with theconformity ofAtty. Felizardode Guzman; upon verification ofthe"expediente"ofthecase,she
discoveredthatbelowthesignaturewhich sheaffixed attherequest ofAtty.de Guzman, thelatter hadwritten "CONFESS JUDGMENT", without her knowledgeand
consent; henceher petition for relieffrom thejudgmentrendered by the City Court.
Vicente Floro filed his Answer totheabove-mentioned Petition for reliefandhe allegedthatthedecision ofthe City Courtwas based on an admission made inopen
court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha onthe basis ofwhich thewords "Confession ofjudgment"werewrittenon the"expediente"ofthe caseand underneathwere
affixed the signature of said petitioner and thatofAtty. Felizardo deGuzman; thatthealleged payments ofLagrimas Lapatha were made after therenditionofthe
decision toforestallimmediate execution ofthejudgment; thatwhen petitioner filed with the City Courta motion for reconsiderationofthe decision alleging fraud,
the true circumstances attending the hearing ofNovember2, 1967, werebrought outto the satisfaction ofpetitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court
denied the motion for reconsideration; that during thehearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. deGuzmanagreed notto press for theexecution of

7. Page7
the judgment ontheassuranceofpetitioner thatshe vacate thepremises by January 15, 1968,however, petitioner didnotcomplywith her promiseand instead filed
the Petition for Relief.9
On July 23, 1968, His Honor, JudgeJesus de Veyra, renderedhis decision10 in the above-mentioned Petition for Relieffavorable to petitioner Lapatha,thedispositive
portion of which wequoted inpage two ofthis Resolution.
Judge de Veyra statedin his decision that dueto the"machinations unworthy ofan attorney" committed by respondentherein,Lagrimas Lapatha was deprived ofher
day in court, said lawyerhaving agreed toa postponement ofthe hearing and evenacceptedpartial payment so the casewould not proceed, but behindherback
wrote the words "confessedjudgment"over her signature andprevailedupon theCity Court torender judgment. 11 Judgede Veyra basedhis findings on thealleged
testimonies of Lagrimas Lapatha and one Atty. Vargas givenduring the trialofthe Petition for Relief.
We are constrained, however, toagreewith theSolicitor Generalthat theabove-mentionedfindings ofJudgede Veyra were not only left unsubstantiated at the
investigation conductedby theSolicitor General's Officefor failureofsaidwitnesses to appear notwithstanding duenoticethatthey weresatisfactorily controverted
by the evidence submitted byrespondent at said hearing.
Thus:
1. The records of Civil CaseNo. 71648 (Petitionfor Relief) show thattheclerkofthe City CourtofManila testified thatwhen the ejectmentcasewas called
for hearing onNovember 2,1967, both Lagrimas Lapatha and Atty. deGuzmanmadetheirappearances, andwhen thetrial JudgeaskedLapatha ifshe
admitted the indebtedness alleged in thecomplaint, sheansweredin the affirmative andforthwith thewords "confessedjudgment"werewrittenon the
"expediente"of thecaseafterwhich Atty. deGuzmanandLapatha affixedtheirsignatures. 12 As aptly observed in theReport oftheSolicitor General,the
aforementioned testimony oftheclerk ofcourt deserves creditbecausetheclerk was present at the hearing ofNovember2 and his testimony is
substantiatedby thedecisionofthe City Judge 13 who, Westate, is presumed, sans evidenceto the contrary,to haveregularly performed his official
duty 14 and passed upon the matters beforehimin the manner stated inhis decision. 15 On theother hand, Atty.Vargas on whomJudge deVeyra relied,
was not in Courton the date ofthehearing sothat his testimonywas simply basedon thesupposedstatementto him ofhis secretary that the latter asked
Atty. de Guzmanfor a postponementofthe trial. 16
2. The check for P350.00was given by either Atty.Vargas or Lagrimas Lapatha toAtty. deGuzmannotfor thepurposeofsecuring a postponement,for said
check was paidon November 16several days afterthehearing, butin partialpaymentofthearrears in therentals to whichLapatha "confessedjudgment"
and in order to forestall the immediateexecution oftheCity Court's decision. 17 As a matter offact, during thehearing ofLapatha's motion for
reconsiderationofthe decision oftheCity Court,Lapatha agreed tovacatethepremises by January15,1968, and Atty. deGuzman in turn waivedthe
collectionof therentals for the months ofNovember,1967, up toJanuary 15, 1968. 18
3. The only objective ofLagrimas Lapatha infiling her Petition for ReliefbeforeJudgede Veyra was to gain moretimeto stay in the leased premises
notwithstanding hercommitment to vacateas ofJanuary 15, 1968, and in fact, sheaccomplished her purposeas shown by the "Compromise Agreement"
enteredinto between her and the lessor, VicenteFloro, beforeJudgede Veyra in Civil Case No. 71which reads:
Plaintiff agrees tovacatethepremises at 821 Second Floor, Isabel Street, Manila, on or before October 31,1968andin the Defendant V. Floro agrees
to condone all rentals pastup toOctober31, 1968plus attorney's fees and costs.
