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Fourth generation warfare (4GW) utilizes asymmetric tactics to undermine an opponent's morale and confidence. It focuses on exploiting weaknesses rather than directly confronting strengths. Key aspects of 4GW include decentralized independent cells, psychological operations like terrorism, and attacking rear areas like infrastructure and society. Victory is achieved through creating mistrust, uncertainty, and threats to human survival instincts in order to destroy an opponent's social cohesion. Emerging technologies, global media, and networked organizations enhance 4GW's effectiveness in the modern era.
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4 g wfinal (2)
- 1. 1/26UNCLASSIFIED FourFourthth GenerationsGenerations ofof ModernModernWarfareWarfare (4GW)(4GW) Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism COL Engr. JÁNOS TOMOLYA Ph.D. HUN Army Chief of Capabilities
- 2. 2/26UNCLASSIFIED Subject : 4thGW Time : 20 minutes Classify : Unclassified Agenda : 1. Introduction; 2. Different classification of war (epochs, waves, forms); 3. Asymmetric Warfare; 4. Military cultures; 5. Fourth Generation of modern warfare;
- 3. 3/26 The Next War? Howcan we avoid being like the French knights at the Battle of Agincourt?
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- 7. 7/26 Number of terroristattacks 2003-2011
- 8. 8/26 Military Expenditure UNCLASSIFIED SIPRI:1531 billions USD in 2009
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- 10. 10/26 1. Different classificationof war: Epochs UNCLASSIFIED Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker : 4 epochs, based on energy sources human energy animal-based energy mechanical energy post-mechanical energy: Advanced technology warfare Non-Western warfare
- 11. 11/26 Waves Agricultural war Industrial-based war(late of 17th century) Knowledge-based war (from 1980s) UNCLASSIFIED Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare based on the economic and societal changes of civilization.
- 12. 12/26 Forms of warfare Symmetric Dissymmetric Asymmetric /EricWalters/ UNCLASSIFIED After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric
- 13. 13/26 Forms of warfare Symmetric Dissymmetric Asymmetric /EricWalters/ UNCLASSIFIED After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric
- 14. 14/26 Symmetric In symmetric conflicts,the two opposing adversaries dispose of armed forces that are similar in all aspects such as force structure, doctrine and assets and have comparable tactical, operational and strategic objectives. UNCLASSIFIED
- 15. 15/26 A conflict isdissymmetric when one of the opposing forces is superior by means of force structure, doctrine and assets, but both parties are striving for similar political and military objectives. Dissymmetric UNCLASSIFIED
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- 17. 17/26 2. Asymmetric Warfare(AW) One of the opponents is unable or unwilling to wage the war with comparable force structure, doctrine and assets and has different political and military objectives than his adversary.
- 18. 18/26 Asymmetric Warfare (AW) What is it? David and Goliath warfare Unsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically) Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan) Often state sponsored/supported Attacking opponent via indirect means such as Terrorism Critical infrastructures Avoids combat w/ conventional forces Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.
- 19. 19/26 3. Military cultures Clausewitz:„War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” UNCLASSIFIED The way of application of force depends on the military culture.
- 20. 20/26 Kinds of MilitaryCultures Material-centric; Movement-centric; Guerilla warfare Forms: terrorism, guerilla warfare, orthodox warfare; Types: anarchism; equality-based; tradition- based; pluralist; secessionist; divider; reformer; Used methods: coup d’état; exhausting, focus on military, warfare in build-up areas; UNCLASSIFIED Orthodox warfare
- 21. 21/26 Strategy of „indirect approach” Characteristics: Daggeringwars; Defence; Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy Indirect warfare- not only with military means Main services: air force, navy Preferred by: maritime powersUNCLASSIFIED Indirect approach Material-centric
- 22. 22/26 Movement-centric UNCLASSIFIED Strategy of „direct approach” Characteristics: Blitzkrieg; Offence; Strategicobjective: destroy the enemy Direct warfare- decisive maneuvers Main services: land force, Preferred by: continental powers
- 23. 23/26 Guerilla warfare UNCLASSIFIED Strategy of„indirect approach in irregular form” Supported by people Characteristics: Hit and run actions; Offence; Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy, provoke a collapse internally Media Indirect warfare- not only with military means Main services: land
- 24. 24/26 4. Generations ofWarfare UNCLASSIFIED COL BOYD Non-linear warfare Focuses on moral-mental-physical portions of enemy & as single entity Focus on the enemy and environment Knowledge of strategic environment Interact w/ environment appropriately
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- 26. 26/26 Trinity Clausewitz: „the waris monopoly of the state” UNCLASSIFIED people government army society
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- 28. 28/26 2 GW= Ageof Firepower UNCLASSIFIED Massed firepower... But still in lines
- 29. 29/26 3 GW= Ageof Maneuver UNCLASSIFIED
- 30. 30/26UNCLASSIFIED 4 GW= Ageof Independent Action Cells Asymmetric warfare in irregular form
- 31. 31/26 4 GW= Ageof Independent Action Cells
- 32. 32/26 Role of Technologyin 4GW UNCLASSIFIED
- 33. 33/26UNCLASSIFIED States & non- states wage war States& non-states wage war 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 The “generations of war” model New commo & transport networks 3 GW Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before) New weapons & concepts Peace of Westphalia State-vs-state— only “legal” form of war 2 GW Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc. Nuclear Weapons Proliferate Fall of USSR 1 GW 4 GW state vs. state
- 34. 34/26 Definition Formless and mostdeadly kind of war Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it). Exploits enemy weaknesses. Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents). UNCLASSIFIED 4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory:
- 35. 35/26 Drivers UNCLASSIFIED The rise of4GW is both a product and a driver of the following: The loss of the nation- state's monopoly on violence. The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict. Globalization (via technological integration).
