This file is created for educational purpose not for sale.
Creator of this presentation is highly appreciated the Authors:James R. Hines Jr.
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3,
Papers and proceedings of
the one hundred twenty-fifth annual meeting of the American economic ASSOCIATION (MAY 2013), pp. 484-488
Taking progressivity research to European CommissionGRAPE
Social security is essentially about insurance. First, it gives insurance against mortality risk by providing annualization. Second, it provides partial insurance against low-income realization by providing intra-cohort redistribution. However, such redistribution is costly because it distorts labor supply incentives. When the link between social security contribution and future benefits becomes weaker, we treat contributions more and more as taxes, not as implicit savings.
With rising longevity, the social security system in many countries is bound to be put under unprecedented fiscal strain. Therefore, some changes appear imperative. Reforms proposed in the literature usually involve linking pensions to individual contributions, thus improving efficiency at the expense of the insurance loss.
In this paper, we propose a novel way of reforming social security. Our reform consists of two elements. First, we replace the redistributive defined benefit payout scheme with a defined contribution payout scheme, which links individual contributions to individual benefits. It raises efficiency as it reduces labor market distortions associated with contribution rates. Second, we propose to accompany this social security reform with adjustments in the progressiveness of labor taxation. Specifically, we increase progression in income taxes.
Thus, we partially replace the redistribution otherwise provided by social security with the one provided within the tax system.
We show that more redistribution during the working periods can fully or partially compensate for the redistribution during retirement. Given the efficiency gains, privatization of social security accompanied by increased labor tax progression can improve welfare. We show that the scope for this improvement crucially depends on the response of labor supply to the social security reform.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system – DB – and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC). Our framework features within cohort heterogeneity of endowments (individual productivities) and heterogeneity of preferences (preference for leisure and time preference). We introduce two policy instruments, which
are widely used: a contribution cap and a minimum pension. We show four main results. First, longevity increases aggregate consumption inequalities substantially in both pension systems, whereas the effect of a pension system reform works to reinforce the consumption inequalities and reduce the
wealth inequalities. Second, the contribution cap has negligible effect on inequalities, but the role for minimum pension benefit guarantee is more pronounced. Third, the reduction in inequalities due to minimum pension benefit guarantee is achieved with virtually no effect on capital accumulation. The
fourth result and the main policy implication of our study, is demonstrating that the minimum pension benefit guarantee addresses mostly the inequalities which stem from differentiated endowments and not those that stem from differentiated preferences.
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This presentation covers an analysis on how do fiscal closures matter for the welfare effects of implementing the pension reforms. We develop an OLG model and calibrate it to the case of actual reform implemented in Poland.
Taking progressivity research to European CommissionGRAPE
Social security is essentially about insurance. First, it gives insurance against mortality risk by providing annualization. Second, it provides partial insurance against low-income realization by providing intra-cohort redistribution. However, such redistribution is costly because it distorts labor supply incentives. When the link between social security contribution and future benefits becomes weaker, we treat contributions more and more as taxes, not as implicit savings.
With rising longevity, the social security system in many countries is bound to be put under unprecedented fiscal strain. Therefore, some changes appear imperative. Reforms proposed in the literature usually involve linking pensions to individual contributions, thus improving efficiency at the expense of the insurance loss.
In this paper, we propose a novel way of reforming social security. Our reform consists of two elements. First, we replace the redistributive defined benefit payout scheme with a defined contribution payout scheme, which links individual contributions to individual benefits. It raises efficiency as it reduces labor market distortions associated with contribution rates. Second, we propose to accompany this social security reform with adjustments in the progressiveness of labor taxation. Specifically, we increase progression in income taxes.
Thus, we partially replace the redistribution otherwise provided by social security with the one provided within the tax system.
We show that more redistribution during the working periods can fully or partially compensate for the redistribution during retirement. Given the efficiency gains, privatization of social security accompanied by increased labor tax progression can improve welfare. We show that the scope for this improvement crucially depends on the response of labor supply to the social security reform.
Inequalities in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
While the inequalities of endowments are widely recognized as areas of policy intervention, the dispersion in preferences may also imply inequalities of outcomes. In this paper, we analyze the inequalities in an OLG model with obligatory pension systems. We model both policy relevant pension systems (a defined benefit system – DB – and a transition from a DB to a defined contribution system, DC). Our framework features within cohort heterogeneity of endowments (individual productivities) and heterogeneity of preferences (preference for leisure and time preference). We introduce two policy instruments, which
are widely used: a contribution cap and a minimum pension. We show four main results. First, longevity increases aggregate consumption inequalities substantially in both pension systems, whereas the effect of a pension system reform works to reinforce the consumption inequalities and reduce the
wealth inequalities. Second, the contribution cap has negligible effect on inequalities, but the role for minimum pension benefit guarantee is more pronounced. Third, the reduction in inequalities due to minimum pension benefit guarantee is achieved with virtually no effect on capital accumulation. The
fourth result and the main policy implication of our study, is demonstrating that the minimum pension benefit guarantee addresses mostly the inequalities which stem from differentiated endowments and not those that stem from differentiated preferences.
