Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
This document introduces a framework for analyzing contracts between a principal and multiple agents who have interdependent preferences. It begins with a simple example involving two agents who can choose between working and shirking, and whose outputs are either success or failure. The agents have interdependent utility that depends on both their own material payoff and their conjecture of the other agent's utility.
The document then outlines the research agenda, which is to characterize optimal contracts when agents have interdependent preferences and to provide recommendations for contract design based on whether preferences are positively or negatively interdependent. Finally, it presents some general results, finding that independent contracts are no longer optimal when preferences are interdependent, and that contracts should incorporate both individual performance bonuses and team
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
This document discusses how labor market inequality may push disadvantaged groups like women into entrepreneurship out of necessity. It presents a theoretical framework showing how greater gender employment gaps could increase the prevalence of female self-employment. The authors test this using data on gender wage and employment gaps matched with survey data on entrepreneurship. Their results show a robust positive effect of gender employment gaps on necessity-driven female entrepreneurship but little effect of wage gaps. This provides empirical support that labor market discrimination can push disadvantaged groups into self-employment when other employment options are limited.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
- The document discusses the optimal assignment of property rights when a social planner cannot commit to future trading mechanisms. This lack of commitment results in ex-post inefficiency and inefficient investment decisions due to hold-up problems.
- The social planner chooses property rights to alleviate these frictions. The paper proposes a framework to characterize the optimal property right using a mechanism design approach. The main result is that the optimal property right is simple but flexible, often featuring an option to own the property.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights using mechanism design. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when the social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors analyze how to design property rights to alleviate these frictions in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power. A key result is that the optimal property right is often simple but flexible, featuring an option to own the resource.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when a social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors' contribution is characterizing the optimal property right from a non-parametric class in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power, finding that flexible rights featuring an option to own are often optimal.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine parties' outside options in economic interactions and impact efficiency and investment incentives. The framework models an interaction where a property rights holder participates in a trading mechanism. The optimal property right balances ex-post inefficiency and hold-up problems arising from the planner's inability to commit. The paper contributes by characterizing the optimal right from a non-parametric class of options and provides a foundation for why option-to-own contracts are attractive.
1. The document discusses a framework for determining the optimal allocation of goods when redistributive concerns are present. It considers allocating heterogeneous goods to agents who differ in observable characteristics, willingness to pay, and unobserved social welfare weights.
2. The designer aims to maximize a weighted sum of revenue and agents' utilities, where the weights reflect redistributive preferences. Non-market mechanisms may be optimal when observable information is imprecise or when certain groups have high welfare weights but monetary transfers are infeasible.
3. The optimal mechanism depends on how labels and willingness to pay statistically correlate with unobserved welfare weights, allowing the designer to estimate agents' relative "need".
1. The document discusses incentive separability in mechanism design problems and its implications for classic results in optimal taxation theory.
2. It introduces a framework to study incentive separability, which is when perturbing a set of decisions along agents' indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
3. The main result is that the optimal mechanism allows unrestricted choice over incentive-separable decisions given prices and budgets, generalizing theorems by Atkinson-Stiglitz and Diamond-Mirrlees.
This document discusses inequality-aware market design and the use of "ordeals" as a screening mechanism for redistributing money. It defines ordeals as activities that are costly for agents but do not directly benefit anyone, such as waiting times or filling out forms. The document compares direct cash subsidies in the US to Indonesia's conditional cash transfer program that requires certain behaviors. It proposes analyzing the equity-efficiency tradeoff of using ordeals for redistribution and comparing different types of ordeals as screening devices. Recent research on using ordeals to improve targeting efficiency is cited but it is noted that little work has considered using ordeals specifically for redistributing money or compared different screening devices.
- The document discusses inequality-aware market design and how to structure redistribution policies using markets under imperfect information.
- It focuses on "ordeals", which are costly activities that do not directly benefit anyone, as a way to screen recipients and better target redistribution, particularly when allocating cash.