Manila, Philippines, October 22, 1968 (Sgd.) LAGRIMAS LAPATHA(Sgd.) VICENTEFLORO (SeeExh. "B"page53 rollo)
We agree withtheSolicitor General that intheinstant case"the evidenceis wanting"to sustaina finding that respondentcommittedany deceitor misconductin Civil
Case No. 165187 of theCity Court ofManila.
In Go vs. Candoy,19 this Courtsaid: "It is quiteelementary thatin disbarment proceedings, theburden ofproofrests uponthecomplainant. To bemadethebasis
suspensionor disbarmentofa lawyer, thecharge againsthimmustbe established byconvincing proof. The recordmust discloseas freefrom doubta casewhich
compels exerciseby this Court ofits disciplinary powers. The dubious characterofthe actdone as well as ofthe motivation thereofmust beclearly demonstrated."
An attorney enjoys thelegal presumption thathe is innocentof the charges preferredagainst him until the contrary is proved, andas anofficer ofthecourt,thathe
has performed his duty inaccordancewith his oath. Thus,theserious consequences ofdisbarment orsuspensionshould follow only wherethereis a clear
preponderance of evidenceagainst a respondent attorney.(Moran, Revised Rules ofCourt, 1970Ed., vol. 6, p. 243, citing In re Tionko,43 Phil. 191)
WHEREFORE, this administrativecomplaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. deGuzman,is exonerated ofthecharge.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENTOF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINOG. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
After successfully passing thecorresponding examinations held in1953, TelesforoA. Diao was admittedto the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him withhaving falsely represented inhis application for such Bar examination, thathe hadtherequisiteacademic
qualifications. Thematterwas induecourse referred to theSolicitor General who caused the chargeto beinvestigated; andlater hesubmitteda report
recommending thatDiao's name beerased fromtheroll ofattorneys, because contrary to theallegations inhis petitionfor e xamination inthis Court, he(Diao) had
not completed, beforetaking up law subjects,therequired pre-legal educationprescribed by the Department ofPrivateEducation,specially,in thefollowing
particulars:
(a) Diao did not completehis high school training; and
(b) Diao neverattended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom -which contradicts the credentials hehad submitted insupport ofhis
application for examination,and ofhis allegation therein ofsuccessfulcompletionofthe"requiredpre-legaleducation".
Answering this officialreportandcomplaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits thefirst charge: but heclaims that although hehad left highschool in his third year,
he entered the serviceof the U.S. Army,passed the GeneralClassificationTestgiven therein,which (according to him) is equivalent toa high schooldiploma, and
upon his return to civilian life,theeducational authorities considered his army service as theequivalent of3rd and 4th year highschool.
We have serious doubts, about the validityofthis claim, whatwith respondent's failureto exhibit any certification tothateffect(theequivalence) by the proper
school officials.However, it is unnecessaryto dwell on this,sincethe second charge is clearly meritorious.Diao never obtained his A.A. fromQuisumbing College; and
yet his application for examinationrepresented him as an A.A. graduate(1940-1941) ofsuchcollege.Now,asserting hehad obtainedhis A.A. titlefromtheArellano
University inApril, 1949,he says he was erroneously certified, due toconfusion, as a graduate ofQuisumbing College,in his schoolrecords.

8. Page8
Wherefore, theparties respectfullypray thattheforegoing stipulation offacts be admitted and approvedby this Honorable Court, withoutprejudice totheparties
adducing other evidenceto provetheircasenot coveredby this stipulation offacts.
