Special Forces-future challenges

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National War College
Washington, DC
Title:
Special Operations – “future challenges”
(Individual Strategic Research Project)
Author:
BG Adrian Ciolponea (ROU-SF)
Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the requirement of
National War College course
Academic Advisor: Bernard Cole
2015

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1. General context- Imminent threats;…………………………p.4-8;
2. David Kilcullen theory; ………………………………………p.8-16
3. Joint Urban Special Operations Task Force; ………………p 16-23
3.1 Intelligence in urban environment;………………..p.24-28;
3.2 JUSOTF-Task-organization;……………………….p.28-33;
3.3 Implementation ofUrban SpecialOperationatOperational
and TacticalLevels …………………………………p.33-38;
4. Communication in urban special operations; ……………….p.38-53;
5. Conclusion;…………………………………………………… p.53-58;
6. Bibliography……………………………………………………p.58-59;
Annexes:
1. Tactical Urban UAVs –MD4-3000; ………………………….p.60-61;
2. Mystic-Diamond theory; Counterinsurgency strategy………..p.62-93;
3. Non-lethal weapons …………………….. …………………...p.94-99

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Executive Summary
The future of warfare is most likely to occur in urban environments. Current
SF units already includethe elements most adaptableto conducting effective urban
warfare.(Kilcullen theory) These attributes include a flattened command structure,
with local commanders having the physical resources, moral authority, and
command abilityto carry out their missions with relative independence. Thisin turn
requires high levels of individual and small-unit competence and morale, within a
framework of effective and reliable communications. This last factor is key for
effective command and control, and for mission accomplishment.
The strategy required for this military response should be part of a modern
counterinsurgency and interagency effort. Nevertheless, doctrinal innovation and
thinking shift is a must, in order to eliminate the bureaucratic drift, conventional
norms and barriers, and to ensure success.
Technologicalinnovation is also vital in order to integratenew urban tacticsand
procedure and eliminate/minimize civilian collateral casualties. The urban force
would be part of a comprehensive smart approach, where all instruments of power
would be tailored for a better strategic approach. Moreover the application of this
type of non-traditional force, would be effective when integrated in correlation of
other elements presented in Professor McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond Theory”-
(Annex no 2).

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1. General context-Imminent threats
We are living in a complex world with increased scarceresources and difficult
economic challenges. Civilizations (western and eastern) and religions are clashing,
and common ground for peace becomes a more difficult objective to achieve.
The world population is growing fast. By the end of 2020 many sociologists
estimate a total of 9 billion inhabitants on Earth, and thus cities are doubling their
size and challenges, due to accelerated urbanization and migration from rural to
urban areas.
Water becomes astrategic vital element for many nations along with energetic
sectors. Food becomes harder to obtain, and pollution irreversibly alter the
environment. The climate becomes unpredictable, global warming has direct
implications on ocean level raising, which eventually will shrink the littoral
populated area.
Innovation and technology becomes an indispensable engine for progress and
life, computers and the internet are governing the human space. The world
population is becoming more interconnected and globalization is present not only in
economy but also in social media.
“Individuals and small groups exploits globalized technology and
information to expand influence and approach state like disruptive capacity.”1
Migration, socialmobility and air connectivity have also increased the danger
the spread of pandemic disease with countries becoming more vulnerable to such
invisible threats. Sociologists estimates global social and demographic trends based
1“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 June 2012,
J 7)

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on particular drivers like, economy, GDP per capita, birth rate, mortality, health
index, education or even weather pattern.
“Zbigniew Brezinski’s recent book, Strategic Vision, highlights globalized
political awakening: …..an interactive and independent world connected by visual
communicationsand of the demographicyouth bulge in the less advanced societies
composed of the easy to mobilize and politically restless university students and the
socially deprived unemployed”2
In today’s dynamic, unpredictable, rapid changing environment, it is rather
difficult to clearly foreseen future conflict trends, although some common elements
stand apart. Globalization, a technological driven society instability, rapid escalation
of the conflicts, are common characteristics of the future. One thing is sure, the
nature of war will remain the same. Violence with political aim.
“The nature of warfare does not change, any more than does that of the
human beingsthatliebehind it. . . . Wars in all eras have more in common with each
other than they do with other activities of their respective time.”3
State to state conflicts are never completely eliminated, the geopolitical arena
is evolving unexpectedly, violence in the Middle-East and Africa has reached
alarming quotas. Radicalism and extremism is on offensive, terrorist attacks has
been multiplied around the globe, and governments often fail to identify the root
causes. Examples could be endless, with the ISIL movement in Iraq and Syria, the
battles in Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, Aleppo, or the Tripoli terrorist’s attacks in
Mumbai, Mexico, Baghdad, Paris, Nairobi, etc. Conflicts are becoming more
blurred, combatlines are becoming undefined. “Manythreatsin the futurecities will
2 Richard Davenport, “ The future of Interdependence: Conventional Forces will look more like
SOF: SOF will look more like CIA”, ” Special Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.23
3 Colin S. Gray, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,” Prism 3
(June 2012), p. 17

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be what have been called “threats without enemies” –there’ll be nobody to fight,
nothing to kill”.4
“While the nature of war will remain a violent clash of wills between states
or armed groups pursuing advantageous political ends, the conduct of future
warfare will include combinations of conventional and unconventional, lethal and
nonlethal, and military and nonmilitary actions and operations, all of which add to
the complexity of the future security environment”5
Additionally the fragile power balance in different regions is affected by
nuclear ambitions of emerging military contenders to US supremacy, like Iran,
North-Korea. The sphere of influence is being disputed and redefined among great
powers; competition for resources is escalating and emerging powers are more
aggressive, as evidenced in China actions in South China Sea and Russian episode
in Ukraine. US Strategy becomes more complex and intermingled with the world
evolution.
“On the relationship with China and Russia, I’ve told many people that we
really have to avoid Thucydides’ trap. The trap goes something like this it was
Spartan fearof Athens that madewarinevitable. Well, I thinkthat one of my jobs as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and as an advisor to our senior leaders, is to help
avoid a Thucydidestrap. We don’t wantthe fear of an emerging China to make war
inevitable.” Gen. Martin Dempsey, 3 May 2012
Even the cold war was reset in the light of “Ukrainian episode“which has not
been anticipated by the world political analysts, and brought to the surface another
perspective on geopolitics balance, and perhaps another type of conflict- the urban
hybrid conflict. Militaries around the world has to identify a properanswer to such
threat.
4 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, 263
5 Joint Force Quarterly 76, Ofer Friedman, “Nonlethal Weapons –a technological gap or mis-
defined requirements?”,1st Quarter,p.74

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“Hybrid threats are the diverse and dynamiccombinationsof regular forces,
irregular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces and criminal elements unified to
achieve mutually benefits effects.”6
Addressing hybrid threats requires a comprehensive smart long term
approach, where Special Forces (as partofmilitary response)could play a major role
Today, U.S. Special Forces are the most advanced forces in the world. Not only the
extensive footprint of more than 50.000 personal is it impressive but also the
technical and tactical/operational combat expertise of special operators. Special
Forces have a wide range of missions, probably one of the most important being
foreign internal defense (military assistance in NATO terms).
This mission allows to a small team ofoperators to operatein hostile environment
and to help the host nation to better operate and to counter an internal or external
threat. Along this line, Richard Davenport, further explains:
“To implement a Mission Command future, more is required, such as the
development of new authorities to fully operate in a decentralized manner in
countries where information and political power are decentralized to large
populations, as well as various nefarious groups and non-state actors.”7
There are critics arguing that the SOF (Special Operation Forces) concept is
overrated, Special Operation are not relevant anymore in the modern warfighting,
having little strategic impact. NATO’s special operations doctrine underlines the
four basic missions: direct actions; special Reconnaissance; military assistance;
psychological Operations. Along this line, critics argue that missions like direct
actions, could be performed by highly trained light infantry forces, special
6 Lawrence W Hank, “ The mindset Change for the Future Operational Environment” Special
Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.18

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reconnaissance could be assigned to long range reconnaissance units, and military
assistance should be performed by various military advisers or liaison officers.
In reality, SF ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) is better suited, designed,
and trained to prepare a foreign unit to face a diffuse enemy, to conductand execute
sensitive missions in urban densely populated environment, to work through and
with local combat elements of the host nation.
2. Kilcullen theory
A well-known Australian expert in guerrilla warfare, David Kilcullen has an
interesting theory about future conflicts. His thesis (presented in “Out of the
mountains”) argues the following: since the world population is becoming more
concentrated in megacities especially in littoral areas, also the future conflicts and
insurgencies will be more likely to start and develop in these areas. His argument is
based not only on current demographic trends and projections, but also on analysis
on different 90 insurgencies and terrorist attacks of this century.
The constant population migration from rural areas to urban zones (more
specific to littoral urban areas) especially in undeveloped and under developing
countries has as primary effect - overpopulation and the lack of governance.
“Rapid unplanned urbanization, lack of governance capacity, limited
economic opportunity, youth unemployment, or shortages of energy, water, and
sanitation- all of which, as we’ve seen, can be city-killers-can’t be fixed simply by
judicious application of some magic formula of kinetic force.”8
These two ingredients associated with reduced resources, political, ethnic and
religious competition would eventually determine the consolidation of organized
crime as a parallel authoritarian structure with the state.
8 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, p.263

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Facing such challenges megacities will react by isolating the traditional core
from the outskirts, thus allowing a parallel social structure to evolve outside the city
walls. Certainly these slums and ghettos, will end up soon to be ruled by criminal
nexus often in open competition with the government. This criminal nexus would
develop internal hierarchy, language codes norms and values. The rest of the local
population has to adapt to this new environment.
“DiegoGambetta, in his fascinating studyof criminalcommunication, Codes
of the Underworld, notes similar initiation behaviors among mafia families, prison
gangs, insurgents, and drug trafficking organizations.”9 “Gambetta also described
cases in which recruits were asked to commit atrocious crimes purelyas tests….This
made the villagers complicit in illegal, violent, collective action- cutting them off
from the state and putting them at the mercy of the movement.”10
Not having ready the infrastructure and the services for the fast growing rural
population attracted by the urban mirage, the cities would collapse, and they would
be forced to adoptan isolation policy, where the residential and commercial centers
are guarded and defended against intruders, leaving the slums and ghettos to evolve
as a separate territory. Alan Bauer, assertion, concur with the above mentioned
theory:
“There is another stage in the evolution-the progression to “gangs-
terrorism” and the prisons and the penal system are reinforcing the
process….”gangs-terrorism” can either proceed or follow the process of
jihadization”11
The organized crime and the lawless would favor the terrorist, radical, ethnic
violence. Supported by different internal or external actors, these internal
movements would reach the critical mass, and transform into insurgency. Usually,
9 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press p.129
10Ibidem p.134
11Alain Bauer, “Hybridization of Conflicts”, Prism 4, No.4, p.65

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governments would employ in suchsituations, a direct military response, often unfit
for an “unconventional threat”. Robert Ward, plainly explains:
“Conventionalgeneralsaretrained tomaneuverlargeforces in majorground
and air operations and therefore seek to employ their forces in ways that do what
large conventionalforces do best: they seek large-scale operations designed to find,
fix and destroy enemy forces. Unfortunately, guerrillas (insurgents) generally have
the operational ability not to allow themselves either to be found or fixed in
significant numbers unless they want to be. Grudgingly, conventional generals
eventuallyabandon largemaneuveroperationsin favorof patrols and raidsbysmall
units, butthis operations, while more effective tactically, do not producethe desired
result unless they are part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy”.12
Nevertheless, the strategic objective of any insurgency remains the same-to
change political regime, establish control and dominate the population. (Annex -2,
Mystic Diamond Theory- ProfessorGordon McCormick NavalPost Graduate
School).
“ In irregular conflicts (that is , in conflicts where at least one combatantis
a non-state armed group), the local armed actor thatgiven population perceives as
best ableto establish a predictable, consistent, wide –spectrum normative system of
control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area.” 13
This is precisely the place where Kilcullen, foreseen future small conflicts
emerging. This is notto say that the possibility oflarger conventional or even nuclear
wars between states or alliances is totally eliminated. The possibility of war
especially in this fragile contemporary environment is never eliminated. What
Kilcullen is arguing based on historical and social evidence is that future small
conflicts will likely to spawn in littoral megacities.
12 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency”,
(Fort Bragg, Department of the Army, JFK Special Warfare center and School, Special Warfare,
volume 20, March-April 2007), p.10.

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“Great historical and revolutionary shifts in societies have more often than
not, caught militaries off guard… “14
The right conditions will be there…unsatisfied, frustrated segment of
population with no hope in a better life, illegal traffic of person, guns, money and
drugs covering the necessary infrastructure requirements for organizing an armed
group or an insurgency. State and insurgents will find themselves in a competitive
environment. The price for this competition is the population. Insurgents can use
violence against population in order to achieve obedience and recruitment.
“Not only are the problems of corruption, organized crime, insurgency, and
the narcotics trade in Afghanistan mutually reinforcing and convergent; they are
also enduring.”15 State is not allowed to do it. When state is using violence as a
primary weapon, it will serve the insurgents interests.
“Any sensible guerrilla, terrorist, or organized criminal network will of
course attack soft target (the unarmed civilian population that supports a risky
target than the police or the military, the civilian population is more numerousand
easily accessible than the government installation and officials.”16
NATO and US government have the necessary military power to face any
major conventional threats. Certainly, for any threat, the US government has to
gradually apply a smart power package consisting of, diplomatic, information,
economic, financial, law enforcement tools.
“… In order to maintain the dynamic of information campaign, and to build
the bridgebetween operatives on the ground and local, he has to classify the target
audiencein three separatesegments- the true believers the hard core, the undecided
15 Tim Sullivan and Carl Forsberg, “Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime
in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict”, Prism 4, No.4, p.170

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and the pro-coalition segments. Then, regarding local population, the focus was on
undecided segment”.17
In order to break enemy’s will to fight, only one of the strategic layers
represents the military option, often time applied in a traditional way. In irregular
conflicts, conventional forces or even Special Forces have the same dilemma:
How to separate and isolate the insurgents from population? How to break the
cycle ofviolence? How to eliminate the collateral casualties and establish a political
control in area of operation?
“Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to
operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means
of achieving effects.”18 Robert Taber asserts:
“Theguerrilla fightsthe warof the flea, and hismilitary enemy suffers the dog’s
disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to
come to grips with. If the war continues long enough this is the theory the dog
succumbstoexhaustion and anemiawithouthaving foundanythingon whichtoclose
his jaws or to rake his claws.”19
If these questions are not addressed during the execution phase of the military
campaign, the perception of the population about foreign and government forces
evolves negative. The outcome, is escalation of violence where regular forces end
up acting oppressive, suppressing basic human rights, and destroying local business
orcommercial networks and the sourceoflocal life. This represents the turning point
in the dynamic of the conflict favoring the insurgency. David Kilcullen, further
describes:
“A purely coercive actor can cast a spell of fear over a population, butsoon as
this spell is broken, the population will turn on its tormentor with incredible speed
and violence. By contrast, a group that applies a rangeof coercive, administrative,
and persuasive means has a much stronger and more resilient control system. Such
a group can respond to a setback in one partof the spectrum by increasing its efforts
17 Colonel Ralph O. Baker, The Decisive Weapon, p.8
15“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15
June 2012, J 7)
19 Robert Taber

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in another, and can therefore maintain greater and more flexible control over
time.”20
The result would be a prolonged conflict fueled by internal, ethnic, religious
economic grievances, where collateral causalities are becoming the very engine for
violence.
“Professor Stathias Kalyvas showed (“The Logic of Violence in Civil War”)
in a comprehensive series of case studies that armed groups in civil war don’t
become strong because the people support their ideology; on the contrary, people
start supporting a given group’s ideology in places where that group is already
strong. Kalyvas argued that as conflicts continue, people increasingly collaborate
with whatever actor controls their area, because political actors who enjoy
substantial territorial control can protect civilians who live in that territory-both
from rivals and themselves, giving survival orientated civilians a strong incentive to
cooperate with them irrespective of their true or initial preferences.” 21
Certainly, the insurgent’s strategy is based oninvisibility oftheir forces which
are embedded within the local population – the main recruitment base. As a result,
this parallel infrastructure of insurgents is taking over and replacing the traditional
government presence:
“The Afghan example is just one illustration of an underground control
structure (a form of illicit social control, sometimes referred to in classical
counterinsurgency theory as a “parallel hierarchy or ‘guerilla government.”22
Insurgents are using the inhabited area as a stage base, logistic and
informational hub, and recruitment base. Their communication strategy is mainly
based on incentives, expectations, punishments, believes.
“Today, the Taliban justice system draws on the movement’s reputation for
harsh predictability and consistency: it attracts people with the promise of fair
22.Ibidem p. 126

