Atty. Gubatan faces disbarment over unpaid loans

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399)
August 25, 2009 | A.C. No. 7399
Antero J. Pobre, complainant
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, respondent
FACTS:
In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following
remarks:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x
x
Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only
sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-
Santiago, were automatically disqualified.
Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady
senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt
of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against
Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary
action by the Court for her questioned speech.
HELD:
No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary
immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of
the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the
Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission.

Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the
respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend
who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love
you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he
asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was
busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22,
2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to
Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street,
New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he
shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be
convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly
immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Rosalie Dallong- Galicinao, Complainant, v. Atty. Virgil R.
Castro, Respondent’s | Adm. Case No. 6396 | 25 October 2005
November 12, 2017
Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and
VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the records
of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of
either party in that case.
Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA
decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go
to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the
party he represents. Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant
explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled
stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and
shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”)
Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case in view of
the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.
Issue:
Did the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility given his actions towards the
complainant?
Held:
Yes, the Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter
his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable.
Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He
violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good
faith.
His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar incentives to the clerk of court was not only ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainant’s
subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted
it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
The respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a
warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.

FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 12839, November 03, 2020 ]
ROMMEL N. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GERALD Z. GUBATAN,
RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
CAGUIOA, J:
The instant disbarment complaint stemmed from a complaint-
affidavit[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Rommel N. Reyes (Reyes) against Atty.
Gerald Z. Gubatan (Atty. Gubatan) for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Reyes alleged that he is the President and Chairman of Integra Asia
Konstruct, Inc. (Coiporation). He and Atty. Gubatan have been friends
since they were schoolmates in college and because of this friendship, he
agreed to lend money to Atty. Gubatan on six different occasions.[2]
On October 3, 2006, Reyes agreed to lend Atty. Gubatan the sum of
P88,000.00 which was payable in 30 days. The loan is evidenced by a
promissory note.[3]
On November 20, 2006, despite the lapse of the 30-day period without
paying the first loan he contracted, Atty. Gubatan again borrowed
P150,000.00 with an interest of 2% per month. This second loan was
evidenced by an Acknowledgment/Agreement where he promised to pay
Reyes immediately after the release of his loan with Banco de Oro.[4]
On November 24, 2006, Atty. Gubatan borrowed from Reyes the amount of
P17,000.00 payable in 30 days, as evidenced by a promissory note.[5]
After these three loan transactions, Atty. Gubatan went to Reyes and tried
to borrow money again. Because Reyes claimed that he no longer had
personal funds to lend him, Atty. Gubatan persuaded him to be allowed to
borrow from the Corporation.[6]
On December 19, 2006, Atty. Gubatan borrowed from the Corporation the
amount of P200,000.00 with 2% interest per month. This was evidenced
by a promissory note.[7]

Thereafter, on August 12, 2007, Atty. Gubatan again asked Reyes for a loan,
this time amounting to P57,676.00 payable in 30 days. This was likewise
evidenced by a promissory note.[8]
Despite the fact that the foregoing promissory notes and an
acknowledgment/agreement were all duly signed and executed by Atty.
Gubatan, he failed and refused to pay his obligations to Reyes and the
Corporation.[9]
On March 13, 2009, Reyes sent a demand letter to Atty. Gubatan
demanding the settlement of his loans amounting to P769,014.00 inclusive
of interest. Atty. Gubatan still failed to pay. Hence, on September 15, 2009,
Reyes filed the instant complaint. In addition, Reyes and the Corporation
also filed two complaints against Atty. Gubatan for collection of sum of
money with damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City
(MTC).[10]
In his Answer, Atty. Gubatan claimed that he was employed by the
Corporation and retained as Legal Consultant and Special Assistant to the
Chairman and President. By virtue of said employment, Atty. Gubatan, who
is based in Dagupan City, was required by Reyes to be at the office of the
Corporation in Quezon City at least once a week.[11]
Aside from his work in the Corporation, Atty. Gubatan claimed that he was
asked by Reyes to handle the latter's numerous personal cases. Since Atty.
Gubatan only started his law practice in 2006, he claimed that Reyes
graciously volunteered to give him several loans as evidenced by
promissory notes and an acknowledgment/agreement. Moreover, he
claimed that when these instruments of indebtedness were signed, he and
Reyes agreed that the amounts stated therein would set off against the
former's compensation and professional fees for services rendered to Reyes
and the Corporation.[12]
Atty. Gubatan averred that there was no issue in the settlement of the loans
as well as the handling of cases assigned to him. However, this all changed
when he declined Reyes' request to prepare and execute an affidavit in
support of the latter's complaint against the officials of Region I Medical
Center (RIMC) and other officials of the Department of Health. The
supposed affidavit would accuse the Director of the RIMC and the members
of the Bids and Awards Committee of demanding sums of money from
Reyes in consideration of the contracts already awarded to the
Corporation.[13]