- Two examples of cash redistribution, direct subsidies in the US and Indonesia's conditional cash program, are contrasted to examine whether and how an ordeal could improve targeting and the equity-efficiency tradeoff.
This document discusses incentive separability in mechanism design. It introduces a framework that allows for complex incentive constraints like private information, moral hazard, and voluntary participation. It defines a new concept of incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along agents' indifference curves preserves incentive constraints. The main theorem states that for incentive-separable decisions, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can extend and unify previous results showing no distortions are needed for certain decisions. Applications discussed include the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on redundant commodity taxes and optimality of removing production distortions.
1. This project studies incentive separability using mechanism design theory. It introduces the concept of incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
2. The main theorem states that when decisions are incentive separable, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can improve the planner's objective over allocations that distort incentive separable decisions.
3. The results generalize prior findings like Atkinson-Stiglitz on redundant commodity taxes. Applications show food vouchers can be optimal by making food choices incentive separable for low-income agents.
1. This project studies the concept of incentive separability using mechanism design theory. It introduces incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
2. The main theorem states that when decisions are incentive separable, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can improve the planner's objective over allocations that distort those decisions.
3. The results generalize prior findings like Atkinson-Stiglitz on redundant commodity taxes. Applications show food vouchers can be optimal by applying the theorem to food choices where low consumption levels are incentive separable.
This document presents two general results about incentive-separable decisions:
1. Distortions in incentive-separable decisions are suboptimal for welfare. Removing such distortions, while keeping utilities and incentives fixed, strictly improves welfare.
2. Under regularity conditions, undistorted allocations of incentive-separable decisions can be decentralized with competitive markets using appropriate prices and budgets. Regular allocations are those that can be characterized as solutions to expenditure minimization problems for each type.
The results are proved using the concepts of incentive-separability and regular allocations. Incentive-separable decisions are those whose perturbation along indifference curves does not violate incentive constraints. Regular allocations minimize costs subject to utility constraints for each type
This document introduces a framework for analyzing contracts between a principal and multiple agents who have interdependent preferences. It begins with a simple example involving two agents who can choose between working and shirking, and whose outputs are either success or failure. The agents have interdependent utility that depends on both their own material payoff and their conjecture of the other agent's utility.
The document then outlines the research agenda, which is to characterize optimal contracts when agents have interdependent preferences and to provide recommendations for contract design based on whether preferences are positively or negatively interdependent. Finally, it presents some general results, finding that independent contracts are no longer optimal when preferences are interdependent, and that contracts should incorporate both individual performance bonuses and team
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
This document discusses how labor market inequality may push disadvantaged groups like women into entrepreneurship out of necessity. It presents a theoretical framework showing how greater gender employment gaps could increase the prevalence of female self-employment. The authors test this using data on gender wage and employment gaps matched with survey data on entrepreneurship. Their results show a robust positive effect of gender employment gaps on necessity-driven female entrepreneurship but little effect of wage gaps. This provides empirical support that labor market discrimination can push disadvantaged groups into self-employment when other employment options are limited.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
- The document discusses the optimal assignment of property rights when a social planner cannot commit to future trading mechanisms. This lack of commitment results in ex-post inefficiency and inefficient investment decisions due to hold-up problems.
- The social planner chooses property rights to alleviate these frictions. The paper proposes a framework to characterize the optimal property right using a mechanism design approach. The main result is that the optimal property right is simple but flexible, often featuring an option to own the property.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights using mechanism design. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when the social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors analyze how to design property rights to alleviate these frictions in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power. A key result is that the optimal property right is often simple but flexible, featuring an option to own the resource.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when a social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors' contribution is characterizing the optimal property right from a non-parametric class in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power, finding that flexible rights featuring an option to own are often optimal.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine parties' outside options in economic interactions and impact efficiency and investment incentives. The framework models an interaction where a property rights holder participates in a trading mechanism. The optimal property right balances ex-post inefficiency and hold-up problems arising from the planner's inability to commit. The paper contributes by characterizing the optimal right from a non-parametric class of options and provides a foundation for why option-to-own contracts are attractive.