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This presentation covers an analysis on how do fiscal closures matter for the welfare effects of implementing the pension reforms. We develop an OLG model and calibrate it to the case of actual reform implemented in Poland.
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
On the optimal introduction of a funded pension pillarGRAPE
Jan Woźnica, Marcin Bielecki, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
In the context of second demographic transition many countries consider pro-natalistic policies as viable solutions to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity and declining fertility. However, increased number of births implies immediate economic costs and delayed economic gains. Moreover, quantification of these gains remains a challenge. We develop an overlapping generations model with family structure and utilize this model to quantify the effects in the increases in birth rates. We show the overall welfare and macroeconomic effects as well as distribution of these effects across cohorts. We also show how the distribution of children across families affects those estimations for a given birth rate.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz, Olivia Komada and Krzysztof Makarski
Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Joao Guerreiro (Northwestern University), Sergio Rebelo (Northwestern University, NBER and CEPR), Pedro Teles (Católica-Lisbon School of Business & Economics, Banco
de Portugal and CEPR)
We study interactions between progressive labor taxation and social security reform. Increasing longevity necessitates reforming social security due to raising the fiscal strain on the current systems. The current systems are redistributive, which provides (at least partial) insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks, but at the expense of labor supply distortions. A reform which links pensions to individual incomes reduces distortions associated with social security contributions, but ushers insurance loss. The existing view in the literature is that net outcome of such reform is negative. Contrary to this view, we show that progressive labor tax can partially substitute for
the insurance loss when social security becomes less redistributive.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare effects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of fiscal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial adjustments in between cohort and within cohort redistribution. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we show that fiscal closure is crucial for determining the welfare effects of the pension system reforms as well as political support for introducing it. We analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that in general, fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. We show the role of the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems for determining the welfare effects of the reform and point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of this motive for determining the welfare effects.
Pension (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.
Progressing towards efficiency: the role for labor tax progression in privati...GRAPE
We show that labor tax progression can effectively substitute for the insurance implicit in redistributive social security. The existing view in the literature is that linking pensions to individual incomes wages reduces distortions associated with social security, but removes insurance. The net outcome of efficiency gain and insurance loss was found to be negative in an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks. Our study shows that privatizing social security can deliver aggregate welfare gains if alternative channels of providing insurance are implemented.
:In this paper, we consider the equity premium puzzle under a general utility function. We derive that
the optimal strategy under a general utility function approximate the optimal strategy under the special utility
function. This result posed in the present paper can be regarded as a generalization of the work by Gong and
Zou [13]
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
On the optimal introduction of a funded pension pillarGRAPE
Jan Woźnica, Marcin Bielecki, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Starzenie się społeczeństwa w Polsce jest faktem i system ubezpieczeń społecznych musiał w związku z tym zostać zreformowany. W 1999 roku system emerytalny zdefiniowanego świadczenia został zmieniony na system zdefiniowanej składki - czy w tej sytuacji podniesienie wieku emerytalnego wciąż jest konieczne?
Political (In)Stability of Pension System ReformsGRAPE
We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. “unprivatizing” the pension system. We show that even if abolishing the system reduces overall welfare, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that some ways of “unprivatizing” social security are always politically favored
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
In the context of second demographic transition many countries consider pro-natalistic policies as viable solutions to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity and declining fertility. However, increased number of births implies immediate economic costs and delayed economic gains. Moreover, quantification of these gains remains a challenge. We develop an overlapping generations model with family structure and utilize this model to quantify the effects in the increases in birth rates. We show the overall welfare and macroeconomic effects as well as distribution of these effects across cohorts. We also show how the distribution of children across families affects those estimations for a given birth rate.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Joanna Tyrowicz, Olivia Komada and Krzysztof Makarski
Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Joao Guerreiro (Northwestern University), Sergio Rebelo (Northwestern University, NBER and CEPR), Pedro Teles (Católica-Lisbon School of Business & Economics, Banco
de Portugal and CEPR)
We study interactions between progressive labor taxation and social security reform. Increasing longevity necessitates reforming social security due to raising the fiscal strain on the current systems. The current systems are redistributive, which provides (at least partial) insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks, but at the expense of labor supply distortions. A reform which links pensions to individual incomes reduces distortions associated with social security contributions, but ushers insurance loss. The existing view in the literature is that net outcome of such reform is negative. Contrary to this view, we show that progressive labor tax can partially substitute for
the insurance loss when social security becomes less redistributive.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare effects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of fiscal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial adjustments in between cohort and within cohort redistribution. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we show that fiscal closure is crucial for determining the welfare effects of the pension system reforms as well as political support for introducing it. We analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that in general, fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. We show the role of the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems for determining the welfare effects of the reform and point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of this motive for determining the welfare effects.
Pension (In)Stability of Social Security ReformGRAPE
In this paper we consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme (i.e. unprivatizing the pension system). We compare politically stable and politically unstable reforms and show that even if the funded system is overall welfare enhancing, the cohort distribution of benefits along the transition path turns unprivatizing social security politically favorable.
