Special Forces-future challenges

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National War College
Washington, DC
Title:
Special Operations – “future challenges”
(Individual Strategic Research Project)
Author:
BG Adrian Ciolponea (ROU-SF)
Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the requirement of
National War College course
Academic Advisor: Bernard Cole
2015

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1. General context- Imminent threats;…………………………p.4-8;
2. David Kilcullen theory; ………………………………………p.8-16
3. Joint Urban Special Operations Task Force; ………………p 16-23
3.1 Intelligence in urban environment;………………..p.24-28;
3.2 JUSOTF-Task-organization;……………………….p.28-33;
3.3 Implementation ofUrban SpecialOperationatOperational
and TacticalLevels …………………………………p.33-38;
4. Communication in urban special operations; ……………….p.38-53;
5. Conclusion;…………………………………………………… p.53-58;
6. Bibliography……………………………………………………p.58-59;
Annexes:
1. Tactical Urban UAVs –MD4-3000; ………………………….p.60-61;
2. Mystic-Diamond theory; Counterinsurgency strategy………..p.62-93;
3. Non-lethal weapons …………………….. …………………...p.94-99

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Executive Summary
The future of warfare is most likely to occur in urban environments. Current
SF units already includethe elements most adaptableto conducting effective urban
warfare.(Kilcullen theory) These attributes include a flattened command structure,
with local commanders having the physical resources, moral authority, and
command abilityto carry out their missions with relative independence. Thisin turn
requires high levels of individual and small-unit competence and morale, within a
framework of effective and reliable communications. This last factor is key for
effective command and control, and for mission accomplishment.
The strategy required for this military response should be part of a modern
counterinsurgency and interagency effort. Nevertheless, doctrinal innovation and
thinking shift is a must, in order to eliminate the bureaucratic drift, conventional
norms and barriers, and to ensure success.
Technologicalinnovation is also vital in order to integratenew urban tacticsand
procedure and eliminate/minimize civilian collateral casualties. The urban force
would be part of a comprehensive smart approach, where all instruments of power
would be tailored for a better strategic approach. Moreover the application of this
type of non-traditional force, would be effective when integrated in correlation of
other elements presented in Professor McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond Theory”-
(Annex no 2).

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1. General context-Imminent threats
We are living in a complex world with increased scarceresources and difficult
economic challenges. Civilizations (western and eastern) and religions are clashing,
and common ground for peace becomes a more difficult objective to achieve.
The world population is growing fast. By the end of 2020 many sociologists
estimate a total of 9 billion inhabitants on Earth, and thus cities are doubling their
size and challenges, due to accelerated urbanization and migration from rural to
urban areas.
Water becomes astrategic vital element for many nations along with energetic
sectors. Food becomes harder to obtain, and pollution irreversibly alter the
environment. The climate becomes unpredictable, global warming has direct
implications on ocean level raising, which eventually will shrink the littoral
populated area.
Innovation and technology becomes an indispensable engine for progress and
life, computers and the internet are governing the human space. The world
population is becoming more interconnected and globalization is present not only in
economy but also in social media.
“Individuals and small groups exploits globalized technology and
information to expand influence and approach state like disruptive capacity.”1
Migration, socialmobility and air connectivity have also increased the danger
the spread of pandemic disease with countries becoming more vulnerable to such
invisible threats. Sociologists estimates global social and demographic trends based
1“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 June 2012,
J 7)

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on particular drivers like, economy, GDP per capita, birth rate, mortality, health
index, education or even weather pattern.
“Zbigniew Brezinski’s recent book, Strategic Vision, highlights globalized
political awakening: …..an interactive and independent world connected by visual
communicationsand of the demographicyouth bulge in the less advanced societies
composed of the easy to mobilize and politically restless university students and the
socially deprived unemployed”2
In today’s dynamic, unpredictable, rapid changing environment, it is rather
difficult to clearly foreseen future conflict trends, although some common elements
stand apart. Globalization, a technological driven society instability, rapid escalation
of the conflicts, are common characteristics of the future. One thing is sure, the
nature of war will remain the same. Violence with political aim.
“The nature of warfare does not change, any more than does that of the
human beingsthatliebehind it. . . . Wars in all eras have more in common with each
other than they do with other activities of their respective time.”3
State to state conflicts are never completely eliminated, the geopolitical arena
is evolving unexpectedly, violence in the Middle-East and Africa has reached
alarming quotas. Radicalism and extremism is on offensive, terrorist attacks has
been multiplied around the globe, and governments often fail to identify the root
causes. Examples could be endless, with the ISIL movement in Iraq and Syria, the
battles in Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, Aleppo, or the Tripoli terrorist’s attacks in
Mumbai, Mexico, Baghdad, Paris, Nairobi, etc. Conflicts are becoming more
blurred, combatlines are becoming undefined. “Manythreatsin the futurecities will
2 Richard Davenport, “ The future of Interdependence: Conventional Forces will look more like
SOF: SOF will look more like CIA”, ” Special Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.23
3 Colin S. Gray, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,” Prism 3
(June 2012), p. 17

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be what have been called “threats without enemies” –there’ll be nobody to fight,
nothing to kill”.4
“While the nature of war will remain a violent clash of wills between states
or armed groups pursuing advantageous political ends, the conduct of future
warfare will include combinations of conventional and unconventional, lethal and
nonlethal, and military and nonmilitary actions and operations, all of which add to
the complexity of the future security environment”5
Additionally the fragile power balance in different regions is affected by
nuclear ambitions of emerging military contenders to US supremacy, like Iran,
North-Korea. The sphere of influence is being disputed and redefined among great
powers; competition for resources is escalating and emerging powers are more
aggressive, as evidenced in China actions in South China Sea and Russian episode
in Ukraine. US Strategy becomes more complex and intermingled with the world
evolution.
“On the relationship with China and Russia, I’ve told many people that we
really have to avoid Thucydides’ trap. The trap goes something like this it was
Spartan fearof Athens that madewarinevitable. Well, I thinkthat one of my jobs as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and as an advisor to our senior leaders, is to help
avoid a Thucydidestrap. We don’t wantthe fear of an emerging China to make war
inevitable.” Gen. Martin Dempsey, 3 May 2012
Even the cold war was reset in the light of “Ukrainian episode“which has not
been anticipated by the world political analysts, and brought to the surface another
perspective on geopolitics balance, and perhaps another type of conflict- the urban
hybrid conflict. Militaries around the world has to identify a properanswer to such
threat.
4 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, 263
5 Joint Force Quarterly 76, Ofer Friedman, “Nonlethal Weapons –a technological gap or mis-
defined requirements?”,1st Quarter,p.74

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“Hybrid threats are the diverse and dynamiccombinationsof regular forces,
irregular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces and criminal elements unified to
achieve mutually benefits effects.”6
Addressing hybrid threats requires a comprehensive smart long term
approach, where Special Forces (as partofmilitary response)could play a major role
Today, U.S. Special Forces are the most advanced forces in the world. Not only the
extensive footprint of more than 50.000 personal is it impressive but also the
technical and tactical/operational combat expertise of special operators. Special
Forces have a wide range of missions, probably one of the most important being
foreign internal defense (military assistance in NATO terms).
This mission allows to a small team ofoperators to operatein hostile environment
and to help the host nation to better operate and to counter an internal or external
threat. Along this line, Richard Davenport, further explains:
“To implement a Mission Command future, more is required, such as the
development of new authorities to fully operate in a decentralized manner in
countries where information and political power are decentralized to large
populations, as well as various nefarious groups and non-state actors.”7
There are critics arguing that the SOF (Special Operation Forces) concept is
overrated, Special Operation are not relevant anymore in the modern warfighting,
having little strategic impact. NATO’s special operations doctrine underlines the
four basic missions: direct actions; special Reconnaissance; military assistance;
psychological Operations. Along this line, critics argue that missions like direct
actions, could be performed by highly trained light infantry forces, special
6 Lawrence W Hank, “ The mindset Change for the Future Operational Environment” Special
Warfare Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.18

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reconnaissance could be assigned to long range reconnaissance units, and military
assistance should be performed by various military advisers or liaison officers.
In reality, SF ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) is better suited, designed,
and trained to prepare a foreign unit to face a diffuse enemy, to conductand execute
sensitive missions in urban densely populated environment, to work through and
with local combat elements of the host nation.
2. Kilcullen theory
A well-known Australian expert in guerrilla warfare, David Kilcullen has an
interesting theory about future conflicts. His thesis (presented in “Out of the
mountains”) argues the following: since the world population is becoming more
concentrated in megacities especially in littoral areas, also the future conflicts and
insurgencies will be more likely to start and develop in these areas. His argument is
based not only on current demographic trends and projections, but also on analysis
on different 90 insurgencies and terrorist attacks of this century.
The constant population migration from rural areas to urban zones (more
specific to littoral urban areas) especially in undeveloped and under developing
countries has as primary effect - overpopulation and the lack of governance.
“Rapid unplanned urbanization, lack of governance capacity, limited
economic opportunity, youth unemployment, or shortages of energy, water, and
sanitation- all of which, as we’ve seen, can be city-killers-can’t be fixed simply by
judicious application of some magic formula of kinetic force.”8
These two ingredients associated with reduced resources, political, ethnic and
religious competition would eventually determine the consolidation of organized
crime as a parallel authoritarian structure with the state.
8 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, p.263