1. The document discusses a framework for determining the optimal allocation of goods when redistributive concerns are present. It considers allocating heterogeneous goods to agents who differ in observable characteristics, willingness to pay, and unobserved social welfare weights.
2. The designer aims to maximize a weighted sum of revenue and agents' utilities, where the weights reflect redistributive preferences. Non-market mechanisms may be optimal when observable information is imprecise or when certain groups have high welfare weights but monetary transfers are infeasible.
3. The optimal mechanism depends on how labels and willingness to pay statistically correlate with unobserved welfare weights, allowing the designer to estimate agents' relative "need".
1. The document discusses incentive separability in mechanism design problems and its implications for classic results in optimal taxation theory.
2. It introduces a framework to study incentive separability, which is when perturbing a set of decisions along agents' indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
3. The main result is that the optimal mechanism allows unrestricted choice over incentive-separable decisions given prices and budgets, generalizing theorems by Atkinson-Stiglitz and Diamond-Mirrlees.
This document discusses inequality-aware market design and the use of "ordeals" as a screening mechanism for redistributing money. It defines ordeals as activities that are costly for agents but do not directly benefit anyone, such as waiting times or filling out forms. The document compares direct cash subsidies in the US to Indonesia's conditional cash transfer program that requires certain behaviors. It proposes analyzing the equity-efficiency tradeoff of using ordeals for redistribution and comparing different types of ordeals as screening devices. Recent research on using ordeals to improve targeting efficiency is cited but it is noted that little work has considered using ordeals specifically for redistributing money or compared different screening devices.
- The document discusses inequality-aware market design and how to structure redistribution policies using markets under imperfect information.
- It focuses on "ordeals", which are costly activities that do not directly benefit anyone, as a way to screen recipients and better target redistribution, particularly when allocating cash.
- Two examples of cash redistribution, direct subsidies in the US and Indonesia's conditional cash program, are contrasted to examine whether and how an ordeal could improve targeting and the equity-efficiency tradeoff.
This document discusses incentive separability in mechanism design. It introduces a framework that allows for complex incentive constraints like private information, moral hazard, and voluntary participation. It defines a new concept of incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along agents' indifference curves preserves incentive constraints. The main theorem states that for incentive-separable decisions, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can extend and unify previous results showing no distortions are needed for certain decisions. Applications discussed include the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on redundant commodity taxes and optimality of removing production distortions.
1. This project studies incentive separability using mechanism design theory. It introduces the concept of incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
2. The main theorem states that when decisions are incentive separable, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can improve the planner's objective over allocations that distort incentive separable decisions.
3. The results generalize prior findings like Atkinson-Stiglitz on redundant commodity taxes. Applications show food vouchers can be optimal by making food choices incentive separable for low-income agents.
1. This project studies the concept of incentive separability using mechanism design theory. It introduces incentive separability, where perturbing certain decisions along indifference curves preserves incentive constraints.
2. The main theorem states that when decisions are incentive separable, it is optimal to allow agents to make unrestricted choices over those decisions given prices and budgets. This can improve the planner's objective over allocations that distort those decisions.
3. The results generalize prior findings like Atkinson-Stiglitz on redundant commodity taxes. Applications show food vouchers can be optimal by applying the theorem to food choices where low consumption levels are incentive separable.
This document presents two general results about incentive-separable decisions:
1. Distortions in incentive-separable decisions are suboptimal for welfare. Removing such distortions, while keeping utilities and incentives fixed, strictly improves welfare.
2. Under regularity conditions, undistorted allocations of incentive-separable decisions can be decentralized with competitive markets using appropriate prices and budgets. Regular allocations are those that can be characterized as solutions to expenditure minimization problems for each type.