This explanation is notacceptable,for thereasonthat the"error"or "confusion"was obviously ofhis own making. Hadhis applicationdisclosed his having obtained
A.A. from ArellanoUniversity, itwould also have disclosedthathe gotit inApril, 1949,thereby showing thathe began his law studies (2nd semester of1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his Associatein Arts degree. And thenhe would nothavebeen permitted totake the bartests, becauseour Rules provide, andtheapplicant
for the Bar examination mustaffirm underoath,"Thatprevious to the study oflaw,he had successfully and satisfactorily completed therequired pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by theDepartment ofPrivateEducation,"(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; butdueto his falserepresentations, hewas allowedto takeit,luckily passed it,
and was thereafter admitted totheBar. Such admissionhaving beenobtained under false pretenses mustbe,and is hereby revoked. The fact that hehurdledtheBar
examinations is immaterial. Passing suchexaminations is not the only qualificationto becomeanattorney-at-law;taking theprescribed courses oflegalstudy in the
regular manneris equally essential.
The Clerk is,therefore, ordered to strikefrom the rollofattorneys,thenameofTelesforoA. Diao. Andthelatteris requiredto return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.
8. KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVEMATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
- Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legalservices intheJuly 5, 2000 issue ofthe Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid a dvertisement which read: “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.”
- Astaff member of thePublic Information Office oftheSupremeCourt took noticeand called the numberposing as an interestedparty. Shespoke to Mrs. Simbillo,
who said that her husband was anexpert inhandling annulment cases andcan guarantee a court decreewithin four to six months, and that the fee was P48, 000.
- Further research by the OfficeoftheCourt Administrator andthePublic Information Officerevealedthat similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue ofthe Philippine Star.
- Atty. IsmaelKhan, Jr., in his capacity as AssistantCourt Administrator and Chiefofthe Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Simbillofor improperadvertising andsolicitationin violation ofRule2.03and Rule 3.01oftheCode ofProfessional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 ofthe
Rules ofCourt.
- The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
- IBP found respondent guilty
- Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
- Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE
WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty ofviolating Rule2.03 and Rule3.01ofthe CodeofProfessional Responsibility and Rul e 138, Section 27 ofthe Rules ofCourt
HELD
Yes. Petitioner was suspended fromthepracticeoflawfor oneyear andwas sternly warnedthata repetition ofthe sameor similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration.
Reasoning
- Rule 2.03 -Alawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
- Rule 3.01-Alawyer shallnotuseor permittheuse ofany false,fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statementor claimregarding
his qualifications or legal services.
- Rule 138, Sec27 of the Rules ofCourt states: Disbarment and suspension ofattorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. —Amember ofthe bar may be
disbarredor suspendedfrom his officeas attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduc t in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction ofa crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation ofthe oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
- The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an “officer ofthe court” to the administration ofjustice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliabil ity
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree offiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods ofadvertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
- Respondent advertised himselfas an “AnnulmentSpecialist,”andby this he underminedthestability and sanctity ofmarriage—encouraging peoplewhomight have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
- Solicitation of legalbusiness sis not altogether proscribed, however,for solicitationto be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity ofthe legal profession.
9. ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSEMAX ORTIZ, respondent.
Canoy was among thoselow-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. Heclaims having preparedtheposition paper ofCanoy, butbeforehe could
submit thesame, theLabor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing thecase.Atty. Ortiz admits thoughthat the periodwithin whichto file the positionpaper
had already lapsed.He attributes this failureto timelyfiletheposition paper to thefact thatafter his electionas Councilor becausehewas too busy.” Eventually,he
withdrew fromhis other cases andhis freelegal services.Complainantfiled this complaint but later onwithdrew .
Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING thata repetitionofthesamenegligencewillbe dealtwith moreseverely.
Still, theseverance of therelationofattorney-clientis not effectiveuntila noticeofdischargeby theclientor a manifestation clearly indicating thatpurposeis filed
with the court ortribunal, anda copy thereofserved upon the adverseparty, and untilthen,thelawyer continues to becounselin thecase.

9. Page9
Assuming that Atty.Ortiz was justifiedin terminating his services,he,however, cannot justdo soand leavecomplainant inthecold unprotected. Indeed,Rule22.02
requires thata lawyer whowithdraws or is discharged shall, subjectto a lien,immediately turn over allpapers and property to which theclientis entitled,and shall
cooperatewith his successor intheorderly transfer ofthematter. Atty.Ortiz claims that the reasonwhy hetookno further action onthecase was thathe was
informed thatCanoy hadacquired the services ofanother counsel. Assuming that weretrue,therewas noapparentcoordinationbetween Atty.Ortiz andthis new
counsel.