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dispute resolution, just and enforceable mediation, and the prevention and
punishment of crime and corruption.”23
“In December 1964, the classical counterinsurgency theorist, Bernard Fall,
was launchingatUS NavalWar College the theory of competitive system of control
in insurgencyenvironment. –“an idea that’snot spatial(“insurgent –controlled” or
“contested” areas or structural “networks and movements” but rather functional.
It implies the presence of a range of incentives and disincentives, all of which are
used to generate control over population groups- the individual strands of a
networked system of control that attracts and then corrals a population, much as a
fish trap cages fish. It also implies a competition among several actors who are all
trying to control the population in a violent and contested environment.”24
The dominant actor in the area are competing with the government in
establishing the control on local population. Similar examples illustrating the
competition for political control could be found in separatist conflict in Ukraine
eastern territories or in Iraq/Syrian northern territories controlled by Sunni radical
groups of ISIS/ISIL.
“Theactor may be a government or a non-state group: it may be benevolent
or malevolent, legally recognized or illicit, formal or informal. But two
characteristics must always be present: the actor must always be armed (that is, it
must have the capacity to inflict violence as part of its spectrum of sanctions) and it
must be a group (some form of collective entity), not just an individual. An unarmed
actor lack the capacity both to enforce its own normative system and to resist
predation from other actors in the violent ecosystem we’ve just described.”25
Nevertheless, military means are not the single ones, when smart power is
applied. Often time, social media, information, propaganda and persuasion are
important factors to be consider, because these are efficient ways to target the
undecided segment of the population, and gradually modify the perception.
“The dominant actor in the area would use a spectrum of persuasive
arguments and inducements to support the dominant rule set. “These include
23 Ibidem p.122
25 Ibidem, p 132

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propaganda, political and ideological mobilization, social pressure, and identity
manipulation.Butas we’ve seen, often the most persuasive element is the feeling of
security, predictability, order and cohesion.”26
If the adversary gains the informational advantage and starts dominate the
perception of population, half the battle is already won.
“Our adversary therefore had considerable success in shaping and
influencing the perceptions of the Iraqi public in its favor. The ponderous way in
which centrally managed PSYOPS products were developed, vetted, and approved
through bureaucratic channelsmeant they were simply not being produced quickly
enough to do any good. Just as important, they were not being tailored precisely
enough to influence our diverse audiences' opinions about breaking events.”27
As was experienced so far in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Liberia,
Somalia, the presence of large military conventional forces only amplify the
magnitude of the conflict:
“The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same
lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be.” -Marshal
Ferdinand Foch.
In this case, along with the other instruments of power, there is a possible
need for a highly specialized urban combatforce, flexible and adaptable. This could
be a possible answer for the future military challenges.
“Unfortunately, for too long that was the preferred response- ground forces
planned tobypassthe cities, naviesfocused on blue water operation, air forces liked
to think about air interdiction,…..That won’t be an option in the future, when the
coastal zone of an entire continent may be one giant mega-slum, when most of the
world’s population will be concentrated in coastal cities, and when the enemy will
be wherever we go, in part because it will be our very presence that turns some
locals into enemies.”28
26 Ibidem, p. 133
27 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006.
28 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, p.265.

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Asymmetric conflicts raging catastrophic terrorism to military intervention in
interstate, ethnic and civil wars are most likely a threat to US security and interests.
Only a general theory of symmetric conflict outcomes can guide US policymakers
in their effort to build the kind of armed forces necessary to implement an effective
US strategic response.
“TheUS was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle
for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in
applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.” 29
“An ideal U.S. strategic response in an asymmetric conflict therefore demands
two central elements: (1) preparation of public expectations for a long war despite
U.S. technologicaland materialadvantages, and(2)thedevelopmentand deployment
of armed forces specifically equipped and trained for COIN operations….. Without a
nationalconsensus and realistic expectations, the United States would be politically
vulnerable in an asymmetric conflict. Without more special operations forces—the
self-reliant and discriminate armed forces necessary to implement an ideal COIN
strategy—what begins as a military operation against an isolated violent minority
will tend to escalate into a war against an entire people.”30
2. Urban Special Operations Task Force
Which are SF operators’ strong points?
Special Operational Forces Detachments (SOF Operational Detachments
Alfa or Bravo) are qualifying asthe most appropriatestructure in the Army in order
to cope with unconventionalwarfare. The reasons for this are worth mentioning the
following: collective skills, cost effective, multiplication role, and cultural
awareness and experience, and language abilities.”31
When it comes to urban combatenvironment, Special Forces, presents several
advantages:-autonomy in planning and execution, the ability to analyze and
29“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 J
une 2012, J 7)
30 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, p. 123.
31 “Adrian Ciolponea; Iancu Cristian, “Alternative war strategies for Iraq” , NPS, 2007, p. 51

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corroborate tactical and operational Intel, ability to perform in multi-spectrum
military environment (from tactical to strategic level), ability to employ multiple
specialization in order to solve tricky problems, ability to learn native language,
abilities and achieve a comfortable cultural awareness level, pedagogic and training
skills.
By far, autonomy in planning and execution is the key ingredient forSF, to be
recommended for future urban conflicts as a primary response. The principals of
special operations remains valid and perennial. …Quality is more important the
quantity; Humans are more important than hardware; Special Forces cannot be
created in the middle of the crises; Special Forces shouldn’t be used for tactical
objectives or where conventional forces, could achieve the same results.
Whenever facing a threat, decision makers have to go through the decision
planning process, wherethe situation is carefully assessed, thethreats are weight and
prioritized, the courseofactions are compared and played against “red teams”. Only
after a conclusion has been reached and a COA approved, the feasible package of
ways and means is addressed, as an integrated part to a smart approach.
“Information technology will changehow, where, and when we work.
Scenario Planning offers us a mechanism by which to bring structure to this and
other forms of complexity, offering us the vital ability to understand thedynamics
of change”. 32
The strategic approach should follow the algorithm: identifying the solution
(unconventional) allocate the necessary resources and task organize the feasible
combat force. Without clearly describing the end-state of the military campaign,
there is little chance for success. Decisions are surrounded by uncertainty, but
inaction leads to failure. In the book “On war” Carl von Clausewitz was observing.
32 Oliver Sparrow, Chatham House

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“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he
intends to conduct it.”
On the other hand a very well supported decision which is coming too late,
can be totally inefficient. Surprise, risk and innovation should be present in any
decision.
“Whoever argued that we should wait another week in order to ensure our
political rear presumablyknew whathewastalking about? Butanyonewhofelt that
in the end we were likely to be involved in war should know the value-and the cost-
of each day. How then could we speak so lightly of waiting another week? We now
had to makeour decision whether or not to carry out a pre-emptive strike. If we took
the enemy by surprise, we would knock at least one hundred of their warplanesout
of action…..the first shot would determine which side would suffer the heaviest
casualties, and would assuredly change the balance of forces.”33
Nevertheless, SpecialOperations are usually representing only a small portion
from a larger military campaign in correlation with other instruments of power. All
these are presumptions and cannot be predicted with 100%certainty; only one thing
can be foreseen. “Putting allpresumptionson the table and then testing them is one
defense of laymen, against experts.”34
According withKillculentheory, the most likelylocation for the next small
armed conflicts, in the next decades, willbein urban area. Knowing this, how do
we formulate an efficient the military response?
The general conviction is that modern US Army or NATO forces as a system
can handle any emerging threat, in any type of environment, just because of their
combat experience, technology, organization and tactics.
“ Future Joint Operations will be increasingly discriminate to minimize
unintended consequences the increased transparency of the future security
environment,heightenstheneed for force to beused precisely when possible…In the
saturated information environment of tomorrow, even minor lapses in conduct or
33 Moshe Dayan ”Story of my life”, Da Capo Press,1976, p.344
34 Neustadt and May, “Thinking in Time”, p 56

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application of fires could seriously damage the international reputation of United
States. This reality places a premium on joint operations informed by values and
professionalism”35(CCJO)
If the insurgency is more likely to start in urban environment, how this would
be addressed. Conventional versus unconventional. Lessons of the past, show us a
possible outcome, as Robert Ward asserts:
“U.S. Soldiersand Marinescannotdefeat an insurgency using essentially the
same strategy we employed unsuccessfully in Vietnam – conducting operations to
find, fix, and destroy groups of insurgents hiding among a generally passive, if not
supportive, population.”36
Taking into consideration the third principle ofspecialforces-(Urban) Special
Forces cannot be created in the eve of the crisis, this thesis argues,- when designing
the force for the future conflicts, we have to consider also the creation and training
of a specialized urban combat force. Most armies are designed, trained, equipped,
indoctrinated to break the will of the enemy, (in old Clausewitzan tradition) - using
military indiscriminate lethal power. As, McCormick well summarize, an
unconventional approach would have a slight different initial objective:
“Theunconventionalapproach in anycounterinsurgencycan betranslated at
Strategic and Operational levels as follows: Combating insurgency cannot be
achieved only by holding the vital points with large mechanized regular forces. If
the space is permissible for insurgents and the bridge between state forces and
population is broken, the both control and security are at peril in the long run.
Attacking insurgent networks should start from the source, denying insurgents
contact with local population by reinforcing an active presence, working closely
with local forces and employ constructive programs for the benefit of population.37
35 Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2020(CCJO);
36 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency,
37 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,”
2006. p.123; Kalev I. Sepp, p.10.

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Engaging regular armies to conquer and destroy the cities, would produce a
constant backlash. Firstly the bystanders would try to escape by evacuating the
fighting area. Rallying in huge refugees’ camps outside the city, would end up
developing huge humanitarian crises, dueto the lack of sustainable basic needs. This
would serve the insurgent’s narrative and objectives. In this case, what type of force
should better serve the unconventional approach?
“Unconventional warfare requires a different mental framework as well as
unique tactical skills. Recruiting, training, and ultimately employing elite warriors
is not sufficient for winning wars. The realm of modern strategy has been reluctant
to accept the unique of unconventional warfare and to avoid conventionalizing the
unconventional. TheSOF hassufficient tactical doctrine and manualsto tradecraft.
What is lacking is relevant strategic theory for exploiting the skills of the Special
Forces warrior.”38
The basic autonomous Special Forces unit called ODA (Operational
Detachment Alpha), is usually comprised of 12 operators with multiple
specializations (operations, intelligence, weapons, medic, communications, and
explosives) and other skills: JTAC, sniper, language expert, computers specialist,
and instructors.
Being able to plan, conduct, and execute any mission with little instructions
and supportfromabove, ODA acts in FID missions as a forcemultiplier, helping the
host government to deal with insurgencies or terrorist organizations.
Certainly, within Special Forces category, we can find US Navy Seals,
specialized in littoral missions or direct actions, Rangers are designated more as an
air assault strike force for direct actions, MARSOC ( Marines Special Operations)
having a wide range of missions, Delta forces are specialized in HRO (Hostage
38 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare,
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.96

21
RescueOperations). All the units above, are trained to operateefficiently in an urban
environment, excelling in CQB/CQC (Close Quarter Battle/Combat), one of the
most practiced set of techniques practiced and rehearsed:
“CQB- close quarter combat, can occur on land, at sea, or in the air, and
involves two-way fights that happen well within maximum visual or sensor
distance…..in a contested, urbanized environment, you mustfirstestablish persistent
presence, and to establish thatpresence you have to prevail in a fight. Thatfight by
definition, will be a close fight because of the way cities create close range,
distributed, fleeting engagements.”39
These missions have a clear objective to efficiently employ tactics, weapons
and communications in order to neutralize and eliminate the opponent.
Unquestionable, Special Forces were always involved in counterinsurgency
missions, “Strategic Hamlets” in Vietnam or “Village Stability Operations” in
Afghanistan.
“SOF in Afghanistan have been in recent years conducting VSO in
strategically importantareasof ruralAfghanistan. VSO areconducted aroundbasic
COIN campaign calling for “bottom up” stability operations designed to restore
local governancethat hasfrequently not existed in the past or hasbeen bypassed or
ignored. VSO efforts are conducted in four phases: shape, hold, build, expand and
transition.”40
Even so, SF units where more inclined to solve the equation using kinetic
actions in order to eliminate the opponents. In many occasions the neutralization of
the insurgents also involved significant civilian collateral casualties. The question is
whether, these forces are already adapted for new type of urban conflict. If not what
is still missing and needs to be improved? Rothstein, explains:
“These commando like activities are close to the conventional model of war
fighting and havegreatappeal, andthustend toconsumea disproportionateamount
40 Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, Chapter 2:”
Overseas Interagency Structures” p.2-15

22
of attention and training time, they are high visibility, immediate-gratification
missions, well within the comfort zone and easily identified with by both
conventional force and SOE. But conventional forces can often perform the same
missions.”41
David Killculen isarguing that if the urban conflict becomes a constant, also
another type of force specialized on urban guerillawarfarehas to be prepared for
the future.
Also, the former head of CIA, Leon Panetta, acknowledged the importance of
building a better force in order to face the future challenges: “The country is at a
strategic turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint
Force for thefuture thatwill be smaller and leaner, butwill beagile, flexible, ready,
and technologically advanced.”-Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 5 Jan 2012
No doubt, Special Forces (SF) have the all necessary ingredients for
becoming the desired urban combat force. In essence, SF should become more like
the CIA covert teams, with radical modification in current structure, command and
control, training, doctrine, technology and equipment. “The greatest risk we run
right now as an armed force is uncertainty.” General Martin Dempsey declared on
May 2014
In order to cope with uncertainty, the challenge of this new force is to build
quickly the necessary survival characteristics: versatility, adaptability to the
environment, invisibility, multiplication factor, collateral casualties free. Friedman
also observes:
“This force must be able to: execute full spectrum of missions, minimize
noncombatant fatalities, permanent injury, and undesired damage to property and
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 88.

23
environment; maintain force protection, reinforcing deterrence; and expand the
range of options available to joint force commanders” 42
Maj.Gen. Bennet Sacolick and Brig.Gen. Wayne Grisbsby Jr. were accurate
when theysaid –“Thescopeand scaleofchallengesanticipated in thefuturesecurity
environment demand the institutionalization of interdependence”43
Innovation would be ensured not only by understanding the unconventional
approachat every level, but also by implementing tactics and techniques specific for
urban environment, by using a better tactical intelligence network and technology
such as: non-lethal urban equipment, drones, fragmentation ammunition, water
breaching devices: Further, Ciolponea summarize:
“For these delicate missions coalition forces should use specialized trained
and skilled forces having a dual role: creating a symmetric network to counter the
insurgency influence over the population, and prepare the legacy force for the
future. In this scenario it is clear that the package of surrogate forces
(unconventional forces) should play the primary role being supported by a flexible
and rapid package of conventional forces. This concept implies also a profound
comprehension of an efficient counterinsurgency strategy, at strategic, operational
and tactical levels. Therefore, the profile of the forces is not only importantbutalso
the structure of command and control which is directing the overarching
doctrine.”44
In highly dense urban environment, with complex human illegal networks,
paramilitary/ terrorist groups, the implementation of a pure military solution would
be difficult to apply in a conventional manner, by any government. The
unconventional approach becomes necessary and desirable.
“The aim of an UW capability is to work by, with, and through indigenous
personnel over the long term. They would develop long-term, long standing person-
to person relations. Their presence and expertise would provide a permanent,
trustworthy ear to the ground to ultimately capture or kill “high value targets”
44Adrian Ciolponea, Iancu Cristian, Alternative war strategies for Iraq, NPS, 2007, p 51

24
through either local military or police operations or as a result of U.S. military
operations.”45
In order to have a tailored smart approach, encompassing all the elements of
power, the state also has to prepare, train equip a specialized urban type of force,
different from classic Special Forces .
This force, called JUSOTF-(Joint, Urban, Special, Operations, Task, and
Force) by retaining the decisional authority at tactical level would achieve a better
autonomy, flexibility and adaptability.
“In ADP 6-0 “Mission Command is described as disciplined initiative to
empower agile and adaptive leaders to conduct operations that defy orderly,
efficient and precise control.”46
The structure of JUSOTF should be modular and not restricted to 12
personnel. Necessary enablers and specialists should be present to help the
commander to engage rapidly and efficiently: PSYOPS and CA teams, linguist and
translators, computer specialists and JTACs are just a few enablers to help the
commander to formulate the adequate answer. Only a flexible dynamic structure,
like JUSOTF, could counter the actions of a decentralized network, as a terrorist
complex nexus or urban guerilla, without initiate the insurgency regeneration
process. This is why, both task organization and allocation of the resources should
take into account the achievement of final strategic objective- separation of
insurgents from the population. Rothstein, explains:
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), 104.