The results are proved using the concepts of incentive-separability and regular allocations. Incentive-separable decisions are those whose perturbation along indifference curves does not violate incentive constraints. Regular allocations minimize costs subject to utility constraints for each type
Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performance
1. Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performance
Katarzyna Bech-Wysocka (FAME|GRAPE & Warsaw School of Economics)
Joanna Tyrowicz (FAME|GRAPE, University of Regensburg, and IZA)
Sebastian Zalas (FAME|GRAPE, University of Warsaw)
Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Maj, 2024
1
2. Wprowadzenie
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
2
3. Wprowadzenie
• Kraje wprowadzają legislację (w tym dyrektywa 30% w UE)
Terjesen et al 2015
• w 2003 Norwegia: 40% kobiet w zarządzie spółek akcyjnych i państwowych (od 2006)
• kwoty m.in. w Belgii, Francji, Niemczech, Islandii, Włoszech, Holandii, Hiszpanii, Szwecji, a także Izraelu i
Indiach
• Kwestie wizerunkowe (element „podręcznika” ESG + Club 30%)
• raport Lorda Davisa (2011): dobrowolne kwoty w firmach FTSE100 UK
• Giełda australijska podobnie
• Deutsche Telekom (2010): dobrowolne kwoty na wszystkich szczeblach zarządczych
→ generujemy koszty czy korzyści?
3
4. Wprowadzenie
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki
• Teoria daje uzasadnienie i na plus, i na minus
• Brak konsensusu w literaturze empirycznej
1. wiele badań przyczynowych na przykładzie ... Norwegii → external validity
Bertrand et al 2003, Dezso-Ross 2012, Dale et al 2013, Bertrand et al 2019
2. znaczna część literatury polega na korelacjach → przyczynowość (?)
Post & Byron 2015, Terjesen et al 2015
3. w spółkach giełdowych kobiety nie szkodzą
Flabbi et al 2020, Sieweke et al 20203
4
5. Co robimy w tym badaniu
Badamy spółki prywatne w latach 1986-2020 w Europie
1. dane o firmach wszystkich typów z wielu europejskich krajów
• nie miały systemu kwot
• nie miały nadzoru ESG ani publicznego
2. nieobciążony estymator przyczynowo-skutkowy
• próba poradzenia sobie z faktem, że organy spółek nie są losowe
• instrument nie związany z konkretną reformą (shift-share IV SSIV)
5
7. Przesłanki teoretyczne
• teoria kapitału ludzkiego → dodatni wpływ
e.g. Becker (1964), Miller and Triana (2009), Faccio et al. (2016), Shaukat et al. (2016), Low et al. (2015), Smith et al. (2006)
• teoria tożsamości społecznej → ujemny wpływ
e.g. Tajfel and Turner (1986)
• teoria sieci społecznych → ujemny wpływ
e.g. Tönnies and Loomis (1959), Hambrick and Mason (1984), Ahern and Dittmar (2012)
• resource dependency theory → dodatni wpływ
e.g. Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), Hillman et al. (2000), D’Souza et al. (2010), Isidro and Sobral (2014), Lückerath-Rovers (2013)
• teoria agencji → dodatni wpływ
e.g. Fama and Jensen (1983), Gul et al. (2008), Adams and Ferreira (2009), Simkins and Simpson (2003), Ararat et al. (2015), Nguyen et al. (2015)
7
8. Wyniki badań empirycznych
• styl zarządzania się różni pomiędzy kobietami i mężczyznami
Flabbi et al 2020, Cardoso & Ebmer 2010, Gagliarducci & Passerman 2015, Matsa & Miller 2014, Lucifora & Vigani 2014
• styl zarządzania ma wpływ na wyniki spółek
Bertrand & Shoar 2003, Kaplan & Klebanov 2012, Bloom et al 2013
• udział kobiet we władzach
• wyniki z eksperymentów naturalnych
Ahern & Dittmar 2023, Matsa & Miller 2013, Bertrand et al 2019, Comi et al 2020
• wyniki z badań przekrojowych & meta-analiza Post and Byron (2015)
Dezso & Ross 2012, Sabatier 2015, Christiansen et al 2016, Post & Byron 2015, Adams and Ferreira 2015, Smith 2018