“There areno goodreasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the causeoftheclientin themidst oflitigation withouteven informing theclientofthe
fact or causeof desertion. That thelawyerforsook his legalpracticeon account ofwhat mightbeperceived as a higher calling, election topublicoffice, does not
mitigatethedereliction of professional duty. Suspension from thepractice is the usual penalty, andthereis no reason todeviatefrom thenormin this case.”
10. Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)
DOCTRINE: "Private practice"ofa profession, specifically thelaw profession does notpertainto an isolated courtappearance;rather, it contemplates a successionof
acts ofthe samenaturehabitually orcustomarilyholding one’s selfto thepublic as a lawyer.
FACTS: Basilio Borja, Sr.as lessor, andSulyap, Inc.,as lessee, entered intoa contract of lease involving a one-storey office building ownedby Borja located at New
Manila, QuezonCity. Pursuantto thelease,Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals, associationdues anddepositfor electrical and telephoneexpenses.
Upon the expiration of theirleasecontract, Sulyapdemanded thereturnofthe saidadvance rentals, dues and depositbut Borja refusedto do so.Thus, Sulyap filed
with the RTC of QC a complaintfor sum ofmoney against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered intoandsubmitted to the trialcourt a “CompromiseAgreement”
stating that Borja is bound topay theamounts P30, 575 andP50, 000andin caseany amount due is not paid within the periodstatedin this agreement shall earn 2%
interest per monthuntil fully paidplus 25% attorney’s fees ofthe amountcollectibleand that writ ofexecution shallbe issuedas a matter ofright.
Petitioner, however, failedto pay theamounts statedin the judicial compromise. Sulyapfiled a writofexecution againstBorja. The TrialCourt granted thewrit. Borja
motionedto quashthewritby stating thathis failureto pay the amounts within theagreedperiod was dueto Sulyap’s fault; therefore, thepenaltyclauseshould not
be imposed.
Borja filedanothermotion praying for the quashal ofthewrit ofexecutionand modificationofthedecision. This time, hecontendedthat there was fraud in
the execution of the compromiseagreement. Heclaimed that 3 sets ofcompromise agreement weresubmittedfor his approval. Among them, heallegedly chose
and signed thecompromiseagreementwhichcontainedno stipulation as to the payment of2%monthly interestand 25% attorney’s fees incaseofdefault in
payment.He allegedthat his former counsel,Atty.Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the saidagreement, removedthepage ofthe genuine
compromiseagreement where heaffixedhis signatureand fraudulently attached thesameto thecompromise agreementsubmittedto the courtin order to make it
appearthat heagreed tothe penalty clause embodied therein.
Sulyap presentedAtty.Cruz as witness, who declared thatthepetitioner gave his consent to the inclusionofthe penalty clauseof2% monthly interest and
25% attorney’s fees in thecompromiseagreement. Headded thatthecompromise agreement approvedby thecourt was infactsigned by the petitionerinside
the courtroombefore the samewas submittedfor approval.Atty. Cruz stressed thatthe penalty clause of2%interestpermonth until fullpayment oftheamount
due, plus 25%thereof as attorney’s fees, in case ofdefaultin payment,was actually chosen by the petitioner.
The trial courtruledin favor ofSulyap becauseit gavecredenceto thetestimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that itwas morethan one year fromreceiptofthe
judgment oncompromiseon October25,1995, when hequestionedtheinclusion ofthepenalty clause intheapproved compromiseagreementdespite several
opportunities to raise saidobjection.
ISSUE: Whether Borja is boundby thepenalty clausein thecompromiseagreement.
HELD: YES. While a judicialcompromise maybe annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent orforgery, wefind that the testimony ofthepetitionerfailed
to establish theattendance offraud intheinstant case. No evidencewas presented by petitioner other thanhis bareallegation thathis former counselfraudulently
attachedthepage of thegenuinecompromise agreement where heaffixed his signature tothe compromise agreement submittedto thecourt.