According to Atty. Gubatan, he declined the request because there was no
factual basis for the alleged demand of money on the part of the RIMC
officials. Because of his refusal, Reyes sent a demand letter for payment of
the loans and eventually filed the instant complaint.[14]
Both parties attended the mandatory conference and submitted their
respective position papers.[15]
Findings by the IBP-CBD
In his Report and Recommendation[16] dated October 25, 2011,
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended that Atty.
Gubatan be censured for violating Rule 16.04 of the CPR which prohibits
lawyers from borrowing money from their client unless the latter's interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice.[17] Here, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Gubatan's
indebtedness to Reyes was duly proven by the promissory notes and Reyes'
act of filing civil cases for sum of money against Atty. Gubatan.[18]
On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution[19] which states in part:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case x x x and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED.[20]
Reyes moved to reconsider,[21] claiming that the IBP Board erred in
dismissing the case after adopting and approving the Resolution of the
Investigating Commissioner which imposed the penalty of
censure.[22] Reyes also insisted that the IBP Board should have modified the
penalty imposed by the Investigating Commissioner to disbarment.[23]
On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board granted Reyes' Motion for
Reconsideration, to wit:
RESOLVED to GRANT Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,
considering Respondent's violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, [the] Resolution x x x dated February 13, 2013
is hereby SET ASIDE and accordingly Atty. Gerald Z. Gubatan
[is] REPRIMANDED.[24]
On June 18, 2019, the IBP Board issued an Extended Resolution[25] to
expound on its earlier Resolution granting Reyes' Motion. The IBP Board
stated that there is no dispute that Atty. Gubatan obtained several loans

from Reyes and the Corporation. However, he abused the trust and
confidence reposed on him by the latter through his persistent refusal to
settle his obligations despite demands.[26]
The IBP Board also emphasized that there is a lawyer-client relationship in
this case as Atty. Gubatan was retained as a lawyer for the Corporation and
as Reyes' counsel for his personal cases. Despite this, Atty. Gubatan still
borrowed money from his clients whose interests, by the lack of any
security of the loan, were not fully protected. Reyes and the Corporation
relied solely on. Atty. Gubatan's word that he would return the money plus
interest.[27]
The IBP Board also found no sufficient evidence of any subsequent
agreement to set-off the loans with Atty. Gubatan's compensation for
professional services. Further, the very act of Reyes and the Corporation in
filing cases for collection of sum of money with damages against Atty.
Gubatan counters his allegation of offsetting of credit.[28]
Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 18, 2019
Resolution nor a Petition for Review before the Court.[29]
RULING
The Court affirms the IBP's finding of administrative liability against Atty.
Gubatan, with modification as to the recommended penalty.
The relationship between lawyers and their clients is inherently imbued
with trust and confidence — and as true as any natural tendency goes, this
trust and confidence is susceptible to abuse.[30] The rule prohibiting lawyers
from borrowing from their clients is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over the client as the rule presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.[31]
In this case, as correctly found by the IBP, there is no doubt that Atty.
Gubatan obtained several loans from Reyes and the Corporation, which are
evidenced by promissory notes and an acknowledgment/agreement. These
loans appear to have been contracted during the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship among the parties, when Atty. Gubatan was employed by the
Corporation and retained as legal consultant and special assistant to the
president. Consequently, Atty. Gubatan clearly violated the following
provisions of the CPR:

