CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya. 2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire. 3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
May 31, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
3
1
1) The announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia does not diminish the Salafi-
jihadi threat from Libya.
2) The return of ceasefire talks in Yemen will not lead to a negotiated
settlement under current conditions.
3) Al Qaeda and ISIS seek to attack commercial flights with explosives
concealed in electronic devices.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Salafi-jihadi groups still seek to attack commercial airliners. They are developing
sophisticated bombs hidden in portable electronic devices to conduct these attacks. The
U.S. may expand a ban on laptops in airplane cabins to include inbound flights from Europe.
The U.S. and the UK banned laptops in carry-on luggage on select inbound flights from
several Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda already developed this capability
and probably continued to refine it. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula developed
sophisticated explosives capabilities and shared expertise with members of the al Qaeda
network. ISIS is attempting to develop similar capabilities. An ISIS threat against commerical
airlines is reportedly the source of the recent actions.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will seek to adapt their bombs to new airline restrictions while
encouraging their followers to conduct less sophisticated terrorist attacks in the West.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Oman convened ceasefire talks between the al Houthi-Saleh bloc and the Hadi government.
Issues on the table include control of al Hudaydah port, which has scuttled talks in the past.
The UN-led process is not progressing toward its goal of establishing a ceasefire.
Outlook: Incompatible ceasefire preconditions will hinder negotiations.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition deployed Sudanese forces offensively instead of defensively to
support the ongoing campaign to secure the Red Sea coastline. Hadi government-aligned
militias are driving al Houthi-Saleh forces from eastern Taiz city in central Yemen.
Outlook: The Saudi-led coalition will not make decisive gains along Yemen’s western coast.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP sustained its pace of operations in central Yemen. U.S. Special Operations Forces
conducted an intelligence-gathering raid on an AQAP compound in Ma’rib governorate.
Local tribes protested against the raid.
Outlook: Anti-American sentiment could grow in central Yemen.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 25 MAY: Gunmen
kidnapped the
director of al
Kurami Bank.
2) 26 MAY: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces killed
15 Sudanese
soldiers near Midi.
3) 26 MAY: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces killed
three journalists
covering fighting in
eastern Taiz city.
4) 29 MAY: AQAP
detonated an IED
targeting al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
Madhawqin.
5) 31 MAY: AQAP
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Dhi
Madahi.
3
5
4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Shabaab seeks to decrease the Kenyan electorate’s support for military involvement in
Somalia before the August 2017 general elections. Al Shabaab propaganda focused on
recent al Shabaab attacks on Kenyan forces, as well as Somali grievances against Kenya.
Outlook: Kenyan voters may increase demand for military withdrawal from Somalia.
Security
Somali security forces increased operations in Lower Shabelle region after a spike in al
Shabaab attacks. They dismantled several al Shabaab roadblocks. Al Shabaab retaliated by
targeting SNA and AMISOM troops in Lower and Middle Shabelle regions.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may increase bombings in Mogadishu to challenge security forces.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is pursuing multiple campaigns against security forces. These include an
offensive against Somali forces in southern Somalia and IED attacks targeting Kenyan
forces in the border region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will broaden its offensive against the SNA in southern Somalia.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
5
1) 24 MAY: Al
Shabaab detonated
a VBIED near
Mogadishu port.
2) 24 MAY: Security
forces arrested al
Shabaab militants
in Hodan.
3) 24-25 MAY: Al
Shabaab detonated
IEDs targeting
Kenyan police in
Liboi, Kenya.
4) 29 MAY: SNA
forces responded
to an al Shabaab
attack at Bakara
Market.
5) 29 MAY: Kenyan
police ambushed al
Shabaab militants
in Tana River town.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Tensions remain high after forces loosely affiliated with the Government of National Accord
(GNA) massacred Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel and civilians at Brak al Shati
airbase on May 19. GNA head Fayez al Serraj opened an investigation into the attack.
Outlook: The rapprochement between GNA and LNA leadership will remain stalled.
Security
Egyptian and possibly Emirati warplanes conducted airstrikes on opponents of the LNA in
Derna city and Jufra district. Egypt framed the attacks as a response to the ISIS-claimed
attack on Coptic Christians in Minya, Egypt on May 26.
Outlook: The LNA will begin a ground offensive to seize Derna.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Ansar al Sharia in Libya disbanded, citing high casualties and leadership attrition. The
group’s dissolution does not significantly weaken the al Qaeda network in Libya, which has
insinuated itself in local shura councils and militias. Al Qaeda retains a safe haven in Libya.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia militants will continue to fight as members of local jihadi groups.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 23 MAY: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes targeting
militias in al Jufra
district.
2) 26 MAY: Pro-
General National
Congress and pro-
Government of
National Accord
forces clashed in
Tripoli.
3) 26 MAY: Egyptian
airstrikes targeted
the Mujahideen
Shura Council of
Derna.
4) 27-28 MAY:
Egyptian or Emirati
airstrikes targeted
anti-LNA militants
in Hun and
Waddan.
4
2
1
3

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Tunisian security forces thwarted possible ISIS Ramadan attack plots. The Tunisian army
dismantled an ISIS-affiliated attack cell and killed its reported leader in Kasserine. Authorities
dismantled an AQIM-affiliated cell that was planning attacks on April 30.
Outlook: Militant groups may conduct small-scale attacks in Tunisia during Ramadan.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM and affiliated groups released propaganda designed to draw support from aggrieved
populations in Mali. AQIM affiliate JNIM portrayed itself as a defender of Malians against
heavy-handed security forces and their French backers. An AQIM leader called for lone-wolf
attacks in France to push the French to withdraw from Mali. Separately, Burkina Faso-based
militant group Ansar al Islam increased its operational tempo against security forces in the
tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Outlook: JNIM will attempt to conduct high-casualty attacks against French troops in Mali.
Ansar al Islam will conduct more cross-border attacks into Mali and Niger.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 25 MAY: Tunisian
security forces
arrested two
militants in Cite
Hlel, Tunis.
2) 25 MAY: Algerian
security forces
killed a militant in
Bejaia province.
3) 26 MAY: Moroccan
intelligence
dismantled an ISIS
cell in Nador
province.
4) 28 MAY: Tunisian
security forces
killed the reported
leader of an ISIS-
affiliated Jund al
Khilafa cell in
Kasserine
governorate.
2
3
1
4

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
3
1
1) 23 MAY: Malian
Army forces
arrested 30 Fulani
people accused of
being militants in
Djénné, Mopti
region, central Mali.
2) 27 MAY: Likely
Ansar al Islam
militants killed two
policemen and one
civilian in Pétèl
Kolé, Soum
province, Burkina
Faso.
3) 28 MAY: Likely
Ansar al Islam
militants
assassinated a
councilman in
Moungnoukana,
Mopti region,
central Mali.

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569