Progressing towards efficiency: the role for labor tax progression in privati...GRAPE
We show that labor tax progression can effectively substitute for the insurance implicit in redistributive social security. The existing view in the literature is that linking pensions to individual incomes wages reduces distortions associated with social security, but removes insurance. The net outcome of efficiency gain and insurance loss was found to be negative in an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks. Our study shows that privatizing social security can deliver aggregate welfare gains if alternative channels of providing insurance are implemented.
:In this paper, we consider the equity premium puzzle under a general utility function. We derive that
the optimal strategy under a general utility function approximate the optimal strategy under the special utility
function. This result posed in the present paper can be regarded as a generalization of the work by Gong and
Zou [13]
I am Mercy Jacobs. I love exploring new topics. Academic writing seemed an exciting option for me. After working for many years with economicshomeworkhelper.com, I have assisted many students with their Economics Homework. I can proudly say, each student I have served is happy with the quality of the solution that I have provided. I have acquired my bachelor's the University of London, UK.
Poster on Learning financial shocks and the Great RecessionGRAPE
We build a simple theoretical model featuring financial markets and imperfect information: consumers, workers, and firms observe and learn continuously about the world they live in. We find that not only financial shock but also what people thought of it mattered for the economy.
Econ 3022 MacroeconomicsSpring 2020Final Exam - Due A.docxtidwellveronique
Econ 3022: Macroeconomics
Spring 2020
Final Exam - Due April 24th 11:59pm
1 Multiple Choice Questions (5 points each)
Question 1 What is Ricardian Equivalence?
(a) The economic hypothesis that agents’ decisions are una↵ected by the timing of taxation
and government spending
(b) The economic hypothesis that agents’ decisions are a↵ected by the timing of taxation
and government spending
(c) The economic hypothesis that taxation must be equal every period.
(d) The economic hypothesis that it is impossible to individually identify taxation today
and taxation tomorrow.
Question 2 Consider the consumer problem from the microeconomic foundations we dis-
cussed in class. Suppose the wage decreases. What do we expect to happen to house-
hold labor supply?
(a) Unclear
(b) Increase
(c) Decrease
(d) Stay constant
1
Question 3 Consider the consumer problem from the real intertemporal model. Which of
the following conditions must be satisfied at the solution?
(a) MRSl,c = w
(b) MRSc0,l0 =
1
w0
(c) MRSl,l0 =
w(1+r)
w0
(d) All of the above
Question 4 If total factor productivity tomorrow, z0, increases. What should happen to
investment?
(a) Unclear
(b) Increase
(c) Decrease
(d) Stay constant
Question 5 Consider the standard Solow model from class where the production function
is zF (K, N) = zK↵N1�↵. What is the golden rule savings rate?
(a) sgr = 1 � ↵
(b) sgr = ↵
(c) The savings rate that leads to a steady state with the highest level of income per capita
(d) The savings rate that leads to a steady state with the lowest level of income per capita
2
2 Economic Growth (20 points)
Consider the Solow Growth Model seen in class where the production function is Cobb-
Douglas and given by:
Y = zK↵ (N)
1�↵
where 0 < ↵ < 1 and z is a constant. Let s be the savings rate of this economy, so that
aggregate savings is just a constant fraction of aggregate output: S = sY . Let n be the rate
of population growth, so N
0
N
= 1 + n. Finally, let d be the depreciation rate, and assume the
law of motion for aggregate capital is given by:
K
0 = (1 � d) K + I
(a) (5 pts) Find an expression for the steady state level of capital per capita (k⇤) that only
depends on parameters of the model. Clearly show your work.
(b) (5 pts) Discuss how per capita variables (consumption and income) as well as aggregate
variables (consumption, capital stock, output, and savings) behave in steady state.
Now, suppose that we have a linear production function given by
Y = zK
where z is a constant. Let s be the savings rate of this economy, so that aggregate savings
is just a constant fraction of aggregate output: S = sY . Let n be the rate of population
growth, so N
0
N
= 1 + n. Finally, let d be the depreciation rate, and assume the law of motion
for aggregate capital is given by:
K
0 = (1 � d) K + I
(c) (5 pts) Find an expression for the level of per capita capital stock today as a function
of per capita capital stock tomorrow. Clea.
Chapter 14 equilibrium effects and market conditionswarawut ruankham
Equilibrium Effects and Market Conditions
THOMAS STERNER
Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Presented by Warawut Ruankham
2 May 2021, NIDA, Thailand
1. This question is on the application of the Binomial optionAbbyWhyte974
1. This question is on the application of the Binomial option
pricing model.
PKZ stock is currently trading at 100. Over three-months it will either
go up by 6% or down by 5%. Interest rates are zero.
a. [25 marks] Using a two period binomial model to construct a delta-
hedged portfolio, price a six month European call option on PKZ
stock with a strike price of £105.
b. [3 Marks] Using your answer from the first part, together with the
put-call parity, price a put option on the same stock with same
strike and expiry.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
2
2. This question is on the Binomial method in the limit δt → 0.
[40 Marks] The binomial model for pricing options leads to the for-
mula
V (S,t) = e−rδt [qV (US,t + δt) + (1 − q) V (DS,t + δt)]
where
U = eσ
√
δt, D = e−σ
√
δt, q =
erδt −D
U −D
.