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
x x x x
RULE 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, in unduly borrowing money from Reyes and the Corporation and
refusing to pay the same, Atty. Gubatan abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his clients. In doing so, he failed to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, in contravention of Canon 7 of the
CPR,[32] which provides:
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Atty. Gubatan himself does not deny the existence of these loans and the
fact that they remain unpaid. In his defense, he claims that when the
instruments of indebtedness were signed, he and Reyes agreed that the
amounts stated therein would be set off against his compensation and
professional fees for services rendered to Reyes and the Corporation. These
contentions are unmeritorious. On this note, the Court agrees with the IBP
Board's pronouncements:
For his part, the Respondent claims that the Complainant volunteered to
extend the period of payment and agreed to offset the loan against his
professional fees. These assertions are, however, self-serving. Attention is
hereby drawn to several Promissory Notes signed by the Respondent. The
last paragraphs thereof [state]: "I will pay the above-mentioned amount
including its interest immediately after the release of my loan from
BANCO DE ORO." The Respondent's assurance that the release of his loan
with the bank is forthcoming and that the said amount will be paid to the
Complainant, which was never fulfilled, manifested his intent to mislead
the latter into giving a substantial amount. Such actuation did not speak
well of him as a member of the Bar.
Moreover, no subsequent agreement was shown that the sums sought to be
collected by the Complainant from the Respondent will be set-off with his
acclaimed compensation for Ms professional services. Additionally, the very
act of the Complainant in filing two (2) cases for Collection of a Sum of

Money with Damages against the Respondent counters the allegations of
extension and off-setting of credit.[33]
In this regard, the Court notes that when he testified in the collection case
before the MTC, Reyes admitted that he did not pay Atty. Gubatan for legal
services rendered to him and the Company. He claimed that Atty. Gubatan
volunteered his legal services without payment in view of the many favors
he extended to the latter.[34] This is belied by Atty. Gubatan, who claims
that he should be paid for the services he had rendered to Reyes and the
Corporation.[35]
Indeed, a lawyer is entitled to protection against any attempt on the part of
a client to escape payment for legal services.[36] However, any disagreement
as regards professional fees is not a matter that a lawyer could simply take
into his own hands, for there are proper legal steps to be followed in order
to recover his just due.[37] Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the
clients owe them attorney's fees.[38] Hence, regardless of the veracity of his
claim of non-payment of professional fees, Atty. Gubatan is not justified in
refusing to pay his debts to Reyes and the Corporation. In any event, the
disposition of the instant administrative case is without prejudice to any
action that Atty. Gubatan may institute to collect his professional fees.
As for the penalty, the IBP Board recommended that Atty. Gubatan be
reprimanded. The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the deliberate
failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.[39] Lawyers are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured.[40] They must, at all times,
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts, and their
clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.[41]
In Junio v. Grupo[42] the errant lawyer was found guilty of violating Rule
16.04 of the CPR and was suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) month. In Spouses San Pedro v. Mendoza,[43] the respondent
therein refused to return the money of his clients despite his failure to
facilitate the transfer of title to property, claiming that the retention of
money was justified owing to his receivables from complainants for services
he rendered in various cases. The Court suspended him from the practice of
law for three (3) months. In Spouses Anaya v. Alvarez[44] the respondent
was suspended for one (1) year for his deliberate failure to pay his debts and
for issuing worthless checks. In the more recent case of Delloro v. Atty.

Tagueg,[45] the respondent therein was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months for violating Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the instant case, the Court finds it proper to impose on Atty. Gubatan the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
As a final point, the Court notes that the IBP Board was correct in not
including an order for the return of the money borrowed by Atty. Gubatan
from Reyes and the Corporation since these loans were contracted in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,[46] the Court held that the
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing
on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature —
meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement — as the same should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding of such nature."[47] In any case, the return of the money herein
is already the subject of two complaints filed by Reyes and the Corporation
against Atty. Gubatan for collection of sum of money with damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Gerald Z. Gubatan is
hereby SUSPENDED for three (3) months from the practice of law,
effective upon the receipt of this Resolution. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to the personal record of Atty. Gubatan as a member of the
Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Macapagal vs Young
The Supreme Court (SC) has reprimanded abogado Walter Young for threatening Parañaque City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 195 Judge Aida Estrella-Macapagal with criminal and disciplinary cases if she proceeded to implement
a writ of possession and demolition against his informal settler clients.
In a recent 9-page decision, the SC 2nd Division found Young guilty of violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and issued a stern warning that a repetition of the offense would be dealt with more severely.
The SC did not impose a harsher penalty because this was Young’s first offense and because of his advanced age,
feelings of remorse and family circumstances.
Judge Macapagal complained about a letter sent by Young before her court in November 2011 implemented the writ
of possession evicting the informal settlers whom the lawyer argued were not actually parties to the case.
In the letter, Young warned: “With all due respect, but much to our regret, we wish to make manifest that we will be
compelled to file an administrative complaint against you before the Office of the Court Administrator as well as a
criminal complaint for ‘knowingly rendering an unjust judgment’ if you should persist in your stubborn actuation of
implementing the writ of possession/writ of demolition against non-parties to the expropriation case.”
The SC shrugged off Young’s claim that he did not intend to threaten the judge, given the wording of the letter and
the insinuation that she was driven by a “desire to please and gratify” the city mayor.
Young’s admission that he wanted to “courteously warn” Macapagal against acting unfavorably “indubitably
demonstrate how [he] failed to observe the respect due to the Court and to judicial officers,” read the decision penned
by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa.
“While lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such criticism, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety,” it added.