- 36. 36/26 Characteristics Violent non-state actor(VNSA) fighting the state. lacks hierarchal authority lack of formal structure patience and flexibility ability to keep a low profile when needed small size VNSA’s forces are decentralized
- 37. 37/26 Tactics 4GW is foughton the tactical level via: Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. Psychological operations -- terror. Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself Human shields
- 38. 38/26 Tactics of 4GW Ethniccleansing Attacking C4I networks Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs) and International laws of war (ILOW) Exploitation of humanitarian relief organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc… Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his rear; Use the enemy’s strength against him
- 39. 39/26 Differences Global -- moderntechnologies and economic integration enable global operations. Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold. Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict. Vulerability -- open societies and economies.UNCLASSIFIED Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include:
- 40. 40/26 Differences II. Technology --new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors. Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation. Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting. UNCLASSIFIED
- 41. 41/26 4th Generation Warfare(4GW) Formless and most deadly kind of war 4GW ops are intelligence driven. Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness Distinguishing a combatant from a non- combatant (civil) can be extremely difficult Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone
- 42. 42/26 Winning a 4GWconflict Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts. Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US). Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future. UNCLASSIFIED Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd):
- 43. 43/26 Center of GravityIs The People Leverage unconventional capabilities against insurgents. Become cellular like “them”. Defeat a networked threat with a network. Develop small independent action forces (SIAF). Establish disciplined, well trained and highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces. UNCLASSIFIED
- 44. 44/26 Power of Perception& Influence As “Ammo” Money is ammunition Food is ammunition Medicine is ammunition Education is ammunition Fuel is ammunition Employment is ammunition Recognition is ammunition Respect is ammunition Information and knowledge is ammunition
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Editor's Notes
- #3 Why we have military science and theory of war? Just because the humanıty spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomen escorting the humanity. What we are waiting from the military science?
- #4 Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.
- #5 How we will fight the next war?
- #7 Lets see a little bit the statistics.
- #19 AW IS JUST A FANCY WAY OF SAYING “SUCKER PUNCH”. IF THE ENEMY EXPECTS YOU TO HIT W/ A RIGHT HOOK, HIT W/ THE LEFT HOOK INSTEAD. In Sun Tzu’s terms, AW is a way of maintaining “formlessness” Hannibal crossed the Alps on elephants Russia invaded by Napoleon. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Vietnamese & United States’ lack of will (as a Nation) to win.
- #25 Fourth generation warfare(4GW) is a concept defined by William S. Lind and expanded by Thomas X. Hammes, used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. Fourth Generation wars are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety.
- #27 Clausewitzian trinitarian paradigm the western conceptualization of nation-state warfare,
- #29 Second Generation Warfare was based on massed firepower. Tactics relied on fire and movement, with heavy reliance on indirect fire from artillery. It was different, but still essentially linear.
- #30 Third Generation Warfare was based on maneuver and real time communications. It was best exemplified by World War II's "Blitzkrieg". The attack relied on infiltration to bypass, cut off and collapse the enemy's main combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.