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Facing such challenges megacities will react by isolating the traditional core
from the outskirts, thus allowing a parallel social structure to evolve outside the city
walls. Certainly these slums and ghettos, will end up soon to be ruled by criminal
nexus often in open competition with the government. This criminal nexus would
develop internal hierarchy, language codes norms and values. The rest of the local
population has to adapt to this new environment.
“DiegoGambetta, in his fascinating studyof criminalcommunication, Codes
of the Underworld, notes similar initiation behaviors among mafia families, prison
gangs, insurgents, and drug trafficking organizations.”9 “Gambetta also described
cases in which recruits were asked to commit atrocious crimes purelyas tests….This
made the villagers complicit in illegal, violent, collective action- cutting them off
from the state and putting them at the mercy of the movement.”10
Not having ready the infrastructure and the services for the fast growing rural
population attracted by the urban mirage, the cities would collapse, and they would
be forced to adoptan isolation policy, where the residential and commercial centers
are guarded and defended against intruders, leaving the slums and ghettos to evolve
as a separate territory. Alan Bauer, assertion, concur with the above mentioned
theory:
“There is another stage in the evolution-the progression to “gangs-
terrorism” and the prisons and the penal system are reinforcing the
process….”gangs-terrorism” can either proceed or follow the process of
jihadization”11
The organized crime and the lawless would favor the terrorist, radical, ethnic
violence. Supported by different internal or external actors, these internal
movements would reach the critical mass, and transform into insurgency. Usually,
9 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press p.129
10Ibidem p.134
11Alain Bauer, “Hybridization of Conflicts”, Prism 4, No.4, p.65

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governments would employ in suchsituations, a direct military response, often unfit
for an “unconventional threat”. Robert Ward, plainly explains:
“Conventionalgeneralsaretrained tomaneuverlargeforces in majorground
and air operations and therefore seek to employ their forces in ways that do what
large conventionalforces do best: they seek large-scale operations designed to find,
fix and destroy enemy forces. Unfortunately, guerrillas (insurgents) generally have
the operational ability not to allow themselves either to be found or fixed in
significant numbers unless they want to be. Grudgingly, conventional generals
eventuallyabandon largemaneuveroperationsin favorof patrols and raidsbysmall
units, butthis operations, while more effective tactically, do not producethe desired
result unless they are part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy”.12
Nevertheless, the strategic objective of any insurgency remains the same-to
change political regime, establish control and dominate the population. (Annex -2,
Mystic Diamond Theory- ProfessorGordon McCormick NavalPost Graduate
School).
“ In irregular conflicts (that is , in conflicts where at least one combatantis
a non-state armed group), the local armed actor thatgiven population perceives as
best ableto establish a predictable, consistent, wide –spectrum normative system of
control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area.” 13
This is precisely the place where Kilcullen, foreseen future small conflicts
emerging. This is notto say that the possibility oflarger conventional or even nuclear
wars between states or alliances is totally eliminated. The possibility of war
especially in this fragile contemporary environment is never eliminated. What
Kilcullen is arguing based on historical and social evidence is that future small
conflicts will likely to spawn in littoral megacities.
12 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency”,
(Fort Bragg, Department of the Army, JFK Special Warfare center and School, Special Warfare,
volume 20, March-April 2007), p.10.

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“Great historical and revolutionary shifts in societies have more often than
not, caught militaries off guard… “14
The right conditions will be there…unsatisfied, frustrated segment of
population with no hope in a better life, illegal traffic of person, guns, money and
drugs covering the necessary infrastructure requirements for organizing an armed
group or an insurgency. State and insurgents will find themselves in a competitive
environment. The price for this competition is the population. Insurgents can use
violence against population in order to achieve obedience and recruitment.
“Not only are the problems of corruption, organized crime, insurgency, and
the narcotics trade in Afghanistan mutually reinforcing and convergent; they are
also enduring.”15 State is not allowed to do it. When state is using violence as a
primary weapon, it will serve the insurgents interests.
“Any sensible guerrilla, terrorist, or organized criminal network will of
course attack soft target (the unarmed civilian population that supports a risky
target than the police or the military, the civilian population is more numerousand
easily accessible than the government installation and officials.”16
NATO and US government have the necessary military power to face any
major conventional threats. Certainly, for any threat, the US government has to
gradually apply a smart power package consisting of, diplomatic, information,
economic, financial, law enforcement tools.
“… In order to maintain the dynamic of information campaign, and to build
the bridgebetween operatives on the ground and local, he has to classify the target
audiencein three separatesegments- the true believers the hard core, the undecided
15 Tim Sullivan and Carl Forsberg, “Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime
in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict”, Prism 4, No.4, p.170

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and the pro-coalition segments. Then, regarding local population, the focus was on
undecided segment”.17
In order to break enemy’s will to fight, only one of the strategic layers
represents the military option, often time applied in a traditional way. In irregular
conflicts, conventional forces or even Special Forces have the same dilemma:
How to separate and isolate the insurgents from population? How to break the
cycle ofviolence? How to eliminate the collateral casualties and establish a political
control in area of operation?
“Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to
operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means
of achieving effects.”18 Robert Taber asserts:
“Theguerrilla fightsthe warof the flea, and hismilitary enemy suffers the dog’s
disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to
come to grips with. If the war continues long enough this is the theory the dog
succumbstoexhaustion and anemiawithouthaving foundanythingon whichtoclose
his jaws or to rake his claws.”19
If these questions are not addressed during the execution phase of the military
campaign, the perception of the population about foreign and government forces
evolves negative. The outcome, is escalation of violence where regular forces end
up acting oppressive, suppressing basic human rights, and destroying local business
orcommercial networks and the sourceoflocal life. This represents the turning point
in the dynamic of the conflict favoring the insurgency. David Kilcullen, further
describes:
“A purely coercive actor can cast a spell of fear over a population, butsoon as
this spell is broken, the population will turn on its tormentor with incredible speed
and violence. By contrast, a group that applies a rangeof coercive, administrative,
and persuasive means has a much stronger and more resilient control system. Such
a group can respond to a setback in one partof the spectrum by increasing its efforts
17 Colonel Ralph O. Baker, The Decisive Weapon, p.8
15“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15
June 2012, J 7)
19 Robert Taber

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in another, and can therefore maintain greater and more flexible control over
time.”20
The result would be a prolonged conflict fueled by internal, ethnic, religious
economic grievances, where collateral causalities are becoming the very engine for
violence.
“Professor Stathias Kalyvas showed (“The Logic of Violence in Civil War”)
in a comprehensive series of case studies that armed groups in civil war don’t
become strong because the people support their ideology; on the contrary, people
start supporting a given group’s ideology in places where that group is already
strong. Kalyvas argued that as conflicts continue, people increasingly collaborate
with whatever actor controls their area, because political actors who enjoy
substantial territorial control can protect civilians who live in that territory-both
from rivals and themselves, giving survival orientated civilians a strong incentive to
cooperate with them irrespective of their true or initial preferences.” 21
Certainly, the insurgent’s strategy is based oninvisibility oftheir forces which
are embedded within the local population – the main recruitment base. As a result,
this parallel infrastructure of insurgents is taking over and replacing the traditional
government presence:
“The Afghan example is just one illustration of an underground control
structure (a form of illicit social control, sometimes referred to in classical
counterinsurgency theory as a “parallel hierarchy or ‘guerilla government.”22
Insurgents are using the inhabited area as a stage base, logistic and
informational hub, and recruitment base. Their communication strategy is mainly
based on incentives, expectations, punishments, believes.
“Today, the Taliban justice system draws on the movement’s reputation for
harsh predictability and consistency: it attracts people with the promise of fair
22.Ibidem p. 126

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dispute resolution, just and enforceable mediation, and the prevention and
punishment of crime and corruption.”23
“In December 1964, the classical counterinsurgency theorist, Bernard Fall,
was launchingatUS NavalWar College the theory of competitive system of control
in insurgencyenvironment. –“an idea that’snot spatial(“insurgent –controlled” or
“contested” areas or structural “networks and movements” but rather functional.
It implies the presence of a range of incentives and disincentives, all of which are
used to generate control over population groups- the individual strands of a
networked system of control that attracts and then corrals a population, much as a
fish trap cages fish. It also implies a competition among several actors who are all
trying to control the population in a violent and contested environment.”24
The dominant actor in the area are competing with the government in
establishing the control on local population. Similar examples illustrating the
competition for political control could be found in separatist conflict in Ukraine
eastern territories or in Iraq/Syrian northern territories controlled by Sunni radical
groups of ISIS/ISIL.
“Theactor may be a government or a non-state group: it may be benevolent
or malevolent, legally recognized or illicit, formal or informal. But two
characteristics must always be present: the actor must always be armed (that is, it
must have the capacity to inflict violence as part of its spectrum of sanctions) and it
must be a group (some form of collective entity), not just an individual. An unarmed
actor lack the capacity both to enforce its own normative system and to resist
predation from other actors in the violent ecosystem we’ve just described.”25
Nevertheless, military means are not the single ones, when smart power is
applied. Often time, social media, information, propaganda and persuasion are
important factors to be consider, because these are efficient ways to target the
undecided segment of the population, and gradually modify the perception.
“The dominant actor in the area would use a spectrum of persuasive
arguments and inducements to support the dominant rule set. “These include
23 Ibidem p.122
25 Ibidem, p 132

