Increasing the retirement age is analyzed under different pension systems (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, funded defined contribution) using an overlapping generations model. The results show:
1) Increasing the retirement age is efficient and leads to welfare gains for all generations under all systems.
2) Labor supply increases at the aggregate level, though individual labor supply may decrease for those close to retirement.
3) Capital per worker decreases primarily due to reduced precautionary savings rather than labor supply adjustments.
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
Agents gradually learn the structure of the economy.
Learning model delivers a sizeable recession in 2008-2010,
...whereas RE model predicts a counterfactual expansion.
In a medium scale model learning still matters.
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the quantitative implications of priors beliefs and confidence
in the model with learning. We introduce a constant-gain adaptive learning into a
medium scale DSGE model with credit-constrained agents. We estimate the model
both under rational expectations and adaptive learning using Bayesian techniques
and study to what extent prior beliefs determine the evolution of expectations and
endogenous variables. We analyze how the introduction of new macroeconomic
policies is affected by priors, their precision, and expectations related to these
policies.
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
Agents gradually learn the structure of the economy.
Learning model delivers a sizeable recession in 2008-2010,
...whereas RE model predicts a counterfactual expansion.
In a medium scale model learning still matters.
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the quantitative implications of priors beliefs and confidence
in the model with learning. We introduce a constant-gain adaptive learning into a
medium scale DSGE model with credit-constrained agents. We estimate the model
both under rational expectations and adaptive learning using Bayesian techniques
and study to what extent prior beliefs determine the evolution of expectations and
endogenous variables. We analyze how the introduction of new macroeconomic
policies is affected by priors, their precision, and expectations related to these
policies.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz, Olivia Komada and Krzysztof Makarski
Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system – DB – and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC). Our framework features within cohort heterogeneity of endowments (individual productivities) and heterogeneity of preferences (preference for leisure and time preference). We introduce two policy instruments, which
are widely used: a contribution cap and a minimum pension. We show four main results. First, longevity increases aggregate consumption inequalities substantially in both pension systems, whereas the effect of a pension system reform works to reinforce the consumption inequalities and reduce the
wealth inequalities. Second, the contribution cap has negligible effect on inequalities, but the role for minimum pension benefit guarantee is more pronounced. Third, the reduction in inequalities due to minimum pension benefit guarantee is achieved with virtually no effect on capital accumulation. The
fourth result and the main policy implication of our study, is demonstrating that the minimum pension benefit guarantee addresses mostly the inequalities which stem from differentiated endowments and not those that stem from differentiated preferences.
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Political (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
We analyze the political stability social security reforms which introduce a funded pillar (a.k.a. privatizations). We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, which introduces a funded pillar. This reform is efficient in Kaldor-Hicks sense and has political support. Subsequently, agents vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces welfare in the long run, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that “unprivatizing” social security is always politically favored. This suggests that property rights definition over retirement savings may be of crucial importance for determining the stability of retirement systems with a funded pillar.
Dierent methods have been used in the literature to mesure and analyze price markup cyclical behavior.
We use a medium-scale DSGE Model with positive trend in
ation, in which aggregate
uctuations are driven
by neutral technology, MEI and monetary policy shocks and, where both price and wage markups vary. We
nd that when raising trend in
ation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markup is more important than price markup
in explaining the dynamics eects of shocks.
Pension (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.
Income and substitution effects of estate taxationwarawut ruankham
This file is created for educational purpose not for sale.
Creator of this presentation is highly appreciated the Authors:James R. Hines Jr.
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3,
Papers and proceedings of
the one hundred twenty-fifth annual meeting of the American economic ASSOCIATION (MAY 2013), pp. 484-488
Pension reform of 1999 Poland had important macroeconomic and wefare effects. We investigate if it can be perceived as efficient, and how the implications differ between cohorts.
Global credit risk cycles, lending standards, and limits to cross border risk...SYRTO Project
Global credit risk cycles, lending standards, and limits to cross border risk diversification. Bernd Schwaab, Siem Jan Koopman, André Lucas.
SYRTO Code Workshop
Workshop on Systemic Risk Policy Issues for SYRTO (Bundesbank-ECB-ESRB)
Head Office of Deustche Bundesbank, Guest House
Frankfurt am Main - July, 2 2014
Joao Guerreiro (Northwestern University), Sergio Rebelo (Northwestern University, NBER and CEPR), Pedro Teles (Católica-Lisbon School of Business & Economics, Banco
de Portugal and CEPR)
Female access to the labor market and wages over transitionGRAPE
We analyze the differences in wages and employment in transition economies in the post transformation period. Using non parametric methods we found that countries differ to a great extent in the paths followed and that institutional features alone fail to explain variation.