- #31 Fourth Generation Warfare is based on dispersion and communications that remove the battle front entirely. Attackers rely on cultural/media attack and coordinated violent actions to and paralyze or collapse the enemy's political will, rather than seeking decisive combat. Fourth Generation war is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state’s monopoly on war. Once again, as before 1648, many different entities, not states, are fighting war. They use many different means, including "terrorism" and immigration, not just formal armies. Differences between cultures, not just states, become paramount, and other cultures will not fight the way we fight.
- #32 the Western rules and conventions guiding and constraining the conduct of war do not apply at all. There are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, and no respect for the territorial limits of states.
- #34 This chart plays well as a slide show. As Echevarria rightly notes, 4GW does not lie in the logical sequence of 1/2/3 GW. In fact, the two vertical red lines on the right imply that that sequence has played itself out as state-vs-state warfare fades in significance. 4GW rises from the swamp at the bottom of the figure. The reason that 4GW is sometimes confused with guerrilla warfare is that violent transnational entities often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare methods - the classical way for militarily weak forces to defeat stronger ones. What defines 4GW is - as Lind and van Creveld insist - who fights and what they’re fighting for. Hammes observed that the transnational nature of 4GW means that networking (as in “social networking”) will be an important tool – see The Sling and the Stone – and so successful 4GW groups may resemble political parties that also have an armed component. Hezbullah fits this model, and the events of July 2006 shows how effective it can be. In this chart, “insurgents” are fighting the established government of a state, and “partisans” are fighting occupiers. Clearly there is a lot of overlap and both often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare at various stages of their campaigns. States also employ terrorism against their state and nonstate opponents and often against their own citizens (e.g., Reign of Terror, Halabja, the Holocaust, etc.) Nobody is exactly sure what “anarchists” were fighting for.
- #35 While this term is similar to terrorism and asymmetric warfare, it is much narrower. Classical insurgencies and the Indian Wars are examples of Pre-Modern War, not 4GW. Fourth generation warfare usually has the insurgency group or non-state side trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the one currently running the territory. The blurring of lines between state and non-state is further complicated in a democracy by the power of the media.
- #37 Fourth generation warfare is normally characterized by a violent non-state actorr (VNSA) fighting a state. This fighting can be physically done, such as by modern examples Hezbollah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In this realm the VNSA uses all three levels of fourth generation warfare. These are the physical (actual combat; it is considered the least important), mental (the will to fight, belief in victory, etc.) and moral (the most important, this includes cultural norms, etc.) levels. Another characteristic of fourth generation warfare is that as with third generation, the VNSA’s forces are decentralized. With fourth generation warfare there may even be no single organisation and that smaller groups organize into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat (that being the state armed forces or another faction). As a result these alliances are weak and if the state’s military leadership is smart enough they can split their enemy and cause them to fight amongst themselves
- #39 ETHNIC CLEANSING: FORMER YUGO, PARTS OF AFRICA HUMAN SHIELDS: IRAQ, SOMALIA, TALIBAN? EXPLOITATION OF POVERTY: I.E. FORMER USSR’S WMD SCIENTISTS MAKING A LIVING BY PROSTITUTING THEIR DEADLY SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE. RUSSIAN MAFIA PROCURING WEAPONS AND WMD TO SELL TO TERRORISTS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. REST IS SELF EXPLANATORY. EXAMPLE OF EXPLOITATION OF U.S. LAWS/U.S. CONSTITUTION ----- Original Message -----> From: XXXXX> To: <undisclosed-recipients:>> Sent: Sunday, June 16, 2002 6:26 AM> Subject: MILINET: I accuse the media in the United States oftreason--Dennis> Pluchinsky>>> >> > washingtonpost.com> >> > They Heard It All Here, And That's the Trouble> >> > By Dennis Pluchinsky> >> > Sunday, June 16, 2002; Page B03> >> >> > I accuse the media in the United States of treason.> >> > I have been analyzing terrorism for the U.S. government for 25 years. My> > specialty is "threat analysis." This is a rather difficult field that> > requires the imagination of Walt Disney, the patience of a kindergarten> > teacher, the mind-set of a chess player, the resolve of a Boston Red Sox> fan,> > the mental acuity of a river boat gambler, and the forecasting abilityof> a> > successful stock market analyst.> >> > While the media have, over the past several weeks, written extensivelyon> > alleged intelligence "failures" surrounding the events of Sept. 11, Iwant> to> > address the media's common-sense "failures." As a terrorism analyst, Iam> > both appalled and confused by many of the post-9/11 articles publishedat> > home and abroad, in newspapers, news magazines and academic journals, as> well> > as on the Internet.