V (S,t) is the option value, t is the time, S is the spot price, σ is volatil-
ity and r is the risk-free rate.
By carefully expanding U,D,q as Taylor series in δt or
√
δt (as appro-
priate) and then expanding V (US,t + δt) and V (DS,t + δt) as Taylor
series in both their arguments, deduce that to O (δt) ,
∂V
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V
∂S2
+ rS
∂V
∂S
− rV = 0.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
3
3. This question is on probability and Monte Carlo
a. Consider theprobabilitydensity function p (x) fora randomvariable
X given by
p (x) =
{
µ exp (−µx) x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
where µ (> 0) is a constant.
i. [15 Marks] Show that for this probability density function
E
[
eθX
]
=
(
1 −
θ
µ
)−1
Hint: You may assume µ > θ in obtaining this result.
ii. [20 Marks] By expanding
(
1 −
θ
µ
)−1
as a Taylor series, show
that
E [xn] =
n!
µn
, n = 0, 1, 2, ....
iii. [15 Marks] Hence calculate the skew and kurtosis for X.
COMP0041 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
4
b. [32 Marks] An Exchange Option gives the holder the right to
exchange one asset for another. The discounted payoff for this
contract V is
V = e−rT max (S1 (T) −S2 (T) , 0) .
The option price is then given by θ = E [V ] where
Si (t) = Si (0) e
(r−12σ
2
i )t+σiφi
√
t
for i = 1, 2, and φi ∼ N (0, 1) with correlation coeffi cient ρ.
Youmayassumethatauniformrandomnumbergenerator isavail-
able. Use a Cholesky factorisation method to show(
φ1
φ2
)
=
(
1 0
ρ
√
1 −ρ2
)(
x1
x2
)
,
where
(
x1
x2
)
is a vector of independent N (0, 1) variables and
has the same distribution as
(
φ1
φ2
)
.
Give a Monte Carlo simulation algorithm that makes use of anti-
thetic variates for the estimation of θ.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
5
4. This question is on finite differences
a. [30 Marks] Consider a forward difference operator, ∆, such that
∆V (S) = V (S + h) −V (S) , (4.1)
where h is an infinitessimal. By introducing the operators
D ≡
∂
∂S
; D2 ≡
∂2
∂S2
show that
∆ ≡ ehD −1 (4.2)
where 1 is the identity operator. Hint: start by doing a Taylor
expansion on V (S + h) .
By rearranging (4.2) show that
D =
1
h
(
∆ −
∆2
2
+
∆3
3
−
∆4
4
+ O
(
∆5
))
.
Hence obtain the second order approximation for
∂V
...
1. This question is on the application of the Binomial optionSantosConleyha
1. This question is on the application of the Binomial option
pricing model.
PKZ stock is currently trading at 100. Over three-months it will either
go up by 6% or down by 5%. Interest rates are zero.
a. [25 marks] Using a two period binomial model to construct a delta-
hedged portfolio, price a six month European call option on PKZ
stock with a strike price of £105.
b. [3 Marks] Using your answer from the first part, together with the
put-call parity, price a put option on the same stock with same
strike and expiry.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
2
2. This question is on the Binomial method in the limit δt → 0.
[40 Marks] The binomial model for pricing options leads to the for-
mula
V (S,t) = e−rδt [qV (US,t + δt) + (1 − q) V (DS,t + δt)]
where
U = eσ
√
δt, D = e−σ
√
δt, q =
erδt −D
U −D
.
V (S,t) is the option value, t is the time, S is the spot price, σ is volatil-
ity and r is the risk-free rate.
By carefully expanding U,D,q as Taylor series in δt or
√
δt (as appro-
priate) and then expanding V (US,t + δt) and V (DS,t + δt) as Taylor
series in both their arguments, deduce that to O (δt) ,
∂V
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V
∂S2
+ rS
∂V
∂S
− rV = 0.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
3
3. This question is on probability and Monte Carlo
a. Consider theprobabilitydensity function p (x) fora randomvariable
X given by
p (x) =
{
µ exp (−µx) x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
where µ (> 0) is a constant.
i. [15 Marks] Show that for this probability density function
E
[
eθX
]
=
(
1 −
θ
µ
)−1
Hint: You may assume µ > θ in obtaining this result.
ii. [20 Marks] By expanding
(
1 −
θ
µ
)−1
as a Taylor series, show
that
E [xn] =
n!
µn
, n = 0, 1, 2, ....
iii. [15 Marks] Hence calculate the skew and kurtosis for X.
COMP0041 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
4
b. [32 Marks] An Exchange Option gives the holder the right to
exchange one asset for another. The discounted payoff for this
contract V is
V = e−rT max (S1 (T) −S2 (T) , 0) .
The option price is then given by θ = E [V ] where
Si (t) = Si (0) e
(r−12σ
2
i )t+σiφi
√
t
for i = 1, 2, and φi ∼ N (0, 1) with correlation coeffi cient ρ.