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propaganda, political and ideological mobilization, social pressure, and identity
manipulation.Butas we’ve seen, often the most persuasive element is the feeling of
security, predictability, order and cohesion.”26
If the adversary gains the informational advantage and starts dominate the
perception of population, half the battle is already won.
“Our adversary therefore had considerable success in shaping and
influencing the perceptions of the Iraqi public in its favor. The ponderous way in
which centrally managed PSYOPS products were developed, vetted, and approved
through bureaucratic channelsmeant they were simply not being produced quickly
enough to do any good. Just as important, they were not being tailored precisely
enough to influence our diverse audiences' opinions about breaking events.”27
As was experienced so far in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Liberia,
Somalia, the presence of large military conventional forces only amplify the
magnitude of the conflict:
“The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same
lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be.” -Marshal
Ferdinand Foch.
In this case, along with the other instruments of power, there is a possible
need for a highly specialized urban combatforce, flexible and adaptable. This could
be a possible answer for the future military challenges.
“Unfortunately, for too long that was the preferred response- ground forces
planned tobypassthe cities, naviesfocused on blue water operation, air forces liked
to think about air interdiction,…..That won’t be an option in the future, when the
coastal zone of an entire continent may be one giant mega-slum, when most of the
world’s population will be concentrated in coastal cities, and when the enemy will
be wherever we go, in part because it will be our very presence that turns some
locals into enemies.”28
26 Ibidem, p. 133
27 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006.
28 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Oxford University Press, p.265.

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Asymmetric conflicts raging catastrophic terrorism to military intervention in
interstate, ethnic and civil wars are most likely a threat to US security and interests.
Only a general theory of symmetric conflict outcomes can guide US policymakers
in their effort to build the kind of armed forces necessary to implement an effective
US strategic response.
“TheUS was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle
for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in
applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.” 29
“An ideal U.S. strategic response in an asymmetric conflict therefore demands
two central elements: (1) preparation of public expectations for a long war despite
U.S. technologicaland materialadvantages, and(2)thedevelopmentand deployment
of armed forces specifically equipped and trained for COIN operations….. Without a
nationalconsensus and realistic expectations, the United States would be politically
vulnerable in an asymmetric conflict. Without more special operations forces—the
self-reliant and discriminate armed forces necessary to implement an ideal COIN
strategy—what begins as a military operation against an isolated violent minority
will tend to escalate into a war against an entire people.”30
2. Urban Special Operations Task Force
Which are SF operators’ strong points?
Special Operational Forces Detachments (SOF Operational Detachments
Alfa or Bravo) are qualifying asthe most appropriatestructure in the Army in order
to cope with unconventionalwarfare. The reasons for this are worth mentioning the
following: collective skills, cost effective, multiplication role, and cultural
awareness and experience, and language abilities.”31
When it comes to urban combatenvironment, Special Forces, presents several
advantages:-autonomy in planning and execution, the ability to analyze and
29“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 J
une 2012, J 7)
30 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, p. 123.
31 “Adrian Ciolponea; Iancu Cristian, “Alternative war strategies for Iraq” , NPS, 2007, p. 51

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corroborate tactical and operational Intel, ability to perform in multi-spectrum
military environment (from tactical to strategic level), ability to employ multiple
specialization in order to solve tricky problems, ability to learn native language,
abilities and achieve a comfortable cultural awareness level, pedagogic and training
skills.
By far, autonomy in planning and execution is the key ingredient forSF, to be
recommended for future urban conflicts as a primary response. The principals of
special operations remains valid and perennial. …Quality is more important the
quantity; Humans are more important than hardware; Special Forces cannot be
created in the middle of the crises; Special Forces shouldn’t be used for tactical
objectives or where conventional forces, could achieve the same results.
Whenever facing a threat, decision makers have to go through the decision
planning process, wherethe situation is carefully assessed, thethreats are weight and
prioritized, the courseofactions are compared and played against “red teams”. Only
after a conclusion has been reached and a COA approved, the feasible package of
ways and means is addressed, as an integrated part to a smart approach.
“Information technology will changehow, where, and when we work.
Scenario Planning offers us a mechanism by which to bring structure to this and
other forms of complexity, offering us the vital ability to understand thedynamics
of change”. 32
The strategic approach should follow the algorithm: identifying the solution
(unconventional) allocate the necessary resources and task organize the feasible
combat force. Without clearly describing the end-state of the military campaign,
there is little chance for success. Decisions are surrounded by uncertainty, but
inaction leads to failure. In the book “On war” Carl von Clausewitz was observing.
32 Oliver Sparrow, Chatham House

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“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he
intends to conduct it.”
On the other hand a very well supported decision which is coming too late,
can be totally inefficient. Surprise, risk and innovation should be present in any
decision.
“Whoever argued that we should wait another week in order to ensure our
political rear presumablyknew whathewastalking about? Butanyonewhofelt that
in the end we were likely to be involved in war should know the value-and the cost-
of each day. How then could we speak so lightly of waiting another week? We now
had to makeour decision whether or not to carry out a pre-emptive strike. If we took
the enemy by surprise, we would knock at least one hundred of their warplanesout
of action…..the first shot would determine which side would suffer the heaviest
casualties, and would assuredly change the balance of forces.”33
Nevertheless, SpecialOperations are usually representing only a small portion
from a larger military campaign in correlation with other instruments of power. All
these are presumptions and cannot be predicted with 100%certainty; only one thing
can be foreseen. “Putting allpresumptionson the table and then testing them is one
defense of laymen, against experts.”34
According withKillculentheory, the most likelylocation for the next small
armed conflicts, in the next decades, willbein urban area. Knowing this, how do
we formulate an efficient the military response?
The general conviction is that modern US Army or NATO forces as a system
can handle any emerging threat, in any type of environment, just because of their
combat experience, technology, organization and tactics.
“ Future Joint Operations will be increasingly discriminate to minimize
unintended consequences the increased transparency of the future security
environment,heightenstheneed for force to beused precisely when possible…In the
saturated information environment of tomorrow, even minor lapses in conduct or
33 Moshe Dayan ”Story of my life”, Da Capo Press,1976, p.344
34 Neustadt and May, “Thinking in Time”, p 56

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application of fires could seriously damage the international reputation of United
States. This reality places a premium on joint operations informed by values and
professionalism”35(CCJO)
If the insurgency is more likely to start in urban environment, how this would
be addressed. Conventional versus unconventional. Lessons of the past, show us a
possible outcome, as Robert Ward asserts:
“U.S. Soldiersand Marinescannotdefeat an insurgency using essentially the
same strategy we employed unsuccessfully in Vietnam – conducting operations to
find, fix, and destroy groups of insurgents hiding among a generally passive, if not
supportive, population.”36
Taking into consideration the third principle ofspecialforces-(Urban) Special
Forces cannot be created in the eve of the crisis, this thesis argues,- when designing
the force for the future conflicts, we have to consider also the creation and training
of a specialized urban combat force. Most armies are designed, trained, equipped,
indoctrinated to break the will of the enemy, (in old Clausewitzan tradition) - using
military indiscriminate lethal power. As, McCormick well summarize, an
unconventional approach would have a slight different initial objective:
“Theunconventionalapproach in anycounterinsurgencycan betranslated at
Strategic and Operational levels as follows: Combating insurgency cannot be
achieved only by holding the vital points with large mechanized regular forces. If
the space is permissible for insurgents and the bridge between state forces and
population is broken, the both control and security are at peril in the long run.
Attacking insurgent networks should start from the source, denying insurgents
contact with local population by reinforcing an active presence, working closely
with local forces and employ constructive programs for the benefit of population.37
35 Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2020(CCJO);
36 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency,
37 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,”
2006. p.123; Kalev I. Sepp, p.10.