• wyniki z metod instrumentalnych
• Adams and Ferreira (2009) instrument: proporcja mężczyzn, którzy są w innych zarządach z kobietami
• Low et al. (2015) instrument: procentowy udział kobiet wśród managerów niższego szczebla
• Smith et al. (2006) instrument: wykształcenie współmałżonka CEO
• Liu et al. (2014) instrument na poziomie sektora: udział kobiet managerów i zatrudnienie kobiet
• Sieweke et al. (2023) & Flabbi et al (2020)
8
10. Dane
9 fal Orbis-Amadeus (2002 - 2020)
• każda fala zawiera informacje do 10 lat wstecz
• dane rejestrowe i finansowe firm + imiona i nazwiska managementu
• wszystkie typy firm: państwowe, prywatne, notowane na giełdzie
• problem: definicja zarządu i rady nadzorczej, płeć
• Próba:
• # krajów: 30
• # firm: 11 milionów
• # obserwacji: ponad 120 milionów
• # lat: ≈ 25
10
11. Dane - problemy rozwiązane
• Nowa heurystyka: przypisywanie płci w oparciu o imiona
• specyficzne dla każdego kraju
• World Gender Names Database
• Industry codes:
• zmiana NACE w 2008 ⇒ problematyczna analiza przed i po
• 50% automatycznie przekodowaliśmy na podstawie correspondence tables
• pozostałe hand-coded
• Definicje:
• identyfikacja firm zobligowanych do posiadania zarządu / rady nadzorczej
• podział na executives i non-executives (wszyscy i sam zarząd)
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12. Board gender diversity
Statistic Management Board All board positions
Average Share
N 60,301.00 64,227.00
Mean 0.20 0.21
25th perc. 0.09 0.13
Median 0.17 0.19
75th perc. 0.27 0.28
Firms with no women
N 60,301.00 64,227.00
Mean 0.74 0.67
25th perc. 0.65 0.55
Median 0.78 0.69
75th perc. 0.88 0.80
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14. Metodologia
• Chcemy oszacować:
log(yi,t) = β0 + γGBDi,t + βk log(ki,t) + +βl log(li,t) + ηi + ηt + εi,t
ale z powodu endogeniczności γGBDi,t korzystamy z IV.
• Shift-share IV, gdzie instrument zi,t konstruujemy jako:
zi,t = sharei,t0 × gk,t
=
#womeni,t0
#managersi,t0
×
#womenk,t
#managersk,t
#womenk,t0
#managersk,t0
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15. Shift-share IV - własności
• metodologia zaproponowana przez Bartik (1991)
• podobnie jak w przypadku standardowego IV: relevance & exogeneity conditions
• shock exogeneity - Borusyak et al. (2022), Adão et al. (2019)
• share exogeneity - Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020)
• wykorzystywana obecnie w wielu aplikacjach:
• Autor et al. (2013) - wpływ chińskiego importu na zatrudnienie w przemyśle w USA
• Flabbi et al. (2020) - wpływ GBD na warunki zatrudnienia w firmach
• Sieweke et al. (2023) - wpływ GBD na wyniki spółek giełdowych
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17. Ostateczna próba
Tablica 1: Jak powstaje próba
Organ wszystkie sam zarząd
Wyjściowo 128,442,985 128,442,985
Które obserwacje wypadają z próby? ↓ # obserwacji: # obserwacji:
firma sprawozdała organ -0 -26,210,791
NACE (A, B, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U) -11,763,772 -9,073,546
rok<1995 -142,929 -124,101
brak K,L,Y -75,218,374 -65,059,154
firmy bez kobiet -22,948,264 -17,922,514
firmy z % kobiet =1 -4,479,556 -3,705,437
mniej niż <3 osoby -10,849,401 -5,815,607
#obs w kraju <1000 -3,562 -2,840
Ostateczna próba: 3,037,127 528,995
2-digit NACE IV 2,656,884 439,352
3-digit NACE IV 2,601,244 416,437
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18. Podstawowe wyniki
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Gender Board Diversity 0.009∗∗
0.405∗∗∗
0.153∗∗
-0.000 0.252∗∗
0.125
(0.004) (0.059) (0.077) (0.011) (0.119) (0.140)