Petitioner cannot feign ignoranceoftheexistence ofthe penalty clausein the compromiseagreement approved by the court. Whenhereceived the
judgment reproducing thefulltext ofthe compromiseagreement, toFebruary 19, 1997,he never raised theissue ofthefraudulent inclusion ofthepenalty clausein
their agreement.Wenotethatpetitioner is a doctor ofmedicine. Hemusthave read and understoodthe contents ofthejudgmenton compromise. In fact,on
November 13, 1995,he filed, withouttheassistanceofcounsel, a motion praying that theamounts ofP50,000.00and 37,575.00be withheldfrom his totalobligation
and instead beappliedto the expenses for therepair oftheleasedpremises whichwas allegedly vandalizedby the privaterespondent
Even assuming thatAtty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority ininserting the penaltyclause, the status ofthesaidclause is not void butmerely voidable,
i.e., capableof being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner’s failure toquestion the inclusion ofthe 2%monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees inthejudicial compromise
despiteseveralopportunities todo sowas tantamount toratification. Hence,he is estopped from assailing thevalidity thereof.
Finally,we findno merit inpetitioner's contentionthat the compromiseagreement shouldbe annulled becauseAtty.Cruz, who assisted him inentering into such
agreement, was then anemployee ofthe Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited fromengaging in theprivatepractice ofhis profession.Sufficeitto state
that the isolatedassistanceprovidedby Atty.Cruz to the petitioner in entering intoa compromiseagreementdoes not constitutea prohibited "private practice"of
law by a publicofficial."Privatepractice" ofaprofession,specifically the law profession doesnot pertain toan isolated courtappearance; rather, itcontemplatesa
succession ofactsofthe same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s selfto thepublic asalawyer. Such was never established intheinstant case.
11. LUTHER SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELOG. FLORES, respondent.
Atty. Flores knewtoolittle oftheprovisions andapplication ofPD No.1508which mandates thatall disputes,except those specifically cited (thedispute between
Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong notincluded), betweenand among residents ofthesamecity or municipality should bebrought firstunderthesystemofbarangay
conciliation beforerecourse tothecourt canbe allowed. Becauseofrespondent’s transgressions,his clientwas hailed tocourt as part-defendant. Respondentalso
refused to return petitioner’s moneyin spiteofhis meager service.

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Held: GUILTY of negligence andincompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN themoneyofcomplainantwith interest. STERNLY WARNEDthat a commission of
the sameor similar act inthefuture will be dealt withmoreseverely.
The breachof respondent’s swornduty as a lawyer and oftheethicalstandards he was strictly tohonor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent
has fallenshort of the competenceand diligencerequired ofeverymember oftheBar.
CANON 17. –ALAWYER OWES FIDELITYTO THE CAUSEOF HIS CLIENTAND HESHALL BEMINDFUL OF THETRUSTAND CONFIDENCEREPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. –ALAWYER SHALL SERVEHIS CLIENTWITH COMPETENCEAND DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03 –Alawyer shall notneglecta legal matter entrusted tohimand his negligence inconnection therewithshallrender himliable.
Respondenterredin not returning complainant’s money despitedemands after his failureto filethecaseand his devious act ofcompelling complainant tosign a
documentstating that hehas no financial obligation tocomplainant inexchangeofthereturnofcomplainant’s papers.This conduct violatedthefollowing Canon:
CANON 15. –ALAWYER SHALL OBSERVECANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTYIN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03. –Alawyershall deliver the funds and propertyofclient when dueor upondemand.
The failureof an attorney toreturntheclient’s money upondemand gives risetothepresumption that hehas misappropriatedit for his own useto the prejudiceand
violation of thetrust reposed inhimby theclient. It is not only a gross violation ofthegeneral moralityas wellas ofprofessional ethics; italso impairs public
confidence inthelegal profession and deserves punishment. Inshort, it is settled thattheunjustified withholding ofmoneybelonging tohis client, as in this case,
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
A lawyer must conducthimself, especially inhis dealings with his clients, withintegrity in a mannerthat is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degreeofgood faithandfairness.
12. LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO[1974]
Facts:
Prior to his appointmentas electionregistrarfor Cadiz, Negros Occ. onOct30,1964,petitionerwas counseldeparteas an accusedina pending casein thesala ofthe
respondent.
Citing thedemands of his appointivepostand theconflictthat mayarise betweenthe dischargeofhis duties as election registrar and officerofthe court, petitioner moved
to withdrawas counsel.
Respondent not only deniedthe motion, but appointedpetitioneras counseldeoficio forthe twoother accused.