We explore the reasons behind the fall of female employment rates in transition economies and compare them to the evolution in advanced economies. Using a large set of micro level databases, we find that the mechanisms that lead to an increasing female presence in the labor market (higher education and postponing marriage) do not seem to play a role in transition economies.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz, Olivia Komada and Krzysztof Makarski
Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system – DB – and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC). Our framework features within cohort heterogeneity of endowments (individual productivities) and heterogeneity of preferences (preference for leisure and time preference). We introduce two policy instruments, which
are widely used: a contribution cap and a minimum pension. We show four main results. First, longevity increases aggregate consumption inequalities substantially in both pension systems, whereas the effect of a pension system reform works to reinforce the consumption inequalities and reduce the
wealth inequalities. Second, the contribution cap has negligible effect on inequalities, but the role for minimum pension benefit guarantee is more pronounced. Third, the reduction in inequalities due to minimum pension benefit guarantee is achieved with virtually no effect on capital accumulation. The
fourth result and the main policy implication of our study, is demonstrating that the minimum pension benefit guarantee addresses mostly the inequalities which stem from differentiated endowments and not those that stem from differentiated preferences.
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Political (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
We analyze the political stability social security reforms which introduce a funded pillar (a.k.a. privatizations). We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, which introduces a funded pillar. This reform is efficient in Kaldor-Hicks sense and has political support. Subsequently, agents vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces welfare in the long run, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that “unprivatizing” social security is always politically favored. This suggests that property rights definition over retirement savings may be of crucial importance for determining the stability of retirement systems with a funded pillar.
Dierent methods have been used in the literature to mesure and analyze price markup cyclical behavior.
We use a medium-scale DSGE Model with positive trend in
ation, in which aggregate
uctuations are driven
by neutral technology, MEI and monetary policy shocks and, where both price and wage markups vary. We
nd that when raising trend in
ation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markup is more important than price markup
in explaining the dynamics eects of shocks.
Pension (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.
Income and substitution effects of estate taxationwarawut ruankham
This file is created for educational purpose not for sale.
Creator of this presentation is highly appreciated the Authors:James R. Hines Jr.
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3,
Papers and proceedings of
the one hundred twenty-fifth annual meeting of the American economic ASSOCIATION (MAY 2013), pp. 484-488
Pension reform of 1999 Poland had important macroeconomic and wefare effects. We investigate if it can be perceived as efficient, and how the implications differ between cohorts.
Global credit risk cycles, lending standards, and limits to cross border risk...SYRTO Project
Global credit risk cycles, lending standards, and limits to cross border risk diversification. Bernd Schwaab, Siem Jan Koopman, André Lucas.
SYRTO Code Workshop
Workshop on Systemic Risk Policy Issues for SYRTO (Bundesbank-ECB-ESRB)
Head Office of Deustche Bundesbank, Guest House
Frankfurt am Main - July, 2 2014
Joao Guerreiro (Northwestern University), Sergio Rebelo (Northwestern University, NBER and CEPR), Pedro Teles (Católica-Lisbon School of Business & Economics, Banco
de Portugal and CEPR)
Female access to the labor market and wages over transitionGRAPE
We analyze the differences in wages and employment in transition economies in the post transformation period. Using non parametric methods we found that countries differ to a great extent in the paths followed and that institutional features alone fail to explain variation.
We explore the reasons behind the fall of female employment rates in transition economies and compare them to the evolution in advanced economies. Using a large set of micro level databases, we find that the mechanisms that lead to an increasing female presence in the labor market (higher education and postponing marriage) do not seem to play a role in transition economies.
Our analysis suggests that "talent" workers, those with higher education and in a good occupation are more likely to establish their own firms after leaving and job. Moreover, they are more likely to create new positions in their companies.
Within occupation wage inequality and task dispersionGRAPE
Recent years, we witnessed an increase in wage dispersion at the occupation level, which cannot be explained by differences in workers' characteristics. In this presentation, we show how the task content of jobs can be used to improve our understanding on the topic
We investigate how women’s attitude and realization of choices towards equal participation in the labor market changes with age, and how these patterns differ between generations in transition and Western economies. As transition countries experienced a drop in employment rates regardless of gender, we study the relative change in the position of women, compared to similarly endowed men. We find that disentangling age, time, and cohort effects is necessary to appropriately assess women’s progress on labor markets in transition. The results indicate that in Western Europe countries women born later have much more equal position on the labor market as compared to older birth cohorts, but this is not the case in transition economies.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneity within cohorts and an oblig...GRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system — DB — and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC).