Youmayassumethatauniformrandomnumbergenerator isavail-
able. Use a Cholesky factorisation method to show(
φ1
φ2
)
=
(
1 0
ρ
√
1 −ρ2
)(
x1
x2
)
,
where
(
x1
x2
)
is a vector of independent N (0, 1) variables and
has the same distribution as
(
φ1
φ2
)
.
Give a Monte Carlo simulation algorithm that makes use of anti-
thetic variates for the estimation of θ.
COMP0041 SEE NEXT PAGE
5
4. This question is on finite differences
a. [30 Marks] Consider a forward difference operator, ∆, such that
∆V (S) = V (S + h) −V (S) , (4.1)
where h is an infinitessimal. By introducing the operators
D ≡
∂
∂S
; D2 ≡
∂2
∂S2
show that
∆ ≡ ehD −1 (4.2)
where 1 is the identity operator. Hint: start by doing a Taylor
expansion on V (S + h) .
By rearranging (4.2) show that
D =
1
h
(
∆ −
∆2
2
+
∆3
3
−
∆4
4
+ O
(
∆5
))
.
Hence obtain the second order approximation for
∂V
...
Saving and Investment Puzzle in Thailand
Author: Warawut Ruankham
Co
authors: Sandar Htwe , Su Hlaing Oo , and Htet Zaw Linn
International Conference on “Opportunity in Adversity
The New Global Success Mantra”
30 March 2021
Valuing Nature: A Survey of the Non Market Valuation Literature
Mitchell L. Mathis
Houston Advanced Research Center
Allen A. Fawcett
University of Texas, Austin
Laura S. Konda
University of Texas, Austin
VNT
03 01 November 2003
The value of cultural heritage sites in southeastwarawut ruankham
THE VALUE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA – A COMPARISON OF VALUES AND DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF BENEFITS TRANSFER
TRAN HUU TUAN (Hue University, VIETNAM)
UDOMSAK SEENPRACHAWONG (NIDA, THAILAND)
EEPSEA
July 30, 2007
his file is created for educational purpose not for sale.
Creator of this presentation is highly appreciated the Authors:Christopher D. Carroll, Jody Overland and David N. Weil
Source: Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 339-367 Published by: Springer
This file is created for educational purpose not for sale.
Creator of this presentation is highly appreciated the Authors: Robert T. Jensen and Nolan H. Miller
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Sep., 2008), pp. 1553-1577.
Published by: American Economic Association
Rearranged by Warawut Ruankham
Economics Major, School of Management, MFU
This handbook is suitable for beginners who willing to study economics. The purpose is for self-study only, not for reference.
Reference:
วันรักษ์ มิ่งมณีนาคิน. (2552). หลักเศรษฐศาสตร์จุลภาค. พิมพ์ครั้งที่ 19. กรุงเทพฯ:สำนักพิมพ์มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์.
ศุภชัย ศรีสุชาติ (2546). แนวบรรยายวิชาเศรษฐศาสตร์เบื้องต้น ( ศ.210 ). มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์. กรุงเทพฯ.
คิม ไชยแสนสุข และ สุกัญญา ตันธนวัฒน์ (2556). หลักเศรษฐศาสตร์ธุรกิจ. สืบค้นจากhttp://mba.sorrawut.com/wiki
Bade, R., and Parkin, M. (BP): Foundations of Microeconomics, 4rd edition. Pearson Addison Wesley.
how can I sell pi coins after successfully completing KYCDOT TECH
Pi coins is not launched yet in any exchange 💱 this means it's not swappable, the current pi displaying on coin market cap is the iou version of pi. And you can learn all about that on my previous post.
RIGHT NOW THE ONLY WAY you can sell pi coins is through verified pi merchants. A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges and crypto whales. Looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale or ico offerings, the only way to get my coins is from buying from miners. So a merchant facilitates the transactions between the miners and these exchanges holding pi.
I and my friends has sold more than 6000 pi coins successfully with this method. I will be happy to share the contact of my personal pi merchant. The one i trade with, if you have your own merchant you can trade with them. For those who are new.
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram.
I wouldn't advise you selling all percentage of the pi coins. Leave at least a before so its a win win during open mainnet. Have a nice day pioneers ♥️
#kyc #mainnet #picoins #pi #sellpi #piwallet
#pinetwork
US Economic Outlook - Being Decided - M Capital Group August 2021.pdfpchutichetpong
The U.S. economy is continuing its impressive recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and not slowing down despite re-occurring bumps. The U.S. savings rate reached its highest ever recorded level at 34% in April 2020 and Americans seem ready to spend. The sectors that had been hurt the most by the pandemic specifically reduced consumer spending, like retail, leisure, hospitality, and travel, are now experiencing massive growth in revenue and job openings.
