homework help,online homework help,online tutors,online tutoring,research paper help,do my homework, https://www.homeworkping.com/

1. P a g e | 1
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/
click here for freelancing tutoring sites
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004]
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authorityof the mother. Inthe exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in
her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent anyimperative cause showingher unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petitionfor Review[1] before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28, 2002 Decision [2] and the December 11, 2002
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 69400.[4]The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petitionis herebyDISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguelshallhave custodyover the childMichael KevinPineda until he
reaches ten(10) years of age. Once the said child is beyondten(10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose whichparent he prefers to live
with pursuant to Section6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, JoeyD. Briones, shallhelpsupport the child,
shallhave visitorial rights at least once a week, andmaytake the childout upon the writtenconsent ofthe mother.
“Acting on the petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order’, and findingit to be without merit, the same is DENIED.”[5]
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.

2. P a g e | 2
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
“On March 5, 2002, petitioner JoeyD. Briones fileda Petitionfor Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel andFrancisca Pineda
Miguel, to obtaincustodyof his minor childMichaelKevinPineda.
“On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filedanAmendedPetitionto include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
“A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued bythis Court on March11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before thisCourt the living bodyof the
minor Michael KevinPineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock inthe afternoon.
“The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael KevinPineda is his illegitimate son withrespondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was borninJapan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced byhis BirthCertificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now marriedto a Japanese national and is presently
residing inJapan.
“The petitioner further alleges that onNovember 4, 1998 he causedthe minor childto be brought to the Philippines so that h e could take care of
him and send himto school. Inthe school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolledhim at the nurseryschool of BlessedAngelsL.A. School, Inc. in
Caloocan City, where he finishedthe nurserycourse.
“According to the petitioner, his parents, whoare both retiredandreceiving monthlypensions, assistedhimintaking care of the child.
“On May2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel andFrancisca P. Miguel came to the house ofthe petitioner in CaloocanCityo n the pretext that
theywere visitingthe minor childandrequested that theybe allowedto bring the saidchildfor recreationat the SMDepartment store. They
promisedhim that theywillbringhim back in the afternoon, to whichthe petitioner agreed. However, the respondents didnot bring him back as
promisedbythem.
“The petitioner went several timesto respondent Maricel P. Miguelat Tanza, TuguegaraoCitybut he was informed that the childis withthe latter’s
mother at BatalHeights, Santiago City. Whenhe went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel toldhimthat Michael KevinPineda is withher
daughter at TuguegaraoCity.
“He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate hissonand to bring him backto him, but all hisefforts were
futile.
“Hence, he was constrainedto file a Petitionfor Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of CaloocanCitywhichwas docketedas SPCNo.
2711. However, the saidcase was withdrawn ex-parte.
“The petitioner prays that the custodyof hisson Michael Kevin Pineda be givento him as hisbiological father and[as] he hasdemonstrated his
capabilityto support andeducate him.
“On May6, 2002, the respondents filedtheir Comment, incompliance withthe May2, 2002 Resolution ofthis Court.
“In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegationof the petitioner that he was the one whobrought their childto the
Philippines andstated that she was the one whobrought himhere pursuant to their agreement.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioner’s allegationthat respondents MaricelP. Miguel andFrancisca P. Miguel were the ones
who took the childfromthe petitioner or the latter’s parents. She averredthat she was the one whotookMichael KevinPineda from the
petitioner when she returnedto the Philippines andthat the latter readilyagreedandconsented.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel allegesthat sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato
Juanzon whenhe was foundto have violatedor committed aninfractionof the laws ofJapan. She further statedthat since the time the petitioner
arrived inthe Philippines, he has not beengainfullyemployed. The custodyof the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel wasentrusted to
petitioner’s parents while theywere bothworking in Japan. She addedthat evenbefore the custodyof the childwas givento the petitioner’s
parents, she hasalreadybeen living separatelyfrom the petitioner inJapan because the latter was allegedlymaintaininganillicit affair with
another womanuntil hisdeportation.