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Engaging regular armies to conquer and destroy the cities, would produce a
constant backlash. Firstly the bystanders would try to escape by evacuating the
fighting area. Rallying in huge refugees’ camps outside the city, would end up
developing huge humanitarian crises, dueto the lack of sustainable basic needs. This
would serve the insurgent’s narrative and objectives. In this case, what type of force
should better serve the unconventional approach?
“Unconventional warfare requires a different mental framework as well as
unique tactical skills. Recruiting, training, and ultimately employing elite warriors
is not sufficient for winning wars. The realm of modern strategy has been reluctant
to accept the unique of unconventional warfare and to avoid conventionalizing the
unconventional. TheSOF hassufficient tactical doctrine and manualsto tradecraft.
What is lacking is relevant strategic theory for exploiting the skills of the Special
Forces warrior.”38
The basic autonomous Special Forces unit called ODA (Operational
Detachment Alpha), is usually comprised of 12 operators with multiple
specializations (operations, intelligence, weapons, medic, communications, and
explosives) and other skills: JTAC, sniper, language expert, computers specialist,
and instructors.
Being able to plan, conduct, and execute any mission with little instructions
and supportfromabove, ODA acts in FID missions as a forcemultiplier, helping the
host government to deal with insurgencies or terrorist organizations.
Certainly, within Special Forces category, we can find US Navy Seals,
specialized in littoral missions or direct actions, Rangers are designated more as an
air assault strike force for direct actions, MARSOC ( Marines Special Operations)
having a wide range of missions, Delta forces are specialized in HRO (Hostage
38 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare,
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.96

21
RescueOperations). All the units above, are trained to operateefficiently in an urban
environment, excelling in CQB/CQC (Close Quarter Battle/Combat), one of the
most practiced set of techniques practiced and rehearsed:
“CQB- close quarter combat, can occur on land, at sea, or in the air, and
involves two-way fights that happen well within maximum visual or sensor
distance…..in a contested, urbanized environment, you mustfirstestablish persistent
presence, and to establish thatpresence you have to prevail in a fight. Thatfight by
definition, will be a close fight because of the way cities create close range,
distributed, fleeting engagements.”39
These missions have a clear objective to efficiently employ tactics, weapons
and communications in order to neutralize and eliminate the opponent.
Unquestionable, Special Forces were always involved in counterinsurgency
missions, “Strategic Hamlets” in Vietnam or “Village Stability Operations” in
Afghanistan.
“SOF in Afghanistan have been in recent years conducting VSO in
strategically importantareasof ruralAfghanistan. VSO areconducted aroundbasic
COIN campaign calling for “bottom up” stability operations designed to restore
local governancethat hasfrequently not existed in the past or hasbeen bypassed or
ignored. VSO efforts are conducted in four phases: shape, hold, build, expand and
transition.”40
Even so, SF units where more inclined to solve the equation using kinetic
actions in order to eliminate the opponents. In many occasions the neutralization of
the insurgents also involved significant civilian collateral casualties. The question is
whether, these forces are already adapted for new type of urban conflict. If not what
is still missing and needs to be improved? Rothstein, explains:
“These commando like activities are close to the conventional model of war
fighting and havegreatappeal, andthustend toconsumea disproportionateamount
40 Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, Chapter 2:”
Overseas Interagency Structures” p.2-15

22
of attention and training time, they are high visibility, immediate-gratification
missions, well within the comfort zone and easily identified with by both
conventional force and SOE. But conventional forces can often perform the same
missions.”41
David Killculen isarguing that if the urban conflict becomes a constant, also
another type of force specialized on urban guerillawarfarehas to be prepared for
the future.
Also, the former head of CIA, Leon Panetta, acknowledged the importance of
building a better force in order to face the future challenges: “The country is at a
strategic turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint
Force for thefuture thatwill be smaller and leaner, butwill beagile, flexible, ready,
and technologically advanced.”-Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 5 Jan 2012
No doubt, Special Forces (SF) have the all necessary ingredients for
becoming the desired urban combat force. In essence, SF should become more like
the CIA covert teams, with radical modification in current structure, command and
control, training, doctrine, technology and equipment. “The greatest risk we run
right now as an armed force is uncertainty.” General Martin Dempsey declared on
May 2014
In order to cope with uncertainty, the challenge of this new force is to build
quickly the necessary survival characteristics: versatility, adaptability to the
environment, invisibility, multiplication factor, collateral casualties free. Friedman
also observes:
“This force must be able to: execute full spectrum of missions, minimize
noncombatant fatalities, permanent injury, and undesired damage to property and
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 88.

23
environment; maintain force protection, reinforcing deterrence; and expand the
range of options available to joint force commanders” 42
Maj.Gen. Bennet Sacolick and Brig.Gen. Wayne Grisbsby Jr. were accurate
when theysaid –“Thescopeand scaleofchallengesanticipated in thefuturesecurity
environment demand the institutionalization of interdependence”43
Innovation would be ensured not only by understanding the unconventional
approachat every level, but also by implementing tactics and techniques specific for
urban environment, by using a better tactical intelligence network and technology
such as: non-lethal urban equipment, drones, fragmentation ammunition, water
breaching devices: Further, Ciolponea summarize:
“For these delicate missions coalition forces should use specialized trained
and skilled forces having a dual role: creating a symmetric network to counter the
insurgency influence over the population, and prepare the legacy force for the
future. In this scenario it is clear that the package of surrogate forces
(unconventional forces) should play the primary role being supported by a flexible
and rapid package of conventional forces. This concept implies also a profound
comprehension of an efficient counterinsurgency strategy, at strategic, operational
and tactical levels. Therefore, the profile of the forces is not only importantbutalso
the structure of command and control which is directing the overarching
doctrine.”44
In highly dense urban environment, with complex human illegal networks,
paramilitary/ terrorist groups, the implementation of a pure military solution would
be difficult to apply in a conventional manner, by any government. The
unconventional approach becomes necessary and desirable.
“The aim of an UW capability is to work by, with, and through indigenous
personnel over the long term. They would develop long-term, long standing person-
to person relations. Their presence and expertise would provide a permanent,
trustworthy ear to the ground to ultimately capture or kill “high value targets”
44Adrian Ciolponea, Iancu Cristian, Alternative war strategies for Iraq, NPS, 2007, p 51

24
through either local military or police operations or as a result of U.S. military
operations.”45
In order to have a tailored smart approach, encompassing all the elements of
power, the state also has to prepare, train equip a specialized urban type of force,
different from classic Special Forces .
This force, called JUSOTF-(Joint, Urban, Special, Operations, Task, and
Force) by retaining the decisional authority at tactical level would achieve a better
autonomy, flexibility and adaptability.
“In ADP 6-0 “Mission Command is described as disciplined initiative to
empower agile and adaptive leaders to conduct operations that defy orderly,
efficient and precise control.”46
The structure of JUSOTF should be modular and not restricted to 12
personnel. Necessary enablers and specialists should be present to help the
commander to engage rapidly and efficiently: PSYOPS and CA teams, linguist and
translators, computer specialists and JTACs are just a few enablers to help the
commander to formulate the adequate answer. Only a flexible dynamic structure,
like JUSOTF, could counter the actions of a decentralized network, as a terrorist
complex nexus or urban guerilla, without initiate the insurgency regeneration
process. This is why, both task organization and allocation of the resources should
take into account the achievement of final strategic objective- separation of
insurgents from the population. Rothstein, explains:
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), 104.

25
“The organization of a military force should reflect the conceptual
organization of the plan. In other words, organization should dictate the chain of
command as well as the command and support relationship within the force.
Similarly, organization should ensure that a commander has authority over or
access to all the resources required accomplishing the assigned mission.”47
2.1. Intelligence in urban environment
When necessary, the urban unit should have the capacity to easily diffuse
among the population thus, borrowing characteristics from HUMINT operators,
SWAT police force or clandestine CIA elements. Moreover building trust and
confidence with the local agencies, intel-networks, and other elements of the task
force would be a priority of a tactical commander, which resides in his ability to
communicate.
“Building relations however is critical to generating the kind of intelligence
needed so that hunter-killer teams can strike accurately and effectively. To build
these relations in the waythey are builtthroughoutmost of the world requires us to
do thingsin a mannersignificantlydifferent from the wayDA teams operate and the
way SOF’s UW capability is currently used.”48
The advantage of this type of force, would be that it can easily identify the urban
opponent while remain largely invisible. Subsequently the force would
progressively engage non-lethal systems to surgical lethal weapons, in order to
neutralize insurgents and avoid collaterals casualties. Having embedded tactical
sensors and elements from the local Intel network, JUSOTF would maintain a clear
situational awareness, rapidly filling the unknown gaps.
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), 106.
48Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, (Annapolis,
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006).p.105.

26
“Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided in host nation
building. However, it was not always approached effectively nor adequately
prioritized and resourced.”49
Professor John Arquilla -Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, argues that in
orderto disrupt a (urban) network, first the state has to undermine the trust structure:
- any informational network has important nodes (insurgencyleadership)defined as
“hubs,” “gatekeepers” and “pulse-takers,” which are critical in influencing the
population. Using actionable intelligence, social analysis software like “Palantir”,
“Ucinet” and an extensive integrated database network, JUSOTF should be able to
rapidly identify the critical hubs of the network and apply “high pressure” in
accordance. Cultural awareness and mutual respect, necessary in the relationship
with locals, combined with a specific mixed of incentives and punishments, should
lead to the elimination ( or at least reduction) of conflict of interests between
JUSOTF forces and the population. Intel network building is summarized by Brown:
“Identification of operators, leadership, and infrastructure across the
spectrum of terrorist networks requires an integrated and adaptive blue force
network. Special Operators will remain essential in this role while they continue to
develop indigenouscapabilitiestofight terrorists and rogueregimes. By positioning
and networking SOF in key locations to obtain and disseminate information,
supported by specialized equipment and advanced technologies.”50
If the network doesn’t have a clear hierarchical structure (like Al-Qaida),
“targeting killing” missions will only accelerate the regeneration process of
insurgency due to collateral casualties involved. Thus the power of insurgent’s
narrative will increase and dominate the informational spectrum. Conventional wars
are design to fight nations, but other methods are required when fighting a flat type
49“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 J
une 2012, J 7)
50 Brian D. Doug Brown, U.S. Special Operation Command: Meeting the Challenges of the
Twenty First Century,(U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, NDU Press, First quarter
2006), p.2.