Petitioner now comes before theSC to havetheorderofthe respondent judgereversed on certiorari.
Issue:
WON respondent judgeactedwith grave abuse ofdiscretion.NO
The principal reason behindrespondent’sdenial ofthemotion to withdraw of petitioner isbecause ofitseffect to delay thecase further.
The criminalproceeding hadalready been postponed several times, andto grantthe petitioner’s motion would havebeentantamount todenialtheaccused’s rights.
The fact thattherespondent already appointedthepetitioner as counseldeoficio other thanthede parte, renders the latter’s excuse ofthedemand ofhis job as
registrar inutile.
There is no reason for him tocompromisethe accused; defensefor wantof timewiththedemands onthetime ofcounsel deoficiois less thanthatofde parte.
It isthus, clear that petitioner ismerely reluctantto represent theaccused,membership in the Bar requiresthe responsibility to live up to itsexacting standard,
which includesassisting the state when called upon to administer justice, the law isnot atrade or acraft, but aprofession.
As such, thefacts that petitioner will not becompensated for his troubleshould nothinder him fromdefending the accused tothebestofhis ability.
The right of the accusedto counsel is a constitutionally protectedright, such thatany frustration thereofby petitioneramounts to a serious affrontto the profession.
Decision: Petition is dismissed. Petitioner is admonished.
13. CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS VITANA.C. No.5835Apr 15, 2005
Facts: Carlos Reyes availedof the services ofAtty. Vitanto file the appropriate complaintagainst certain individuals who failedto comply witha courtorder for
partition of properties in his favor.It was alleged thatafter having received17,000, Atty. Vitandidnot acton his case. Hence,he filed anadministrativecase for
disbarment againstthesaid lawyerfor gross negligence.
Issue: W/N Atty. Vitanviolated theCanon ofProfessionalResponsibility infailing to filetherequiredcomplaint for his client
Held: Yes, Atty. Vitan is liablefor gross negligence. Canon 18oftheCodeofProfessional Responsibility provides thata lawyer shall servehis clients with competence
and diligence. Specifically, a lawyer shallnotneglect a legalmatter entrusted to him andhis negligence in connectiontherewith shall renderthem liable.n this case,
the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services but subsequently failing torender suchservices is a clearviolationofthe abovementionedrule.
However, the Courtheld that therecommended penalty by the IBP oftwo years suspension is too harsh.Jurisprudenceshows thatlighter sanctions havebeen
imposedfor thesame violations. Hence,Atty.Vitan was suspendedfor a period ofonly six months.
14. SpousesOLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE AC-5365. April 27, 2005
Facts: Atty.Victor V. Deciembre was given fiveblank checks by Spouses Olbes for security ofa loan.After the loan was paid and a receiptissued, Atty. Deciembre
filled up four of thefivechecks for P50, 000 withdifferent maturity date.All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa againstthespouses
Olbes. This promptedthespouses Olbes to file a disbarmentcase againstAtty. Deciembrewith the OfficeoftheBarConfidant ofthis Court. In the report,
Commissioner Dulay recommended thatrespondent besuspended fromthepracticeoflaw for twoyears for violating Rule1.01of the CodeofProfessional
Responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not the suspensionofAtty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.
Held: Membership inthelegal profession is a specialprivilegeburdened withconditions. Itis bestowed upon individuals who arenotonly learned inthelaw,butalso
known to possess good moral character. “Alawyer is an oath-boundservantofsociety whoseconduct is clearlycircumscribedby inflexiblenorms oflawand ethics,

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and whoseprimarydutyis theadvancement ofthequest for truthand justice,for which hehas swornto bea fearless crusader.”By taking thelawyer’s oath,an
attorneybecomes a guardian oftruth and theruleoflaw, andanindispensableinstrument inthefair and impartialadministration ofjustice. Lawyers should actand
comport themselves with honesty andintegrityin a manner beyond reproach, inorder topromote the public’s faith in thelegal profession.It is also glaringly clear
that the Codeof ProfessionalResponsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolentact offilling up theblank checks by indicating amounts that had not been
agreed upon at allanddespite respondent’s fullknowledgethattheloansupposed tobe securedby thechecks had already been paid. His was a brazenact of
falsification of a commercialdocument,resorted to for his material gain.