25
“The organization of a military force should reflect the conceptual
organization of the plan. In other words, organization should dictate the chain of
command as well as the command and support relationship within the force.
Similarly, organization should ensure that a commander has authority over or
access to all the resources required accomplishing the assigned mission.”47
2.1. Intelligence in urban environment
When necessary, the urban unit should have the capacity to easily diffuse
among the population thus, borrowing characteristics from HUMINT operators,
SWAT police force or clandestine CIA elements. Moreover building trust and
confidence with the local agencies, intel-networks, and other elements of the task
force would be a priority of a tactical commander, which resides in his ability to
communicate.
“Building relations however is critical to generating the kind of intelligence
needed so that hunter-killer teams can strike accurately and effectively. To build
these relations in the waythey are builtthroughoutmost of the world requires us to
do thingsin a mannersignificantlydifferent from the wayDA teams operate and the
way SOF’s UW capability is currently used.”48
The advantage of this type of force, would be that it can easily identify the urban
opponent while remain largely invisible. Subsequently the force would
progressively engage non-lethal systems to surgical lethal weapons, in order to
neutralize insurgents and avoid collaterals casualties. Having embedded tactical
sensors and elements from the local Intel network, JUSOTF would maintain a clear
situational awareness, rapidly filling the unknown gaps.
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), 106.
48Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, (Annapolis,
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006).p.105.

26
“Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided in host nation
building. However, it was not always approached effectively nor adequately
prioritized and resourced.”49
Professor John Arquilla -Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, argues that in
orderto disrupt a (urban) network, first the state has to undermine the trust structure:
- any informational network has important nodes (insurgencyleadership)defined as
“hubs,” “gatekeepers” and “pulse-takers,” which are critical in influencing the
population. Using actionable intelligence, social analysis software like “Palantir”,
“Ucinet” and an extensive integrated database network, JUSOTF should be able to
rapidly identify the critical hubs of the network and apply “high pressure” in
accordance. Cultural awareness and mutual respect, necessary in the relationship
with locals, combined with a specific mixed of incentives and punishments, should
lead to the elimination ( or at least reduction) of conflict of interests between
JUSOTF forces and the population. Intel network building is summarized by Brown:
“Identification of operators, leadership, and infrastructure across the
spectrum of terrorist networks requires an integrated and adaptive blue force
network. Special Operators will remain essential in this role while they continue to
develop indigenouscapabilitiestofight terrorists and rogueregimes. By positioning
and networking SOF in key locations to obtain and disseminate information,
supported by specialized equipment and advanced technologies.”50
If the network doesn’t have a clear hierarchical structure (like Al-Qaida),
“targeting killing” missions will only accelerate the regeneration process of
insurgency due to collateral casualties involved. Thus the power of insurgent’s
narrative will increase and dominate the informational spectrum. Conventional wars
are design to fight nations, but other methods are required when fighting a flat type
49“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 J
une 2012, J 7)
50 Brian D. Doug Brown, U.S. Special Operation Command: Meeting the Challenges of the
Twenty First Century,(U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, NDU Press, First quarter
2006), p.2.

27
of terrorist network with global reach. “How do you attack a trust structure -- which
is whata networkis? You're not going todothis with Tomahawkmissilesor strategic
bombardment. It's a whole new playing field. You're not attacking a nation, but a
network.”51
The importance of the Intel picture is paramount. JUSOTF has to combine
local sources products with higher echelon intelligence and sensors in order to
complete and update the battle picture. At operational level, depending on priority,
the UAVs can cover many areas like ISR platform, C2 weapons platform.
Nevertheless, in an urban environment, there is an acute need for tactical
UAV/drone, integrated in ODA organic. This type of tactical UAV should be
available to commanders in a matter of minutes, cover a range up to 50 miles, and
perform in a silent invisible posture, from both stationary and orbital trajectory. The
tactical drone would belong organic to the ODA, including the operator. The ODA
would still benefit from the support/CAS of larger non-organic UAVs (Predator,
Reaper, and Global Hawk) whenever the situation requires.
Any tactical commander would perform better in urban environment, having
a tactical UAV for direct support, which could integrate the battle picture, and help
to identify potential threats and targets. Blue and red forces disposition and
maneuver are essential for mission success. Beside C2 and ISR, the tactical UAV
could also perform several tasks. Communication relay when non satellite
communication are obstructed by buildings and an emergency delivery system for
essential equipment, electronic, forensic, ammunition, medical, especially when
troops are pinned down by enemy fire.
51 Phd. John Arquilla, comments in NPS, seminar, oct 2007.

28
The BICES system has especially becomefor NATO Special Forces a secure
internet type ofplatform, where data base, voice and video could be shared instantly
via SATCOM.
Nevertheless, depending on the situation, replacing military networks
(CENTRIX)with encrypted socialmedia platforms, could be a solution worth testing
and implementing. In the future there is a need of implementation of social media as
a command and control platform (in secure mode) for urban special operations.
Davenport, further underlines:
“Initially these auxiliary groups will be formed through initial face-to-face
type of settings followed byother meanssuch various social media tools. These tools
will be predominately through the use of smartphones/iPadsbutenhanced through
government covert apps that will be similar to the social media platforms of
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google maps and Google Earth, Flickr, and Blogger.
These tools will serve the dual effort communication role such strengthening the
various groups will to fight through virtual communication, and will also offer
various means of disruption through cyber and physical mobilization. The use of
various IP addresses and digital code for communication will enhance OPSEC
during all operation from internal and external detection.”52
The irony is that social media technology or even tactical drones are fully
operational for civilian application and further presented in annex 1- MD4-3000 –
Tactical UAV.(Annex 1)
Therefore, in order to become adaptable the urban Special Forces unit
requires essential structural, doctrinal and technological innovations. However,
reaching that capability is still not enough. Only a permanent presence on the
ground with an elaborate overlapping transition between forces, can achieve the
continuity of the process, and maintain the initiative. The relationship with local

29
forces and the community are difficult to achieve, and easy to be lost when the
rotational process is too rapid, and not overlapped.
2.2. JUSOTF-Task-organization
The placeof SpecialForces is widely recognized bytoday’s Army leaders,
from both perspectives, impressive traditions and successes and future role.
“Today special warfare remains an important Army mission. Our
primary combat maneuver element is the regionally expert Special Forces, the
Green Berets, supported by our Psychological Warfare and Civil Affair units.
Conventional forces, such as the Regionally Aligned Forces, work alongside
SOF in what is an increasingly complex world where the lines between war,
conflict and competition are blurred.”53
Current Special Operations Forces are too dependent on geographical
commander providers, organized in rigid structures and hierarchical
subordinated to conventional leaders. Therefore, special operations operational
objectives are subordinated and supportive of larger strategic conventional
objectives as part ofthe military campaign- thus doctrinally unable to address an
unconventional threat. Nonetheless, at tactical/operational level, SF proved to be
an excellent leverage for traditional conventional campaign, strategic objectives,
as described by Eugene Piasecki in “The history of Special Warfare”,
“Following 9/11, ArmySOF assumed historic roles in the early stages of
Operation EnduringFreedom and operation IraqiFreedom. In Afghanistan, 300
Army SF operators supporting the Northern Alliance helped to topple the
Taliban. In Iraq, the 10th SFG (A) advised 65.000 KurdishPeshmerga, assumed
tactical control of the 173rd Infantry brigade (A) and the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit and successfully tied down three Iraqi corps”54
53 Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, Introduction” The history of Special
Warfare”, Special Warefare, volume 28, April 2015, p.9
54 Eugene Piasecki, Introduction” The history of Special Warfare”, Special Warefare, volume 28,
April 2015, p.11

30
A valid example of different thinking which demonstrates the efficiency
of a combined task force between CIA covert teams – and Special Forces ODA
is “Jawbreaker operation in Afghanistan “. This highly secretive and sensitive
mission was conducted under “Title 50”, therefore having different prerogatives
and liberties:
“Title 50 gives the CIA not only the authority to do UW, butalso provides
them with freedom to think, and to be creative as they need to be in order to be
successful before and whilein a UW setting. Creating a new strategic narrative
for changing Title 10, and relooking the U.S. Special Operation Command’s
definition of UW are the type of approachesthatareneeded in order to properly
meet the future demands of warfare.”55
In the “Jawbreaker Operations”, the setting, task-organization, and
decisional authority allowed SpecialForces units to have maximum freedom and
maneuver, substantial funding, and a clear end-state of the mission. Quite
important in the process was little or no interference (regarding operational
objectives, methods, and procedures)from the higher echelon. Working closely
with CIA covert cells, Special Forces were able to achieve the desired strategic
objective –to employ Masood’s North Alliance forces against the Taliban
regime. The Special Operation team had realized this objective having some
specifications. Little strategic interference from higher, was present during
operation, the authority was delegated to the tactical level, along with financial
access, flexibility regarding location and movement; flatten structure, flexibility
of the task force. Another more recent case, reflects the interoperability level
reached by CIA and SF, regarding, capabilities, skills and options; Johnson,
notes:

31
“The successful raid against Osama Bin Laden’s compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, is probably the best contemporary
illustration of CIA- Special Forces (US Navy Seal) cooperation and highlights
the complementary nature of each organization’s unique capabilities.”56
Urban Special Forces have to be design to act and operate in an urban
environment, where tactics and techniques are designed to protectthe population
and capture the opponent. Hence the development, integration and utilization of
urban nonlethal segment is becoming paramount. In order to successfully
implement any feasible counterinsurgency strategy, collateral casualties among
civilian population have to be reduced to minimum. Although US spent a fair
amount of money developing NLW57 (non-lethal weapons) program, there were
little steps integrating these capabilities with the current force.
“Thejoint non-lethalprogram has conducted more than 50 research and
development efforts and spentat least $396 million since 1997…andyet most of
the NLW adopted by military are commercial off the shelf system produced for
the law enforcement market”58
Individual and riot control devices are now fully operational, and the
change has to start with TTP. Basically, offering to force on the ground the
option to apply a wide range of means from non-lethal to lethal in order to
accomplish the mission.
“According with the FOC, nonlethal weapons should enhance the
capability of the joint force in accomplishing the following objectives:
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; take military actions wherethe use
of lethal force is either nor the preferred option, or is not permitted under the
established ROE; protect our forces; disable equipment, facilities, and enemy
56 John D. Johnson, “10 Things: The Military Should Know about CIA”, ” Special Warfare
Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.29
57 DOD Directive 3000.3-“weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to
incapacitate personal and material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel,
and undesired damage to property and the environment”

32
personnel; engage the control people through civil affair operations and
PSYOPS; dislodge enemy from positions without causing extensive collateral
damage; separate combatants from noncombatants; deny terrain to enemy”59
In this case, innovation should be a permanent process, in order to allow
JUSOTF to employ not only traditional NLW, but also special fragmentation
ammunition with specific range and penetration power, surgical water based
breaching devices, microwaves projectors for enemy incapacitating end even
paralyzing gases deployed on micro terrestrial or aerial drones. (Annex no 3)
Urban Special Forces could operate in permissive, semi and non-
permissive environment, having initiative down to the tactical level, and
continuous logistic/air/intel support located out of the area of operation,
managed by unique command. McCormick further describes:
“Changes of waging modern unconventional warfare are necessary in
order to achieve long term results. These changesare regarded as: commitment
of proper forces, multiplication of internal defense, an irregular thinking
revolution, decentralization of command and control, and a profound
understandingofa dual – political and militaryleadership (matrix-network type
of organization)”. 60
.
Applying a grill of urban Special Forces in certain megacity
neighborhood, would imply a very direct, simple, decentralized and informal
command and control based on encrypted social media platform. This system
would allow flexibility and adaptability for highly volatile situation in urban
environment. Regular bureaucratic drift should be avoided in order to ensure a
quick reaction time form operators and combat teams.
“Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on
subordinatestoeffect the necessary coordination and on thehuman
capacity for implicit communication based on a mutual
59 Ibidem,p.74
60 Adrian Ciolponea, Iancu Cristian, Alternative war strategies forIraq,chapter 3,NPS,2007, p 57

33
understandingofrequirements. By decentralizing decision-making
authority, mission and control seeks to improve the ability to deal
with fluid and localized situation.”61
Within the structure of JUSOTF, if a lesser layer of command is present,
the structure the more responsive is and the decisional act the shortest is. The
logical algorithm for organizational design of the force necessary to implement
the urban unconventional approach should follow the steps: identifying the
solution, elaborating the conceptofoperations, and then, task-organize the force.
Further, by decentralizing the command and control, the tactical JSOUTF
commanders are empowered with the necessary authority and initiative in order
to rapidly react to and engage the insurgents. Perhaps the most important step in
strategy implementation, would be to share the vision and the end state before
deploying. If the vision is clear and understood by all operator, then the unity
and freedom of action can be achieved without ethical and moral compromise.
“Delegating authority to subordinates does not absolve higher
commanders of ultimate responsibility. Consequently , they must frame their
guidancein such a waythat subordinatesare provided sufficient understanding
to act in accordance with their desires while not restricting freedom of action.
Commandersmustbeadeptatexpressing their desires clearly and forcefully.”62
Key elements of JUSOTF:
 invisible for enemy, easy to blend within population;
 flatten structure with empowered tactical commanders;
 tactical authority and decisional power;
 objective driven not order driven ;
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.105.
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006) p.106.

34
 integrated psychological operation, strategic communication;
 command and control based on social media crypto platform;
 modular, interagency task force in accordance with the mission profile;
 external logistic, air support and joint fire support;
 adaptable, flexible, highly effective and aggressive,
 the power to use appropriate discriminate force from non-lethal to surgical
lethal in order to take out the hubs, log cells and leadership of the
opposition network, without provoking an irreversible alienation of the
population.
2.3. Implementation of Urban SpecialOperation at Operational
and Tactical Levels
The local government has no other option than to interdict insurgents to
fill out the political space and to avoid the vacuum of power/presence in certain
areas. In order to do that, a package of forces has to be applied systematical and
progressive starting from a more secure area towards the troubled zones. Thus,
the secured and stable area is gradually expanded. This could only take place if
borders are secured and insurgents are isolated from population. The strategic
concept is better explained in Annex 2-Mystic Diamond Model.
The package of force has to include not only urban specialized forces, but
also local militia, police, Intel and PSYOPS elements, supported logistically and
informational in a continuous manner.
Urban operations are primarily objective driven operation, not order
driven. Tactical commanders adapt, balance and prioritize tasks in order to
achieve the desire end-state and to synchronize their actions. “In mission
command, thecommandermust understand theproblem, envision the end state,

35
and visualize the nature and design of the operation. Mission command is nota
mechanicalprocessthatthecommanderfollowsblindly. Instead, itis a continual
cognitive effort to understand, toadapt, andto direct effectively the achievement
of intent.” General Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command” 2012.
Being present onthe ground, this task forceshould have enough flexibility
to quickly response or to preempt any insurgents’ actions. Just by filling the
vacuum in different city neighborhoods, the insurgents’ freedom of maneuver is
denied, and soon their isolation from local population, becomes reality.
Subsequently, by isolating themselves form local population, they (insurgents)
become clear targets for conventional military means, air strikes, drones, and
raids. The necessary steps for implementation are further explained by
McCormick:
“Thesolution is to empower the lowest levels of the military in phase2 of
the operations. Empower the captains who are the unit/squad commanders as
the local decision makers and hold them responsible. This means the top
leadership cannot enter the picture in that local community without the
permission of the local commanders. This is a SF function, supported by the
Army conventional. The elements of the conventional force should be broken
down to supporttheSF teams. Each AO commandermustmaintain a continuous
contact with the commanders contiguous to them, in order to avoid (deny) the
enemy the ability (opportunity) to infiltrate between the spaces. There must be
no space but continuity between each area of operation. Let the commander of
the area of operation be the king of the area of operation.”63
A robust QRF with air capabilities should be positioned and cover a
central area in order to respond timely to different critical situation. The
necessary ORF should also comprise naval and aerial assets for rapid
deployment, and should be stationed outside area of operation, AO. The

36
integrated effort should be doneunder the umbrella of a single unique command,
having a decentralized execution. Seep Kalev further asserts:
“Emergency conditions dictate that government needs a single, fully
empowered executive to direct and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts.
Power-sharing among political bodies, while appropriate and necessary in
peace times, presents wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in coordination that
insurgents can exploit”.64
Professor McCormick explains the relations between the force and its
commander, relations which should not undermine the achievement of the
strategic objective, even in the absence of specific guidance or orders.
“When the problem arises, the associated QRF must fall in underthe AO
commandercontrol, to solve the issue. The JTF commandershould be roaming
the area of operations AOs to ensure that the empowered captains are getting
what they need, when they need. The JTF commander should be the single
person in chargein AO, responsible for all, and everyone should answer to him.
Because the unity of command is crucial, he should have total and ultimate
control. All others are there to support him.”65
In order to efficiently control the area of operation, JUSOTF helped by
local authorities should design and enforce restrictive measures. One efficient
example could be: magnetic identification card distributed to local population,
and instant access to the data-base. Additionally to magnetic code, photo,
fingerprint, other security measures should be added to these cards for two
reasons: first to deny the illegal reproduction and second to allow tactical
commanders to check the card through a portable tactical devise tied to the
database.(Link 16 type) “Important individual data should comprise, at a
minimum, name, photograph,biographicaldata, distinguishing characteristics,
64 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” (Military Review, May – June
2005), 11.