log(total assets) 0.515∗∗∗
0.515∗∗∗
0.539∗∗∗
0.449∗∗∗
0.476∗∗∗
0.445∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
log(employment) 0.461∗∗∗
0.461∗∗∗
0.422∗∗∗
0.473∗∗∗
0.472∗∗∗
0.435∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country weights No No Yes No No Yes
Board definition all all all MB MB MB
Observations 2,602,122 2,602,122 2,602,122 428,662 428,662 428,662
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19. Podstawowe wyniki
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Gender Board Diversity 0.009∗∗
0.405∗∗∗
0.153∗∗
-0.000 0.252∗∗
0.125
(0.004) (0.059) (0.077) (0.011) (0.119) (0.140)
log(total assets) 0.515∗∗∗
0.515∗∗∗
0.539∗∗∗
0.449∗∗∗
0.476∗∗∗
0.445∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
log(employment) 0.461∗∗∗
0.461∗∗∗
0.422∗∗∗
0.473∗∗∗
0.472∗∗∗
0.435∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Dependent variable: GBD (first stage)
First Stage F stat. 414.38 349.97 108.26 98.34
Instruments F test 95.037 61.264 20.994 18.437
IV -0.303∗∗∗
-0.321∗∗∗
-0.197∗∗∗
-0.174∗∗∗
[0.034] [0.048] [0.031] [0.029]
IV2
0.018∗∗∗
0.020∗∗∗
0.004∗∗∗
0.003∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.001]
Overididentification test 4.362 2.648 3.587 1.340
[0.037] [0.104] [0.058] [0.247]
Endogeneity test 48.614 3.988 8.057 1.318
[0.000] [0.046] [0.005] [0.251]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country weights No No Yes No No Yes
Board definition all all all MB MB MB
Observations 2,602,122 2,602,122 2,602,122 428,662 428,662 428,662
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20. Te wyniki są bardzo odporne
Sprawdzamy
• redefinicja instrumentu na 3-cyfrowym NACE
• włączenie do regresji never-takers
• imputacje
• alternatywne systemy wag
• mniej liczne organy
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21. Te wyniki są heterogeniczne
Rysunek 1: Zmienność w czasie
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22. Te wyniki są heterogeniczne: Przemysł (NACE 10-43) vs usługi (NACE 44-63)
Manufacturing Services
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Gender Board Diversity -0.006 -0.099 -0.044 0.017∗∗∗
0.640∗∗∗
0.302∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.076) (0.119) (0.006) (0.069) (0.088)
log(total assets) 0.545∗∗∗
0.545∗∗∗
0.588∗∗∗
0.503∗∗∗
0.503∗∗∗
0.516∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
log(employment) 0.471∗∗∗
0.471∗∗∗
0.432∗∗∗
0.449∗∗∗
0.448∗∗∗
0.405∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Dependent variable: GBD (first stage)
First Stage F stat. 162.89 149.98 255.04 202.72
Instruments F test 33.094 22.231 68.501 37.070
IV -0.295 -0.303 -0.453 -0.476
[0.042] [0.062] [0.051] [0.065]
IV2
0.011 0.012 0.034 0.034
[0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Overidentification test 1.386 0.900 1.188 0.840
[0.239] [0.343] [0.276] [0.359]
Endogeneity test 1.381 0.055 87.512 11.144
[0.240] [0.814] [0.000] [0.001]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country weights No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 900,607 900,607 900,607 1,698,845 1,698,845 1,698,845
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24. Wnioski
Najważniejsze wyniki
1. pozytywny mały wpływ GBD na wyniki firm
2. instrument się względnie dobrze sprawdza
3. nowe wyniki
• heterogeniczność sektorowa
• trendy w czasie
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25. Dziękuję za uwagę!
Chętnie odpowiem na wszystkie pytania
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape_org
f: grape.org
e: j.tyrowicz@grape.org.pl
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