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial adjustments in between cohort and within cohort redistribution. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we show that fiscal closure is crucial for determining the welfare effects of the pension system reforms as well as political support for introducing it. We analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that in general, fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. We show the role of the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems for determining the welfare effects of the reform and point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of this motive for determining the welfare effects.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...Oliwia Komada
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure.
Is the retirement age increase in Poland still necessary given the 1999 reform of the pension system? EmerytGRAPE analysis with the use of OLG model answers this question.
Political (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Political (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
On the optimal introduction of a funded pension pillarGRAPE
Jan Woźnica, Marcin Bielecki, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Political (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, which may decide about abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as- you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This presentation covers an analysis on how do fiscal closures matter for the welfare effects of implementing the pension reforms. We develop an OLG model and calibrate it to the case of actual reform implemented in Poland.
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performanceGRAPE
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
how can I sell my pi coins for cash in a pi APPDOT TECH
You can't sell your pi coins in the pi network app. because it is not listed yet on any exchange.
The only way you can sell is by trading your pi coins with an investor (a person looking forward to hold massive amounts of pi coins before mainnet launch) .
You don't need to meet the investor directly all the trades are done with a pi vendor/merchant (a person that buys the pi coins from miners and resell it to investors)
I Will leave The telegram contact of my personal pi vendor, if you are finding a legitimate one.
@Pi_vendor_247
#pi network
#pi coins
#money
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
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how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the telegram id of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Tele gram: @Pi_vendor_247
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
how to sell pi coins in all Africa Countries.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network for other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, usdt , Ethereum and other currencies And this is done easily with the help from a pi merchant.
What is a pi merchant ?
Since pi is not launched yet in any exchange. The only way you can sell right now is through merchants.
A verified Pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins from miners and resell them to investors looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before mainnet launch in 2026.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview.pptxmarketing367770
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview
If you're dreaming of owning a home in California's rural or suburban areas, a USDA loan might be the perfect solution. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers these loans to help low-to-moderate-income individuals and families achieve homeownership.
Key Features of USDA Loans:
Zero Down Payment: USDA loans require no down payment, making homeownership more accessible.
Competitive Interest Rates: These loans often come with lower interest rates compared to conventional loans.
Flexible Credit Requirements: USDA loans have more lenient credit score requirements, helping those with less-than-perfect credit.
Guaranteed Loan Program: The USDA guarantees a portion of the loan, reducing risk for lenders and expanding borrowing options.
Eligibility Criteria:
Location: The property must be located in a USDA-designated rural or suburban area. Many areas in California qualify.
Income Limits: Applicants must meet income guidelines, which vary by region and household size.
Primary Residence: The home must be used as the borrower's primary residence.
Application Process:
Find a USDA-Approved Lender: Not all lenders offer USDA loans, so it's essential to choose one approved by the USDA.
Pre-Qualification: Determine your eligibility and the amount you can borrow.
Property Search: Look for properties in eligible rural or suburban areas.
Loan Application: Submit your application, including financial and personal information.
Processing and Approval: The lender and USDA will review your application. If approved, you can proceed to closing.
USDA loans are an excellent option for those looking to buy a home in California's rural and suburban areas. With no down payment and flexible requirements, these loans make homeownership more attainable for many families. Explore your eligibility today and take the first step toward owning your dream home.
what is the future of Pi Network currency.DOT TECH
The future of the Pi cryptocurrency is uncertain, and its success will depend on several factors. Pi is a relatively new cryptocurrency that aims to be user-friendly and accessible to a wide audience. Here are a few key considerations for its future:
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram if u want to sell PI COINS.
1. Mainnet Launch: As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, Pi was still in the testnet phase. Its success will depend on a successful transition to a mainnet, where actual transactions can take place.
2. User Adoption: Pi's success will be closely tied to user adoption. The more users who join the network and actively participate, the stronger the ecosystem can become.
3. Utility and Use Cases: For a cryptocurrency to thrive, it must offer utility and practical use cases. The Pi team has talked about various applications, including peer-to-peer transactions, smart contracts, and more. The development and implementation of these features will be essential.
4. Regulatory Environment: The regulatory environment for cryptocurrencies is evolving globally. How Pi navigates and complies with regulations in various jurisdictions will significantly impact its future.