Could this growth lead to a “Roaring Twenties”? As quickly as the U.S. economy contracted, experiencing a 9.1% drop in economic output relative to the business cycle in Q2 2020, the largest in recorded history, it has rebounded beyond expectations. This surprising growth seems to be fueled by the U.S. government’s aggressive fiscal and monetary policies, and an increase in consumer spending as mobility restrictions are lifted. Unemployment rates between June 2020 and June 2021 decreased by 5.2%, while the demand for labor is increasing, coupled with increasing wages to incentivize Americans to rejoin the labor force. Schools and businesses are expected to fully reopen soon. In parallel, vaccination rates across the country and the world continue to rise, with full vaccination rates of 50% and 14.8% respectively.
However, it is not completely smooth sailing from here. According to M Capital Group, the main risks that threaten the continued growth of the U.S. economy are inflation, unsettled trade relations, and another wave of Covid-19 mutations that could shut down the world again. Have we learned from the past year of COVID-19 and adapted our economy accordingly?
“In order for the U.S. economy to continue growing, whether there is another wave or not, the U.S. needs to focus on diversifying supply chains, supporting business investment, and maintaining consumer spending,” says Grace Feeley, a research analyst at M Capital Group.
While the economic indicators are positive, the risks are coming closer to manifesting and threatening such growth. The new variants spreading throughout the world, Delta, Lambda, and Gamma, are vaccine-resistant and muddy the predictions made about the economy and health of the country. These variants bring back the feeling of uncertainty that has wreaked havoc not only on the stock market but the mindset of people around the world. MCG provides unique insight on how to mitigate these risks to possibly ensure a bright economic future.
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
How to get verified on Coinbase Account?_.docxBuy bitget
t's important to note that buying verified Coinbase accounts is not recommended and may violate Coinbase's terms of service. Instead of searching to "buy verified Coinbase accounts," follow the proper steps to verify your own account to ensure compliance and security.
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview.pptxmarketing367770
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview
If you're dreaming of owning a home in California's rural or suburban areas, a USDA loan might be the perfect solution. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers these loans to help low-to-moderate-income individuals and families achieve homeownership.
Key Features of USDA Loans:
Zero Down Payment: USDA loans require no down payment, making homeownership more accessible.
Competitive Interest Rates: These loans often come with lower interest rates compared to conventional loans.
Flexible Credit Requirements: USDA loans have more lenient credit score requirements, helping those with less-than-perfect credit.
Guaranteed Loan Program: The USDA guarantees a portion of the loan, reducing risk for lenders and expanding borrowing options.
Eligibility Criteria:
Location: The property must be located in a USDA-designated rural or suburban area. Many areas in California qualify.
Income Limits: Applicants must meet income guidelines, which vary by region and household size.
Primary Residence: The home must be used as the borrower's primary residence.
Application Process:
Find a USDA-Approved Lender: Not all lenders offer USDA loans, so it's essential to choose one approved by the USDA.
Pre-Qualification: Determine your eligibility and the amount you can borrow.
Property Search: Look for properties in eligible rural or suburban areas.
Loan Application: Submit your application, including financial and personal information.
Processing and Approval: The lender and USDA will review your application. If approved, you can proceed to closing.
USDA loans are an excellent option for those looking to buy a home in California's rural and suburban areas. With no down payment and flexible requirements, these loans make homeownership more attainable for many families. Explore your eligibility today and take the first step toward owning your dream home.
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
What price will pi network be listed on exchangesDOT TECH
The rate at which pi will be listed is practically unknown. But due to speculations surrounding it the predicted rate is tends to be from 30$ — 50$.
So if you are interested in selling your pi network coins at a high rate tho. Or you can't wait till the mainnet launch in 2026. You can easily trade your pi coins with a merchant.
A merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive quantities till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just telegram this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
how can i use my minded pi coins I need some funds.DOT TECH
If you are interested in selling your pi coins, i have a verified pi merchant, who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
Because the core team has announced that pi network will not be doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges like huobi, bitmart and hotbit can get pi is by buying from miners.
Now a merchant stands in between these exchanges and the miners. As a link to make transactions smooth. Because right now in the enclosed mainnet you can't sell pi coins your self. You need the help of a merchant,
i will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant below. 👇 I and my friends has traded more than 3000pi coins with him successfully.
@Pi_vendor_247
Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank Introduce New Co-Branded Credit Cardnickysharmasucks
The unveiling of the IndusInd Bank Poonawalla Fincorp eLITE RuPay Platinum Credit Card marks a notable milestone in the Indian financial landscape, showcasing a successful partnership between two leading institutions, Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank. This co-branded credit card not only offers users a plethora of benefits but also reflects a commitment to innovation and adaptation. With a focus on providing value-driven and customer-centric solutions, this launch represents more than just a new product—it signifies a step towards redefining the banking experience for millions. Promising convenience, rewards, and a touch of luxury in everyday financial transactions, this collaboration aims to cater to the evolving needs of customers and set new standards in the industry.
Introduction to Indian Financial System ()Avanish Goel
The financial system of a country is an important tool for economic development of the country, as it helps in creation of wealth by linking savings with investments.
It facilitates the flow of funds form the households (savers) to business firms (investors) to aid in wealth creation and development of both the parties
how to sell pi coins in all Africa Countries.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network for other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, usdt , Ethereum and other currencies And this is done easily with the help from a pi merchant.
