Dierent methods have been used in the literature to mesure and analyze price markup cyclical behavior.
We use a medium-scale DSGE Model with positive trend in
ation, in which aggregate
uctuations are driven
by neutral technology, MEI and monetary policy shocks and, where both price and wage markups vary. We
nd that when raising trend in
ation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markup is more important than price markup
in explaining the dynamics eects of shocks.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
The dangers of policy experiments Initial beliefs under adaptive learningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence on the system’s
dynamics under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics
and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents,
in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine
how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that
agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macroprudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in
fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect
information about the policy experiment. This is in the stark contrast to the effects of such policy
under rational expectations.
Estimating Financial Frictions under LearningGRAPE
The paper studies the implication of initial beliefs and associated confidence under adaptive learning. We first illustrate how prior beliefs determine learning dynamics and the evolution of endogenous variables in a small DSGE model with credit-constrained agents, in which rational expectations are replaced by constant-gain adaptive learning. We then examine how discretionary experimenting with new macroeconomic policies is affected by expectations that agents have in relation to these policies. More specifically, we show that a newly introduced macro-prudential policy that aims at making leverage counter-cyclical can lead to substantial increase in fluctuations under learning, when the economy is hit by financial shocks, if beliefs reflect imperfect information about the policy experiment.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Building Institutional Capacity in Thailand to Design and Implement Climate P...UNDP Climate
23-25 November 2016, Thailand - A centerpiece of the Integrating Agriculture in National Adaptation Plans Programme (NAP-Ag) in Thailand is its support to develop a new five-year Strategy on Climate Change in Agriculture (2017-2021). This is spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) and its Office of Agriculture Economics (OAE). The strategy was unveiled after a series of meetings by a Technical Working Group at a three-day workshop held on 23-25 November 2016 in Bangkok, organized by UNDP. Over 60 participants from each MOAC line department and 10 participants from academia and civil society were briefed by the Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) and GIZ on the status of the National Adaption Plan (NAP) and learned how NAP-Ag programme efforts could support a broader NAP process and align with the Sector Plan. The new strategy focuses on improving evidence and data for informing policy choices, building the capacity of farmers and agri-businesses to adapt, promoting low-carbon development and productivity growth in the sector, and building institutional and managerial capacities to cope with climate change impacts.
The gravitation process of market prices towards production prices is here presented by means
of an analytical framework where the classical capital mobility principle is coupled with a determination
of the deviation of market from normal (natural) prices which closely follows the description provided by
Adam Smith: each period the level of the market price of a commodity will be higher (lower) than its
production price if the quantity brought to the market falls short (exceeds) the level of effectual demand.
This approach also simplifies the results with respect to those obtained in cross-dual literature. At the
same time, anchoring market prices to effectual demands and quantities brought to the markets requires a
careful study of the dynamics of the ‘dimensions’ along with that of the ‘proportions’ of the system.
Three different versions of the model are thus proposed, to study the gravitation process: i) assuming a
given level of aggregate employment; ii) assuming a sort of Say’s law; iii) and on the basis of an explicit
adjustment of actual outputs to effectual demands. All these cases describe dynamics in which market
prices can converge asymptotically towards production prices.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within a cohort. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. Moreover, the literature has argued that the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems plays a major role in determining the welfare eects of the reform: reforms otherwise improving welfare become detrimental to welfare once insurance motive is internalized. We show that this result is not universal, i.e. there exists a variety of scal closures which yield welfare gains and political support for a pension system reform. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. Furthermore, we point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of the insurance motive in determining the welfare effects.
Building Institutional Capacity in Thailand to Design and Implement Climate P...UNDP Climate
23-25 November 2016, Thailand - A centerpiece of the Integrating Agriculture in National Adaptation Plans Programme (NAP-Ag) in Thailand is its support to develop a new five-year Strategy on Climate Change in Agriculture (2017-2021). This is spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) and its Office of Agriculture Economics (OAE). The strategy was unveiled after a series of meetings by a Technical Working Group at a three-day workshop held on 23-25 November 2016 in Bangkok, organized by UNDP. Over 60 participants from each MOAC line department and 10 participants from academia and civil society were briefed by the Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) and GIZ on the status of the National Adaption Plan (NAP) and learned how NAP-Ag programme efforts could support a broader NAP process and align with the Sector Plan. The new strategy focuses on improving evidence and data for informing policy choices, building the capacity of farmers and agri-businesses to adapt, promoting low-carbon development and productivity growth in the sector, and building institutional and managerial capacities to cope with climate change impacts.