37
educations, current and former employment, address and phone numbers,
record of foreign travel and military service, family member’s tribal affiliation,
ethnic and religious affiliation.”66
The grill of forces applied on the ground (to include JUSOTF) would have
access to an extensive and regular updated database, thus it could monitor the
suspect’s movements and description, foreign personnel entering the city area,
restricting the insurgent’s movement. Richard Schultz further translates the
intelligence dominance of the urban area:
“Putting intelligence dominance into practice to gain control of territory
plagued by armed groups means the integration of the collection, analysis, covert
action, and counterintelligence instruments – to maximize effectiveness against
targets.”67
No doubt, foran efficient controlon the population movement, other integrated
measures should be in place. Surveillance and monitoring street cameras, tactical
drones, surveillance balloons in vicinity of important objective, joint check-points,
random patrols, curfews, road-blocks, non-lethal devices for vehicle disabling,
HUMINT and PSYOPS operations. As stated by Kalev Sepp, without constant and
vigorous pressure on enemy, the danger of power vacuum is present:
“Constant patrolling by government forces establishes an official
presence that enhances security and builds confidence in the government.
Patrolling is a basic tenet of policing, and in the last 100 years all successful
counterinsurgencies have employed this fundamental security policy.”68
66 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency”,
67 Richard Schultz Jr. and Godson Roy, Intelligence Dominance, (Washington, DC, CSI’s
Armed Groups Project, Weekly Standard, 31 July 2006), p. 22.
68 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” (Military Review, May – June,
2005), p.11.

38
After this complex package of restrictive measures are in place, having a
unique command and control, the next the most important step is “information
sharing”. Forall these measures to becomereality, the force commander would need
political power and more important, the will. Without local national will and U.S. will
to solve the crisis, all the measures mentioned above become ineffective.
“Once the curfew has been imposed, specially trained units should begin
exhaustive systematic search and clear operations, block by block, building by
building. Thehost nation element of the clearing and consolidation force should
conduct an aggressive information operation campaign to tell the populace how
the operations is design to improve their security and quality of life; to request
their tolerance of thistemporary, yet necessary, inconvenience;and to solicit their
active support.”69
In urban counterinsurgency operations often time, actionable intelligence
arise when the full control is established, the population sees the benefits of a
secure environment, and insurgents are becoming isolated, thus exposed to
coalition sensors. Furthermore, any clear-up operations in conjunction with local
forces, militia and other agencies, has to be based on reliable intelligence about
enemy disposition and possible threats. Ward explains:
“Clearing operations should be preceded by an intense intelligence
gathering campaign in the target city or area. The campaign will identify
insurgents, insurgents’ sympathizers and government supporters. Intelligence
gatherers will compile black and white lists to identify known insurgents and
insurgents’ sympathizers.”70
Urban operations are perhaps the most difficult and would require a high
level of flexibility and adaptability from both commanders and operators.
Innovation in tactics and technological superiority can bring a huge advantage
69 LTC Robert J. Ward, p.15.
70 Ibidem p.14.

39
only if is backed-up by political and national will. Without popular support, on
long run the tactical achievements are erased by strategic failure. More than ever
counterinsurgency needs persistence and communication.
3. Communication in urban special operations.
Any modern organization needs a strong leadership, having clear vision and a
well-defined objective. Similar for Special Operation urban task force, clear,
efficient, rapid horizontal and vertical communication is required. This is the key to
survival. In order to survive in a constant urban changing environment, SOF
commander has to be adaptable and efficient in execution. As a leader he has to pay
attention to details, both in planning and execution. All surrounding indicators
related to population activities or spirit, becomes part of the accelerated learning
process. “Through learning we perceive the world and our relations to it. Trough
learning we extent our capacity to create, to be part of the generative process of
life.”71
Without any doubt, many important lessons that emerged in the last decade of
conflict are about understanding the environment, building coalition and the cultural
awareness, synchronizing the effort, developing and sustaining the unity of
command, interagency coordination, and sharing the strategic vision. Preparing our
forces to fight in a predominantly urban densepopulated environment would involve
more autonomy at the tactical level. Peter Senge, further offer that:
“A shared vision is the first step in allowing who mistrusted each other to begin
to work together. It creates a common identity. Shared vision fosters risk taking and
experimentation.”72
71 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.14
72 Ibidem p.15

40
Moreover any vision cannot be shared without an efficient, direct, tailored,
effective communication. Shared vision, is a key component of an objective driven
mission, and for building the network. We can combat a network only with another
network. The main relevant aspect in communication strategy is to clearly establish
early in the process a sense of urgency and importance, a decisional context, a
desired end-state. Without solid communication skills a leader cannot materialize
his vision in the mind of his people. “Manyleaders havepersonal visions thatnever
get translated into shared visions that galvanize an organization.”73
Communication can be analyzed from different angles. Special Forces leaders
have to consider both internal and external communication. Internal refers to the
JUSOTF structure, external communication points both to allies and population.
In order to counter negative propaganda, and shake enemy morale, the message
to the enemy should be always tailored in correlation with the (IO)-Information
Operation Campaign Strategic Objective. The level of efficiency is determined by a
constant constructive dialog, by a well-tailored modulated messages, and without
any question by the end results. Furthermore, in an urban dense populated
environment with a variety of antagonists groups, ethnic minorities and broke-
powers, is becoming paramount for decision makers to have a sound and clear
strategic message tailored for every category.
The message has to be integrated in a comprehensive information operation
campaign correlated with the other non-military instruments of powers: diplomatic,
intelligence, military, economic, financial, law enforcement.
In order to adapt leaders have to learn to becomeobjective as possibleas the can,
so they inspire, identify the obstacles, and quickly react. Next step is to identify
73 Ibidem p.23

41
innovative solutions. These could include (NLW) Non-lethal weapons for
discriminate application of force, tactical UAVs for a better situational picture,
social media platform for more flexible command and control, (Tactics, techniques,
technology, weapons).
Organizations are different, because of their role, structure, size, education,
people, culture, budget and leadership. One of the common nominator for all
organizations is the communication. Organizations are also different because the
people and leaders are different. “Organizationswork the way they do because how
we work, how we think, and interact;the changesrequired ahead arenotonly in our
organization but in ourselves as well.”74
Cultural genetic structure
Living in a complex world with shifting threats, trends, technologies and
policies it becomes clear that communication becomes an essential leadership skill.
First and foremost the ability of communication has a strong interconnection with
leader personality, structure, and vision. The education, culture, personality of the
leader determines the communication style, in one word “the genetic culture”.
The depth of the environment understanding, the level of experience and the
organizational culture would also determine the quality of dialogue within the
organization and outside. Only a permanent dialogue can set up the necessary
conditions for a fair honest game.
“The ideal of combining inquiry and advocacy is challenging. It can be
especially difficult if you work in a highly political organization that is not open to
genuineinquiry. Speakingasa veteran advocate, I can say thatI found patienceand
perseverance needed to move towards a more balanced approach.”75
74 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990 p.10
75 Ibidem p.185

42
If policies and doctrine are written in the past to provide the framework, the
direction, the power to adapt, to change and to learn, can ensure the right answer,
the feasible solution in the future. All these attributes of adaptability, transformation
and learning are conditioned by communication.
“Understanding equips decision -makers at all levels with the insight and
foresight required to make effective decisions, to manage the associated risks, and
to consider second and subsequent order effects. Building trust with subordinates
and partnersmaybethemostimportantaction a commanderwillperform.” General
Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command” 2012
That’s why, it is critical forJSOTUto bea flexible, adaptable structure, where
communication from the leaders to troops is efficient, quick and dynamic with open
channels both ways. The key to survive is adaptability. The key to adapt is to learn.
Learning should be a continuous process and should be done by constant dialogue,
and constant challenging of the other’s view. Peter Senge, further explains:
“Alearning organization isa placewherepeoplecontinuallydiscovering how
they create their reality. And how they can changeit. As Archimedes said, “Give me
a lever long enough….and single –handed I can move the world”76
For all leaders (including tactical Special Forces leaders), communication
skills are paramount in conceiving and sending a clear message. It is always a
challenge to “paint” clearly the context, the desired strategic effects, and to share a
vision, especially when implement an urban counterinsurgency strategy.
“Define and stay focused on your goal, get to know other person and
particularly that’s person interests, appeal to shape those interests, anticipate the
possible actions of the other person, generate options together, evaluate the options
using a fair process, decide and gain commitment for the decision”77
77 Ibidem p.16

43
Understanding the environment and the political, social, economic dynamics
in a specific area could make the difference between a long lasting progressive
strategy and a failure strategy. In this equation strategic communication plays an
essential role.
“Your ability to lead the other leaders arises not just from your position,
resources, or charisma but from your will and skill” 78
Modern SF leaders are striving to develop several attributes and skills, such
as: professional ethos, ethics, the ability to nuance and to read between the lines,
proactive-ness, teamwork, intestinal fortitude, out of the box thinking, solid moral
compass, political savvy, permanent control of emotions, just to mention a few.
Reflecting about these, we come to realize that all of these require good
communication skills and permanent dialogue with the staff members on both the
horizontal and vertical axes/lines of the structure.
On the long run, without permanent and honest dialogue with the people,
agencies, allies, the critical internal balance of the organization cannot be
maintained. Solving an urban conflict would entail a comprehensive approach
where the interagency effort should be integrated taking into account the drivers
which fuels the conflict. Admitting and acknowledging the past mistakes, inspiring
the sense of pride (”l’espri de corp”) and accountability for progress, leaders are
opening the dialog.
“It is no accident that most organizations learn poorly. The way they are
designed and managed, the way people’s jobs are defined, and, most importantly, the
way we have all been taughtto think and interact (not only in organizationsbut more
broadly) create fundamental learning disabilities. These disabilities operate despite
the bestefforts of bright, committed people. Often theharderthey try to solve problems,
the worse the results.”79
78 Ibidem p.10

44
When the members of an organization (ODA) do not feel they belong to
something greater than their own interest, they stop sharing the passion for the job,
they stop approvingtheir leader vision. Having that said, often time they would work
under pressure, on compliance basis and this do not constitute a realteam. Therefore,
dialog is vital. “Most managementteamsbreakdown underpressure. Theteam may
function quite well with routine issues. But when they confront complex issues that
may be embarrassing or threating, the team-ness seems to go to pot” 80
SF units need a strong foundation which is basically the organizational
culture, a clear set of rules, check and balances, a sense of emergency and a strong
motivation and implication.
Whenever the decision process starts, leaders should become aware of the
complexity of decisional environment, the cause-effect (and second order effect)
relation, the “domino effect”, the antagonist and competitive interests in and out of
the organization. Moreover, people are biased and have particular interests to
promote. In developing strategies and tactics, leaders need to take into account the
the interests of the people they would lead.
“Theessence of the discipline of systems thinking lies in a shift of the mind:-
Seeing inter-relationships rather than linear cause -effect chains, and seeing
processes of change rather than snapshots.”81
Furthermore, when cognitive filters become active (personal learnings,
knowledgeand experiences, biases, prejudices, mentaltraps, stereotypes) the fog of
war lies downon the plains of reality. In suchinstances, the reality is altered, blurred
and sometimes small elements are exaggerated or consequently critical issues are
neglected. In this foggy stormed oceanthe SF leader has to be the “lighting beacon”.
80 Ibidem p 18

45
“Ultimately, the payoff from integrating systems thinking and mentalmodels
will be not only improving our mental models (whatwe think) butaltering our ways
of thinking:shifting from mental models dominated by events to mental models that
recognize longer- term patterns of change and the underlying structures producing
those patterns.” 82
Often times, we process the information according with our prejudices,
stereotypes, assumptions, mental maps …which in the end could be a distorts
perception of the reality .
“Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even
pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take
action. Very often, we are not consciously awareof our mentalmodels or the effects
they have on our behavior.”83
Mental maps leads to cognitive traps based on unique personal perspective,
bias, experience and knowledge. The crucial role of the dialogue is to help the leader
to overcome all these obstacles and maximize outputs (the long term cost/benefits
results). In this way communication looks more like an art and less like a science.
“Personal Mastery might suggest gaining dominance over the people and things.
But mastery can also mean a special level of proficiency”84
Leaders have to understand the system thinking used by the audience and to
synchronize the communication accordingly. “Systems thinking is a conceptual
framework, a body of knowledge and tools which makes us to see the full patterns
clearer, and help us to change them effectively.”85
Being in contact with your people is important. On the contrary, leader
isolation and lack of dialogue is not “healthy”, especially when trying to achieve the
objective representation of reality. In order to achieve an internal/external
82.Ibidem p.75
83 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990,p.80
84 Ibidem p.20
85 Ibidem,p.21

46
organizational equilibrium, leadership requires a broad vision of interconnected
events and phenomena. Leaders become cultural awareness attuned.
“Learning to see slow, gradualprocess requires slowing down frenetic pace
and paying attention to the subtle as well as the dramatic” As a leader one have to
set up form the get go the clear concise message abouthis intention, phasesand the
final outcome. “ 86
Particularly, in a foreign dense populated urban environment, constant dialog
it is highly recommended. In this case anticipation and adaptability are mainly
generated through an open dialogue. Refining the thinking ability is a never-ending
process moreover parallel with the evolution of the organizational culture. Critical
thinking skills are paramount to become a strategic leader, nevertheless
communication ensures the validation and the feed-back of these skills. An open
minded leader should be aware of different models to be found in the strategic
decision process, rational actormodel, cognitive, group thinking. This could provide
the necessary tools in modulating the strategic message following the rational logical
conclusion. Senge, clearly observes:
“Just as linear thinking dominates most models used for critical decisions
today, the learning organizations of the future will make key decisions based on
shared understanding of interrelationships and patterns of change” 87
“Two level of conscious awareness-unconscious thinking process are
determined by pure-preferences, incentives, motives, desires, coercive measures,
and in the end determines the leap from fact to conclusion. One set of facts can lead
to different conclusions analogy. “Our fixation on events is actually part of our
evolutionary programming.”88
The power of synthesis becomes relevant when someone is presenting a
problem or message, simplicity, and conciseness are keys to success. The art of
86 Ibidem, p.9
87Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990 p.19
88Ibidem, p.20

47
communication comprise also elements like rhetoric, argumentation, supporting
evidence, posture, presentation, persuasive-ness. Certainly communication is also
influenced by structure, rules, regulations, laws, norms.
“Different people in the same structure tend to produce qualitatively similar
results. In human systems, structure includes how people make decisions-the
operating policies whereby we translate perceptions, goals, rules, and norms into
actions”89
”The strategy, the concepts and policies, the ways /resources to reach that
stage will emerge during the communication process heading to the final decision.
Team work and dialogue are a necessity for evolution. “The discipline of team
learning starts with dialogue, the capacity of members of a team to suspend
assumption and enter into a genuine thinking together. To the Greeks dia-logos
meant a free –flowing of meaning though a group, allowing the group to discover
insights not attainable individually.” 90
Mobilizing the staff for the proposed endeavors requires first a careful
selection of the team, based on character, expertise, professionalism, loyalty and
merit. Without promoting the merit system, the staff will never reach the
cohesiveness and efficiency of a well-oiled machine.
“Moreover the balance between overloading and a total isolation from the
working groups is related to the leader personality, experience, character, his
flexibility and open minded , working style, communication strategy. “We learn best
from our experience but we never directly experience the consequence of many of
our most important decisions.”91
Nevertheless, communication is a very important factor when making
decisions. The reason is that the speaker not always can sent a clear message or
description of the situation, close to reality. “The practice of shared vision involves
the skills of unearthing shared pictures of the future that fostergenuine commitment
and enrollment rather than compliance”- and this can be done only through direct
89Ibidem, p 21
90Ibidem p.10
91Ibidem p.23