27
of terrorist network with global reach. “How do you attack a trust structure -- which
is whata networkis? You're not going todothis with Tomahawkmissilesor strategic
bombardment. It's a whole new playing field. You're not attacking a nation, but a
network.”51
The importance of the Intel picture is paramount. JUSOTF has to combine
local sources products with higher echelon intelligence and sensors in order to
complete and update the battle picture. At operational level, depending on priority,
the UAVs can cover many areas like ISR platform, C2 weapons platform.
Nevertheless, in an urban environment, there is an acute need for tactical
UAV/drone, integrated in ODA organic. This type of tactical UAV should be
available to commanders in a matter of minutes, cover a range up to 50 miles, and
perform in a silent invisible posture, from both stationary and orbital trajectory. The
tactical drone would belong organic to the ODA, including the operator. The ODA
would still benefit from the support/CAS of larger non-organic UAVs (Predator,
Reaper, and Global Hawk) whenever the situation requires.
Any tactical commander would perform better in urban environment, having
a tactical UAV for direct support, which could integrate the battle picture, and help
to identify potential threats and targets. Blue and red forces disposition and
maneuver are essential for mission success. Beside C2 and ISR, the tactical UAV
could also perform several tasks. Communication relay when non satellite
communication are obstructed by buildings and an emergency delivery system for
essential equipment, electronic, forensic, ammunition, medical, especially when
troops are pinned down by enemy fire.
51 Phd. John Arquilla, comments in NPS, seminar, oct 2007.

28
The BICES system has especially becomefor NATO Special Forces a secure
internet type ofplatform, where data base, voice and video could be shared instantly
via SATCOM.
Nevertheless, depending on the situation, replacing military networks
(CENTRIX)with encrypted socialmedia platforms, could be a solution worth testing
and implementing. In the future there is a need of implementation of social media as
a command and control platform (in secure mode) for urban special operations.
Davenport, further underlines:
“Initially these auxiliary groups will be formed through initial face-to-face
type of settings followed byother meanssuch various social media tools. These tools
will be predominately through the use of smartphones/iPadsbutenhanced through
government covert apps that will be similar to the social media platforms of
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google maps and Google Earth, Flickr, and Blogger.
These tools will serve the dual effort communication role such strengthening the
various groups will to fight through virtual communication, and will also offer
various means of disruption through cyber and physical mobilization. The use of
various IP addresses and digital code for communication will enhance OPSEC
during all operation from internal and external detection.”52
The irony is that social media technology or even tactical drones are fully
operational for civilian application and further presented in annex 1- MD4-3000 –
Tactical UAV.(Annex 1)
Therefore, in order to become adaptable the urban Special Forces unit
requires essential structural, doctrinal and technological innovations. However,
reaching that capability is still not enough. Only a permanent presence on the
ground with an elaborate overlapping transition between forces, can achieve the
continuity of the process, and maintain the initiative. The relationship with local

29
forces and the community are difficult to achieve, and easy to be lost when the
rotational process is too rapid, and not overlapped.
2.2. JUSOTF-Task-organization
The placeof SpecialForces is widely recognized bytoday’s Army leaders,
from both perspectives, impressive traditions and successes and future role.
“Today special warfare remains an important Army mission. Our
primary combat maneuver element is the regionally expert Special Forces, the
Green Berets, supported by our Psychological Warfare and Civil Affair units.
Conventional forces, such as the Regionally Aligned Forces, work alongside
SOF in what is an increasingly complex world where the lines between war,
conflict and competition are blurred.”53
Current Special Operations Forces are too dependent on geographical
commander providers, organized in rigid structures and hierarchical
subordinated to conventional leaders. Therefore, special operations operational
objectives are subordinated and supportive of larger strategic conventional
objectives as part ofthe military campaign- thus doctrinally unable to address an
unconventional threat. Nonetheless, at tactical/operational level, SF proved to be
an excellent leverage for traditional conventional campaign, strategic objectives,
as described by Eugene Piasecki in “The history of Special Warfare”,
“Following 9/11, ArmySOF assumed historic roles in the early stages of
Operation EnduringFreedom and operation IraqiFreedom. In Afghanistan, 300
Army SF operators supporting the Northern Alliance helped to topple the
Taliban. In Iraq, the 10th SFG (A) advised 65.000 KurdishPeshmerga, assumed
tactical control of the 173rd Infantry brigade (A) and the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit and successfully tied down three Iraqi corps”54
53 Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, Introduction” The history of Special
Warfare”, Special Warefare, volume 28, April 2015, p.9
54 Eugene Piasecki, Introduction” The history of Special Warfare”, Special Warefare, volume 28,
April 2015, p.11

30
A valid example of different thinking which demonstrates the efficiency
of a combined task force between CIA covert teams – and Special Forces ODA
is “Jawbreaker operation in Afghanistan “. This highly secretive and sensitive
mission was conducted under “Title 50”, therefore having different prerogatives
and liberties:
“Title 50 gives the CIA not only the authority to do UW, butalso provides
them with freedom to think, and to be creative as they need to be in order to be
successful before and whilein a UW setting. Creating a new strategic narrative
for changing Title 10, and relooking the U.S. Special Operation Command’s
definition of UW are the type of approachesthatareneeded in order to properly
meet the future demands of warfare.”55
In the “Jawbreaker Operations”, the setting, task-organization, and
decisional authority allowed SpecialForces units to have maximum freedom and
maneuver, substantial funding, and a clear end-state of the mission. Quite
important in the process was little or no interference (regarding operational
objectives, methods, and procedures)from the higher echelon. Working closely
with CIA covert cells, Special Forces were able to achieve the desired strategic
objective –to employ Masood’s North Alliance forces against the Taliban
regime. The Special Operation team had realized this objective having some
specifications. Little strategic interference from higher, was present during
operation, the authority was delegated to the tactical level, along with financial
access, flexibility regarding location and movement; flatten structure, flexibility
of the task force. Another more recent case, reflects the interoperability level
reached by CIA and SF, regarding, capabilities, skills and options; Johnson,
notes:

31
“The successful raid against Osama Bin Laden’s compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, is probably the best contemporary
illustration of CIA- Special Forces (US Navy Seal) cooperation and highlights
the complementary nature of each organization’s unique capabilities.”56
Urban Special Forces have to be design to act and operate in an urban
environment, where tactics and techniques are designed to protectthe population
and capture the opponent. Hence the development, integration and utilization of
urban nonlethal segment is becoming paramount. In order to successfully
implement any feasible counterinsurgency strategy, collateral casualties among
civilian population have to be reduced to minimum. Although US spent a fair
amount of money developing NLW57 (non-lethal weapons) program, there were
little steps integrating these capabilities with the current force.
“Thejoint non-lethalprogram has conducted more than 50 research and
development efforts and spentat least $396 million since 1997…andyet most of
the NLW adopted by military are commercial off the shelf system produced for
the law enforcement market”58
Individual and riot control devices are now fully operational, and the
change has to start with TTP. Basically, offering to force on the ground the
option to apply a wide range of means from non-lethal to lethal in order to
accomplish the mission.
“According with the FOC, nonlethal weapons should enhance the
capability of the joint force in accomplishing the following objectives:
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; take military actions wherethe use
of lethal force is either nor the preferred option, or is not permitted under the
established ROE; protect our forces; disable equipment, facilities, and enemy
56 John D. Johnson, “10 Things: The Military Should Know about CIA”, ” Special Warfare
Journal, June 2014, Vol 27, p.29
57 DOD Directive 3000.3-“weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to
incapacitate personal and material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel,
and undesired damage to property and the environment”

32
personnel; engage the control people through civil affair operations and
PSYOPS; dislodge enemy from positions without causing extensive collateral
damage; separate combatants from noncombatants; deny terrain to enemy”59
In this case, innovation should be a permanent process, in order to allow
JUSOTF to employ not only traditional NLW, but also special fragmentation
ammunition with specific range and penetration power, surgical water based
breaching devices, microwaves projectors for enemy incapacitating end even
paralyzing gases deployed on micro terrestrial or aerial drones. (Annex no 3)
Urban Special Forces could operate in permissive, semi and non-
permissive environment, having initiative down to the tactical level, and
continuous logistic/air/intel support located out of the area of operation,
managed by unique command. McCormick further describes:
“Changes of waging modern unconventional warfare are necessary in
order to achieve long term results. These changesare regarded as: commitment
of proper forces, multiplication of internal defense, an irregular thinking
revolution, decentralization of command and control, and a profound
understandingofa dual – political and militaryleadership (matrix-network type
of organization)”. 60
.
Applying a grill of urban Special Forces in certain megacity
neighborhood, would imply a very direct, simple, decentralized and informal
command and control based on encrypted social media platform. This system
would allow flexibility and adaptability for highly volatile situation in urban
environment. Regular bureaucratic drift should be avoided in order to ensure a
quick reaction time form operators and combat teams.
“Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on
subordinatestoeffect the necessary coordination and on thehuman
capacity for implicit communication based on a mutual
59 Ibidem,p.74
60 Adrian Ciolponea, Iancu Cristian, Alternative war strategies forIraq,chapter 3,NPS,2007, p 57

33
understandingofrequirements. By decentralizing decision-making
authority, mission and control seeks to improve the ability to deal
with fluid and localized situation.”61
Within the structure of JUSOTF, if a lesser layer of command is present,
the structure the more responsive is and the decisional act the shortest is. The
logical algorithm for organizational design of the force necessary to implement
the urban unconventional approach should follow the steps: identifying the
solution, elaborating the conceptofoperations, and then, task-organize the force.
Further, by decentralizing the command and control, the tactical JSOUTF
commanders are empowered with the necessary authority and initiative in order
to rapidly react to and engage the insurgents. Perhaps the most important step in
strategy implementation, would be to share the vision and the end state before
deploying. If the vision is clear and understood by all operator, then the unity
and freedom of action can be achieved without ethical and moral compromise.
“Delegating authority to subordinates does not absolve higher
commanders of ultimate responsibility. Consequently , they must frame their
guidancein such a waythat subordinatesare provided sufficient understanding
to act in accordance with their desires while not restricting freedom of action.
Commandersmustbeadeptatexpressing their desires clearly and forcefully.”62
Key elements of JUSOTF:
 invisible for enemy, easy to blend within population;
 flatten structure with empowered tactical commanders;
 tactical authority and decisional power;
 objective driven not order driven ;
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006), p.105.
(Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2006) p.106.