What is a pi merchant ?
Since pi is not launched yet in any exchange. The only way you can sell right now is through merchants.
A verified Pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins from miners and resell them to investors looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before mainnet launch in 2026.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
Income and substitution effects of estate taxation
1. Income and Substitution
Effects of Estate Taxation
Author(s): James R. Hines Jr.
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3,
Papers and proceedings of
the one hundred twenty-fifth annual meeting of the American economic
ASSOCIATION (MAY 2013), pp. 484-488
Presented By Mr. Warawut Runakham,
National Institute of Development Administration, NIDA
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 1
2. Coverage of
presentation
1. Introduction:
I. Get to know who gives or receives
the bequest
II. Effects of estate taxes on Labor
supply
2. Model
3. Results
4. Conclusion
5. Q&A
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 2
3. Introduction: Get to know agents
Who gives bequests ?
• Rational (wealthy) individual
can spend their money or give it
away to others, including gifts
in the form of bequests
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 3
Who receives bequests ?
• subsequent legatees (those to
whom bequests are directed)
or relatives
How to bequeath ?
• Anticipated and planed ahead prior to mortality
• Make accidental bequest when die unexpectedly
• Consider portion of life-time resources and
remainder to bequest
How to receive bequests ?
• Do nothing
• Pay some service cost to such elderly
4. What are Bequests ?
• Purposeful assets leaving to legatees
• Gratuitous to (some) legatees
• Some bequest is a form of payment
(Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers
1985)
Introduction: bequest and estate taxes
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 4
How is the US Estate Taxes ?
• First proposed in 1797 to finance the
wartime expenditures
• The modern estate tax was introduced in
1916, with varying exemption levels and
tax rate to large and small scale estate
Function of Estate Taxes ?
I. collect revenue from large estates
II. discourages the transmission of wealth at death
Impact of Estate Taxes
I. reduce resources available to individuals, affect
relative prices,
II. have income and substitution effects on labor supply,
consumption, saving, and other economic decisions
5. Introduction: Effect of Estate Taxes
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 5
Income Effects
If bequests are purposeful and gratuitous
then estate taxes have two separate
income effects on labor supply
1. To the legatees (as taxes increase the
transmitting cost and reduce real net
worth of after-tax bequest)
2. To the givers (as estate taxes reduce
the well-being of those who plan to
make bequest)
• Note: Income effect generally
encourages the labor supply
Substitution Effects
• Estate taxes increase the cost of
bequeathing relative to the costs of
leisure and present consumption
• If leisure and bequests are substitutes,
which is likely, then the substitution
effect of higher estate taxes is to
discourage labor supply
Question:
What is the net impact of estate taxes on
labor supply ?
6. Decomposing Income and Substitution effect
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 6
Setup of the Model
1. Individual Utility (live for one period)
• Individual utility can be expressed as a function of
exogenous income, government resources, and
relative prices
• Individual indirect utility function
Where y is exogenous resources
g is government tax’s revenue
w is after-tax wage
p is a price of bequeathing an additional after-
tax dollar to legatee
• The price of current consumption is normalized to
utility
• Individual choose their bequests requires
inclusions of price of bequeathing
),,,( pwgyv
• For convenience, estate taxes is taken to be a linear
function of bequest above an exempt amount
• Pre-tax bequests (𝐵) that individual choose to
leave are subject to tax rate (𝑡)
• Price of after-tax bequest
• Exempt amount (𝐸)
• After-tax bequest
• Government collect tax revenue from
individual’s bequest
• Take the same tax parameters to apply to receipts,
and using an asterisk to denote Individual receives
)1/(1 tP
EttB )1(
tEB )(
EttB )1(*
7. Decomposing Income and Substitution effect
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 7
Setup of the Model
2. Individual labor supply
• Individual labor supply expressed as a function of
exogenous income, government revenue, and
relative prices
• Individual labor supply function
• (1)
• In evaluating (1),
),,,( pwgyL
dt
dp
p
L
dt
dg
g
L
dt
dy
y
L
t
L
2
)1(
1
tt
p
• Effect of tax change on tax revenue (if labor
income is untaxed) is
• The effect of the tax change on exogenous after-tax
bequest receipts is
• derivative of labor supply with respect to the price
change can be decomposed into a substitution
effect and an income effect:
• ; where is
• the compensated effect of a price change on labor
supply
EB
dt
dB
t
t
g
*
*
EB
dt
dB
t
t
y
*
*
)1(
)1)(( tEB
y
L
p
L
p
L c
p
Lc
8. Decomposing Income and Substitution effect
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 8
• If government tax revenue enters the utility function in
an additively separable fashion, then
• and (1) implies
• (2)
• The terms with * reflects the effect of a tax change on
the after-tax portion of bequests that is taxable: their
sum equals the value of the derivative
• (2.1)
• If (2.1) = 0, then estate tax changes slightly increase net
receipts of legatees (by increasing the value of the
exempt amount) as pretax bequests increase in response
to the tax changes
)1(
)(
)*(
*
)1(
)1(
1
2
t
EB
EB
dt
dB
t
y
L
tp
L
dt
dL c
0
g
L
Substitution effect Income effect
dt
tEBd )1)(*(
• If (2.1) = (-) , the bequest behavior is
unresponsive to tax changes ,
• In order to consolidate terms it is helpful to
consider the steady sate (in which bequest are
unchanging across generation) such that B=B*
• It is possible to define an elasticity (𝜀) of after-
tax portion of taxable bequest with respect to
one minus the tax rate
• It follows that (2) can be written as
• (3)
)*(
)1)(*(
EB
dt
tEBd
)1(
)1)((
)(
1
td
tEBd
EB
)1(
)1(
)(
)1(
1
2
t
EB
y
L
tp
L
dt
dL c
9. Decomposing Income and Substitution effect
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 9
• The composition of (3) has a look of standard
separation of substitution effect of price changes
(3)
• For income effect which dependent on (1 + 𝜖)
• If 𝜖 = 0 individuals make bequest
• If 𝜖 = 1 individuals receive bequests, thereby doubling
the income effect
• The presence of elasticity term on the right hand side of
(3) picks up the second income effect of estate taxes on
labor supply
)1(
)1(
)(
)1(
1
2
t
EB
y
L
tp
L
dt
dL c
10. Empirical Implication
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 10
• In order to evaluate the effects of estate taxation on
labor supply, it is helpful to recast (3) in the manner
that expresses empirical magnitudes as commonly
estimated elasticities.