The gravitation process of market prices towards production prices is here presented by means
of an analytical framework where the classical capital mobility principle is coupled with a determination
of the deviation of market from normal (natural) prices which closely follows the description provided by
Adam Smith: each period the level of the market price of a commodity will be higher (lower) than its
production price if the quantity brought to the market falls short (exceeds) the level of effectual demand.
This approach also simplifies the results with respect to those obtained in cross-dual literature. At the
same time, anchoring market prices to effectual demands and quantities brought to the markets requires a
careful study of the dynamics of the ‘dimensions’ along with that of the ‘proportions’ of the system.
Three different versions of the model are thus proposed, to study the gravitation process: i) assuming a
given level of aggregate employment; ii) assuming a sort of Say’s law; iii) and on the basis of an explicit
adjustment of actual outputs to effectual demands. All these cases describe dynamics in which market
prices can converge asymptotically towards production prices.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
What website can I sell pi coins securely.DOT TECH
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BYD SWOT Analysis and In-Depth Insights 2024.pptxmikemetalprod
Indepth analysis of the BYD 2024
BYD (Build Your Dreams) is a Chinese automaker and battery manufacturer that has snowballed over the past two decades to become a significant player in electric vehicles and global clean energy technology.
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Founded in 1995 and headquartered in Shenzhen, BYD started as a battery company before expanding into automobiles in the early 2000s.
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The Cyclical Behavior of the Markups in the New Keynesian Models
1. The Cyclical Behavior of the Markups in the
New Keynesian Models
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M.
June 2015
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 1 / 39
2. Outline
1 Introduction
Background
What This Paper Does
Findings
2 The Model
Firms and Price setting
Households and Wage setting
Monetary Policy
Aggregation
3 Calibration
4 Results
Staggered Price-Setting Model
Staggered Wage - Setting Model
Staggered Price-Setting and Staggered Wage-Setting Model
5 Conclusion
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 2 / 39
3. Background
"How markups move, in response to what, and why, is however nearly terra
incognita for macro. ... Some of these theories imply pro-cyclical markups,
..... Some imply, however, counter-cyclical markups, with the opposite
implication. ... But we are a long way from having either a clear picture or
convincing theories and this is clearly an area where research is urgently
needed." Blanchard (2008), p.18
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 3 / 39
4. Role of price markup in the New Keynesian
Models
Inspired by evidence of countercyclical price markup which builds upon
earlier work by Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
Price markup is a key part of the transmission mechanism :
A positive demand shock leads output and marginal cost to increase.
Because prices cannot adjust immediately, the markup falls.
A positive technology shock lowers marginal cost and raises output.
Because prices cannot adjust immediately, the markup rises.
Leading New Keynesian models with sticky prices and sticky wages
also predict countercyclical price markups in response to demand
shocks.
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 4 / 39
5. Evidence of procyclical price markup
Built upon recent work by Nekarda and Ramey (2013) and many
others
Evidence of acyclical or procyclical price markup conditional on supply
and demand shocks.
The question is :
what will happen in a model where monopolistically competitive
households set wages in staggered contracts ?
Wage markup varies
the focus on price markup in the literature is misplaced
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 5 / 39
6. What This Paper Does
Analyzes markup cyclicality using a medium-scale DSGE model
Inspired by Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015) which built upon earlier
work by CEE (2005)
An extended version with :
Non-zero steady-state ination
Roundabout production structure
trend growth in IST and neutral technology
aggregate uctuations are driven by neutral technology, MEI and
monetary policy shocks
and most importantly both price and wage markups vary
assesses how positive trend ination aects the responses of price and
wage markups to shocks
Identies alternative sources of price and wage markups cyclical
behavior
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 6 / 39
7. Findings
The main result is that wage markup is more important than price
markup in our baseline model
When rising trend ination from 0 to 4 percent
wage markup change from countercyclical to procyclical movements
interaction with MEI/TFP shocks has greater impact on wage markup
cyclicality than with monetary shock.
with signicant increases ( in magnitude) in the wage markup than in
the price markup
price markup has a negligeable impact
These results put into question the focus on price markup cyclical
behavior in the literature.