> >> > Many of these articles have clearly identified for terrorist groups the> > country's vulnerabilities -- including our food supply, electricalgrids,> > chemical plants, trucking industry, ports, borders, airports, special> events> > and cruise ships. Some of these articles have been lengthy and have> provided> > tactical details useful to terrorist groups. No terrorist group that Iam> > aware of has the time and manpower to conduct this type of extensive> research> > on a multitude of potential targets. Our news media, and certain think> > tankers and academicians, have done and continue to do the target> > vulnerability research for them.> >> > Imagine that you are a supporter or sympathizer of a terrorist group and> you> > have been tasked to identify and collect tactical information onpotential> > U.S. targets. Consider some of the following headlines that haveappeared> > since 9/11: "Private Plane Charters: One Way Around Air Security,"> "Suicidal> > Nuclear Threat Is Seen At Weapons Plants," "Priority Required for> Protecting> > Utilities," "NRC Warns of Missing Radioactive Materials," "Freight> Transport:> > Safe from Terror?" "Chemical Plants Are Feared As Targets," "America's> Roads> > May Be Just As Vulnerable As Its Skies," "Study Assesses Risk of Attackon> > Chemical Plants," "Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on PassengerJets:> 2> > Reports List Security Gaps," and "Truck Terrorism Possible, U.S. Says:> > Investigation Finds Lack of Licensing Safeguards."> >> > I do not understand the media's agenda here. This country is at war. Do> you> > honestly believe that such stories and headlines, pointing out our> > vulnerabilities for Japanese and Nazi saboteurs and fifth columnists,> would> > have been published during World War II? Terrorists gather targeting> > information from open sources and field surveillance. What other sources> do> > they have? Do they have a multibillion-dollar intelligence communitywith> > thousands of employees? Do they have telecommunications satellites to> > intercept communications?> >> > If there's one thing terrorists have been open about, it's theirreliance> on> > open information. In the mid-1980s there was a Belgian left-wingterrorist> > group called the Communist Combatant Cells, or CCC. At the time, it was> > carrying out a series of bombings against American targets in Belgium.The> > media there were speculating that the CCC had plants or spies inside> various> > Belgian agencies to be able to carry out attacks so efficiently. "NATO> > Pipelines Sabotaged: Military Secrets in the Hands of the CCC?" read a> > headline in the Dec. 12, 1984, edition of the Belgian newspaper Le Soir.> > Finally, in a written communiqué disseminated in April 1985, the CCC> > explained how it acquired its targeting information. The communiqué> stated:> > "Being methodical types and having considered the relative accessibility> of> > the pipeline, we consulted the top-secret telephone book where, under> > 'Ministry of Defense,' every pumping station in the entire country is> listed.> > We drew up our lists of all the towns these stations were located in,and> > decided to explore them during long walks in the countryside."> >> > Terrorist groups continue to rely on open sources to come up with> targeting> > ideas and tactical information. This is why the Internet has become so> > valuable to terrorist groups. Richard Clarke, head of the White House's> > Office of Cyber defenses and probably the most knowledgeable high-level> > government official on terrorism, testified to Congress on Feb. 13 that,> > based on evidence found in the caves of Afghanistan, al Qaeda "was using> the> > Internet to do at least reconnaissance of American utilities andAmerican> > facilities." Furthermore, he noted, "if you put all the unclassified> > information together, sometimes it adds up to something that ought to be> > classified."> >> > So why do the research for the terrorists? For example, "vulnerability"> > articles appearing in the media always contain interviews or commentsfrom> > three or four experts or specialists. It could be the former head of the> > National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an American Trucking> > Associations official, a union leader, technician or consultant. These> > experts will talk to reporters. None of them would ever talk to a> terrorist.> > Therefore, if not for the media, terrorist groups would have no accessto> the> > insights and wisdom of these people. What also infuriates me is when the> > media publish follow-up reports noting that security measures or> procedures> > around a specific target or system still have not been implemented. Not> only> > do the media identify potential target vulnerabilities for theterrorists> but> > they also provide our foes with progress reports!> >> > In a war situation, it is not business as usual. Use some common sense.> > Certainly, if a reporter or academician believes that he or she has> > discovered a vulnerability or flaw in one of our sectors or systems, itis> > important to let others know. It seems reasonable to me that a process> should> > be established where such articles are filtered through a government> agency> > such as the proposed Department of Homeland Security. A skeptic wouldcall> > this censorship; a patriot would call it cooperation. This type of> > cooperation existed during World War II and believe me, this current war> is a> > "world war" also.