CELESTINO MALECDAN, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 12121, SECOND DIVISION, June 27, 2018, CAGUIOA, J.
Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because “a personal
confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the
disputants.”
FACTS: Complainant Celestino Malecdan filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Atty. Simpson T. Baldo for his alleged violation of Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 or the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which prohibits the participation of lawyers in the proceedings
before the Lupon. Malecdan had earlier filed a complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contracts and
Damages against spouses James and Josephine Baldo before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La
Trinidad, Benguet. Atty. Baldo later appeared as the counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing
on the subject complaint before the Punong Barangay. Malecdan proceeded to file a complaint
before the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter. Atty. Baldo admitted the allegation but explained that he
was permitted by the parties to participate in the said hearing, to which Malecdan alleged that he
vehemently objected. Investigating Commissioner Robles recommended that Atty. Baldo be given
a warning because it was found that the language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that
definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that
clear on the sanction imposable for such an appearance. The IBP Board of Governors reversed the
recommendation and instead recommended that Atty. Baldo be reprimanded.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baldo should be reprimanded instead of being given a warning.
(YES) RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors, as the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in barring lawyers from appearing before
the Lupon. As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties because “a personal confrontation between the parties without
the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable
disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants.” Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D.
1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. A lawyer, to the best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus,
avoid any act or omission that is contrary to the same. A lawyer's personal deference to the law
not only speaks of his character but it also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law.

Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or
omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. Here, Atty. Baldo
admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay in
violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01of the CPR in
connection with Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and
Josephine Baldo in a hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La
Trinidad in Benguet. Thus, the Supreme Court found Atty. Baldo liable and was reprimanded with
a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely

PELAGIO VICENCIO SORONGON, JR., Complainant, -versus- ATTY. RAMON Y.
GARGANTOS, SR., Respondent A.C. No. 11326, SECOND DIVISION, June 27, 2018, Caguioa,
J.
In determining or tempering the penalty to be imposed, has considered mitigating factors, such as
the respondent's advanced age, health, humanitarian and equitable considerations, as well as
whether the act complained of was respondent's first infraction.
FACTS: Complainant Pelagio Vicencion Sorongon, Jr. was a retired businessman and was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. He engaged Atty. Ramon
Gargantos, Sr.’s legal services and allegedly gave respondent the amount of two hundred thousand
pesos as full payment of the latter’s legal services which would cover the acceptance fee,
appearance fee and other fees. It was also agreed upon that if there would be court hearings outside
of Quezon City, then it would be Sorongon that would provide for Gargantos’s expenses. However,
there was no receipt and there was also no formal memorandum of agreement. Despite Gargantos’s
legal services having been allegedly paid in the amount of P200,000.00, which, as was said to be
agreed upon, he allegedly abandoned his client when the latter was not able to give him the "pocket
money" he had demanded. Sorongon is now praying for the refund of a portion of the amount paid
to Gargantos in order that he might hire a new lawyer, and it was only the complainant who
appeared and filed his brief and pleadings, which Gargantos failed to do. The CBD found that
Gargantos violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16,
Rule 16.01. Thus, it was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year and that he should return all documents and money in his possession over and above
his lawful and reasonable attorney's fee amounting to P150,000, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. The IBP adopted and approved
the CBD’s Report but modified by ordering Gargantos to return the entire amount of P200,000 to
Sorongon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gargantos violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
(YES) RULING: The Supreme Court adopted the findings of Commissioner Villamor of the
Commission on Bar Discipline with modifications. The Court agreed that Gargantos allegedly
failed to return, despite demand, the complainant's documents after he withdrew as his counsel in
violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer shall account for and hold in trust
the money or property from the client. However, in deciding the punishment, the Court took note