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 7 / 39
8. Outline
1 Introduction
Background
What This Paper Does
Findings
2 The Model
Firms and Price setting
Households and Wage setting
Monetary Policy
Aggregation
3 Calibration
4 Results
Staggered Price-Setting Model
Staggered Wage - Setting Model
Staggered Price-Setting and Staggered Wage-Setting Model
5 Conclusion
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 8 / 39
9. Final Goods Producers
Composite gross output :
Xt =
1
0
Xt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
θ
θ−1
(1)
Input-demand function for the intermediate good :
Xt(j) =
Pt(j)
Pt
−θ
Xt, ∀j, (2)
Aggregate price indexe :
P1−θ
t =
1
0
Pt(j)1−θ
dj (3)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 9 / 39
10. Intermediate Producers
The production function for a typical intermediate producer j :
Xt(j) = max AtΓt(j)φ
Kt(j)α
Lt(j)1−α
1−φ
− ΥtF, 0 , (4)
F is a xed cost, and production is required to be non-negative.
Υt is a growth factor and F is chosen to keep prots zero along a
balanced growth path.
At follows a process with both a trending and stationary component :
At = AtAτ
t , (5)
Aτ
t = gAAτ
t−1 (6)
The stochastic process driving the detrended level of technology At is
given by
At = At−1
ρA
exp sAuA
t , 0≤ ρA 1 (7)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 10 / 39
11. Prot Maximization and Price Setting
Firms set their price according to Calvo pricing
Since all updating rms will choose the same reset price, the optimal
reset price relative to the aggregate price index is p∗
t ≡ P∗
t
Pt
.
The optimal pricing condition can be written:
p∗
t =
θ
θ − 1
x1,t
x2,t
. (8)
The auxiliary variables x1,t and x2,t can be written recursively :
x1,t = λr
t νtXt + βξpEt(πt+1)θ
x1,t+1, (9)
x2,t = λr
t Xt + βξpEt(πt+1)θ−1
x1,t+1. (10)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 11 / 39
12. Labor Composite
The composite labor input is :
Lt =
1
0
Lt(i)
σ−1
σ di
σ
σ−1
(11)
The input demand for labor of type-i :
Lt(i) =
Wt(i)
Wt
−σ
Lt (12)
The aggregate wage indexe is :
W 1−σ
t =
1
0
Wt(i)1−σ
di (13)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 12 / 39
13. Utility Maximization
The problem of a typical household :
maxCt ,Lt (i),Kt+1,Bt+1,It ,Zt
E0
∞
t=0
βt
ln(Ct − bCt−1) − η
Lt(i)1+χ
1+ χ
subject to
Pt Ct + It +
a(Zt)Kt
εI,τ
t
+
Bt+1
1+ it
≤ Wt(i)Lt(i) + Rk
t ZtKt + Πt + Bt + Tt
where
a(Zt) = γ1(Zt − 1) +
γ2
2 (Zt − 1)2
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 13 / 39
14. Utility Maximization
and the physical capital accumulation process,
Kt+1 = εI,τ
t ϑt 1− S
It
It−1
It + (1− δ)Kt. (14)
Investment adjustment cost
S
It
It−1
=
κ
2
It
It−1
− 1
2
, (15)
Two types of investment shocks (Justiniano et al., 2011)
IST, shocks map one-to-one into the relative price of investment goods
MEI, ϑt , shocks do not impact the relative price of investment
with
ϑt = (ϑt−1)ρI
exp sI uI
t , 0≤ ρI 1. (16)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 14 / 39
15. Wage setting
Households update their wages each period with the probability
(1− ξw ).
The rst order condition gives the following optimal wage :
w∗
t =
σ
σ − 1
f1,t
f2,t
. (17)
Recursively the terms f1,t and f2,t give the following :
f1,t = η
wt
w∗
t
σ(1+χ)
L1+χ
t +βξw Et(πt+1)σ(1+χ) w∗
t+1
w∗
t
σ(1+χ)
f1,t+1,
(18)
and
f2,t = λr
t
wt
w∗
t
σ
Lt + βξw Et(πt+1)σ−1 w∗
t+1
w∗
t
σ
f2,t+1. (19)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 15 / 39
16. Monetary Policy
Monetary policy consists of a talor-type rule
1+ it
1+ i
=
1+ it−1
1+ i
ρi
πt
π
απ Yt
Yt−1
g−1
Y
αy 1−ρi
εr
t . (20)
with it and i the nominal and steady state interest rate respectevely
πt
π the ination gap,Yt
Y the output gap and ρi the interest rate
smooting
απ and αy the control parameters
εr
t an exogenous shock to the policy rule, εr
t ∼iid 0, σ2
εr .