34
 integrated psychological operation, strategic communication;
 command and control based on social media crypto platform;
 modular, interagency task force in accordance with the mission profile;
 external logistic, air support and joint fire support;
 adaptable, flexible, highly effective and aggressive,
 the power to use appropriate discriminate force from non-lethal to surgical
lethal in order to take out the hubs, log cells and leadership of the
opposition network, without provoking an irreversible alienation of the
population.
2.3. Implementation of Urban SpecialOperation at Operational
and Tactical Levels
The local government has no other option than to interdict insurgents to
fill out the political space and to avoid the vacuum of power/presence in certain
areas. In order to do that, a package of forces has to be applied systematical and
progressive starting from a more secure area towards the troubled zones. Thus,
the secured and stable area is gradually expanded. This could only take place if
borders are secured and insurgents are isolated from population. The strategic
concept is better explained in Annex 2-Mystic Diamond Model.
The package of force has to include not only urban specialized forces, but
also local militia, police, Intel and PSYOPS elements, supported logistically and
informational in a continuous manner.
Urban operations are primarily objective driven operation, not order
driven. Tactical commanders adapt, balance and prioritize tasks in order to
achieve the desire end-state and to synchronize their actions. “In mission
command, thecommandermust understand theproblem, envision the end state,

35
and visualize the nature and design of the operation. Mission command is nota
mechanicalprocessthatthecommanderfollowsblindly. Instead, itis a continual
cognitive effort to understand, toadapt, andto direct effectively the achievement
of intent.” General Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command” 2012.
Being present onthe ground, this task forceshould have enough flexibility
to quickly response or to preempt any insurgents’ actions. Just by filling the
vacuum in different city neighborhoods, the insurgents’ freedom of maneuver is
denied, and soon their isolation from local population, becomes reality.
Subsequently, by isolating themselves form local population, they (insurgents)
become clear targets for conventional military means, air strikes, drones, and
raids. The necessary steps for implementation are further explained by
McCormick:
“Thesolution is to empower the lowest levels of the military in phase2 of
the operations. Empower the captains who are the unit/squad commanders as
the local decision makers and hold them responsible. This means the top
leadership cannot enter the picture in that local community without the
permission of the local commanders. This is a SF function, supported by the
Army conventional. The elements of the conventional force should be broken
down to supporttheSF teams. Each AO commandermustmaintain a continuous
contact with the commanders contiguous to them, in order to avoid (deny) the
enemy the ability (opportunity) to infiltrate between the spaces. There must be
no space but continuity between each area of operation. Let the commander of
the area of operation be the king of the area of operation.”63
A robust QRF with air capabilities should be positioned and cover a
central area in order to respond timely to different critical situation. The
necessary ORF should also comprise naval and aerial assets for rapid
deployment, and should be stationed outside area of operation, AO. The

36
integrated effort should be doneunder the umbrella of a single unique command,
having a decentralized execution. Seep Kalev further asserts:
“Emergency conditions dictate that government needs a single, fully
empowered executive to direct and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts.
Power-sharing among political bodies, while appropriate and necessary in
peace times, presents wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in coordination that
insurgents can exploit”.64
Professor McCormick explains the relations between the force and its
commander, relations which should not undermine the achievement of the
strategic objective, even in the absence of specific guidance or orders.
“When the problem arises, the associated QRF must fall in underthe AO
commandercontrol, to solve the issue. The JTF commandershould be roaming
the area of operations AOs to ensure that the empowered captains are getting
what they need, when they need. The JTF commander should be the single
person in chargein AO, responsible for all, and everyone should answer to him.
Because the unity of command is crucial, he should have total and ultimate
control. All others are there to support him.”65
In order to efficiently control the area of operation, JUSOTF helped by
local authorities should design and enforce restrictive measures. One efficient
example could be: magnetic identification card distributed to local population,
and instant access to the data-base. Additionally to magnetic code, photo,
fingerprint, other security measures should be added to these cards for two
reasons: first to deny the illegal reproduction and second to allow tactical
commanders to check the card through a portable tactical devise tied to the
database.(Link 16 type) “Important individual data should comprise, at a
minimum, name, photograph,biographicaldata, distinguishing characteristics,
64 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” (Military Review, May – June
2005), 11.

37
educations, current and former employment, address and phone numbers,
record of foreign travel and military service, family member’s tribal affiliation,
ethnic and religious affiliation.”66
The grill of forces applied on the ground (to include JUSOTF) would have
access to an extensive and regular updated database, thus it could monitor the
suspect’s movements and description, foreign personnel entering the city area,
restricting the insurgent’s movement. Richard Schultz further translates the
intelligence dominance of the urban area:
“Putting intelligence dominance into practice to gain control of territory
plagued by armed groups means the integration of the collection, analysis, covert
action, and counterintelligence instruments – to maximize effectiveness against
targets.”67
No doubt, foran efficient controlon the population movement, other integrated
measures should be in place. Surveillance and monitoring street cameras, tactical
drones, surveillance balloons in vicinity of important objective, joint check-points,
random patrols, curfews, road-blocks, non-lethal devices for vehicle disabling,
HUMINT and PSYOPS operations. As stated by Kalev Sepp, without constant and
vigorous pressure on enemy, the danger of power vacuum is present:
“Constant patrolling by government forces establishes an official
presence that enhances security and builds confidence in the government.
Patrolling is a basic tenet of policing, and in the last 100 years all successful
counterinsurgencies have employed this fundamental security policy.”68
66 LTC Robert J. Ward U.S. Army (ret), “Oil Spot – Spreading Security to Counter Insurgency”,
67 Richard Schultz Jr. and Godson Roy, Intelligence Dominance, (Washington, DC, CSI’s
Armed Groups Project, Weekly Standard, 31 July 2006), p. 22.
68 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” (Military Review, May – June,
2005), p.11.

38
After this complex package of restrictive measures are in place, having a
unique command and control, the next the most important step is “information
sharing”. Forall these measures to becomereality, the force commander would need
political power and more important, the will. Without local national will and U.S. will
to solve the crisis, all the measures mentioned above become ineffective.
“Once the curfew has been imposed, specially trained units should begin
exhaustive systematic search and clear operations, block by block, building by
building. Thehost nation element of the clearing and consolidation force should
conduct an aggressive information operation campaign to tell the populace how
the operations is design to improve their security and quality of life; to request
their tolerance of thistemporary, yet necessary, inconvenience;and to solicit their
active support.”69
In urban counterinsurgency operations often time, actionable intelligence
arise when the full control is established, the population sees the benefits of a
secure environment, and insurgents are becoming isolated, thus exposed to
coalition sensors. Furthermore, any clear-up operations in conjunction with local
forces, militia and other agencies, has to be based on reliable intelligence about
enemy disposition and possible threats. Ward explains:
“Clearing operations should be preceded by an intense intelligence
gathering campaign in the target city or area. The campaign will identify
insurgents, insurgents’ sympathizers and government supporters. Intelligence
gatherers will compile black and white lists to identify known insurgents and
insurgents’ sympathizers.”70
Urban operations are perhaps the most difficult and would require a high
level of flexibility and adaptability from both commanders and operators.
Innovation in tactics and technological superiority can bring a huge advantage
69 LTC Robert J. Ward, p.15.
70 Ibidem p.14.