48
dialogue. When leaders just imposeordictate a vision/decision (without sharing with
subordinates), the opposition would reach the maximum level and the creativity/
initiative would reach the minimum. As Senge asserts,
“True reactiveness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own
problems.it is a product of our way of thinking, not our emotional state”
The start in the decision process is often times critical because it defines the
rules of the game, the representation of the facts, the dynamic of the events, and it
estimates the possible outcomes. McCormick further explains:
“The weak, including insurgency movements, win low intensity conflicts by
using Asymmetric Strategic Approach. If the insurgents fight unconventionally
against the state entrenched in conventional vision, the chances to win will seldom
favor the weak actor.”92
Trust and influence
Fighting in urban requires balanced cooperationwith multiple agencies and local
authorities. Therefore, trust becomes very important in interagency relations.
The basic trust foundation resides in permanent communication. Coordination
cannot be achieved in government operations without skillful and permanent
communication. Agencies, organizations often time operate having particular
interests and agenda. Trust in the leader is a necessary element of leadership, and
persons are more disposed to follow a leader in whom they have trust then one they
do not trust” In any decision process consensus can be achieved only after a real
communication has been established between the agencies (members) and only after
the referential system is set up end everyone understand objectively the situation.
Without trust in leadership, any communication becomes heavy, interrupted,
92 Gordon McCormick, Seminar NPS, 2007

49
challenged to the point of exclusion. People aspire to change, recommend, and
influence policies and decisions which leads to certain competition.
“Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent participation in
planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences in
organizational culture. “93
Although the competition is beneficial, in long term, this could lead to poor
communication, weak coordination of the agencies, and lack of unity for decisional
implementation. (Panel Auditorium, Bloomfield, Miller, 22 Aug2014, NWC)
“Communication is your fundamental tool in building those relations”
“It doesn’t matter who votes it matter who counts the votes” (V.I. Stalin).
The useofdifferent statics data graphics are usually helpful to describearelevant
situation. Having a different agenda, one could alter the reality and manipulate the
truth. In other words, outcomes canbemanipulated. As leaders we have to bealways
alert about these factors and to use available tools to question our decisions, to
challenge our solutions and to allow the decisional environment to develop in a free
unrestrained way for the most reliable and maximum output. Senge further
underlines: “Remember that one of your primary functions as a leader providing
directions is to ask the right questions”94
Too less interaction with your staff and the leader is in danger to be out of the
loop with the rapid changing evolution and the set of values and tools the staff used
to reach assertions starting from assumptions.
“Achieving the task of direction, structure and conducta strategic conversation
on thatsubject rather to impose a new vision from the top, develop a fair process for
“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 Ju
ne 2012, J 7)

50
conducting the conversation aboutdirection, the genuineparticipation of followers,
and for decisions based on acceptable principles and standards”95
Too muchinterference will modify the working style, everyone will work under
pressure determining a minimal feedback -this sound like a dictatorial style…where
collaborative work cannot progress.
Certainly there are no silver bullets, everyone has to learn and start to work
together. “When teams are truly learning, not only are they produce extraordinary
results, but the individual members are growing more rapidly than could have
occurred otherwise”96
“Team learning is vital because teams, not individuals, are the fundamental
learning unit in modern organizations. This is where rubber meets the road; unless
teams can learn, the organization cannot learn.”97
Types of communication
There are at least 2 types of communication-internal and the external one. Both
are meant to formulate the proper message in accordance with the audience profile
(staff, public, international actors, adversaries). If the internal communication is
addressing the staff members, hierarchical structure, the external communication is
addressing all other actors involved directly or indirectly in the process/event.
Efficient communication requires parallel lines of effort, leading to a commonresult.
“Direction-negotiating the vision, integration-making stars a team, mediation-
settling leadership conflicts, motivation, representation, trust creation- capitalizing
your leadership”
Communication goes beyond the very means of sending the message; it also
relates to the organizational culture, to bring objectivity in describing the real
95Ibidem, p.87
96Ibidem, p.88
97Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.91

51
situation. The contextpicture should bebased onfacts and evidences not on personal
opinions. The importance of communication reveals the feedback from anyone
involved in the decision process. Next, the communication is paramount for force
synchronization. It was proved that the most efficient, direct and personal types of
communication is the verbal one. There are substitutes of direct verbal engagement
like video-conference, calls, e-mails or letters, but no one succeed to have the
maximum psychological, emotional and moral impact as the direct face-to-face
interaction. For this very reason, when facing important decisions, leaders will use
the direct engagement as the primary resort.
Nowadays, the distinctions between internal and external communication
becomes more blurred because of the social media. Social media, through its power,
coverage and speed, is taking slowly controlover organizations, events, and actions.
It is becoming more difficult to controlled and assess a clear impact on all actors.
On the same level of importance are formal communication and informal one.
In any SF unit are formal and informal leaders. In many situations the informal
leaders plays a great role in the organizational dynamic and opinion. Not having on
the same page, the informal leaders (the senior NCO) makes any policy
implementation more painful and unstable.
“Lack of authority does not necessarily means the lack of power”98
On the same line we could assert, that wise informal engagement of the leaders
has great influence when building coalitions and alliances. Fighting alone in
counterinsurgency do not set up the path for success. Alliances and coalitions are
necessary in the decisional process as much as they are necessary in politics or
98 Jeswald W Salacuse , Leading the Leaders , AMACOM, 2006 p.4

52
international affairs. Listening is paramount. Before acting, SF leader, has to learn
to listen.
Necessary balance
Nonetheless, from time to time the SF commander has to create competition
between individuals and groups. He also has to accommodate personal requests of
his subordinates or other players in counterinsurgency, in order to develop an
innovative environment. Compromising it’s important. For quick decisions, in the
absence of time, the necessary direction and motivation, involve compromise.
Having said that, the balance will determine the working style of a commander. The
leader need to have the ability to discern the motivating factors in a challenging
counter-argument, to make the difference between a personal/group interest and a
position determined by strong beliefs.
To reach this special sense, first and foremosta leader has to become savvy in
knowing human personality, different characters, and negotiation techniques.
Complexity ofthe relations within SF unit in closeconnection with the culture
spirit and traditions.
“Learn to discern patterns of deference among the members of the group you
lead and then mobilize those patterns to arrive at an agreement on strategic
direction”99
The cycle of learning, although it is a clear-cut process, the steps, methods,
and furthermore the qualitative results foreach individual, are different and depends
on the unique perspective of the world of every human. (Seminar on Leadership,
NWC, 20 Aug 2014). Listening subordinated is paramount in making sound
decisions….reading scanning peoples knowing characters and personality, using the
99 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.186

53
informal leaders to achieve the objectives. If the members of the organization do not
find the vocation, satisfaction and the call for their job/ shared vision, the results are
often mediocre.
“When people in organizations focus only on their positions, they have little
sense of responsibility for the results produced when all positions interact.
Moreover, when results are disappointing, it can be very difficult to know why.”100
Another important controlling mechanism in leadership/communication is the
direct feedback. Without direct and constant feedback, leader will not catch the
nuances of a problem, he will be hasty into a wrong assumption and more over he
will not realize that he was wrong. Senge, underlines:
“Questioning can be crucial for breaking the spiral of reinforcing advocacy,
but until a team or an individuallearns to combine inquiry and advocacy, learning
skills are very limited. One reason that pure inquiry is limited is that we almost
always do have a view, regardless of whether or not we believe that our view is the
only correct one. Thus, just asking lots of questions can be a way of avoiding
learning-by hiding our own view behind a wall of incessant questioning.”101
“Consider carefully the six mediation power tools of reward coercion, expertise,
legitimacy, reference, and coalition that you may employ”102
SF commanders, have to employ different techniques in accordance with
specific situations, as follow: brainstorming, advocacy, group thinking, parallel
analysis, Alexander question, MDMP, SWOT, trend line, odds versus probability,
PPT, IPB, network analysis, social analysis and, sometimes ….instinctual decision.
“The ideal of combining inquiry and advocacy is challenging. It can be especially
difficult if you work in a highly political organization that is not open to genuine
100 Ibidem, p.89
101 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990,p.97
102 Ibidem p.99

54
inquiry. Speaking as a veteran advocate, I can say that I found patience and
perseverance needed to move towards a more balanced approach.” 103
The instinctual decision, is based on previous combat experience, knowledge,
out of the box thinking. In Q-course (qualification), candidates are often forced to
take instinctual decisions in order to build necessary healthy decisional reflexes.
The mental maps and cognitive traps are always present in the decision
process that is why it is very important to have the context very well defined with
clear information, data, facts and real statics. Parallel planning and analysis could
bring to the table two different points of views which often are neglected and only
one courseof action is consider. Playing advocacy, “red cell versus blue cell”-“war
gaming” becomes important in identifying logic rational “leaks, weaknesses and the
strong points.
“When advocating your view: Make your own reasoning explicit; encourage
other to provide different views; encourage others to provide different views;
actively inquire into other views that differ from your own; state your assumptions
clearly and acknowledgethatthey are assumptions; state the data upon which your
assumptions are based; don’t bother asking questions if you are not genuinely
interested in the other’ response; when you arrive at an impasse, ask what data or
logic might changetheir view; ask if there is any way you mighttogether design an
experiment that might provide new information; encourage them to think out loud
about what might be making it difficult; if there is mutual desire to do so, design
with the others ways of overcoming these barriers”104
4. CONCLUSION
We are living in a very dynamic world with unexpected trends and threats.
The struggle for water and resources of an exponentially growing world population,
103 Ibidem p.185

55
will determine an increased probability of conflicts in urban areas, whether we refer
to insurgencies, guerillas, terrorism acts, organized crime. David Kilcullen, is
arguing that, in order to efficiently deal with this type of urban threat, we have to
prepare a slightly different type of force.
The closest to an urban combat profile would be Special Forces, but even this
type of unit would require sensitive modifications in doctrine, structure, command
& control, training, weapons and equipment, modus operandi. The main objective
of this type of force is to work with the indigenous urban forces in order to control
and secure the local population and to subsequently isolate and neutralize the
insurgents. At organizational level, optimal force structure will ensure for deployed
forces to have the requisite capabilities for operating in the unique (unconventional)
counterinsurgency or counterterrorist environment.
“We should take a flexible approach to organization, maintaining the
capabilityto organize forces to suit the situation thatmight includethe creation
of nonstandard and temporary task forces. By organizing into self –reliant
groups, we increase each commander’sfreedom of action and in the same time
decrease the need for centralized coordination of support. We also reduce
synchronization across an extended battlefield. Commanders should have the
flexibility to eliminate or bypass selected echelons of command or staff as
appropriate in order to improve operational results.”105
JUSOTF, should encompass characteristics from Special Forces, CIA covert
teams, SWAT units, PSYOPS and CA. The proper command relations, structure,
task-organization, implementation, intelligence are aspects to be taken into account
for the new force. The strategy required for this military responseshould be part of
modern counterinsurgency and interagency effort. Nevertheless, in order to
eliminate the bureaucratic drift, conventional norms and barriers, and to ensure
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.107.

56
success, doctrinal innovation and thinking shift is a must. The urban forcewould be
part of a comprehensive smart approach, where all instruments of power would be
tailored for a better strategic approach. Moreover the application of this type of non-
traditional force, would be effective when is integrated in correlation with other
elements presented in ProfessorMcCormick’s “Mystic Diamond Theory. Therefore
a suitable type of force should be designed to cope with such threats.
“Thatis a paradigm thatneeds to be modified within reason, calculating
necessary risks, and only a strong narrative at the strategic level can do it. In
the meantime more interdependence training will be needed in the future”.106
Without these capabilities and skills, the doctrinal, training, and technological
improvements are wasted. Resurrecting a UW capability will require a real change
in thinking, at the national policy level, within Department of Defense and in the SOF
community.
At the highest levels, it will require a change in strategic thinking and
policymaking to accept UW as an important arena that is not peripheral to
national interest, but is one that can add significantly to our security.107
Certainly, the necessary autonomy cannot be achieved easily. New
technologies and equipment have to be integrated and new tactics perfected.
There is also a need for a conceptualtransition, initially in the SOF community,
starting within USSOCOM, and JFK Special Forces Warfare Center. Which
requires innovation, an open mind, often in conflict with Pentagon bureaucratic
drift which is embedded in norms rules and procedures. Richard Davenport,
explains:
107Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare,
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.178

57
“We need to changerules, the legislative, titles authorities, to allow more
applicablechangewithin doctrine. Thecurrent Title 10 rules for war are very
restrictive to creative thinking forthe futuredemandsthattheUSArmywillmore
than likely face.”108
Secondly, there is a need for adaptation of the existent force structure to
integrate new techniques and procedures and new technologies (tactical UAVs,
non-lethal equipment, social media platforms, and fragmentation ammunition).
Technological innovation is also vital in order to integrate new urban tactics and
procedure and eliminate/minimize civilian collateral casualties.
Essentially to an urban environment is invisibility, the powerto use social
media as an alternate C2 structure, the use of tailored weapons and ammunition
in order to become more precise and less lethal, especially for civilians caught
between the fires.
“Dr. McCormick suggests that SOF should be integrated in a broader
concept were the area of operation is divided between tactical commanders,
each retaining full autonomy and authority in their specific area. Hence the
JUSOTFC should delegate the authority to the tactical level, centralizing
intelligence products and distributing them back to all tactical levels, providing
the logistic support, quick reaction force and fire support assets. In a
multilateral environment the joint campaign should integrate information and
psychological operations, and civil affairs, to serve a larger goal of positively
influencing the population behavior. Allied military forces and advisory teams,
organized to supportpolice forces and fightinsurgents, can bolstersecurity until
indigenous security forces are competent to perform these tasks without allied
assistance. “109
The use of urban SF, has to be integrated to a whole government approach
and part of a holistic counterinsurgency strategy. Mystic Diamond model could
109 Adrian Ciolponea, Iancu Cristian, Alternative war strategies for Iraq, chapter 3, NPS, 2007,
p.60

58
offer a viable solution for the orchestration of all instruments of power required
for achieving a long lasting solution. Davenport concludes that:
“The future will be more interdependent amongst all services and
agencies, within a whole-of-government approach to conflicts. These conflicts
will more than likely beon theurban UW persuasion. PushingthisUW construct
is the decentralization of power from centralized governments to their respective
populaces, and istied tothe interconnectedness of thenetworked society through
the power of social media.”110
Thirdly, leadership, especially in a complex urban environment cannotsurvive
without efficient horizontal and vertical communication. One specific situation
cannot be interpreted/described without proper communication. Leaders evolves
when their power of communication evolve. Personality, inborn charisma and
oratorical skills are helpful but not necessary constructive, if are not correlated with
final objective. Dialogue has to be present, challenging and inquiring is the key to
optimize results. Best ideas and concepts becomes “dust in the wind” without
efficient tailored communication. Strategic messages comes in many forms and have
to be addressed simultaneously inside and outside of the organization.
“Themost productive learning usually occurs when managerscombine skills
in advocacy and inquiry. By this we mean that everyone makes his or her thinking
explicit and subject to public examination. This creates an atmosphere of genuine
vulnerability”111
“The future of warfare is most likely to occurin urban environments. Current
SF units already include the elements most adaptable to conducting effective urban
warfare. These attributes include a flattened command structure, with local
commanders having the physical resources, moral authority, and command ability
to carry out their missions with relative independence. This in turn requires high

59
levels of individual and small-unit competence and morale, within a framework of
effective and reliable communications. This last factor is key for effective command
and control, and for mission accomplishment.”112
If this strategic concept is analyzed through the lens of “ilites test”, we can
find promising results. For the next generation warfare, the JUSOTF concept is
suitable, because meets several requirements: adaptability, flexibility, modularity.
Also this strategic approach could be desirable by decision makers, because
it increases the chances of success, reducing the risk of failure (having a smaller,
diffused footprint on the ground), and being more acceptable for American public
and US congress.
The solution is feasible, since was tested several times during modern
conflicts and is well supported by most experts in the field. Also this concept is
acceptable only when the US national interests are aligned with the local national
will, and the risk calculus is overweight by possible enduring outcome.
Initially, in order to be effective, this approach has to achieve international
legitimacy and necessary alliances. Thus diplomatic engagement has to precedethe
forcedeployment. On long run, the forceis sustainable, firstly becauserequires only
a fraction of resources comparing with a large conventional contingent and secondly
because the autonomous force can be effective when works with and through local
government and population.
112 Bernard Cole, NWC, Washington DC