of the respondent’s advanced age and the fact that it was Gargantos’s first offense. Thus, in
determining or tempering the penalty to be imposed, has considered mitigating factors, such as the
respondent's advanced age, health, humanitarian and equitable considerations, as well as whether
the act complained of was respondent's first infraction. In the present case, in view of the
respondent's advanced age and the fact that this is his first offense, Gargantos was suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. The Court also instructed him to return the legal fees paid to him by
the complainant in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and the documents
in his possession which pertain to the case of the complainant.

A.C. No. 8450, July 26, 2017 - SPOUSES FELIX AND FE NAVARRO, Complainants, v.
ATTY. MARGARITO G. YGOÑA, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8450, July 26, 2017
SPOUSES FELIX AND FE NAVARRO, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARGARITO G.
YGOÑA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CAGUIOA, J.:
A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public
must exercise utmost care in performing his duties to preserve the public's confidence
in the integrity of notarized documents.1
The relevant facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Complainants spouses Felix and Fe Navarro (Spouses Navarro) were the owners of a
parcel of land (subject property) located at Barrio Panadtaran, San Fernando, Cebu,
Philippines, covered by Tax Declaration No. 0137-7148.2
Sometime in November 2002, the Spouses Navarro obtained a loan from Mercy Grauel
(Grauel) in the amount of P300,000.00.3
As a collateral for the loan, the Spouses
Navarro executed and signed a Promissory Note and a Real Estate Mortgage over the
subject property on November 22, 2002.4
In addition, Grauel proposed to the Spouses
Navarro the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the subject property to
Grauel, in the event that the Spouses Navarro would fail to pay the loan.5
Grauel
admitted that she made the proposal to avoid the tedious process of foreclosing a
property, and that the Deed of Absolute Sale would serve merely as an additional
security for the loan.6
According to Grauel, the Spouses Navarro agreed to her proposal
and voluntarily signed the Deed of Absolute Sale.7
Grauel repeatedly demanded payment from the Spouses Navarro, but her demands
went unheeded.8
Grauel recounted that due to her hectic schedule, she forgot to
register the Real Estate Mortgage with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It was only
on March 2004 when Grauel filed her request and paid the corresponding fees for the
registration of the Real Estate Mortgage. Despite this, the Real Estate Mortgage was not
registered because the Office of the Register of Deeds allegedly just sat on Grauel's
request.9

Upon instructions made by Grauel, Atty. Ygoña sent the Spouses Navarro a letter,
received on September 24, 2004, demanding payment of the loan.10
According to
Grauel, since the Spouses Navarro could no longer pay, Grauel proposed that the
Spouses Navarro convey to her the subject property to extinguish all their obligations
arising from the loan.11
Thereafter, on October 22, 2004, Atty. Ygoña notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale which Grauel used to cause the transfer of the tax declaration
over the subject property to her name.12
Upon learning that Grauel filed a civil case for Quieting of Title, the Spouses Navarro
filed an adverse claim in order to restore their right over the subject property.13 The
Spouses Navarro also filed a criminal complaint against Grauel and Atty. Ygoña for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, and the instant administrative case
against Atty. Ygoña.14
The Spouses Navarro asserted that, driven by their dire need for
the proceeds of the loan and lacking familiarity with the particulars of the transaction,
they hastily signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, of which the date and other relevant
portions were allegedly left blank.15
According to the Spouses Navarro, and as admitted by Grauel, the Promissory Note, the
Real Estate Mortgage, and the Deed of Absolute Sale were all executed on November
22, 2002.16
The Real Estate Mortgage was notarized by Atty. Ygoña on the same date.
However, the Deed of Sale was notarized only on October 22, 2004.17
In their complaint,18
the Spouses Navarro alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
fictitious and that their signatures therein were forged. In impugning the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the Spouses Navarro pointed out several irregularities,
particularly, the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) used in the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the Acknowledgment portion.19
In addition, the Spouses Navarro presented a
Certification20 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (Notarial Section), Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, confirming that Atty. Ygoña had submitted his
notarial report for the year 2004, but the subject Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on
October 22, 2004 was not among the documents listed.
For his part, Atty. Ygoña averred that at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented to him for notarization, it was complete in all material particulars, and that
the Spouses Navarro freely and voluntary executed and signed the same.21 Atty. Ygoña
also emphasized that the Spouses Navarro did not deny the genuineness of their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale.22
In a Resolution23
dated September 19, 2005, the City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal
complaint for Estafa against Atty. Ygoña as there was no proof that he conspired with
Grauel in committing the crime against the Spouses Navarro. However, in the same
Resolution, the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an Information for Estafa
under Article 315, No. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Grauel after finding
probable cause that she employed deceit and fraud when she induced the Spouses
Navarro to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale purposely as an assurance before granting
the loan, but used it to transfer the title over the property to her name, to the prejudice
of the Spouses Navarro.24
At the scheduled mandatory conference on August 13, 2010, the Spouses Navarro and
Atty. Ygoña were present, and assisted by their respective counsels, jointly moved for