5. Technology Development: The Pi network must continue to develop and improve its technology, security, and scalability to compete with established cryptocurrencies.
6. Community Engagement: The Pi community plays a critical role in its future. Engaged users can help build trust and grow the network.
7. Monetization and Sustainability: The Pi team's monetization strategy, such as fees, partnerships, or other revenue sources, will affect its long-term sustainability.
It's essential to approach Pi or any new cryptocurrency with caution and conduct due diligence. Cryptocurrency investments involve risks, and potential rewards can be uncertain. The success and future of Pi will depend on the collective efforts of its team, community, and the broader cryptocurrency market dynamics. It's advisable to stay updated on Pi's development and follow any updates from the official Pi Network website or announcements from the team.
If you are looking for a pi coin investor. Then look no further because I have the right one he is a pi vendor (he buy and resell to whales in China). I met him on a crypto conference and ever since I and my friends have sold more than 10k pi coins to him And he bought all and still want more. I will drop his telegram handle below just send him a message.
@Pi_vendor_247
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor
@Pi_vendor_247
1. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
The shadow of longevity – does social security reform
reduce gains from increasing the retirement age?
with Karolina Goraus, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz
Marcin Bielecki
Faculty of Economics, University of Warsaw
First World Congress of Comparative Economics
Rome, 25-27 June 2015
1 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Motivation
Major issues in pension economics:
increasing old-age dependency ratio
majority of pension systems fail to assure actuarial fairness
in most countries people tend to retire as early as legally allowed
Typical reform proposals
switch to DC systems and strengthen the link
between contributions and benefits
raise the social security contribution rate
cut government expenditure
increase minimum eligibility retirement age
2 / 30
2. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Effective retirement age in OECD
3 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Participation rates in OECD
4 / 30
3. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Outline
1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Scenarios
4 Calibration
5 Results
5 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Literature review
Two streams of literature:
1 Answering the question about optimal retirement age
Gruber and Wise (2007), Galasso (2008), Heijdra and Romp (2009)
2 Comparing different pensions system reforms: increasing retirement age
vs cut in benefits/privatization of the system/...
Auerbach et al. (1989), Hviding and Marette (1998), Fehr (2000),
Boersch-Supan and Ludwig (2010), Vogel et al. (2012)
Fehr (2000)
Macroeconomic effects of retirement age increase may depend on the existing
relation between contributions and benefits
Remaining gaps in the literature
how the macroeconomic effects differ between various pension systems?
what happens to the welfare of each affected generation and why?
6 / 30
4. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Goals and expectations
Goal
Analyse macroeconomic and welfare implications of retirement age
increase under DB (defined benefit), NDC (notionally defined
contribution) and FDC (funded defined contribution) systems
Expectations
under DB: leisure ↓, taxes ↓, welfare?
under DC: leisure ↓, pensions ↑, welfare?
difference between FDC & NDC: pricing of capital?
Why a full model? Labor supply adjustments & GE effects
7 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Model structure: consumers I
”born” at age 20 (j = 1) and live up to 100 years (J = 80)
subject to time and cohort dependent survival probability π
choose labor supply l endogenously until exogenous
retirement age ¯J (forced to retire)
optimize remaining lifetime utility derived from leisure 1 − l
and consumption c
Uj,t =
J−j
s=0
δs πj+s,t+s
πj,t
u(cj+s,t+s, lj+s,t+s)
with
u(c, l) = log(cφ
(1 − l)1−φ
)
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5. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Model structure: consumers II
receive market clearing wage for labor
receive market clearing interest rate on private savings
receive pension income
receive unintentional bequests
pay taxes
Subject to the budget constraint
(1 + τc
t )cj,t + sj,t = (1 − τl
t )(1 − τι
)wj,tlj,t ← labor income
+ (1 + (1 − τk
t )rt)sj−1,t−1 ← capital income
+ (1 − τl
t )pι
j,t ← pension income
+ bj,t ← bequests
− Υt ← lump-sum tax
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Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Model structure: producers
perfectly competitive representative firm
standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = Kα
t (ztLt)1−α
profit maximization implies
wt = zt(1 − α)kα
t
rt = αkα−1
t − d
with k ≡ K
zL
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6. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Model structure: government
collects taxes on earnings, interest and consumption (sum up to T)
spends GDP fixed share of GDP on government consumption G
collects social security contributions and pays out pensions
of DB and NDC system
subsidyt = τι
¯J−1
j=1
wj,tlj,t −
J
j= ¯J
pj,tNj,t
services debt D and maintains debt/GDP ratio fixed
lump-sum taxes Υ adjust to satisfy the govt budget constraint
Gt + subsidyt + (1 + rt)Dt−1 = Tt + Dt + Υt
J
j=1
Nj,t
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Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Pension systems
Defined Benefit: constructed by imposing a mandatory exogenous
contribution rate τ and an exogenous replacement rate ρ
pDB
¯J,t
= ρw ¯J−1,t−1l ¯J−1,t−1
indexed by 25% of total payroll growth
Defined Contribution: constructed by imposing a mandatory
exogenous contribution rate τ and actuarially fair individual
accounts
pDC
¯J,t
=
accumulated sum of contributions ¯J,t
expected remaining lifetime ¯J,t
Notional: contributions before retirement and pensions are indexed
by 25% of total payroll growth
Funded: contributions before retirement and pensions are indexed
by market interest rate
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7. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
What we do
What happens within each experiment?
