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AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
June 6, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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3
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1) The schism between Qatar and several Arab states may compromise
political negotiation efforts in Yemen.
2) Egyptian air power helped the Libyan National Army score a major strategic
victory in central Libya.
3) Al Shabaab seeks to decrease public support for Kenya’s intervention in
Somalia by attacking Kenyan targets before the general elections in August.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda leadership seeks to guide Salafi-jihadi groups on the battlefield in Syria. Senior al
Qaeda leader Sami al Oraidi released a statement warning against the formation of a secular
unity government in Syria. Oraidi’s warning echoes an April 23 statement by al Qaeda emir
Ayman al Zawahiri calling on Syrian fighters to eschew nationalism.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to compete with other actors for influence over Syrian
armed opposition groups.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
Pakistan is expanding operations against militants before the June meeting of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), an international oversight organization that combats terror
financing and money laundering. The Pakistani government froze the accounts of 5,000
suspected militants. Pakistani security forces also conducted a series of raids on militant
hideouts in Balochistan.
Outlook: Pakistan will crack down on militant activities and finances in the near term to
avoid scrutiny from FATF.

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| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Prospects for a UN-negotiated ceasefire decreased after the al Houthi movement declared
the UN Special Envoy to Yemen a persona non grata. Saudi Arabia and the UAE suspended
diplomatic ties to Qatar, which has acted as an intermediary with the al Houthi-Saleh bloc.
Outlook: Ceasefire talks will not restart under current political and military conditions.
Security
Emirati-backed southern Yemeni forces increased their control over Aden, challenging the
internationally recognized Hadi government’s ability to access its de facto capital. Militants
fired on a tanker near the Bab al Mandab Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint.
Outlook: Southern Yemeni forces will seize additional economic and military sites in Aden.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is participating alongside Hadi government-allied militias in an offensive to seize key
military sites in eastern Taiz city from al Houthi-Saleh forces. AQAP has begun providing
some public services in parts of Taiz in which it helped to oust al Houthi-Saleh troops.
Outlook: AQAP’s influence in Taiz city will increase.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 31 MAY: Militants
fired RPGs at a
commercial tanker
in the Red Sea.
2) 31 MAY: Emirati-
backed forces took
control of Aden
Airport.
3) 31 MAY: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
counterattacked in
western Taiz.
governorate.
4) 31 MAY: AQAP
militants fought in a
Hadi government-
aligned offensive in
Taiz city.
5) 31 MAY: AQAP
militants
assassinated a
former GPC official.
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5
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1 2

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| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Shabaab seeks to turn Kenyan public opinion against the intervention in Somalia before
the August general election by attacking Kenyan military and police. Current President Uhuru
Kenyatta reiterated his support for increasing AMISOM’s footprint in Somalia.
Outlook: Kenyatta may lose popular support amid increased attacks and tightening polls.
Security
Somali and AMISOM efforts to prevent al Shabaab attacks during Ramadan were
unsuccessful. Al Shabaab assassinated four government officials in Mogadishu in response
to SNA arrests. It also conducted attacks near Kismayo before President Farmajo’s visit.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase IED and ambush attacks on the outskirts of Mogadishu.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab escalated attacks against Kenyan forces in eastern Kenya and Somalia. The
group raided several military bases and detonated IEDs targeting Kenyan military forces. Al
Shabaab has killed over 30 Kenyan troops in the past three weeks.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will maintain its high operational tempo against Kenyan troops.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
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1) 30 MAY-02 JUN:
Al Shabaab
conducted multiple
assassinations in
Mogadishu.
2) 31 MAY: Al
Shabaab raided
Fafi town.
3) 01 JUN: Security
forces arrested 200
al Shabaab
suspects in
Mogadishu.
4) 03 JUN: Al
Shabaab raided a
Kenyan military
camp in Kolbio.
5) 03-05 JUN: Al
Shabaab
conducted minor
attacks near
Kismayo.

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| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar intends to secure his power by
making a deal with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Haftar praised the
GNA’s Presidency Council for ousting rival militias from Tripoli, shifting away from prior
rhetoric threatening to “liberate” the capital by force.
Outlook: Pro-GNA Tripoli militias will reject Haftar’s stated demands for an agreement.
Security
The LNA made a strategic advance westward by gaining control of Waddan and Jufra
airbase. The advance is a significant blow against rival Misratan and Islamist forces.
Outlook: Anti-LNA forces will regroup for a counterattack in central or southwestern Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS in Libya supports an attack network in Europe. The suicide bomber who attacked
Manchester Arena on May 22 met with Katibat al Battar, an ISIS unit that fought in the
Levant and currently operates in Libya.
Outlook: Katibat al Battar will support and possibly coordinate more attacks in Europe.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
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3
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1) 02 JUN: The GNA
Presidential Guard
secured Tripoli’s
airport and nearby
military camps after
pro-GNC forces
withdrew.
2) 02 JUN: Suspected
ISIS militants
attacked the Sirte
Protection Force
near Gardabiya
airbase.
3) 03 JUN: LNA and
Egyptian warplanes
struck GNA-aligned
forces in Hun and
Sokna.
4) 03 JUN: The LNA
secured Jufra
airbase and
Waddan town.
4

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| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Salafi-jihadi activity led to an increase in protests in Tunisia. Citizens blamed the government
for the execution of a shepherd, whom ISIS-linked militants accused of being a government
informant. ISIS’s affiliate in Algeria expanded its area of operations toward Algiers.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will conduct small-scale attacks to exacerbate anti-government
sentiment in Tunisia’s interior.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) prioritized attacks on
French targets in Mali. JNIM used remote desert areas to stage several attacks.
Boko Haram-Shekau increased attacks in northern Cameroon while attempting to win back
territory in northeastern Nigeria. The group has attempted to extend into Cameroon several
times in the past. Boko Haram will likely attempt to capitalize on weaker Cameroonian
security to expand as Nigerian counter-terrorism efforts in Borno State continue.
Outlook: JNIM will attempt to cause French casualties in Mali to challenge French President
Emmanuel Macron’s renewed force commitment and weaken French support for Operation
Barkhane. Boko Haram will continue efforts to regain territory.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 31 MAY: ISIS
Wilayat Jaza’ir
attacked a security
checkpoint and
wounded four
soldiers in Larbaa,
Blida, Algeria.
2) 01 JUN: Tunisian
security forces
arrested three ISIS
militants in Tunis.
3) 01 JUN: The
Algerian National
People’s Army
killed two militants
in Bougara, Blida
province, Algeria.
4) 03 JUN: ISIS-
linked Jund al
Khilafa militants
beheaded a
shepherd in Sidi
Bouzid, Tunisia.
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1
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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
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31
1) 28-31 MAY: Boko
Haram stormed
several villages in
Borno State,
Nigeria, killing 21
people.
2) 01 JUN: JNIM
militants shelled
French forces in
Timbuktu, Mali,
wounding five
soldiers.
3) 02 JUN: Boko
Haram used child
bombers to conduct
a double suicide
bombing in
Kolofata, Extreme-
Nord region,
Cameroon, killing
11 people.

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ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569