the resetting of the case to give them enough time to go over the records.25
During the last mandatory conference on November 19, 2010, the Spouses Navarro,
represented by Atty. Rainier C. Lacap, and Atty. Ygoña agreed that stipulations,
admissions, and issues shall be limited to the pleadings already filed.26
The mandatory
conference was terminated and the parties submitted their respective position papers.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Mario V. Andres (Commissioner Andres) rendered
a Report and Recommendation27 on June 10, 2013, concluding that Atty. Ygoña failed
to diligently perform his notarial functions after notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale, when he should have already been aware of a possible badge
of pactum commissorium in the transaction - that the lender, Grauel, intended
an automatic appropriation of the subject property in case of nonpayment of
the loan by the Spouses Navarro.28
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that if the notarial commission
of the Respondent still exists, that it be hereby revoked and that he be disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. It is also recommended that
herein Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) to six (6)
months.29
In its Resolution30
dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the said Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by evidence on record and the applicable laws, and for
failure to exercise the utmost diligence in the performance of his functions as a notary
public, Atty. Margarita G. Ygoña's Notarial Commission is hereby Immediately
Revoked. Atty. Margarito G. Ygoña is further DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as notary public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months.31
On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Ygoña's Motion for
Reconsideration finding no reason to reverse its previous decision.32 On August 26,
2016, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Ygoña's Second Motion for
Reconsideration for the following reasons: (1) neither the Rules of Court nor the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline Rules allow the filing of the same; (2) for being dilatory;
and (3) the issues therein had already been passed upon.33
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, this Court
affirms the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent Atty. Ygoña
administratively liable, but modifies the penalty imposed.
The Court does not entirely agree with the basis of Commissioner Andres in finding
Atty. Ygoña liable forhis failure to diligently perform his notarial functions.
Commissioner Andres concluded that Atty. Ygoña should have been aware that the
Deed of Absolute Sale he had notarized was in the nature of a pactum commissorium.
The Court finds that this issue should be resolved in a separate civil action. Likewise,
the issue of whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed forged, is civil, and