1 Run the no policy change scenario ⇒ baseline
2 Run the policy change scenario ⇒ reform
3 For each cohort compare utility, compensate the losers from the
winners
4 If net effect positive ⇒ reform efficient
Welfare analysis – like Nishiyama & Smetters (2007)
Macroeconomic analysis
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Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Reforms
Three experiments:
1 DB with flat retirement age → DB with increasing retirement age
2 NDC with flat retirement age → NDC with increasing retirement age
3 FDC with flat retirement age → FDC with increasing retirement age
Increasing retirement age
14 / 30
8. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Robustness: age-productivity profile
Heterogeneity between cohorts due to age-specific productivity: wj,t = ωjwt
Deaton (1997) decomposition on Polish LFS data
15 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Calibration to replicate 1999 economy of Poland
Preference for leisure (φ) chosen to match participation rate of 56.8%
Impatience (δ) chosen to match interest rate of 7.4%
Replacement rate (ρ) chosen to match benefits/GDP ratio of 5%
Contributions rate (τ) chosen to match SIF deficit/GDP ratio of 0.8%
Labor income tax (τl
) set to match PIT/GDP ratio
Consumption tax (τc
) set to match VAT/GDP ratio
Capital income tax (τk
) set de iure = de facto
16 / 30
9. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Calibrated parameters
Age-productivity profile
ω – D97 ω = 1
α capital share 0.31 0.31
τl
labor income tax 0.11 0.11
τc
consumption tax 0.11 0.11
τk
capital income tax 0.19 0.19
φ leisure-consumption preference 0.578 0.526
δ discounting rate 0.998 0.979
d depreciation rate 0.045 0.045
τ social security contribution 0.060 0.060
ρ replacement rate 0.138 0.227
resulting
(dk)/y investment rate 21 21
r interest rate 7.4 7.4
17 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Exogenous processes in the model I
Demographic projection until 2060, after that 80 years, and after
that “new steady state”
“Births” of 20-year olds from the projection, constant afterwards
Mortality rates from the projection, constant afterwards
18 / 30
10. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Exogenous processes in the model II
Productivity growth
Labor augmenting productivity parameter z
Projection from AWG, after that “new steady state”, 1.7%
19 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Is the reform efficient?
Yes!
Net consumption equivalent ω – D97 ω = 1
DB 9.88% 3.70%
Transition to NDC 11.31% 4.41%
Transition to FDC 11.81% 4.70%
20 / 30
11. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Everybody gains
21 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Why they gain? Benefits under DC systems ...
22 / 30
12. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
... and taxes under DB system
SIF deficit
Lump-sum taxes
23 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Is there any behavioral response? Of course!
24 / 30
13. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Labor supply in the final steady state
Labor supply Labor supply with MERA increase
(no reform) j < 60 j ≥ 60 Total
Average Average Aggregate Average Aggregate
(base=100%) (base=100%)
DB 63.2% 59.6% 94.4% 71.8% 113.7%
NDC 62.0% 58.8% 94.8% 72.3% 114.7%
FDC 61.7% 59.0% 95.5% 72.2% 115.4%
25 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Aggregate labor supply (in millions of individuals)
26 / 30
14. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Capital per effective unit of labor decreases ...
27 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
... but mostly due to decrease in “precautionary savings”
28 / 30
15. Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Conclusions
extending the retirement age is universally welfare enhancing
some downward adjustment in individual labor supply,
but the aggregate labor supply increases
effects on capital are “overstated”
29 / 30
Introduction Model Scenarios Calibration Results
Thank you for your attention!
Questions or suggestions?
30 / 30