> >> > I also am concerned about the many articles detailing how the 9/11> terrorists> > were able to come and live in the United States. These articles havenoted> > which mannerisms of the terrorists aroused the suspicion of their> landlords,> > acquaintances, neighbors, flight instructors and others. Articles have> > pointed out what mistakes the terrorists made and how we failed to pickup> on> > those mistakes. Al Qaeda terrorists now know to pay a speeding ticket> > promptly. They now know not to pay for things with large amounts ofcash.> > They now know to buy some furniture for their apartments or rooms. They> now> > know that they have to act friendly and not surly or antagonistic intheir> > dealings with neighbors and other locals. They know now that they should> have> > a phone installed in their apartments or rooms.> >> > The U.S. media's autopsy of the movements and interactions of earlier> > terrorists may have helped the 9/11 hijackers and others seeking to come> to> > the United States to do us harm. In a March 23 article entitled "The> Jackals> > of Islam" that was published on an Islamic Web site, Abu-Ubaydal-Qurashi,> > believed to be a close aide to Osama bin Laden, commenting on the 9/11> > operatives, stated that "the suicide hijackers studied the lives of> > Palestinian Yehiya Ayash [a Hamas bomb maker who was himselfassassinated]> > and Ramzi Yousef [operational planner of the 1993 World Trade Center> bombing]> > and the security mistakes that led to their downfall while they were> > preparing for the September 11 operation." How did al Qaeda know aboutthe> > security mistakes that led to the death of Ayash and the capture of> Yousef?> > The media, at home and abroad.> >> > Courtrooms can also give terrorists windows into our thinking andmethods.> In> > the 1980s when German terrorists from the leftist Red Army Faction (RAF)> were> > tried in Germany, the prosecution had to detail all of the evidence,> > including how they linked the terrorists to specific attacks. Forensic> > experts from the German BKA (comparable to the FBI) described in theopen> > courtroom how they extracted fingerprints from items left at the attack> > sites. At the time, there were RAF sympathizers and supporters in the> > courtroom who took notes. It did not take long for the RAF terrorists> still> > at large to change their methods -- wearing gloves and spraying their> hands> > with latex so that they would not leave any fingerprints.> >> > The U.S. media are providing a similar service for al Qaeda. I am sure> that> > al Qaeda will fix its mistakes and mannerisms before its next attack in> the> > United States. I say the following with a heavy heart, but if there were> an> > "Osama bin Laden" award given out by al Qaeda, I believe that it wouldbe> > awarded to the U.S news media for their investigative reporting. Thistype> of> > reporting -- carrying specifics about U.S. vulnerabilities -- must be> stopped> > or censored.> >> > I propose that the Department of Homeland Security establish a program> where> > academicians, reporters, think tankers or any citizen could contact the> > department and inform them of security vulnerabilities. If thedepartment> > determined that these vulnerabilities indeed existed, then it couldaward> > "Homeland Security Protective Security" certificates to individuals or> > "Homeland Security Gold Stars" to newspaper or Internet sites that putthe> > country first during a time of war. If displayed on its banner, thisstar> > might increase circulation.> >> > During World War II, there was a security slogan that went: "Loose lips> sinks> > ships." Maybe the current security slogan should be: "Prolific pens> propagate> > terrorist plots." The president and Congress should pass lawstemporarily> > restricting the media from publishing any security information that canbe> > used by our enemies. This was necessary during World War II, it is> necessary> > now. These restrictions were backed by the American public during World> War> > II, and I believe the public would support them now.> >> > As for "treason," well, maybe that accusation against the media is not> > justified. Webster's dictionary defines treason as violation ofallegiance> > toward one's country and lists one of its characteristics as"consciously> and> > purposely acting to aid its enemies." I know the media have not> consciously> > and purposely aided al Qaeda. Therefore, J'accuse the media of lacking> common> > sense. As a concerned terrorism analyst, I say the following to themedia:> > You are making the jobs of terrorism analysts, intelligence officers and> law> > enforcement officials very difficult. Help us, don't hinder us from> defeating> > our enemies.> >> > Dennis Pluchinsky is a senior intelligence analyst with the Diplomatic> > Security Service in the U.S. Department of State. His opinions are> personal> > ones and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the State> > Department or any other branch of the U.S. government.> >> >> >> > © 2002 The Washington Post Company
- #45 22 countries of Arab League 300 – 330 millions 5 % of the world population has the youngest 40% under 14. From this population 60 million people is illiterate. Number of translated books from foreign language to Arab in the Arab world is 4.4 / 1 million people this figure in western world is around 900. Poor access to the knowledge!!!