perhaps criminal, in nature, and should be passed upon in a proper
case.34
Nevertheless, the Court agrees that Atty. Ygoña was remiss in the exercise of
his notarial functions.
Notarization is not merely an empty or meaningless exercise. It is invested with public
interest, such that only those qualified and authorized may act as notaries
public.35
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.36
A notarized document
is, therefore, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and the courts,
administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public.37
Corollary to this, notaries public
must observe utmost care and diligence in carrying out their duties and
functions.
In Salita v. Salve,38
a case with a similar factual milieu, the Court revoked therein
respondent Atty. Salve's notarial commission and disqualified him from being
commissioned as a notary for a period of (2) years, for his gross neglect in the
performance of his duty as a notary when he notarized the pre-formed Deed of
Absolute Sale without therein complainant Salita's presence before him. The Court
found that it was unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the Deed
of Absolute Sale notarized, as it would be detrimental to his own interests.39
Here, Atty. Ygoña should have been more circumspect in notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Assuming that there is truth in Atty. Ygoña's assertion that the Spouses
Navarro freely and voluntarily signed and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
Court agrees with Commissioner Andres that the discrepancies in the CTCs used in the
Deed of Absolute are too glaring to ignore.40
Thus, serious doubt exists as to whether
the Spouses Navarro did indeed appear before Atty. Ygoña to have the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized, as required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.41
Moreover, the Court notes the Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court
confirming that the notarial report submitted by Atty. Ygoña did not contain the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale.42 This failure on the part of Atty. Ygoña to record the transaction
in his books and include the same in his notarial register, as required by the Rules on
Notarial Practice,43 warrants a corresponding sanction.
As for the penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into account the dismissal of the
criminal case for falsification filed against Atty. Ygoña. Despite the ruling of the IBP
Board of Governors on Atty. Ygoña's Second Motion for Reconsideration, the Court
deems it necessary to point out that the Spouses Navarro previously filed a disbarment
case44
against the former counsel of Grauel, Atty. Gregorio B. Escasinas, concerning the
same civil action involving the subject property. This shows the Spouses Navarro's
propensity to file suits against the lawyers of their opponent, which the Court should
not overlook. Thus, considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with, and hereby
adopts, the recommended penalty of the IBP that respondent Atty. Ygoña's notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years. However, the Court does not agree that the acts of
Atty. Ygoña warrant the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Margarita G. Ygoña is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 19 AURORA AGUILAR-DYQUIANGCO VS ATTY. DIANA LYNN M. ARELLANO (A.C.
No. 10541, July 12, 2016)
FACTS: Sometime in 2006, Complainant engaged Respondent's services for the purpose of filing a case
for collection of sum of money against a certain Delia Antigua ("Antigua"), advancing P1 0,000.00 for
filing fees and P2,000.00 as part of the attorney's fees out of the agreed amount of P20,000.00. Three
years later, Complainant, upon inquiry with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Fernando, La
Union, discovered that Respondent failed to file her case against Antigua. Consequently, Complainant
sent a letter to Respondent terminating Respondent's services and demanding the return of the said money
and documents she entrusted to Respondent, who, in turn, refused to return Complainant's documents
alleging that she was enforcing her retainer's lien. During the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them, Respondent frequently borrowed money from Complainant and her husband, Antonio
Dyquiangco ("Antonio") , for which Respondent issued postdated checks in July 2008 ("checks issued in
July 2008") as security. Complainant and Antonio later stopped lending money to Respondent when they
discovered that she was engaged in "kiting", that is, using the newer loans to pay off the previous loans
she had obtained. Upon presentment by Complainant, all of the said checks were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds and closure of accounts. Hence, Complainant filed complaints for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ("BP Blg. 22") against Respondent. Complainant and her husband sent a demand
letter dated August 26, 2009 to Respondent for the payment of the dishonored checks issued in July 2008.
The Respondent's failure to pay despite demand resulted in letter exchanges between the parties dated
September 28, 2009 and October 7, 2009. The October 7, 2009 demand letter by Complainant was also
sent to Respondent's mother, Florescita M. Arellano. This exchange of letters, which the Respondent
believed to be libelous, led to the filing of two (2) complaints for Libel against Complainant with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union, both of
which were eventually dismissed for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 19 particularly Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The Court noted that Respondent's act of filing two (2) baseless complaints for libel against
Complainant in two (2) different venues (Manila and San Fernando City, La Union) for the same alleged
act is a clear violation of the Lawyer's Oath — which states that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same." Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law”. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless
criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, AC. No.
5624, 2004-01-20
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict
C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath
as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order."
Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each
other.
Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent
Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which
is pending before the Court of Appeals... respondent went to complainant's residence in
Tanjay City... and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to
him.
He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her.
Sensing... something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City,
respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she
surrender to him the custody of their children.
He threatened to forcefully... take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with
respondent for one night on... condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City.
complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the
children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed
until... later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court... for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorney's oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals'
Resolution in and outside a court of law.

Issues:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Ruling:
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic.
This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution
several times.
Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have...
participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the
defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
CANON 10.
A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02

A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or... amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives.
A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal... profession.
By calling complainant, a"sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital
prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