60
Bibliography:
1. 1“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15
June 2012, J 7);
2. Richard Davenport, “ The future of Interdependence: Conventional Forces will look
more like SOF: SOF will look more like CIA”, ” Special Warfare Journal, June 2014,
Vol 27;
3. Colin S. Gray, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,”
Prism 3 (June 2012);
4. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press,
5. Colonel Ralph O. Baker, The Decisive Weapon
6. Alain Bauer, “Hybridization of Conflicts”, Prism
7. LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter
Insurgency”, (Fort Bragg, Department of the Army, JFK Special Warfare center and
School, Special Warfare, volume 20, March-April 2007)
8. Robert Taber
9. Tim Sullivan and Carl Forsberg, “Confronting the Threat of Corruption and
Organized Crime in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict”, Prism 4,
No.4
10. Lawrence W Hank, “ The mindset Change for the Future Operational Environment”
Special Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27
11. Neustadt and May, “Thinking in Time”
12. Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,”
2006;
13. Ivan Arreguín, Toft, p. 123;
14. LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter
Insurgency”, (Fort Bragg, Department of the Army, JFK Special Warfare center and
School, Special Warfare, volume 20, March-April 2007)
15. Oliver Sparrow, Chatham House;
16. Moshe Dayan ”Story of my life”, Da Capo Press,1976;
17. Adrian Ciolponea; Iancu Cristian, “Alternative war strategies for Iraq” , NPS, 2007;
18. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare,
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006);
19. Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, Chapter
2:” Overseas Interagency Structures”
20. John D. Johnson, “10 Things: The Military Should Know about CIA”, ” Special
Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27
21. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, Introduction” The history of
Special Warfare”, Special Warfare, volume 28, April 2015
22. Richard Schultz Jr. and Godson Roy, Intelligence Dominance, (Washington, DC,
CSI’s Armed Groups Project, Weekly Standard, 31 July 2006),

61
23. Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” (Military Review, May –
June, 2005),
24. Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990
25. Jeswald W Salacuse , Leading the Leaders , AMACOM, 2006
26. ADP 6-0 Mission Command
27. Counterinsurgency Manual
28. Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart:
The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28
29. Joint Force Quarterly 76, Ofer Friedman, “Nonlethal Weapons –a technological gap
or mis-defined requirements?”,1st Quarter
30. Bernard Cole, NWC, Washington DC
Annex. No 1- MD4-3000-Tactical Urban UAV
(http://www.microdrones.com/en/products/md4-3000)
The micro drone md4-3000 aerial vehicle is a miniaturized VTOL aircraft
(Vertical TakeOff and Landing). Itcan fly by remote control or automaticallyusing
our GPS Waypoint navigation software. This system is important in urban
operations, because wheneveroperator is losing the link, the drone is flying back
to the base without any other instructions. In the same time the mission could
preload on drone computer and re-send the results back via link.
The md4-3000 drone consists of a carbon fiber body, boasts a flying time of
45-75 minutesand can carry a load of up to 3,000 g. Rain, snow and dust pose no

62
particular problem for micro drones aerial vehicles. The fact that the drone can
carry more than 10 pounds of equipment, it make it suitable for ISR platform
incorporating: TV live camera stream, photo camera, infrared camera and other
sensors. In the same time depending on miniaturization, a mini-gun can be
installed and a small charge of explosive (C 4) with impact detonation. This
weaponized variant could be used even to neutralize HVT like insurgents leader
vehicle.
Theultra-lightweightrobustand weather–resistantcarbon fiberbodyenables
the md4-3000toreach an operating heightofup to 4,000 meters. Theflying altitude
is more than suitable for urban guerrilla, mostimportantisthe stationaryfeature
of the drone, over objective, checking buildings, hangars, bridges or even IEDs
from few feet above, without risking the life of EOD operators.
Thanks to its unique AHHRS (Attitude, Height and Heading Reference
System) even novice pilots can learn to fly within a very short time. Generally a
beginner is in a position to control our aerial vehicles with less than an hour’s
training. With its patented aerodynamic design in combination with new, more
powerful motors, the md4-3000 drone can attain a higher operating speed
with lower wind Cw wind resistance as well as – for the first time – »real« CA
values.
The md4-3000 is the first micro drone, to generate aerodynamic lift, similar
to the wing of a plane, thusattaining better flight performance and at the same time
saving battery power. The optimized 3-blade rotors with adjustable pitch allow
applications up to 4,000 meters above sea level.

63
Utilizations: Anti-terrorist operations, Countering drugs, Aerial mapping of
compounds, Tracking & monitoring of contamination in nuclear accidents,
Monitoring disasters, Bordersurveillance, Firefighting;-foreachODA-2-3 UAVS
max. flying
time
45-75 min
Payload 3,000 g-10 pounds
Cruising
Speed
16 m/s- 60 miles /hour
Dimensions 360 x 2052 x 1888 mm (H/L/W)
MTOW 15,000 g estimated price-$50.000
Annex 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MYSTIC DIAMOND
MODEL (Adrian Ciolponea-“Alternative War Strategies for Iraq”-NPS, 2007)
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF MODELS
Models are organizing devices to help political and military leaders
identify critical issues. Intellectual models simplify reality. To be validated, a
model must be tested in realistic conditions and must have predictive as well as
explanatory power. Assuming that the model is accurate, other measures of its
value are simplicity, practicality, and power. Simplicity is critical for presenting
the model to others. To be practical, the model should be fully understood at the
individual, organizational and strategic level, while a powerful model is useful
for prediction.
B. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL

64
McCormick's Mystic Diamond modelillustrates the conditions, dynamics,
and complexity of an insurgency and prescribes the appropriate steps for
successful counterinsurgency strategy.113 The model involves two levels of
analysis. At the strategic level, it emphasizes the necessity of winning popular
support in order to achieve the desired political objective. “Like the moving
bubble on a level, the behavior of the bulk of the populace will shift to assist
either the government or the insurgents, depending on the carrots and sticks
(rewards and punishments) used by each side.”114 At the operational and
tactical level, the model proposes a complex package of interdependent social,
political, judicial, economical, and military solutions to isolate and neutralize
the core of insurgency.
This chapterdescribes the key variablesin the Mystic Diamond modeland their
theoretical relationships. To grasp the dynamic of the model, it is necessary to
understand the universal features of insurgency movements, including their
evolution, motivation, passive support, inputs/outputs, actionable intelligence
and conversion mechanisms. After describing key factors in the evolution of
insurgency, this chapter presents the spectrum of strategies and objectives
availableto both the state and thecounter-state. Thefinalsection of this chapter
addresses the main characteristics of appropriate state responses in an
insurgency environment.115 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the main
features of theMystic Diamond model, which in laterchaptersis used to analyze
113 Gordon McCormick currently serves as Chair of the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California.
114 Erik P. Wendt,citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt,“Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” Special
Warfare Bulletin, September 2005, 2.
115 Due to space limitations, this thesis does not review the root causes of insurgency or the nature of
modern war. It should be noted that the Mystic Diamond Model is still being evaluated by the author, s o concepts
presented here are subject to modification (McCormick, personal communication).

65
the objectives, tactics, and patterns of the Iraqi insurgency and to develop of a
coherent strategy to disrupt and isolate the insurgency.
Themain idea of the Mystic Diamond isthatin an insurgentenvironment,
unlike in conventional war, opponents compete to control and influence the
population to support their own objectives. If the behavior of the population is
crucial in implementing strategy, the modelidentifies contributing factors which
influencethe population'sbehavior. Thesefactors, which involve theimportance
of political environment, political motivation and support for insurgency or
state, are described in the next section. Without identifying the source of an
insurgency's power and how it transforms internal and external inputs into
action, the state cannot articulate an efficient strategy in response.
For both state and counter-state actors, the structure is the main determinant
only at the beginning of the process; strategy subsequently becomes more
importantfor winning popularsupport. Thisappliesagain for both actors; state
and counter-state.

66
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class,
2006.
TheMystic Diamond Modeldiscussed in greater detailbelow is presented
in Figure 4. The model reveals the importance of a correct sequence of steps
when implementing counter-insurgency strategy. If the state discounts the
importance of popular support and legitimacy for international actors, and
applies the most direct approach by attacking the core of the insurgency, the
results are often disastrous. Thecorrect sequenceof steps to betaken by thestate
are described graphicallyin Figure 1 and in more detail in the strategic options
section of this chapter.

67
When analyzing the schematic structure of the model, it is easy to note its
simplicity and value. In an insurgency environment, this model states that there
are two opponents or competitors struggling for mutual elimination. Each can
have two main sources of inputs: internal inputs, from the population, and
external inputs, from international actors. Oftentimes the battle to control the
population is the deciding factor in the outcome of insurgency. Nevertheless,
external support can be also very important. The bottom line is that the state
initially has to cut the links between the population and insurgents while at the
sametime cutting thelinks between insurgentsand internationalsupporters. The
next step is for the state is to attack and disrupt the internal and external
infrastructure of insurgent’s organization. Only after isolating the core of
insurgency, stopping itsgrowth and fullycontrolling thepopulation and political
space can the state efficiently “take out” the insurgents.
According to Wendt, “this model will allow planners to optimize
counterinsurgency resources by addressing all aspects of insurgent conflict
simultaneously and holistically rather in a disjointed finger-in-the-dike
fashion.”116 The model organizes a large number of factors into a coherent
diagram which depicts their relationships. Those factors—features of
insurgency, strategic options, and conventional versus unconventional
approaches—are described in the following sections.
C. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY
Any insurgency has three major characteristics: structure, infrastructure
and strategy. The structure is how the insurgency is organized, controlled and
116 Erik P. Wendt,citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt,“Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” Special
Warfare Bulletin, September 2005, 5.

68
commanded by its leadership. Usually, the incipient structure it is similar to a
network or even a “network of networks.” In the beginning, decentralization to
ensure the survivability of the movement is very high, with a flat type of
organization, loose command and control, and highly compartmentalized cells.
This incipient form is most vulnerable, so an insurgency must grow and
regenerate rapidly in order to overcome the power of the state.
Insurgents, tend to develop decentralized authority structures as
they mature, even wherethey originally form around a single charismatic
individual or centralized charter group. Where the state is constructed
from the top down, insurgencies are built from the bottom up. They not
only emerge locally, they remain tied to an increasingly distributed local
base as they grow.117
The infrastructure represents all the connections between the population and
external supporters and the insurgency, links which allow the conversion of
inputs into outputs. For the moment it is sufficient to note that regarding
strategy, the insurgents have a clear objective: to disrupt the state's power to
maintain stability and order. The objective of the state is to retain power and
defeat or displace its competitors. The insurgency’s objective is to expand its
popular support and defeat or displace the state.118
In the beginning, insurgentsuse violence and terror againstthe state and
its supporters to underminestate authority. The evolution of the insurgency can
be hard to predict, butit is clear thatan insurgency hasto attain a critical mass
to move to the next phase. At that point, an insurgency can grow exponentially
117 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics
of Internal Wars, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007, 331.
118 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, 322.

69
by winning a large spectrum of popularsupport, or it mightmaintain the status
quo of instability and terror by engagingthestate in a prolonged attrition war.
First, if the insurgencyis ableto maintain a positive rate of growth,
over time it will eventually reach the point where it can either defeat or
displace its opponent. Second, if the rate growth after attrition stabilizes
short of what is needed to win, but is still sufficient to allow it to stay in
the game, the conflict can continue indefinitely.119
The extinction of the insurgency occurs only if the state has adequate solutions
to the problem. The evolution process is graphically displayed in the Figure 5.
119 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla
Mobilization, (Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007), 295.

70
2006.
1. The Life Cycle of Insurgencies
Thefamous insurgentleader Mao Tse Tung characterizes the life cycle of
insurgency as having three main stages: defensive, equilibrium, and offensive.
From the perspective of the insurgents, Stage 1 is the defensive stage. The
insurgency is smaller than the state, with limited resources and limited
manpower. The only advantage the insurgents have in this phase is the
informational advantage. This advantage is conferred by the underground
profile of incipientinsurgency and bythe fact thatinsurgentscan better monitor
the state actionswhich aremore visible. Stage2, thestageof equilibrium, occurs
when the powers of the state and insurgencyare roughly equal. There may be a
period of dualpower, with the country divided into different regions of influence
and authority. In this situation, the insurgentscan playthe attrition card, which
in the long term might achieve the desired effect: Stage 3, the offensive stage.
With adequategrowth, theinsurgencybecomes a larger force than the state and
can finally react with a conventional offense. The guerillas' growth rate must
become faster than the force advantage of the state in order for the insurgents
to get through the insulation phase120. There is a correlation between the size of
the opposition and thestate's ability to detect it. Thismeansthere is a time when
the guerillas should grow and a time for them to sit tight so as to remain unseen.
Accordingly, until the critical mass is reached, the insurgency could know a
nonlinearevolution characterized by upsand downs. Oncethe critical mass has
120 Insulation phase represents the portion of insurgency lifecycle where, the influence exercised by the
insurgents can not change the behavior of major population.

71
been reached, also the conditions for generalizing the conflict are created. The
environment context can be crucial for the development of an insurgency.
2. The Environmental Spectrum
The struggle between the state and counter-state involves controlling the
political space which can be conceptualized as an environmentalspectrum with
two extremes. In the middleis the population, which itself hasdifferent layers of
affiliation with one or even both of the extremes; the population may include
active and passive supporters, moderates, and sympathizers. Popularsupportis
somewhere in the middle of the political space. The mobilisable population can
be divided into three groups: core supporters of the state, core supporters of the
insurgency, and a largemiddlegroup ofindividualswhoareprepared tosupport
one side the other depending on the circumstances of the struggle.121 The
structural environment acts as the context for the revolution or insurgency. The
area of influence is graphicallydescribed in Figure 6. The strategic space is in
the middle, and the migration of a segment of population towards one extreme
or another can determine the outcome of the conflict. McCormick says,
The strategic space in between, gives opportunities for every side
to influence the behavior of the population. That is why it becomes a
matter of how you implement the strategy to influence and determine the
desired outcome.122
121 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 301.

72
Figure 6. Area of Influence Model
2006.
Another importantidea is that at the extreme edges, structure determines
who winsor loses, butin the middle, strategy is the dominantfactor. Depending
on a particularsituation and context, if the environmentis so stable and thestate
structural circumstances are effective, then there is no possibility for insurgency
success, because most of the population will support the state actions; (as the
blue line shows in the next figure). Conversely, at the other end of the spectrum,
the environment is so unstable, and the bulk of the population is sympathetic

73
with the movement that no matter how incompetent the insurgents may be, and
no matter how competent the government is, there is simply no way the
insurgents can lose.
If the opposition is operating in a typical mobilization environment, there
is come critical size beyond which its level of popularsupport will begin
to grow of its own accord. Oncethis crossover pointis reached, thegroup
will enjoy the bandwagon effects associated with achieving a position of
critical mass. Thechiefoperationalproblem it faces is getting to thispoint
in the first place.123

74
Figure 7. Area of Influence Model.
2006.
To summarize the environmental spectrum analysis, the Mystic Diamond
model reveals that the success in unconventional conflict has two essential
conditions. Thenecessary condition is the structure, and thesufficient condition
is strategy. Whichever side is better managing the strategy and influence the
population support, will eventually win the conflict. Certainly there are some
limits, in between which, the strategy plays a role, above those limits, there is
little one actor can do to influence the outcome. In time, depending on the
package (pure preferences, incentives, expectations), the undecided segment of

75
the population could shift from one side to another, determining the outcome of
the conflict.
By influencing popularexpectation , and through this, theexpected
value of supporting one player against the other, popular beliefs about
shifting balanceof power has a significant and highly variable influence
over the context in which both sides approach mobilization.124
3. Motivation
According to McCormick, motivation is defined by pure preference,
selective incentives and expectations that shape a person’s motivation.
Motivation can determine the shift of popularaffiliation towards one end of the
political space. In the Iraq case, one end of the political space is occupied by
counter-state hard core insurgents, “true believers,” and the other end is held
by the state.
In every case and everywaythechoices peoplemakearesubjective,
based on a highly personalized (and variable) utility function, socially
conditioned values, imperfect information, and sometimes surprisingly
inability to sort through and evaluatethe information they haveavailable
to them at the time.125
Insurgents use both punishments and rewards to influence the
population's conditioned preferences and gain its support. The state strategy
focuses on restricting potentialfor active support of the insurgents, butthe state

76
can do little to influence or stop passive support. Furthermore, punishment
works more in favor of insurgents, whohavenorestrictions in applying violence.
Passive Support
Historical records of insurgencies in China, Cuba, Malaya and the
Philippines show that successful insurgencies initially have public support that
is two percent active and 98 percent passive. This means that in the beginning,
only a small fraction of the population chooses violence to express their political
grievances.126 While passive support does not buttress insurgentactivities other
than with sympathy and tolerance, it gives insurgents an informational
advantage over the state, and freedom of maneuver.
McCormick says, “People act according to their pure preferences,
selective incentives and expectations, which are subject to manipulation byboth
the state and the counter-state.”127 For the state at the operational level, it is
most important to gain political control of the population in order to counter
insurgents' efforts at coercion. Evidence suggests growing active Iraqi support
for insurgentsdue to coalition and government failure to maintain security and
provide basic needs, economic decline, sectarian cleansing and collateral
casualties.
The low resolution and indirect tactics used by insurgents has a direct
effect on state forces posture by creating a gradual shifting from a passive
diplomaticapproach toa moreaggressiveand retaliatory responses. In thiscase
126 Nathan Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr., “Rebellion and Authority:An Analytic Essay on Insurgents Conflicts,”
(RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February, 1970).