Deception andother fraudulent acts arenot merely unacceptable practices thataredisgraceful anddishonorable;they reveala basicmoral flaw.The standards ofthe
legal professionarenotsatisfied byconduct thatmerely enables one toescape the penalties ofcriminallaws. Considering thedepravity oftheoffensecommitted by
respondent, wefindthepenalty recommendedby theIBP ofsuspension for two years from thepracticeoflaw to betoomild.His propensity for employing deceit
and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuseofthefilled-up checks that ledto thedetention ofonepetitioner is loathsome. Thus, heis sentencedsuspended
indefinitely fromthepractice oflaweffective immediately.
15. MercedesRuth Cobb-Perezand Damaso Perezv. Hon. Gregorio Lantin,Ricardo Hermoso & City SheriffofManila(1968)
OriginalPetitionin the SC.Ceriorariw/ preliminaryinjunction.
FACTS:
→ Feb 1959: respondent Hermoso filedcivil caseagainst petitioner Damaso Perez&oneGregorioSubong for recovery ofprincipal sumPhP17, 309.44as unpaid purchases
ofleather materials usedintheshoemanufacturing business of Perez.
→ April 1960:Judgmentrendered ordering petitioner to pay the sumw/ interest, atty’s fees and costs.
→ June 1960: Appeal toCAby Perez &Subong dismissedfor it was filedbeyondthereglementary pd.
→ Aug 1961: Writof execution was issued after thecase was remandedto the courtoforigin.
→ 1st notice: Sept1961, respondent SheriffofMla scheduledauctionsaleoflevied 3,573 shares ofcommonstockregistered inthename ofDamasoPerez
w/RepublicBank. Judgesuspendedsuch saleon the groundthat it was highlyexcessive& unjust,debt was only PhP17,309.44whilevalueofshares wasPhP357,300.
→ 2nd notice: Oct 1961,cancelled byCApending hearing ofPerez’ motion for mandamus & certiorariw/ prelim injunction
→ 3rd notice: Jan 1963,sale was loweredto 210shares ofstock. Butwas later enjoinedby theffcomplaint.
→ New twist: in thesamemonth,Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, W ofDamaso,filed a complaintagainst respondents whereinshecontendedthatthelevied shares are
conjugalassets w/c are not answerablefor thejudgmentdebt ofherH, itbeing a personalnature ofobligation and contracte dnot for thebenefit/interest oftheir
conjugalpartnership. Case was later dismissed uponthemotionofW herself.
→ 4th notice: Oct 1963,auctionsale of220 shares ofstockscheduled by Sheriff but was suspendeddueto Mrs Cobb-Perez filing a 3rd party claimoverthe
shares of stocks.
→ 5th notice: Nov ’63 but was later suspended by Mr Perez’s offer ofhis alleged cash dividends insamebank worth PhP19, 985.His motion/offerdenied.
→ 6th notice: Jan’65: auctionsale of240 shares ofstock. Sheriffenjoined for petitioners posted a bondofPhP10,000for writ ofpreliminary injunctionprayed
ISSUE: WON judgmentdebt is H’s exclusive &privatedebt
HELD: Petitiondismissed. Preliminary injunction dissolved.
RATIO:
1) No, debts contractedby H, as head ofthefamily and administratorofthe conjugal partnership, in theexerciseofan industry orprofessionby w/c hecontributesto
the support of thefamily cannotbe his exclusivedebts.The said debtwas contractedin the purchase ofleatherusedin theshoemanufacturing business oftheH and
said business is an ordinary commercial enterprisefor gain, inthepursuitofw/c Damaso Perez had theright toembark the partnership.
Moreover, thepresumption thatall property ofthemarriage belong totheconjugalpartnershipunderArt 160 CC must beaccompanied by proofofacquisitionof
property. Sincethereis no evidenceas towhen the shares ofstock wereacquired, thefact that they areregistered inthenameoftheHalone is an indicationthatthe
shares belong exclusively to him.
NOTES:
In the case,theCourt did nothavejurisdictionto entertain motionto quashthewritofexecutionfor noneoftheffgrounds werepresent. Itcan only do so when:
(1)writ has been improvidently issued,(2) it has beenissuedagainst the wrong party,(3) it is defectivein substance, (4) judgmentdebt has beenpaid, (5) writhas
been issued w/oauthority, (6) there has beena changein the situationofthe parties w/c makes execution inequitable,or (7) controversy has never been submitted
to court andthereforeno judgmenthas been rendered