3. P a g e | 3
“She likewisestatedin her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of availingof the privileges of stayingtemporarily
in Japan to pursue her work soshe could be able to sendmoneyregularlyto her son inthe Philippines. She further statedthat she hasno intention
of stayingpermanentlyinJapanas she hasbeen returning to the Philippines everysix (6) months or as often as she could.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custodyof her minor child be givento her andinvokesArticle 213, Paragraph 2 of the FamilyCo de and
Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
ApplyingArticle 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother,
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner trulyloved andcaredfor hissonandconsideringthe trouble and expense he
had spent ininstitutingthe legal actionfor custody, it neverthelessfoundnocompelling reasonto separate the minor fromhis mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issue
I n his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the “ultimate” issue as follows: “x x x [w]hether or not [he], as the naturalfather, may
be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.”[7]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitionhas nomerit. However, the assailedDecisionshould be modifiedin regardto its erroneous application ofSection6 of Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferentialright over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be
awardedto himwhenever she leaves for Japanandduring the periodthat she stays there. Inother words, he wants joint custodyover the minor,
such that the mother wouldhave custodywhenshe is inthe country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- shouldhave custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always inthe country. Whenshe is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he
adds, is that she lives most of the time inJapan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,[8] granting to her sister
temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is alreadywithhismother inJapan, where he is studying,[9] thus renderingpetitioner’s argument moot. While
the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an “Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure
Order,”[10] alleging thereinthat respondents were preparingthe travel papers of the minor so the childcould join his moth er and her Japanese
husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.[11]
Havingbeen bornoutside a valid marriage, the minor is deemedanillegitimate childof petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
FamilyCode ofthe Philippines[12] explicitlyprovides that “illegitimate childrenshall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, andshallbe entitledto support inconformitywith thisCode.” This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.[13]
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate childrenwere generallyclassified into twogroups:(1) natural, whether actual
or by legal fiction;and(2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.[14] A natural childis one bornoutside a lawful wedlock ofparents who,
at the time of conception ofthe child, were not disqualified byanyimpediment to marryeachother.[15] On the other hand, a spurious child is one
born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.[16]
Parental authorityover recognizednatural children who were under the age of majoritywas vestedinthe father or the mother recognizing
them.[17] If both acknowledge the child, authoritywas to be exercisedbythe one to whom it was awarded bythe courts;if it was awarded to both,
the rule as to legitimate childrenapplied. Inother words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.[18]

4. P a g e | 4
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have beeneliminatedin the Family Code.[19] Now, there are only two
classes ofchildren -- legitimate (andthose who, like the legallyadopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children
conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legit imate status.[20]
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions:“Children conceived or born before the judgment ofannulment or absolute nu llity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become finalandexecutoryshall be consideredlegitimate. Children conceived or born ofthe subsequent marriage
under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.”
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any distinction
between natural and spurious.[21] The concept of “naturalchild” is important only for purposes of legitimation.[22] Without the subsequent
marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the FamilyCode) child, as there is nothing inthe records showingthat his parents were
sufferingfrom a legal impediment to marryat the time ofhis birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant
to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals[23] heldthat the recognition ofanillegitimate childbythe father couldbe a ground for ordering the latter to give
support to, but not custodyof, the child. The law explicitlyconfers to the mother sole parental authorityover anillegitimate child; it follows that
onlyif she defaults can the father assume custodyandauthorityover the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate
child;[24] in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.[25]
There is thus noquestionthat Respondent Loreta, beingthe mother of andhaving sole parentalauthorityover the minor, is entitled to have
custodyof him.[26] She hasthe right to keephim in her company.[27] She cannot be deprivedof that right,[28] and she may not even renounce or
transfer it “except in the cases authorized by law.”[29]
Not to be ignoredinArticle 213 of the FamilyCode is the caveat that, generally, no childunder sevenyears ofage shallbe separatedfrom the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Onlythe most compelling of reasons, suchas the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her de privation of
parental authorityandthe awardof custodyto someone else.[30] In the past, the followinggrounds have beenconsidered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custodyandparental authority:neglect or abandonment,[31] unemployment, immorality,[32] habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearinginmind the welfare andthe best interest ofthe minor as the controlling factor,[33] we holdthat the CA didnot err in awarding care,
custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right grantedbythe CA to petitioner. InSilva v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court sustainedthe visitorialright of
an illegitimate father over hischildren inview of the constitutionallyprotected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.[35] Even
when the parents are estrangedandtheir affection for eachother is lost, their attachment to andfeeling for their offsprin g remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well -being of the child.
However, the CA erroneouslyappliedSection 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplatesa situationinwhich the parents
of the minor are marriedto each other, but are separatedeither byvirtue of a decree of legal separationor because theyare living separately de
facto. In the present case, it has beenestablished that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA
Decisionallowing the childto choose whichparent to live withis deleted, but without disregardingthe obligationof petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petitionis DENIEDandthe assailed Decision AFFIRMEDwiththe MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child,
upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales , J., on leave.
In custody disputes, what is the paramount criterion?
The paramount criterion in custody disputes is the welfare and well-being of the child, or the best interest of the child.
The court, in arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, must take into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Nevertheless, this primordial rule can
override the rights of one or both parents over their children.
What is the general rule as to custody over children?

5. P a g e | 5
The general rule is that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother, which is based on
the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
This is more pronounced in case of illegitimate children, as the law expressly provides that illegitimate children shall
be under the parental authority of their mother.
Is this rule absolute?
This rule is not absolute. Even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age
for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.
Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element of abandonment, regardless
of actual intention. A strong basis for a finding of the parent’s abandonment of his or her child is found in the case
where the parent has left the child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or
surrendered it entirely.
I left my child to a relative, even signing a document to such effect. Am I barred from taking back my
child?
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The rule is that children older than 7 years old are allowed to state his preference. Is the court bound by
such preference?
While such choice is given respect, the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by
disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be
given to the other parent, or even to a third person. Decisions on custody of children are always open to adjustment
as the circumstances may warrant.
8902143 - inves