RENATO M. MALIGAY vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,
A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006
Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla which
charged him with "misleading the court through
misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of
justice". Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any
agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla,
who took up the larger part of two hearings to present
evidence and explain his side, admitted several times
that there was, in fact, no such agreement. Later he
explained in his memorandum that his main concern was
"to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial" and insisted that there was no
proof of his having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the lawyer's oath. He pointed out, in
addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it,
his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the
continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual
prejudice to complainant.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla
breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not
only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of
which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements.
His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law."
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision
(Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court) means only
suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we
disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty.
Doronilla's suspension from the government military
service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's
liability as a member of the legal profession, not his
liability as a legal officer in the military service.
Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty
for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath,
his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate
General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment

as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law
but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a
penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be
going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to
do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's
recommendation as one for suspension from the practice
of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's
recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that
mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him
credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made
in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be considered as
a mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is
Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some
measure of forbearance.
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the
conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere
slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty.
Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice
of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of
the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise
justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
Wherefore, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for two monthes. He
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANASTACIO E.
REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7054,
November 11, 2014
FACTS:
Que filed a disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, case against Atty. Anastacio Revilla of committing the
following violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138 of the Rules of Court:
1. The respondent’s abuse of court remedies and processes by
filing a petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two
petitions for annulment of title before the RTC, a petition for
annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondent’s clients. The respondent in this
regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully well that these courts have
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also
repeatedly attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over
the property subject of the unlawful detainer case.
2. The respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the
subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and
to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case.
3. The respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards his

adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception
to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of
justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of
judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the
presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion
to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his
lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients
(who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.
4. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly
maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late
Atty. Alfredo Catolico, the previous counsel of the respondent’s
clients.
5. The respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment
for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
6. The respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in the second
petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complainant further alleged that the respondent of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in a civil case when no such
authority was ever given to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty
these transgressions should carry.

HELD:
Yes, the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical
infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go
beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in
defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for
measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC
and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03 of the
CPR which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the end of justice. By his
actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct
the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice
to the winning parties in that case.
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of
the CPR, as well as rule against forum-shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same
objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they
tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly
judicial procedure, and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of
CPR for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe candor and fairness in
his dealing with the court.
In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to
observe Rule 19.01 of CPR which obligates a lawyer, in defending his
client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and

JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing
of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See
Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.1
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542
for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.2 The subject of the dispute
was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in
favor of defendant (complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties
executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject
property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration,
however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an
equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the
reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed the
ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2, 1991,
hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as
reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988
until the premises shall have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned
over to defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorney's fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear
showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith. There should
be no penalty on the right to litigate.3
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and
denied the petition.4
Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.5
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance6
as counsel of Tomas See
Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-
14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic]
Decision without Writ,"7
worded as follows:

1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had already
become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall
voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in the decision sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos,
equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision and the same to be covered by
supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the
amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.8
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon)
filed the Complaint9 for nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance, maintenance
of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121
thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 12610 issued an
Order11
in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution with Manifestation
earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit,
the "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit12
dated March 20, 2002, complainant alleged
that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing
out that it involves "the same parties, the same causes of action and relief
prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant prayed that
the respondent be "disbarred and/or suspended from the practice of law for his gross
misconduct," on the following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in
filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on January 07, 2002.
Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly
violated his lawyer's oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or unlawful suits
among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey the decision of our
Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies and disputes, he is showing
disrespect to a final and executory decision of our court.13
In his Comment,14
respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted
that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that
it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same
party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res
judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-
14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No.
19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his professional
appreciation that his client had a good case."

In his Reply,15
the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum
shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and
"the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the
other case is an action in personam" did not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.16
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to
Commissioner Salvador L. PeÃ±a. Only the counsel for the respondent appeared at the
mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual
issues in the case, Commissioner PeÃ±a terminated the mandatory conference and
ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter,
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report
and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of misconduct.
It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months' suspension from the
practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present
in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil
Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained
finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c)
the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and Recommendation with
the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.Ï‚Î·Î±Ã± rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î± l lÎ± Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own
admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory
when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not
the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for
nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were
not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves
scant consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the
effect of such final and executory decision on his clients' rights, instead of encouraging
them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the

courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.17
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.18
Thus,
the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. x x x19
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent
the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a
community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the
subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is
sufficient.20 Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or
their privies.21
This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance
of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the ruling
of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals22
effectively determined with finality the
rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.23
The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the
Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state,
the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations,
respondent also violated Rule 12.0225
and Rule 12.0426
of the Code, as well as a
lawyer's mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."27
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty. Indeed, the Court has time
and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets.28
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer

as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.29
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties
as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory.
Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Gubatan faces disbarment over unpaid loans

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