39
only if is backed-up by political and national will. Without popular support, on
long run the tactical achievements are erased by strategic failure. More than ever
counterinsurgency needs persistence and communication.
3. Communication in urban special operations.
Any modern organization needs a strong leadership, having clear vision and a
well-defined objective. Similar for Special Operation urban task force, clear,
efficient, rapid horizontal and vertical communication is required. This is the key to
survival. In order to survive in a constant urban changing environment, SOF
commander has to be adaptable and efficient in execution. As a leader he has to pay
attention to details, both in planning and execution. All surrounding indicators
related to population activities or spirit, becomes part of the accelerated learning
process. “Through learning we perceive the world and our relations to it. Trough
learning we extent our capacity to create, to be part of the generative process of
life.”71
Without any doubt, many important lessons that emerged in the last decade of
conflict are about understanding the environment, building coalition and the cultural
awareness, synchronizing the effort, developing and sustaining the unity of
command, interagency coordination, and sharing the strategic vision. Preparing our
forces to fight in a predominantly urban densepopulated environment would involve
more autonomy at the tactical level. Peter Senge, further offer that:
“A shared vision is the first step in allowing who mistrusted each other to begin
to work together. It creates a common identity. Shared vision fosters risk taking and
experimentation.”72
71 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.14
72 Ibidem p.15

40
Moreover any vision cannot be shared without an efficient, direct, tailored,
effective communication. Shared vision, is a key component of an objective driven
mission, and for building the network. We can combat a network only with another
network. The main relevant aspect in communication strategy is to clearly establish
early in the process a sense of urgency and importance, a decisional context, a
desired end-state. Without solid communication skills a leader cannot materialize
his vision in the mind of his people. “Manyleaders havepersonal visions thatnever
get translated into shared visions that galvanize an organization.”73
Communication can be analyzed from different angles. Special Forces leaders
have to consider both internal and external communication. Internal refers to the
JUSOTF structure, external communication points both to allies and population.
In order to counter negative propaganda, and shake enemy morale, the message
to the enemy should be always tailored in correlation with the (IO)-Information
Operation Campaign Strategic Objective. The level of efficiency is determined by a
constant constructive dialog, by a well-tailored modulated messages, and without
any question by the end results. Furthermore, in an urban dense populated
environment with a variety of antagonists groups, ethnic minorities and broke-
powers, is becoming paramount for decision makers to have a sound and clear
strategic message tailored for every category.
The message has to be integrated in a comprehensive information operation
campaign correlated with the other non-military instruments of powers: diplomatic,
intelligence, military, economic, financial, law enforcement.
In order to adapt leaders have to learn to becomeobjective as possibleas the can,
so they inspire, identify the obstacles, and quickly react. Next step is to identify
73 Ibidem p.23

41
innovative solutions. These could include (NLW) Non-lethal weapons for
discriminate application of force, tactical UAVs for a better situational picture,
social media platform for more flexible command and control, (Tactics, techniques,
technology, weapons).
Organizations are different, because of their role, structure, size, education,
people, culture, budget and leadership. One of the common nominator for all
organizations is the communication. Organizations are also different because the
people and leaders are different. “Organizationswork the way they do because how
we work, how we think, and interact;the changesrequired ahead arenotonly in our
organization but in ourselves as well.”74
Cultural genetic structure
Living in a complex world with shifting threats, trends, technologies and
policies it becomes clear that communication becomes an essential leadership skill.
First and foremost the ability of communication has a strong interconnection with
leader personality, structure, and vision. The education, culture, personality of the
leader determines the communication style, in one word “the genetic culture”.
The depth of the environment understanding, the level of experience and the
organizational culture would also determine the quality of dialogue within the
organization and outside. Only a permanent dialogue can set up the necessary
conditions for a fair honest game.
“The ideal of combining inquiry and advocacy is challenging. It can be
especially difficult if you work in a highly political organization that is not open to
genuineinquiry. Speakingasa veteran advocate, I can say thatI found patienceand
perseverance needed to move towards a more balanced approach.”75
74 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990 p.10
75 Ibidem p.185

42
If policies and doctrine are written in the past to provide the framework, the
direction, the power to adapt, to change and to learn, can ensure the right answer,
the feasible solution in the future. All these attributes of adaptability, transformation
and learning are conditioned by communication.
“Understanding equips decision -makers at all levels with the insight and
foresight required to make effective decisions, to manage the associated risks, and
to consider second and subsequent order effects. Building trust with subordinates
and partnersmaybethemostimportantaction a commanderwillperform.” General
Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command” 2012
That’s why, it is critical forJSOTUto bea flexible, adaptable structure, where
communication from the leaders to troops is efficient, quick and dynamic with open
channels both ways. The key to survive is adaptability. The key to adapt is to learn.
Learning should be a continuous process and should be done by constant dialogue,
and constant challenging of the other’s view. Peter Senge, further explains:
“Alearning organization isa placewherepeoplecontinuallydiscovering how
they create their reality. And how they can changeit. As Archimedes said, “Give me
a lever long enough….and single –handed I can move the world”76
For all leaders (including tactical Special Forces leaders), communication
skills are paramount in conceiving and sending a clear message. It is always a
challenge to “paint” clearly the context, the desired strategic effects, and to share a
vision, especially when implement an urban counterinsurgency strategy.
“Define and stay focused on your goal, get to know other person and
particularly that’s person interests, appeal to shape those interests, anticipate the
possible actions of the other person, generate options together, evaluate the options
using a fair process, decide and gain commitment for the decision”77
77 Ibidem p.16

43
Understanding the environment and the political, social, economic dynamics
in a specific area could make the difference between a long lasting progressive
strategy and a failure strategy. In this equation strategic communication plays an
essential role.
“Your ability to lead the other leaders arises not just from your position,
resources, or charisma but from your will and skill” 78
Modern SF leaders are striving to develop several attributes and skills, such
as: professional ethos, ethics, the ability to nuance and to read between the lines,
proactive-ness, teamwork, intestinal fortitude, out of the box thinking, solid moral
compass, political savvy, permanent control of emotions, just to mention a few.
Reflecting about these, we come to realize that all of these require good
communication skills and permanent dialogue with the staff members on both the
horizontal and vertical axes/lines of the structure.
On the long run, without permanent and honest dialogue with the people,
agencies, allies, the critical internal balance of the organization cannot be
maintained. Solving an urban conflict would entail a comprehensive approach
where the interagency effort should be integrated taking into account the drivers
which fuels the conflict. Admitting and acknowledging the past mistakes, inspiring
the sense of pride (”l’espri de corp”) and accountability for progress, leaders are
opening the dialog.
“It is no accident that most organizations learn poorly. The way they are
designed and managed, the way people’s jobs are defined, and, most importantly, the
way we have all been taughtto think and interact (not only in organizationsbut more
broadly) create fundamental learning disabilities. These disabilities operate despite
the bestefforts of bright, committed people. Often theharderthey try to solve problems,
the worse the results.”79
78 Ibidem p.10

44
When the members of an organization (ODA) do not feel they belong to
something greater than their own interest, they stop sharing the passion for the job,
they stop approvingtheir leader vision. Having that said, often time they would work
under pressure, on compliance basis and this do not constitute a realteam. Therefore,
dialog is vital. “Most managementteamsbreakdown underpressure. Theteam may
function quite well with routine issues. But when they confront complex issues that
may be embarrassing or threating, the team-ness seems to go to pot” 80
SF units need a strong foundation which is basically the organizational
culture, a clear set of rules, check and balances, a sense of emergency and a strong
motivation and implication.
Whenever the decision process starts, leaders should become aware of the
complexity of decisional environment, the cause-effect (and second order effect)
relation, the “domino effect”, the antagonist and competitive interests in and out of
the organization. Moreover, people are biased and have particular interests to
promote. In developing strategies and tactics, leaders need to take into account the
the interests of the people they would lead.
“Theessence of the discipline of systems thinking lies in a shift of the mind:-
Seeing inter-relationships rather than linear cause -effect chains, and seeing
processes of change rather than snapshots.”81
Furthermore, when cognitive filters become active (personal learnings,
knowledgeand experiences, biases, prejudices, mentaltraps, stereotypes) the fog of
war lies downon the plains of reality. In suchinstances, the reality is altered, blurred
and sometimes small elements are exaggerated or consequently critical issues are
neglected. In this foggy stormed oceanthe SF leader has to be the “lighting beacon”.
80 Ibidem p 18

45
“Ultimately, the payoff from integrating systems thinking and mentalmodels
will be not only improving our mental models (whatwe think) butaltering our ways
of thinking:shifting from mental models dominated by events to mental models that
recognize longer- term patterns of change and the underlying structures producing
those patterns.” 82
Often times, we process the information according with our prejudices,
stereotypes, assumptions, mental maps …which in the end could be a distorts
perception of the reality .
“Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even
pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take
action. Very often, we are not consciously awareof our mentalmodels or the effects
they have on our behavior.”83
Mental maps leads to cognitive traps based on unique personal perspective,
bias, experience and knowledge. The crucial role of the dialogue is to help the leader
to overcome all these obstacles and maximize outputs (the long term cost/benefits
results). In this way communication looks more like an art and less like a science.
“Personal Mastery might suggest gaining dominance over the people and things.
But mastery can also mean a special level of proficiency”84
Leaders have to understand the system thinking used by the audience and to
synchronize the communication accordingly. “Systems thinking is a conceptual
framework, a body of knowledge and tools which makes us to see the full patterns
clearer, and help us to change them effectively.”85
Being in contact with your people is important. On the contrary, leader
isolation and lack of dialogue is not “healthy”, especially when trying to achieve the
objective representation of reality. In order to achieve an internal/external
82.Ibidem p.75
83 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990,p.80
84 Ibidem p.20
85 Ibidem,p.21