• Marshallian own-price labor supply elasticity is
defined as
• Hicksian own-price labor supply elasticity is
defined as
L
w
w
L
M
L
w
w
L
H
c
• It follows from the Slusky Equation that
• Compensated demand properties guarantee that
H>0 , and sign of M depends on the relative
importance of substitution and income effect, it is
common to assume that M>0
• Magnitude of substitution effect depends on the
extent to which leisure and bequest are
i. Hicksian substitute
ii. Hicksian complement
• Both are possible, much of literature makes the
simplifying assumption that utility is weakly
separable in leisure and in composite of present
consumption and after-tax bequest, which carry out
that both are “Hicksian Substitute”
w
HM
y
L )(
11. Empirical Implication
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 11
• With separability assumption implies that
• Applying the Hicksian definition, it follows that
• Final notational convenience to define 𝛼 ≡ 𝐸/𝐵 as
the ratio of estate tax exemption to the size of the
equilibrium pretax estate, together with
simplification of (3) that can be written as
• (4)
• According to components of (4)
• (A) = the change in labor earnings occasioned by a
change in estate tax
• (B) = substitution effect that is clearly (-)
• (C) = income effects (that is a function of difference
between Marshallian and Hicksian labor supply
elasticities)
• If 1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝜀 = 1, then (4) will become
• Means that the greater estate taxes (t) discourage
labor supply (if Marshallian labor supply schedule a
positive sloping or M>0)
• A higher 𝜶 corresponds to a greater estate tax
exemption relative to equilibrium bequests, which
dampens (reduce) income effect while leave
substitution effect unchanged.
L
tB
w
L
p
L cc
)1(
L
tB
H
p
Lc
)1(
)1)(1)((
)1(
)(
HMH
t
EB
dt
dL
w
(A) (B) (C)
)1( t
BM
dt
dL
w
12. Empirical Implication
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 12
• The value of 𝜶 depends in part on legislative choice
of how large to make the estate tax exemption, and
this has changed considerably over the year.
• How large is 𝜺
• if pretax bequests do not respond to estate taxation,
then 𝜺 = 1
• whereas if pretax bequests decline at higher tax
rates, then 𝜺 > 1
• Very little is known about the effect of estate taxes
on pretax bequests (Kopczuk forthcoming surveys
the limited available literature), so the range of
plausible potential values of 1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝜀 is
perhaps rather wide, though a high value in that
range might be two. If 1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝜀 = 2,
• then equation (4) becomes
• (5)
• If the Marshallian labor supply elasticity (M) is
negative, then the right side of equation (5) is
positive, and higher estate taxes (t) encourage
greater labor supply
• More commonly, the Marshallian labor supply
elasticity is estimated to be positive, in which case
the sign of the effect of estate taxation on labor
supply then depends on the relative magnitudes of
the Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities
)2(
)1(
MH
t
B
dt
dL
w
13. Conclusion
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 13
• What conclusion is appropriate to draw from this
evidence? It would be fair to say that it is difficult
to know either the sign or the magnitude of the
effect of estate taxation on labor supply (as many
studies on male and female worker would yielded
different magnitude result of M and H)
• The estate tax discourages labor supply by
reducing the return to work, but encourages labor
supply by imposing burdens on individuals both as
recipients of bequests and those who plan to leave
the bequests
• If labor supply response to income changes, then
this double the tax burden of estate has potential
to encourages labor supply more than tax induced
–relative price changes discourages labor supply.
• Resolving implication of the substitution and
(double) income effects is “empirical matter” for
which there is no consensus on “magnitude” of
theses effects for population who affected by this
estate tax.
14. Thank You
DE 8100 Microeconomics Theory 14
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