77
the popular opinion about coalition forces shifts conversely they are perceived
less as “liberators” and more as “occupation forces.”
Because it is much easier to identify the movement sympathizers
than its participants, the unfortunate tendency is to apply repression
indiscriminately…This not only creates moral outrage, it destroys the
incentive not to join the battle among the opponent’s weakly committed
adherents.128
5. Inputs, Outputs, and the Conversion Mechanism
External support facilitates the growth of insurgency by providing
tactical, procedures, logistical support and communications. The core of the
problem is mainly not the multiplier role assured by external support, but the
indigenous support, which fuels the regeneration process.
External and internal support, flow to a cadre or infrastructure,
where they will be refined and translated into output. It is important to
note that supportwill likely come from a mixture of external and internal
sources. Defining where the majority of insurgentsupportis coming from
allows for the proportionate and correct application of COIN
[counterinsurgency] resources.129
A mechanism model is very important for an insurgency movement,
because it translates of inputs to outputs. Derived from the writings of Nanthan
Leites and Charles Wolf Jr, this model is vital for understanding thedifferences
between conventional and unconventional approaches to COIN, as well as for
129 Erik P. Wendt,citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt,“Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” (Fort
Bragg: Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005), 5.

78
defining where COIN operations should focus the priority of their effort.130
According with the model, inputs are resources (basically people, guns and
money) and outputs are operations (to organize, train, equip, coordinate and
operate). Outputs are the final product of any activity that allocates resources.
They “can range from armed forces patrolling to the placement of improvised
explosive devices (IED), to suicide bombings.”131 Initially, faced with scarcity
of resources and support, insurgents are forced to make choices and therefore
to go for the maximum effect with minimum resources as the best return on
investment. For insurgents, more important than physical destruction is the
moral impact of the message they send to state supporters. It is crucial to send
a clear and strong message that they fight for a just cause and will sacrifice to
achieve victory. Thepopulation isa source of endogenousinputs. In theabsence
of an endogenous connection, the insurgency becomes easily visible. By not
being embedded within the population, the insurgency is an easy target for
conventional decisive actions. In the absence of internal support, the external
ones become exposed and easily defeated. The equation is graphically
represented in Figure7, which showsthatexogenousand endogenousinputsare
transformed through the conversion mechanism into outputs, which in the end,
leadsto authoritativecontrol over political space and population.Ifoneelement
of the equation is removed, the process stops and the insurgency is likely to be
destroyed.
130 Erik P. Wendt,citing Leitis and Wolf Jr., in Wendt,“Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” (Fort Bragg:
Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005), 5.
131 Wendt, 6.

79
Source: Leites, Nathan; Wolf, Jr., Charles,” Rebellion and authority: an
analytic essay on insurgents conflicts,” and Professor Gordon McCormick,
“Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006.
As a generalrule, insurgentsseek to grow. At the same time, the state and
its internal and external supporters try to contain the situation and isolate the
hard core of the insurgent organization. Only after isolation they can be
physically eliminated. The insurgent strategy is revealed by outputs—by
actions—not by words. In the case of a healthygrowing insurgency, the growth
cycle is iterative, little by little. Each stage of a cycle is supposed to lay the
groundwork for the next one. Step by step, the insurgent footprint increases,
more resources are gained; more control is achieved and so on. The flow of
inputs within the political space is represented in Figure 4.

80
In this light, one can understand whyit is importantfor the state to have
a feasible strategy in place. Thefollowing section details the availablestrategic
options for the state and counter-state actors.
C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS
In a closed political environment, the state and the counter-state have
limited strategic options. Theinsurgencyhasto grow constantly in order to win.
Thestate hasthedifficulttask of separating insurgentsfrom thepopulation while
simultaneouslycutting off external support. If the state disregardsthelater, then
tactical successes cannot stop the regeneration of the insurgency. The strategic
objectives of the state and insurgent are the same: influencing the behavior of
populace and establishing political control.
1. Strategic Approach of the State against the Insurgents
According to McCormick, for the state, the struggle between the state and
an insurgency involves five basic strategic “legs,” or elements: (1) Building a
bond with the population (infrastructure development); (2) Infrastructure
targeting and disrupting relations between the insurgents and the population;
(3) Direct action targeted killing of high value targets (HVT) as the first order
effect (indiscriminate methods can produce alienation); (1’) Building state
legitimacy with relevant international actors including the intelligence
community (developing intelligence infrastructure and actionableintelligence);
(2’) Disrupting relations between insurgents and international sponsors
(infrastructure targeting). Thecorrect sequence of strategic steps is graphically
represented in Figure 9.

81
Figure 9. The Strategic Steps to be Implemented by the State in
Counterinsurgency.
2006.
Themain counterinsurgency objectives are as follows: Objective 1 is “establishing
control and legitimacyover the population (leg 1), objective 2 is building legitimacy
with international actors (leg 1’).”132 The state cannot strike at the infrastructure
between the insurgency and population until this connection becomes visible; the
same can be said for state efforts to disrupt the infrastructure between insurgents
and their external support. The insurgentscannot be seen until the state establishes
effective control over the population and consequently influences the population’s
132 Wendt, citing McCormick, 6.

82
behavior. The state also must win the legitimacy struggle in the population and the
international arena. As it establishes control, it can gradually shift towards the
second objective.
Objective 2 is disrupting the insurgency infrastructure (leg 2) and its
external support (leg 2’). The insurgents become visible thanks to the
information, legitimacy and support from the population and international
arena; this allows the state to attack the infrastructure of the insurgency and to
discover their soft spots.
Objective 3 is striking directly at the insurgency core (leg 3). Without
popular support, intelligence or clarity about the insurgents, the state cannot
strike directly and effectively. After the insurgency is visible and the links with
its supporters disrupted, the hard core can be neutralized or destroyed. This
objective can be accomplished by numerous integrated operations, including
raidson insurgencybasesor cachepoints, leadership targeting to kill or capture
HVT, and other visible direct actions. At this point the state must still maintain
the operational status quo achieved by the first two objectives. The outcome of
each strategic objective determines the success of subsequent efforts. The
movement from one objective to the next is sequential, and, atthe tactical level,
the state can extend its actions by carefully transitioning from one objective to
the next.
2. Sequence for Implementing State Objectives
Thebest wayto dealwith insurgencyis indirectly, through thepopulation.
To defeat the insurgents, the state has to accomplish the three objectives. When
the insurgency becomes visible enough, the state has to address the objectives,

83
either sequentially or simultaneously, in accordance with strategic
requirements.
To the conventionally minded, the conflict between the state and the
counter-state seems mostly direct, a force againstforce confrontation. Buthere
it is all about how the weak can win the game. If insurgents are dying or
disappearing, the state is easily deceived into a false sense of victory while the
insurgency lives on.
Thus, if the strategic approach is based solely or primarily on the third
objective of striking directly againsttheinsurgentcore, theinsurgencywillnever
be neutralized or destroyed because the movement will generally retain the
capability to regenerate. The Mystic Diamond model sequencing of events
directs the state into the specific series of actions thatthe state needs to win. The
most direct way to prosecute this kind of waris indirectly. For the state, the first
goal is to overcome the lack of information. For the insurgents, the first goal is
to overcome their lack of force. Insurgencyis like an amorphousgas, constantly
changing,nevertaking a solid shape. AsMcCormicksays, “Insurgencyisa force
in development and the state is a force in being.” He explains that
Each element of this struggle is grounded in a geographical and
political space. Insurgentsare most efficient through differentiation; they
don’t have to compete for resources. Then, finding information becomes
more difficult becauseinsurgentsareseparate elements in various sectors
of the population, like a network. However, they still compete for power

84
and control over the population unless their weaknesses are understood
and can effectively be exploited by the state.133
3. Strategic Approach of the Insurgents
The insurgency movement has objectives that mirror the state's objectives.
Objective 1 for the insurgents is developing the infrastructure through
popular or external support. This allows the insurgency to gain resources,
credibility and strength and leads to the next step, which is limiting state
influence in the political space. In the early stages the insurgency the leaders
pose questions like “How can the movement extend its infrastructure? Whatare
the methods for maximizing the growth rate of the insurgency? What are ways
to develop the infrastructure unmolested in order to achieve surprise?”134 When
insurgents have more resources, they grow exponentially and can increase
attacks againstthe state. More attacks increase the credibility and legitimacy of
their organization which in turn accelerates the influx of resources.
Objective 2 is attacking thestate’s infrastructureand externalsupport. To
extend their own infrastructure further, the insurgency has to diminish the
infrastructure of the state, which it does byattacking theinstrumentsof the state.
Terror is one of the most effective tactics initially because with limited inputs,
terror allows the insurgents to achieve maximum outputs.
Directed violence is used, in the first place, as an instrument of
agitation or ‘propagandabythedeed’, designed to definethe terms of the

85
struggle and force people to take a political position. It is also used to
provoke the state into excessive and misdirected use of counter-violence
in the hope that this will alienate otherwise neutral elements of the
population and reshapetheirpreferences in the favor of the opposition.135
Control is critical; without controlling the population, the insurgency
cannot survive. Insurgent movements' growth will always be restricted by the
state, which is why insurgency is likely to start in places with ineffective state
control. One of the most important prescriptions for the growth phase of the
insurgency is to resist the urge to go conventional againstthe military power of
the state.
Objective 3 is to attack the state. Theuse of terrorism in combination with
concentric attacks against state pillars (police, military, political leadership)
and external supporters diminishes public confidence in the state’s ability to
insure a secure and healthy environment.
Over time the balance of power shifts. Insurgents can exploit their size
advantage to gain power. In the case of an occupying force, as in Iraq, the
insurgents do not need to get bigger than the state, but only big enough to
influencethe occupier's withdrawalprocess. Conventionalarmieslose if they do
not win – insurgents drive them out by not losing.136 Once the first obstacle is
eliminated, then the next objective for insurgency is to reach the next phase the
offensive phase, when it can conventional engage the state.
136 Gordon McCormick citing Henry Kissinger during NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006.

86
4. Sequence for Implementing Insurgent Objectives
The optimal sequence for the insurgent’s strategic implementation is
symmetrical with the state’s strategic implementation. The first strategic
objective (leg 1 and leg 1’) lays the groundworkfor the second (leg 2 and leg 2’)
who determine the conditions for the third (leg 3).
Figure 10. Strategic Implementation for the Counter-state.
2006.

87
D. CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY
Conventional war is not obsolete; therefore in order to wage this type of
conflict, there is still theneed for a powerful, versatile, joint, conventional force.
Furthermore, even in unconventionalconflict, the conventional forces can play
an important supporting role for an unconventional force. Nevertheless, today,
the warfare is shifting from conventional conflict to low intensity,
unconventionalconflict. To better respond, the state's army should also shift its
thinking, resources and application of force. If the army and political leaders
cannot make the necessary adjustments, the army might win all the battles and
still lose the war. This paradoxemerges in unconventionalenvironments where
conventionalarmyresponses multiplyproblemsand acceleratethe growth of the
insurgency. This seems to imply that the future calls for two types of armies:
conventional and unconventional. So far, no country can afford this. So whatis
the solution? For a rational analysis, one should first recognize the problem,
then design the strategy, and only then select and organize the necessary force
package, incentives, and coercion measures. In other words, the force has to be
tailored according to the nature of the conflict. The default position for most
military establishment is the conventional mindset: “We need to kill the enemy
and then the problem is solved.” The general perception is that once the enemy
is killed, nobody will replace him to continue the struggle. The facts show that
the regeneration process is more rapid than expected. Killing the enemy in
counterinsurgency is a weak win. As McCormick says, “The conventional
mindsetstates thatit is necessary to destroy the enemyand after thatto establish
the control. Theunconventionalapproach states that it is necessary to establish

88
control and onlyafter thatto kill or capturetheenemy.”137 For success, thestate
mustgrasp thesituation in itsentirety and reducetheinsurgents' abilitytoembed
in the population. Insurgentsattack state symbols to erode the linkage between
state and population. The state has to reduce the insurgent’s freedom of
maneuver. Actionable intelligence is paramount. Population and intelligence
are resource bases. Thestate and counter-state compete for thesame population
and the same international actors. As McCormick has noted, the state begins
with a force advantage. The counter-state begins with an informational
advantage.Thestate buildsbonds with the population to get more information.
Thecounter-state buildsbondswith thepopulation togetmore people, guns, and
money.
The state begins the game with a force advantage but an
information disadvantage. The insurgents, by contrast, enter the game,
with an information advantage and a force disadvantage. They are
generally ableto see whatthey wish to hit, butthey have limited ability to
hit whatthey see. This asymmetry can be exploited by provoking the state
into striking out at targets it cannot see, alienating the population, who
become victims by-substitution, and pushing people into the arms of the
insurgents.138
The conventional approach cannot handle the situation from the
strongholds, where military forces are totally separated from locals and leave
the political space in the hands of the insurgents. An effective intelligence
network is the key in understanding the motives, culture, decision processes,
138 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla
Mobilization,(Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007), 308.

89
resources, capabilities, and locations of real and potential adversaries. This
situational awarenesscannot be achieved by force; therefore the overwhelming
power of conventional forces contributes little to the creation and maintenance
of the information network.
Another key in counterinsurgency is to reverse the growth curve of the
movement. Targeting itis difficult and counterproductiveifnot based on reliable
human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. The conventional approach only
accelerates the growth of insurgency. Moreover, if collateral casualties are not
considered carefully, the pure preference of the population tilts towards
insurgency.
In the first two stages, defense and equilibrium, the insurgency has the
informationaladvantageover the state and the state has trouble identifying and
locating targets, so it is crucial that the state win popular support to increase
the flow of information about insurgent activities and to achieve the necessary
resolution regarding the insurgents infrastructure. Once the intelligence is
actionable, the insurgents do not stand a chance against state power. The
conventional approach has little success because it targets only what is visible
at the surface, disregarding theinsurgents' underground linksto the population.
The unconventional approach emphasizes integrating surrogate forces into the
populace to acquire actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence represents
a vital factor in counter insurgency operations.
As T. E. Lawrence famously described it, fighting rebels is “like
eating soup with a knife.” Guerrillas do not depend on vulnerable lines
of supply and communications, so counterinsurgents must target them
directly, and even a few thousand armed guerrillas can create chaos in a
country of tens millions. Guerrillas camouflage themselves among the

90
population; frequently the only way to distinguish an insurgent from
population; frequently the only way to distinguish an insurgent from a
civilian is when he (or she) opens fire.139
Cultural awareness and the respect of local people, combined with a
specific mixture of incentives and punishments, should eliminate conflicts
between state/coalition forces and the population. Unconventional forces,
external or internal, have a better package of knowledge, experience, and
equipment to deal with locals.
Figure11. Winning Strategies for Conventional versus Unconventional War.
139 Daryl G. Press and Benjamin Valentino, “A Victory, But Little Is Gained,” New York Times, November 17, 2004, 3.