46
organizational equilibrium, leadership requires a broad vision of interconnected
events and phenomena. Leaders become cultural awareness attuned.
“Learning to see slow, gradualprocess requires slowing down frenetic pace
and paying attention to the subtle as well as the dramatic” As a leader one have to
set up form the get go the clear concise message abouthis intention, phasesand the
final outcome. “ 86
Particularly, in a foreign dense populated urban environment, constant dialog
it is highly recommended. In this case anticipation and adaptability are mainly
generated through an open dialogue. Refining the thinking ability is a never-ending
process moreover parallel with the evolution of the organizational culture. Critical
thinking skills are paramount to become a strategic leader, nevertheless
communication ensures the validation and the feed-back of these skills. An open
minded leader should be aware of different models to be found in the strategic
decision process, rational actormodel, cognitive, group thinking. This could provide
the necessary tools in modulating the strategic message following the rational logical
conclusion. Senge, clearly observes:
“Just as linear thinking dominates most models used for critical decisions
today, the learning organizations of the future will make key decisions based on
shared understanding of interrelationships and patterns of change” 87
“Two level of conscious awareness-unconscious thinking process are
determined by pure-preferences, incentives, motives, desires, coercive measures,
and in the end determines the leap from fact to conclusion. One set of facts can lead
to different conclusions analogy. “Our fixation on events is actually part of our
evolutionary programming.”88
The power of synthesis becomes relevant when someone is presenting a
problem or message, simplicity, and conciseness are keys to success. The art of
86 Ibidem, p.9
87Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990 p.19
88Ibidem, p.20

47
communication comprise also elements like rhetoric, argumentation, supporting
evidence, posture, presentation, persuasive-ness. Certainly communication is also
influenced by structure, rules, regulations, laws, norms.
“Different people in the same structure tend to produce qualitatively similar
results. In human systems, structure includes how people make decisions-the
operating policies whereby we translate perceptions, goals, rules, and norms into
actions”89
”The strategy, the concepts and policies, the ways /resources to reach that
stage will emerge during the communication process heading to the final decision.
Team work and dialogue are a necessity for evolution. “The discipline of team
learning starts with dialogue, the capacity of members of a team to suspend
assumption and enter into a genuine thinking together. To the Greeks dia-logos
meant a free –flowing of meaning though a group, allowing the group to discover
insights not attainable individually.” 90
Mobilizing the staff for the proposed endeavors requires first a careful
selection of the team, based on character, expertise, professionalism, loyalty and
merit. Without promoting the merit system, the staff will never reach the
cohesiveness and efficiency of a well-oiled machine.
“Moreover the balance between overloading and a total isolation from the
working groups is related to the leader personality, experience, character, his
flexibility and open minded , working style, communication strategy. “We learn best
from our experience but we never directly experience the consequence of many of
our most important decisions.”91
Nevertheless, communication is a very important factor when making
decisions. The reason is that the speaker not always can sent a clear message or
description of the situation, close to reality. “The practice of shared vision involves
the skills of unearthing shared pictures of the future that fostergenuine commitment
and enrollment rather than compliance”- and this can be done only through direct
89Ibidem, p 21
90Ibidem p.10
91Ibidem p.23

48
dialogue. When leaders just imposeordictate a vision/decision (without sharing with
subordinates), the opposition would reach the maximum level and the creativity/
initiative would reach the minimum. As Senge asserts,
“True reactiveness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own
problems.it is a product of our way of thinking, not our emotional state”
The start in the decision process is often times critical because it defines the
rules of the game, the representation of the facts, the dynamic of the events, and it
estimates the possible outcomes. McCormick further explains:
“The weak, including insurgency movements, win low intensity conflicts by
using Asymmetric Strategic Approach. If the insurgents fight unconventionally
against the state entrenched in conventional vision, the chances to win will seldom
favor the weak actor.”92
Trust and influence
Fighting in urban requires balanced cooperationwith multiple agencies and local
authorities. Therefore, trust becomes very important in interagency relations.
The basic trust foundation resides in permanent communication. Coordination
cannot be achieved in government operations without skillful and permanent
communication. Agencies, organizations often time operate having particular
interests and agenda. Trust in the leader is a necessary element of leadership, and
persons are more disposed to follow a leader in whom they have trust then one they
do not trust” In any decision process consensus can be achieved only after a real
communication has been established between the agencies (members) and only after
the referential system is set up end everyone understand objectively the situation.
Without trust in leadership, any communication becomes heavy, interrupted,
92 Gordon McCormick, Seminar NPS, 2007

49
challenged to the point of exclusion. People aspire to change, recommend, and
influence policies and decisions which leads to certain competition.
“Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent participation in
planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences in
organizational culture. “93
Although the competition is beneficial, in long term, this could lead to poor
communication, weak coordination of the agencies, and lack of unity for decisional
implementation. (Panel Auditorium, Bloomfield, Miller, 22 Aug2014, NWC)
“Communication is your fundamental tool in building those relations”
“It doesn’t matter who votes it matter who counts the votes” (V.I. Stalin).
The useofdifferent statics data graphics are usually helpful to describearelevant
situation. Having a different agenda, one could alter the reality and manipulate the
truth. In other words, outcomes canbemanipulated. As leaders we have to bealways
alert about these factors and to use available tools to question our decisions, to
challenge our solutions and to allow the decisional environment to develop in a free
unrestrained way for the most reliable and maximum output. Senge further
underlines: “Remember that one of your primary functions as a leader providing
directions is to ask the right questions”94
Too less interaction with your staff and the leader is in danger to be out of the
loop with the rapid changing evolution and the set of values and tools the staff used
to reach assertions starting from assumptions.
“Achieving the task of direction, structure and conducta strategic conversation
on thatsubject rather to impose a new vision from the top, develop a fair process for
“Lessons from a Decade of War”, Volume I, report of the Decade of War study (15 Ju
ne 2012, J 7)

50
conducting the conversation aboutdirection, the genuineparticipation of followers,
and for decisions based on acceptable principles and standards”95
Too muchinterference will modify the working style, everyone will work under
pressure determining a minimal feedback -this sound like a dictatorial style…where
collaborative work cannot progress.
Certainly there are no silver bullets, everyone has to learn and start to work
together. “When teams are truly learning, not only are they produce extraordinary
results, but the individual members are growing more rapidly than could have
occurred otherwise”96
“Team learning is vital because teams, not individuals, are the fundamental
learning unit in modern organizations. This is where rubber meets the road; unless
teams can learn, the organization cannot learn.”97
Types of communication
There are at least 2 types of communication-internal and the external one. Both
are meant to formulate the proper message in accordance with the audience profile
(staff, public, international actors, adversaries). If the internal communication is
addressing the staff members, hierarchical structure, the external communication is
addressing all other actors involved directly or indirectly in the process/event.
Efficient communication requires parallel lines of effort, leading to a commonresult.
“Direction-negotiating the vision, integration-making stars a team, mediation-
settling leadership conflicts, motivation, representation, trust creation- capitalizing
your leadership”
Communication goes beyond the very means of sending the message; it also
relates to the organizational culture, to bring objectivity in describing the real
95Ibidem, p.87
96Ibidem, p.88
97Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.91

51
situation. The contextpicture should bebased onfacts and evidences not on personal
opinions. The importance of communication reveals the feedback from anyone
involved in the decision process. Next, the communication is paramount for force
synchronization. It was proved that the most efficient, direct and personal types of
communication is the verbal one. There are substitutes of direct verbal engagement
like video-conference, calls, e-mails or letters, but no one succeed to have the
maximum psychological, emotional and moral impact as the direct face-to-face
interaction. For this very reason, when facing important decisions, leaders will use
the direct engagement as the primary resort.
Nowadays, the distinctions between internal and external communication
becomes more blurred because of the social media. Social media, through its power,
coverage and speed, is taking slowly controlover organizations, events, and actions.
It is becoming more difficult to controlled and assess a clear impact on all actors.
On the same level of importance are formal communication and informal one.
In any SF unit are formal and informal leaders. In many situations the informal
leaders plays a great role in the organizational dynamic and opinion. Not having on
the same page, the informal leaders (the senior NCO) makes any policy
implementation more painful and unstable.
“Lack of authority does not necessarily means the lack of power”98
On the same line we could assert, that wise informal engagement of the leaders
has great influence when building coalitions and alliances. Fighting alone in
counterinsurgency do not set up the path for success. Alliances and coalitions are
necessary in the decisional process as much as they are necessary in politics or
98 Jeswald W Salacuse , Leading the Leaders , AMACOM, 2006 p.4

52
international affairs. Listening is paramount. Before acting, SF leader, has to learn
to listen.
Necessary balance
Nonetheless, from time to time the SF commander has to create competition
between individuals and groups. He also has to accommodate personal requests of
his subordinates or other players in counterinsurgency, in order to develop an
innovative environment. Compromising it’s important. For quick decisions, in the
absence of time, the necessary direction and motivation, involve compromise.
Having said that, the balance will determine the working style of a commander. The
leader need to have the ability to discern the motivating factors in a challenging
counter-argument, to make the difference between a personal/group interest and a
position determined by strong beliefs.
To reach this special sense, first and foremosta leader has to become savvy in
knowing human personality, different characters, and negotiation techniques.
Complexity ofthe relations within SF unit in closeconnection with the culture
spirit and traditions.
“Learn to discern patterns of deference among the members of the group you
lead and then mobilize those patterns to arrive at an agreement on strategic
direction”99
The cycle of learning, although it is a clear-cut process, the steps, methods,
and furthermore the qualitative results foreach individual, are different and depends
on the unique perspective of the world of every human. (Seminar on Leadership,
NWC, 20 Aug 2014). Listening subordinated is paramount in making sound
decisions….reading scanning peoples knowing characters and personality, using the
99 Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline ,Doubleday,1990, p.186

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