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 16 / 39
17. Aggregation
The aggregate input demands :
Γt(j) = φmct (stXt(j) + ΥtF) , (21)
Kt(j) = α(1− φ)
mct
rk
t
(stXt(j) + ΥtF) , (22)
Lt(j) = (1− α)(1− φ)
mct
wt
(stXt(j) + ΥtF) . (23)
The Real GDP or Aggregate net output, Yt is given by :
Yt = Xt − Γt (24)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It +
a(Zt)
εI,τ
t
Kt (25)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 17 / 39
18. Outline
1 Introduction
Background
What This Paper Does
Findings
2 The Model
Firms and Price setting
Households and Wage setting
Monetary Policy
Aggregation
3 Calibration
4 Results
Staggered Price-Setting Model
Staggered Wage - Setting Model
Staggered Price-Setting and Staggered Wage-Setting Model
5 Conclusion
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 18 / 39
19. Calibration
Shock and Non-Shock Parameters borrowed from Ascari, Phaneuf and
Sims (2015)
Table: Non-Shock Parameters
β δ α η χ b κ γ2
0.99 0.025 1/3 6 1 0.7 3 0.05
θ σ ξp ξw φ ρi απ αy
6 6 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.8 1.5 0.2
Table: Shock Parameters
gA gI ρr sr ρI sI ρA sA
1.00221−φ 1.0047 0 0.0020 0.95 0.0272 0.95 0.0029
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 19 / 39
20. Moments
Moments borrowed from Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015)
Table: Moments
E(∆Y ) σ(∆Y ) σ(∆I) σ(∆C) ρ1(∆Y )
Model 0.0057 0.0078 0.0247 0.0048 0.539
Data (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0202) (0.0047) (0.363)
σ(Y hp) σ(Chp) σ(Ihp) σ(π) ρ1(π)
Model 0.0169 0.0089 0.0555 0.0064 0.892
Data (0.0162) (0.0086) (0.0386) (0.0064) (0.907)
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 20 / 39
21. Outline
1 Introduction
Background
What This Paper Does
Findings
2 The Model
Firms and Price setting
Households and Wage setting
Monetary Policy
Aggregation
3 Calibration
4 Results
Staggered Price-Setting Model
Staggered Wage - Setting Model
Staggered Price-Setting and Staggered Wage-Setting Model
5 Conclusion
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 21 / 39
24. Staggered Price and Wage Setting
Staggered price and wage -setting
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 24 / 39
25. Outline
1 Introduction
Background
What This Paper Does
Findings
2 The Model
Firms and Price setting
Households and Wage setting
Monetary Policy
Aggregation
3 Calibration
4 Results
Staggered Price-Setting Model
Staggered Wage - Setting Model
Staggered Price-Setting and Staggered Wage-Setting Model
5 Conclusion
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 25 / 39
26. Conclusion
This paper analyzes markups cyclical behavior in a positive trend
ination medium-scale DSGE model
in a Staggered price-setting and staggered wage-setting model with
imperfect competition and trend ination rising from 0 to 4 percent,
wage markup is more important than price markup
The focus on the price markup in the literature is misplaced
More resarch is needed on the role of the wage markup
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 26 / 39
27. TFP Shock vs SPRPG Model
TFP Shock vs SPRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 27 / 39
28. TFP Shock vs SWRPG Model
TFP Shock vs SWRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 28 / 39
29. TFP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
TFP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 29 / 39
30. MEI Shock vs SPRPG Model
MEI Shock vs SPRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 30 / 39
31. MEI Shock vs SWRPG Model
MEI Shock vs SWRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 31 / 39
32. MEI Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
MEI Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
Jean Blaise Nlemfu M. 32 / 39
33. MP Shock vs SPRPG Model
MP Shock vs SPRPG Model
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34. MP Shock vs SWRPG Model
MP Shock vs SWRPG Model
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35. MP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
MP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
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36. MP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
MP Shock vs SPSWRPG Model
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