91
2006.
The figure above, displays the opposite sequence of strategic goals
pursued by conventional and unconventional strategies. Thus, becomes evident
that the fundamental difference between these two strategies is that what is the
necessary initial condition in unconventional approach, the control over the
population, is conversely the final objective in conventional approach. Another
key aspect when fighting theinsurgentsis the level of force engaged bythestate.
When overreacting, the state fuels the insurgency, accelerating its regeneration
and growth. Thisidea is expressed bythe equivalentresponse model. According
to Wendt,
The equivalent response model is vital to strategic
counterinsurgency modeling because it demonstrates that insurgent
warfare is the thinking man’s game in the extreme. To be successful,
counterinsurgency forces must take the initiative, carefully chose their
actions, weigh possible actions against the band of excellence, and
anticipatethe adversary’s reaction. An effective strategy initiates actions
that fall within the band of excellence, but cause the opponent to react
with actions that fall outside the band. When insurgents actions fall
outside the band, thebubbleof the area of influence model will shift, and
we can expect corresponding decreases in people, guns, and money from
the population and internalinsurgentsupporters, further diminishing the
insurgent’s ability to produce output.140
140 Wendt, citing McCormick, 5.

92
E. CONCLUSION: MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL PRINCIPLES
In conclusion, this chapter presents three main principles of the Mystic
Diamond model. Examiningtheseprinciplesclarifies whyit is necessary thatthe
state establish a proportionalsymmetric reaction to combat insurgency. In other
words, the model shows that an effective strategy will find and engage the
appropriate response to the violence induced by insurgency.
1. The Principle of Mutual Exclusion
The political space has natural borders. Over time, one entity will
dominate and control the space. Perfect equilibrium is impossible, especially
when radicalization takes place. One side always has an edge over the other.
Each actor begins with an advantage that determines their priorities for
strategic objectives, and each sidemustlearn to leverage its opening advantage.
Thestate hasto create the perception thatthe bad guyswillbecaptured or killed
no matter how long it takes and how manyresources are spent. ThePrinciple of
Mutual Exclusion states that if one side accomplishes one of its objectives; the
other side does not control the political space. The regime starts out with
nominal power. The real power comes in filling up the political space. The
solution for the state is to take the country village by village, creating and
establishing an administrative presence.
Some strategies are required by both sides to engage an apathetic
population which would otherwisesupportthestate. Theregimemaynot get into
the gameuntilthe spaceis contested. Thesolution for the state is to establish an
administrativepresence and takethe country village by villageas a strategy that
attacks the insurgents' infrastructure.

93
2. The Principle of Feedback
In the first phase, the state's concern is information; the insurgencyneeds
inputs - people, gunsand money. The state has the resource advantage, though
the feedback about their influence over the insurgency is quite limited. The
insurgents have the information advantageand an obvious deficit in resources.
Theeffectiveness of insurgentsisdefined bythequalityand quantityofits attacks
over state.
The group’s visible performance, in such cases, will be used as a
surrogate variable to measure its capability and prospects. The most
important measure of performance is the quality and quantity of its
attacks. All other things being equal, an effective and rising pattern of
violence is a signal of strength. An ineffective and declining level of
activity, by contrast, is a signal of weakness.141
Only the population can help the state forces to acquire the necessary
resolution on insurgents network, that why the feedback mechanism is
determined by positive behavior of the populace towards state actions against
insurgents. In the gameof influencing thepopulacebehavior, effectiveness plays
a primary role. According with McCormick, the effectiveness of the state and
counter- state actions can be measured in different way:
Insurgent effectiveness measures the numbers of losses they are
able to inflict on the state per time period per unit of rebel force. State
effectiveness, on the other hand, measuresthe numberof rebel losses it is

94
able to inflict per time period per potential interaction between the
opposing forces.142
3. The Principle of Political Control
McCormick says, “Control is an exclusive phenomenon: if you have it,
they don’t. When you have control over the environment, you can influence the
pure preferences of the population.”143 Control is the ability to shape behavior
through selective incentives. Control must be exercised across the breadth and
depth of the political spectrum. High resolution control means knowing the
insurgency down to the individual level—knowing where every individual is,
whathethinks, whathedoes. With this type of control, manipulation and secrecy
are easy. Conversely, the insurgents lose the initiative and cannotstrike at will.
Political control is the key outcome of the Mystic Diamond model. Trying to
establish the control, the state is also confronting the following paradox:
As the state is successful at reducing the strength of insurgency, it
will be harder and harderfor it to continue to reduce the insurgency at a
constant rate. This is in stark contrast to most military operations, where
success enables continued success.144
When facing a murky situation like an insurgency, the state must clearly
identify the relevant features of its opponents even before articulating its
strategic objectives, concepts and allocation of resources. The Mystic Diamond
142 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B Horton, Lauren A Harrison, 349.
144 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics
of Internal Wars, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007, 349.

95
model is an analytic tool which identifies both the insurgency’s main features
and the dynamic of its evolution. Moreover, the model reveals the principles to
be followed when implementing an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
ChapterIIIanalyzesthe situation in Iraq through thelensof the Mystic Diamond
model.

96
Annex 3-Nonlethal Weapons. (http://jnlwp.defense.gov/PressRoom
InTheNews/ tabid/4777/Article/58613 /developing-non-lethal-weapons-the-
human-effects-characterization-process.aspx)
Current non-lethal weapons are fielded and in use. A number of non-lethal weapons are
currently being fielded to give our men and women in uniform alternatives between “shouting and
shooting”, while reducing the risk of fatalities and permanent injury to non-combatants. These
devices have been and continue to be extremely valuable to troops involved in current operations.
Non-lethal capabilities are available for use in a variety of conflict scenarios, from humanitarian
and peace operations to combat operations.
Currently available non-lethal capabilities range from non-lethal munitions and acoustic
devices to non-lethal optical distractors and vehicle stopping devices. Non-lethal weapons are
multi-capable, with the ability to strike single or multiple targets. These non-lethal capabilities
give warfighters a variety of options in situations where traditional weapons are not the best
solution.
To help resolve this dilemma, warfighters were equipped with non-lethal weapons, including a
dazzling laser that got drivers’ attention and indicated a need to stop. Using these capabilities
helped differentiate combatants and noncombatants and reduced checkpoint shootings.
Non-lethal weapons are needed where conflict and disasters occur within population centers. They
fill the space between “shouting and shooting” and their use often has prevented the worsening of
bad situations. Non-lethal weapons like blunt-impact rounds, pepper spray and others stopped
and/or dispersed noncombatants who posed a threat to forces in Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti and
Afghanistan. They also helped determine the intentions of operators of small boats that were
nearing U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels. As these examples highlight, non-lethal weapons
provide options tocommanders on the escalation and de-escalation of force continuum, enhancing
their capability sets in various environments. While the benefit of these options maybe seem self-
evident, it may not be as obvious how the Department of Defense (DoD) defines a non-lethal
weapon and procures systems which meet that definition. The need for non-lethal weapons was
recognized with the 1996 establishment of the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program. This followed
the asymmetric warfare experience in Somalia. Here, rock- and Molotov-cocktail-throwing
crowds and open looting of military equipment were undeterred until U.S. forces adopted non-
lethal weapons during the 1995 United Nations withdrawal from Somalia. Though their use was

97
limited, U.S. forces made these non-lethal capabilities knownto the Somali population in advance,
deterring hostile crowds who initially were bent on “driving the Americans back into the sea.
”Since then, this program has sought to facilitate development and fielding of non-lethal weapons
to meet U.S. forces’ requirements. And, by 2011, needs had grown to the point that then-Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford stated, “The demand for non-lethal
weapons exceeds the inventory,” as reported by the Marine Corps Times. What Is Non-lethality
in DoD? “Non-lethal” means something that produces more nuanced effects to achieve a given
purpose. For countering personnel, examples of non-lethal effects include electro muscular
incapacitation that disables, glaring light that obscures vision, and millimeter wave energy that
heats nerve endings, repelling individuals. The term “non-lethal” is subject to varying
interpretations—and, while examples help elicit the scope of effects included in the non-lethal
spectrum, the topic is defined more clearly by DoD policy. DoD Directive 3000.03E, DoD
Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons and Non-Lethal Weapons Policy, defines non-lethal
weapons as: Weapons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed
to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent
injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. NLW
[non-lethal weapons] are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and materiel. The
directive also states it is DoD policy that: Developers of NLW will conduct a thorough human
effects characterization in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3200.19 to help understand
the full range of effects and limitations prior to operational employment of the NLW. In effect,
development and acquisition must include a process, unique to non-lethal weapons, which
accounts for the effects of the system on human targets. It is important to note that while human
effects on the target must be characterized for non-lethal weapons, they are not required to have
a zero probability of producing adverse effects. Instead, the human effects on the target are an
inherent attribute that will influence heavily the design of any non-lethal weapons system:
Achieving the desired effectiveness with an acceptable injury risk often is the crux of their
development. From the onset, programs should incorporate human effects into their overall risk
management approach similar to other aspects of the development. In fact, DoDI 3200.19, Non-
Lethal Weapons Human Effects Characterization, published in 2012, requires the human effects
of a required non-lethal capability be designated as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) or Key
System Attribute (KSA).Characterizing Human Effects in Non-Lethal Weapons Acquisition

98
Whether forces are rapidly fielding commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items or addressing a
capability gap with a development program of record, characterizing the human effects in non-
lethal weapons acquisition is critical to the warfighters who face complex engagement scenarios.
The warfighters must have confidence in the effectiveness of a non-lethal weapon and understand
the risk of adverse effects. This need was identified early in the Non-Lethal Weapons Program.
The human effects characterization process has since matured and is one of the aspects of non-
lethal weapons acquisitions that make it unique from other weapons. In some cases, non-lethal
weapons have been rapidly developed and/or fielded to meet urgent warfighting needs. These
effortshave been informed by the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program, quickly drawing on experts
and past research. Such was the case with dazzling lasers, urgently needed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Experts from the Air Force Research Laboratory, Naval Surface Warfare Center
Dahlgren, and the Army’s Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering
Center collectively assessed considerable research on lasers’ ocular effects. They determined
factors impacting effectiveness and injury risks, thereby informing laser use and future
development.
For programs of record, the process starts with a capability requirement defined by combat
developers—driven by the needs of our warfighters. As with other acquisitions, the definition of
requirements is critical to a program’s success.. Here, requirements must be written in terms of
the consequences for a human target both foreffectivenessand risk. This, therefore,demands early
involvement of subject-matter experts on non-lethal weapons human effects. The importance is
amplified when one considers that, for non-lethal weapons, human effects may be the most
constraining attribute. The feasibility of delivering a human effect at desired ranges is good for
many systems. However, doing so may incur great risk of inflicting injuries. Thus, in designing
non-lethal weapons, trade-offs often are necessary between the weapons’ effectiveness and the
risks of injuries. Adding to this complexity, consideration must be given to testing a system
prototype against a new human effects capability requirement. The importance of insightful and
clear requirement definition cannot be overstated.Here is an example of considerations for a non-
lethal, counter-personnel capability, which will heavily influence system design: Task: Is the non-
lethal capability intended to deny individuals access to areas, move them from areas, disable
and/or render them unable to perform, or suppress and/or reduce performance? This addresses
the system’s desired effect on a target’s behavior and how it enables mission accomplishment.

99
However, a measureable requirement for behavioral effectiveness is difficult to define. In the past,
human effectsexperts necessarily have interpreted and defined these desired effectsin terms of the
more measureable physiological effects of the stimulus caused by the system. Conditions: These
include the intended domain for the capability—land, air or maritime; types of weather—day
and/or night; open or confined spaces; involvement of one or several targeted persons; and
whether these persons are moving. Conditions can have significant effects on a system’s
performance—for example, the glare effects of dazzling lasers and flash bangs are highly variable
depending on ambient lighting. Parameters: What is the desired range to targeted personnel? Is
the target a point or area?
What is the duration of the effect? How long should reversal take? After defining a requirement,
it may be found that a 40-milimeter projectile is deliverable to a needed range beyond 100
meters—but could inflict unacceptable injuries, thus necessitating design modifications and/or
trade-offs. Also, well-defined non-lethal capability requirements may drive applied research. For
example, technically it is possible to achieve extended human electromuscular incapacitation
(effects similar to those caused by TASER devices used by law enforcement).
However, confidence must be assessed about the ability to incapacitate targets for longer than 15
seconds with acceptable risk defining a requirement for a non-lethal capability also includes
determining an acceptable Risk of Significant Injuries (RSI).
This is the DoD-defined metric to measure the non-lethality of a weapon system. Warfighters,
through combat developers, determine this risk based on a concept of operations for a nonlethal
capability. DoDI 3200.19 defines significant injuries as those that result from proper employment
and require health care beyond the field or self-aid, permanent functional impairments, and
fatalities. It is oftenexpressed as a percentage, such as a 5 percent probability of significant injury
at defined ranges. This determination is deliberative, driven by the intended mission use, and
informed by human-effects experts. Risk of Significant Injuries is, therefore, the build-to DoD
specification for non-lethality. Describing the trade space between risk of significant injuries and
effectiveness is paramount in non-lethal weapons development. An example of user requirements
may be to hail and warn individuals, and also temporarily suppress vision. Translated into a
measurable human effect, the requirement may call for specific irradiance levels at ranges, which
vary depending on the desired effect and distance.

100
The human effectsrole continues throughout the acquisition process and should be integrated fully
into the system engineering process to ensure informed characterization planning, prioritization
and programmatic risk management. The DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Human Effects
Office, manages a portfolio of science and technology efforts to understand the relevant human
impacts of emerging technologies in terms of their effectiveness and risk. Examples of such efforts
include examining novel stimuli for applicable effects, determining stimuli doses for achieving
those effects, and developing a framework for assessing behavioral effectiveness.
The results of these efforts establish the human impacts of these technologies in terms of their
effectiveness and risks and contribute to the development of models and surrogates for testing.
Robust engagement between materiel and combat developers, testers and human effects personnel
ensures integration of technology development, human effects and test and evaluation plans and
investment strategies—managing cost, schedule and technical risk due to human effects
characterization.
Meeting the DoD Definition of Non-Lethal
Within the DoD acquisition system, non-lethal weapons are treated the same as other weapons
programs, with the addition of a target human effects review. DoDI 3200.19 requires non-lethal
acquisition programs to undergo this independent DoD review, called a Human Effects Review
Board (HERB). The board provides Non-Lethal Weapons Program Managers and Milestone
Decision Authorities with:
 An assessment of the quality and completeness of human effects information
 Potential human effects risks
 Recommendations to mitigate these risks
The HERB consists of representatives from the Surgeon General and safety offices of the military
Services (including the Marine Corps’ medical officer), U.S. Special Operations
Command and U.S. Coast Guard. The DoD Instruction states that
“the HERB review ensures human effects of NLWs are evaluated consistently. ”In addition to the
HERB, from the early phases of materiel development onward, the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons
Program identifies technologies or systems to undergo independent scientific assessment by
Human EffectsAdvisory Panels. These panels consist of scientific experts from industry, academia
and government who review the current state of a human effects characterization effort, offering

101
a critical peer review of the available research data, models and research plans. Such a review
can shape and validate the human effects characterization and technology development going
forward.
Ultimately, human effects characterization and peer review processes provide decision makers,
commanders and users with confidence that the system will work as intended—and a firm
understanding of the risk of employing it.
They also may inform legal and policy reviews, development of rules of engagement governing
non-lethal weapons use, and contribute to training on non-lethal weapons.
Conclusion
In 2014, a U.S. Marine convoy in southwest Afghanistan encountered more than a dozen, rock-
throwing locals. After a Marine fired a 12-gauge, non-lethal warning munition, the rock throwers
fled. Similarly, in eastern Afghanistan, a U.S. Air Force security patrol observed local people
attempting to cut concertina wire on the perimeter of a U.S. base. When the locals persisted after
visual warnings to stop and leave, the patrol initiated two non-lethal, sting-ball grenades, causing
the intruders to flee, evidently unharmed.
Had the Marines or Airmen been equipped only to respond with lethal force, the engagements
and/or their abilities to accomplish the mission might have been changed.
Non-lethal weapons provide commanders options for escalation and de-escalation of force,
making them more effective in similar situations that arise almost daily in typical recent
operations.
The characterization of non-lethal weapons human effects has become more defined and
advanced, building on knowledge and lessons learned. Today, it is guiding non-lethal weapons
development in its earliest stages, focused first and foremost on warfighter needs as expressed by
combat developers. And this human effects characterization is informing development of far more
sophisticated non-lethal technologies needed by warfighters today and needed even more
tomorrow. This continually improving human effects characterization process is key to improving
non-lethal weapons.

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